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Institutional and political economy approaches have long dominated the study of post-
Communist public broadcasting, as well as the entire body of post-Communist media 
transformations research, and the enquiry into publics of public broadcasting has 
traditionally been neglected. Though media scholars like to talk about a deep crisis in the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics in former Communist bloc 
countries across Central and Eastern Europe, little has been done to understand the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics in these societies drawing on 
qualitative audience research tradition. Building on Hirschman’s influential theory of ‘exit, 
voice and loyalty’, which made it possible to see viewing choices audiences make as an act of 
agency, in combination with theoretical tools developed within the framework of social 
constructionist approaches to national imagination and broadcasting, my study focuses on 
the investigation of responses publics of the Latvian public television LTV have developed 
vis-à-vis its role as contributing to the nation-building project in this ex-Soviet Baltic country. 
With the help of focus groups methodology and family ethnography, the thesis aims to 
explore the relationship between the way members of the ethno-linguistic majority of 
Latvian-speakers and the sizeable ethno-linguistic minority of Russian-speakers conceptualize 
the public broadcaster LTV, as well as understand the concept of public broadcasting more 
generally, and the way they define the national ‘we’.  
The study concludes that what I call publics of LTV employ Hirschman’s described exit 
mechanism as a voice-type response. Through their rejection of public television which, for a 
number of complex reasons they consider to be a state broadcaster serving the interests of 
those in power they voice their protest against the country’s political establishment and in the 
case of its Russian-speaking publics also against the government’s ethno-nationalistic 
conception of the national ‘we’. I also find that though having exited from the public 
broadcaster LTV, its publics have not abandoned the idea of public broadcasting as such. At 
least at a normative level the public broadcasting ideals are recognized, accepted and valued, 
though they are not necessarily associated with the country’s de jure institutional embodiment 
of public broadcasting LTV. Rejection of the public television has also not made its non-
loyal publics ‘less citizens’. The commercial rivals of LTV, be they national or, in the case of 
Russian-speaking audiences, localized transnational Russian television, have allowed their 
viewers to exercise citizenship and be loyal nationals day in day out in a way that is more 
liberal and flexible than the hegemonic form of citizenship and national imagination of the 
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Poor and declining audience figures of the Latvian public service television LTV (in its 
full name Latvijas Televīzija/Latvian Television) for more than 20 years since the 
restoration of independent statehood after decades of Soviet rule in 1991 initiated my 
interest in the research of the relationship between public broadcasters and their publics1 
in post-Communist societies. As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, commercial 
channels dominate the media scene of the Baltic country of Latvia with public television 
struggling to gain public support and demand. 
Previous studies on post-Communist public broadcasting have identified symptoms of 
the crisis in the relationship between Central and Eastern European public broadcasters 
and their publics, namely poor audience figures and high licence fee evasion, and yet little 
attention has been paid to the investigation of reasons standing behind it. Apart from the 
analysis of the audience statistics little has been done when it comes to the research of 
post-Communist public broadcasting from the perspective of publics of the institutions 
of public radio and television. 
Perhaps it should not come as a surprise given the little overall attention the study of 
media audiences has received in Central and Eastern European media research after the 
fall of Communism. As recently Reifová and Pavlíčková have concluded, ‘media 
audiences – people who receive, co-create, interpret, understand and appropriate media 
messages – were rendered almost invisible in the post-socialist study of media’ 
(2013:130). For Reifová and Pavlíčková, it is the ‘tyranny of structuralism’, preoccupation 
with the study of the macromedia structures, that explains ignorance of the research of 
media audiences in Central and Eastern European media scholarship. 
It is mainly institutional and political economy approaches that have hitherto dominated 
post-Communist public broadcasting studies and, indeed, overall post-Communist media 
research preferring the exploration of macro(system)-level political and economic factors 
                         
1 Here and throughout the thesis the notion of ‘publics of public broadcasters’ refers to their potential 
audiences, all members of the national community, while to identify their actual audiences, those who have 
more or less regular listening/viewing experience with the institutions of public radio and television, the 
notion of ‘audiences of public broadcasters’ are used. Thus, in the case of the Latvian public television 
LTV we can distinguish ‘publics of LTV’ (its possible viewership) from ‘audiences of LTV’ (its real 
viewership). It should be also noted that in this study ‘publics’/‘audiences’ distinction is not used to 
distinguish the ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ roles of viewers/listeners. Instead, the concepts of ‘publics’ and 
‘audiences’ are seen as each incorporating both roles conceived as interplaying instead of being in conflict 





and seeing broadcasting transformations first and foremost as institutional changes – 
from state to public broadcasters (Sparks with Reading, 1998, Gross, 2002, Jakubowicz, 
1996, 2007a, just to name a few), while less attention has been devoted to the analysis of 
socio-cultural aspects shaping post-Communist broadcasting reforms.  
This study aims to shift the focus from the investigation of institutions of post-
Communist public broadcasting to the exploration of their publics, situating the close 
examination of perceptions its publics have of the Latvian public television, and their 
understanding of the idea of public broadcasting more generally, as well as their 
experiences with the public television at the heart of the research. Though the empirical 
research of the study is based solely on the Latvian case, the insights derived from it 
should be relevant for the understanding of the relationship between public broadcasters 
and their publics also in other Central and Eastern European countries. 
My departure point is Polish media scholar Karol Jakubowicz’s identification of a ‘lack of 
social embeddedness of the idea of public service broadcasting and lack of a social 
constituency willing and able to support public service broadcasters and buttress its 
autonomy and independence’ as the idiosyncrasies of post-Communist public 
broadcasting systems (2008a:117). Albeit not using such terminology, what Jakubowicz 
seems to have in mind is that there is a deficit of loyalty towards public broadcasting 
institutions, as well as the overall idea of public broadcasting, in post-Communist 
societies. 
With Jakubowicz’s notion in mind I will utilize Albert Hirschman’s influential theory of 
‘exit, voice and loyalty’ (see Hirschman, 1970) to explore the mass exodus of Latvian 
publics from the country’s public television LTV against a backdrop of what at first sight 
appears to be a lack of  loyalty on the part of its publics towards public broadcasting and 
its de jure institutional embodiment LTV. 
Through the utilization of the analytical framework of Hirschman’s approach this study 
aims to contribute to the tradition of qualitative audience research. Hirschman’s concepts 
so far have not been applied for the purposes of the examination of responses of publics 
of public broadcasting institutions, be they within or beyond the post-Communist world. 
It is Hirschman’s approach that allows the study of viewing choices audiences make day 
in day out as the exercise of agency. As we shall see it throughout the study, it is their exit 





Though I started this research project with a rather broad aim to understand the crisis in 
the public television and its publics relationship in the ex-Soviet country Latvia, during 
the course of the research it took another direction. Discourses of my respondents 
discussing their relationship with the public television made me rethink the focus of the 
study. Due to the prominence of nation-building discourses in the narratives of my 
informants it was clear that the investigation of responses of Latvian-speaking majority 
and large Russian-speaking minority (making nearly 40% of the population) publics 
towards the public television as a nation-building project should become a central theme 
of the research.2 
The deep crisis in the relationship between the public broadcaster LTV and its publics 
not only reflects similarly turbulent relationships between public broadcasters and their 
publics in other former Communist bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe; it also 
reveals uneasy nation formation experiences and ethno-linguistic divisions in this post-
Communist country. On one hand, public television reflects ethno-linguistic cleavages in 
the society; on the other hand, it plays a pivotal role in the construction and maintenance 
of these rifts. 
Discussing the relationship between public broadcasters and their publics in relation with 
problematic nation formation aspirations the study seeks to provide connections 
between the post-Communist nation-building experiences and equally troubled 
broadcasting reformations to argue that broadcasting transformations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as overall changes after the fall of Communism, cannot be 
understood in isolation from the analysis of their socio-cultural context. 
                         
2 Here and throughout the text as ‘Latvian-speakers’ I understand all those Latvians who speak at home 
predominantly Latvian. Accordingly, all those whose primary language in the family is Russian are 
identified as ‘Russian-speakers’. In line with the official statistics, the overwhelming majority of Latvian-
speakers think of themselves as ethnic Latvians, while among Russian-speakers the majority identify 
themselves as ethnic Russians. Therefore, we can look at the collective labels ‘Latvian-speakers’/‘Russian-
speakers’ as ethno-linguistic categories as in the majority of cases they comprise both one’s ethnic and 
linguistic identity. It should be also noted that the majority of both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers 
are bilingual. Latvian-speakers with the exception of younger generations have good command of Russian. 
Likewise, except older generations a great part of Russian-speakers has good Latvian language skills. For 
more statistical data on the ethno-linguistic composition of Latvian society see Chapter 2. Yet, I am well 
aware that such distinction between Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers is problematic as it may 
misleadingly suggest an existence of two uniform ethno-linguistic communities, for the purposes of this 
study recourse to such categorization is merely a practical one and not intended to obscure the 
heterogeneity of both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers. As we shall see, neither Latvian-speakers, 





In Latvia, as in other new post-Communist nation-states, overall transformations 
following the collapse of the Communist regime, including attempts to reform ex-state 
radio and television organizations into Western-like public broadcasters, coincided with 
nation-forming aspirations. Making the nation and the state happened to take place at the 
same time. Ethno-nationalistic sentiments have so far dominated the official Latvian 
project of national imagination defining the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic 
majority as key criteria of membership in the national communion, and in line with the 
government’s national integration (social cohesion) plans it is the language and culture of 
the ethno-linguistic majority that is also expected to bind the Latvian-speaking majority 
and the vast Russian-speaking minority together around the public television LTV. 
This strategy of making the national ‘we’ around the institution of public television 
possible has not been a success story as Russian-speaking audiences, the majority of 
which are Soviet era settlers and their descendants, instead of gathering around public 
television opt for transnational television broadcasting from neighbouring Russia. In the 
mainstream political discourse, because of this little interest of theirs in public (national) 
broadcasting and a huge appetite for transnational Russian broadcasting, Russian-
speaking audiences have often been accused of national disloyalty, and their viewing 
preferences have been conceived as a threat to the ideals of national integrity, and even 
national security. Yet, to be true, also its Latvian-speaking publics are not keen viewers of 
public television and, instead, prefer watching national commercial channels. 
Through qualitative audience research, combining methodologies of focus groups and 
family observations the study aims to explore: 
1. What attitudes have the Latvian-speaking majority and Russian-speaking minority 
publics developed and what actions members of both ethno-linguistic groups 
have taken as a response to Latvian public service television’s role as contributing 
to the nation-building project in the post-Communist era? 
2. What perceptions of the public broadcaster LTV publics of both ethno-linguistic 
communities have, and how these discourses inform and are informed by their 
experiences with public television with a special interest in their everyday 





3. What is the relationship between the way members of the ethno-linguistic 
majority and minority conceptualize the public broadcaster LTV, as well as 
understand the concept of public broadcasting more generally, and the way they 
define the national ‘we’? In other words, how do their definitions of the public 
broadcasting idea and its de jure institutional embodiment LTV interact with their 
definitions of the nation? 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1, ‘Public Service Broadcasting and 
the Construction of National ‘We’’, outlines the theoretical foundations of the study that 
are based on two main premises. First, in line with social constructionist approaches to 
the study of nationalism nations are conceived as social constructs. Here the well-known 
notion of Benedict Anderson’s of nations as imagined communities (see Anderson, 2006) 
forms a starting point for elaborating the idea of nations as the outcome of the process 
of social imagination. Second, public broadcasters are seen as one of the key agents of 
national imagination projects in their societies (or at least they are expected to play such a 
role) creating and sustaining particular representation(s) of nationhood. With a reference 
to the writings of Scannell, Cardiff, Morley, Moores, and others the chapter focuses on 
the analysis of uneasy experiences of Western European public broadcasters, and the 
British BBC in particular, in their nation-building aspirations situating these historical 
accounts into wider public broadcasting/citizenship debates. The chapter critically 
examines the idea of public broadcasting as an institutional embodiment of a modern 
Habermasian-style public sphere to suggest that there has never existed such thing as one 
unitary public sphere of the nation in the same way as there has never existed one 
unproblematic conception of who constitutes the national ‘we’. Instead, what is in place 
are several public spheres, as well as many different definitions, or we can also say 
imaginations, of national membership, interacting, and also contending, with each other. 
The chapter also invites to abandon simplistic opposition of the citizen/consumer roles 
of audiences.  
Drawing on the writings of Jakubowicz, Sparks, Gross, and other well-known scholars of 
post-Communist media Chapter 2, ‘Public Service Broadcasters and Their Publics in 
Post-Communist Societies’, provides a context for understanding the tangled post-
Communist broadcasting transformations. The chapter identifies connections between 
broadcasting reforms and nation-building aspirations in new post-Communist nation-





broadcasters and their publics in these societies within a broader context of post-
Communist societal transformations. The chapter also offers an overview of the Latvian 
public service broadcasting system. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological framework of the study with the next four 
chapters presenting results of the focus groups and family observations that form the 
empirical basis for the study. Chapter 4, ‘Defining Public Service Broadcasting: Between 
State, Public, National and Commercial Television’, investigates what classificatory 
schemes its publics apply to make a distinction between the public television LTV, and 
the public broadcasting idea in general, and other types of broadcasting, and how their 
conceptions of public broadcasting interact with definitions of the nation they have 
formulated. The chapter argues that while exiting from public television, its publics do 
not reject the public broadcasting values and the role of citizen. It also demonstrates how 
its publics utilize their withdrawal from the public television to voice their protest against 
the country’s political establishment and, in the case of its Russian-speaking publics, also 
against its hegemonic concept of the national ‘we’.  
Chapter 5, ‘Television News Preferences and a Sense of Belonging: the Case of Panorāma 
and Vremya’, offers a case study of two long-running prime-time news programmes, one 
on the ex-state and current Latvian public television and the other on the former Soviet 
Central TV, which today is Russian state television, to explore connections between news 
consumption patterns and identity formation processes among Russian-speaking 
audiences. The chapter demonstrates that, despite their abandoning public (national) 
broadcasting and what at first sight looks as their immersion into transnational Russian 
television, Russian-speakers have not lost interest in national affairs. It is through 
localized transnational television from Russia that Russophone audiences participate in 
the national life and exercise the role of a citizen no less than Latvian-speakers.  
Chapter 6, ‘Celebrating the Arrival of New Year Twice: Public TV and National 
Celebrations’, addresses the role of public broadcasting during the national celebrations 
to demonstrate how national and even transnational commercial rivals of the public 
television LTV have taken over its long monopoly on the making of national 
togetherness during the moments of national celebrations further blurring the lines of 
demarcation not only between public and commercial broadcasting but also between 





Chapter 7, ‘Popular Culture Bringing the Nation Together: the Case of Live Sports 
Broadcasts and the Eurovision Song Contest’, focuses on popular culture on public 
television to show how sports and music, contrary to news and politics, make the 
national ‘we’ around public television possible. The chapter also demonstrates how live 
broadcasts of big international sporting and music events on public television offer its 
publics of both ethno-linguistic majority and minority a platform for the expression of 
national sentiments and manifestation of national allegiance. The concluding chapter 
provides an overview of the key findings of the study, it also demonstrates the originality 
of the study, as well as outlines its limitations and discusses possible future developments 


















Public Service Broadcasting and the Construction of 
National ‘We’  
1.1 Introduction 
At the heart of the theoretical framework of this study lie two main arguments. First, in 
the spirit of social constructionism nations are seen as social constructs, inventions, 
products of national imagination. In other words, national communities, as well as 
national identities, are looked at as discursively constructed entities and not fixed and 
given in their character. From this perspective, collective, as well as individual, identities 
are thought of as multiple, hybrid, fluid and unsettled instead of being single, pure, stable 
and free from tensions. Second, public radio and television organizations are seen as 
playing, or at least as being expected to play, one of the central roles in nation-building 
projects in their societies. Yet, public broadcasters do not simply reflect the nation as it is 
but are involved in its construction establishing and maintaining particular image(s) of 
the national community. Nevertheless, national imagination has been and continues to be 
central to the  mandate of public broadcasting institutions. 
Public service broadcasting, from its very inception – at least in its Western European 
public broadcasting models that I will focus on in this chapter – has been conceived as a 
national project having close links with the idea of a nation-state. As Roosvall and 
Salovaara-Moring have summarised, ‘the public service remit had an inherent mission to 
construct, protect, inform and entertain the nation’ (2010:13). In the eyes of public 
broadcasting pioneers and their governments, public radio and television had been one 
of the most important institutions reproducing the nation day in day out, a view of public 
broadcasting organizations still much alive also today. 
From the very early days of Western European public broadcasting at the heart of its 
mandate has been a commitment of bringing the nation together around shared mediated 
experiences of the national life and providing members of the national community with a 
sense of national unity. To borrow Anderson’s influential concept of nations as imagined 
communities (see Anderson, 2006), in this way public broadcasters were hoped to allow 





national public and the construction of a sense of national unity has been, indeed, a 
significant part of the mandate of public broadcasting organizations, in reality the 
fulfilment of this task has often been a turbulent one. As we shall see, the issues of 
national identity formation, as well as of its accompanying processes of self/other 
boundary-drawing and maintenance, have always been central in the debate of the role of 
public broadcasting in the construction of that collective body that we call a nation. 
1.2 Imagined National Communities  
For Anderson, nations are imagined political communities, imagined as limited (having 
national boundaries) and sovereign (free to govern themselves) communities 
(comradeships). The central idea of his approach to nationalism is that nations are 
created through the act of imagination by their members. In the mind of each member of 
a national communion lives the image of the national ‘we’, he argues, suggesting that 
links between people of the same nation are imagined and not given. To quote 
Anderson, 
An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a 
handful of his 240,000,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of 
what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in 
their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity (2006:26).  
It is the centrality of the role of communication, namely a daily ritual of media 
consumption (book and newspaper reading), in the production of a sense of national 
consciousness that is at the heart of Anderson’s theory, and that also makes it a highly 
useful starting point for building the theoretical framework of my own investigation into 
the responses of Latvian publics towards the country’s public television organization as a 
nation-building resource.  
For Anderson, the dailiness of mass simultaneous and anonymous experiences of reading 
the same copy of a national newspaper,  ‘one-day best-sellers’, as he has put it to describe 
the novelistic format of a newspaper (2006:35), allow their readership to imagine 
themselves as part of the national community. In other words, it allows imagining 
themselves as ‘nationals’. As Anderson argues, this ‘mass ceremony’ of newspaper 
reading brings the nation’s members together day in day out, year in year out, making the 





his approach tends to romanticise the formation of a national ‘we’ with a help of the 
ritual of newspaper consumption obscuring the heterogeneous and full of contradictions 
nature of an actual collectivity of fellow readers. As Anderson describes, the ritual of 
newspaper reading 
is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each 
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being 
replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose 
existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest 
notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or 
half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for 
the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? 
At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his 
own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential 
neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly 
rooted in everyday life [..] creating that remarkable confidence of 
community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations 
(2006:35-36). 
According to Anderson, standardization of vernaculars as print languages in sixteenth 
century Europe, stimulated by the rising book publishing industry’s search for new 
markets – what Anderson terms ‘print-capitalism’, provoked the decline of the sacred 
language of Latin, the language of the church and educated elites and, also, the decay of 
European religious communities and dynastic monarchies themselves. Along with the 
decline of the authority of the church, also its conception of temporality was replaced 
with a novel one seeing time as clocked and calendrical that, in turn, found vivid 
expression in the imagined world as conjured up by the novel and the newspaper, both 
products of print capitalism.3 It all made new type, national, communities imaginable 
with the idea of a nation to rise in the Old Continent at the end of the eighteenth 
century. To quote Anderson, ‘the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the 
fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation’ 
                         
3 It was a shift, as Anderson has described it with a reference to Walter Benjamin, from ‘a simultaneity of 
past and future in an instantaneous present’ (2006:24), as time has been understood in the medieval 
Christian world, to the post-medieval conception of simultaneity as ‘transverse, cross-time, marked not by 






The product of the standardization of vernacular languages, driven by the commercial 
needs of the emerging printing business for one language, one national territory and 
borders around it, became the language of printing. People coming from different 
territories, who till then spoke each in their own vernacular, started not only to read in 
the same language but also to use the language of printing to communicate with each 
other. The process of linguistic standardization allowed new national languages to 
emerge and so laid foundations to the rise of national consciousness. It was new mass 
reading publics, created by the fusion of print technology and a capitalist economy, that 
later formed the bases for new national collectivities. As Anderson explains, print 
languages  
created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and 
above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, 
Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to 
understand one another in conversation, became capable of 
comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they 
gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of 
people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only 
those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow-
readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their 
secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community (2006:44, original emphasis).  
Well before Anderson, Innis (2007) in his account on the importance of various media of 
communication in the rise and decline of empires had pointed to the impact of the 
interplay between the advance in communication technologies and the spread of 
capitalism on the growth of nationalism. Also Innis connects the introduction of the 
printing press in Europe in the fifteenth century and the later expansion of the printing 
industry – what for him is the start of the mechanization of communication (it was first 
the ‘mechanization of the printed word’ what was followed by the ‘mechanization of the 
spoken word’ with the later arrival of radio) – with the rise of nationalism:  
With printing, paper facilitated an effective development of the 





nationalism. The adaptability of the alphabet to large-scale machine 
industry became the basis of literacy, advertising, and trade. The book as 
a specialized product of printing and, in turn, the newspaper strengthened 
the position of language as a basis of nationalism (2007:196).  
As Anderson argues, the flourishing book and newspaper industries of eighteenth 
century Europe ‘provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined 
community that is the nation’ (2006:25, original emphasis). While Anderson refers to 
early capitalism and its needs for reproduction and expansion to explain the emergence 
of nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century, for Habermas the bourgeois public 
sphere, a public space for critical debate between the state and the private domain, 
constituted  a result of the very same early capitalism. It was the print language that made 
the liberal public sphere of the eighteenth century possible – it was the language of 
printing, the same Anderson is referring to, in which members of the rising early middle 
class, the core of the bourgeois public sphere, read and which also became the language 
of the coffee house conversations of these new reading publics. 
In his  influential The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere study Habermas sees the 
eighteenth century European press, that itself was born out of the ‘traffic in news’ 
(1989:21), the newsletter business, created by the needs of the ‘early capitalist long-
distance trade’ (1989:15), as a key institution of the bourgeois public sphere. The press, 
Habermas argues, served as a forum of public critical debate which reflected, as well as 
informed, face-to-face discussions taking place in urban meeting places such as the 
salons, clubs and coffee houses. Describing journals devoted to art and cultural criticism 
of the eighteenth century, Habermas notes that  
the periodical articles were not only made the object of discussion by the 
public of the coffee houses but were viewed as integral parts of this 
discussion; this was demonstrated by the flood of letters from which the 
editor each week published a selection (1989:42). 
For Habermas, participation in the sessions of public rational-critical reasoning of this 
kind turned individuals who had gathered at the coffee houses of the European cities, 
such as London, to read newspapers and discuss with others what they had read into 
citizens, the public. Initially, matters of a cultural realm but later also political issues 





into a public’ (1989:160), described by him as ‘a critically debating entity’ (1989:162). 
According to his theory, this form of community acted as  
a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, 
readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before 
public opinion. The publicum developed into the public, the subjectum into 
the [reasoning] subject, the receiver of regulations from above into the 
ruling authorities’ adversary (1989:25-26, original emphasis).   
1.3 Conceptualizing National Identity 
Social constructionist approaches to national identity which also forms the basis for the 
theoretical and analytical framework of my own investigation question primordialist, 
essentialist perspectives that see national collectivities as given, authentic, natural and 
static entities. As social constructionists argue, instead of single homogeneous and 
harmonious versions of the nation, what is in place is multiplicity of different, and also 
rival, understandings of national identity in the same way as there are not one but several, 
and not necessarily in agreement with each other, definitions of national culture and the 
history of the nation. As Billig has pointed out, ‘nations often do not typically have a 
single history, but there are competing tales to be told’ (1995:71), and the same could be 
as well said about national cultures and national identities.  
Social constructionist approaches invite us not only to analyse the mechanisms of 
production and reproduction of particular constructions of nationhood but also to 
investigate the ways dominant formulations of the national community, its identity, 
culture and memory, are resisted and challenged. As social constructionists stress, any 
conception of the national ‘we’, no matter how fixed it may appear to be, is subject to 
dynamic processes of continual negotiation, contestation and reconstruction. From such 
a perspective the process of nation formation can never be an accomplished project (for 
a more detailed overview of the social constructionist approaches to nationalism see 
Özkırımlı, 2005). 
In the spirit of social constructionism, Jenkins and Sofos stress, nations are nothing more 
than social constructs and have nothing to do with an objective social reality. In their 
discussion of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ models of nationhood Jenkins and Sofos point out that 





social, cultural and political artefacts’ (1996:16). Similarly, in their critique of 
ethnosymbolic approach to nationalism that stresses the centrality of ethnicity in the 
emergence of modern nations Özkırımlı and Sofos argue that national, as well as ethnic, 
communities, are ‘collections/collations of cultural practices established over time or 
invented, and forged together often arbitrarily, according to the judgement or needs of 
nation-builders’ (2008:9). Basch et al. also emphasize the socially constructed nature of 
national communities arguing that ‘while at any one time, culturally constructed 
boundaries – be they those of nations, ethnicities, or races – may seem fixed, timeless, or 
primordial, dynamic processes of reformulation underlie the apparent fixity’ (1994:32). 
Also Calhoun reminds us that ‘nationality is not primordial but constructed’ (1994:314). 
To quote him, 
the history which nationalism would write of itself begins with the 
existence of national identity, continues through acts of heroism and 
sometimes struggles against oppression, and unites all living members of 
the nation with the great cultural accomplishments of its past. It is usually 
not a sociological history, of diversity forged into unity, of oppression of 
some members of the nation by others, of migration and immigration, 
and so forth (1994:314).  
Making of the national ‘we’ is problematic at its very essence as the construction of any 
collective form of identity, including the identity of the nation, inevitably involves 
drawing of borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Paradoxically, when you include someone, 
you at the same time exclude another. Through making ‘we’, you also make ‘the other’. 
Whatever the formulation of national membership, someone has to be included and 
someone has to be left behind; there is no other way to define who ‘we’ are than positing 
this ‘we’ against ‘the other’. The nation has to be imagined and membership of the nation 
has to be formulated, and, as I will demonstrate in the following discussion, it is media, 
first books and newspapers and later radio and television, that play a crucial role in 
establishing distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ defining who constitutes the national 
‘we’ and who are to be left outside the national communion. 
‘The imagining of ‘our’ community involves imagining, either implicitly or explicitly, 
‘them’, from whom ‘we’ are distinct,’ argues Billig in his seminal study of ‘banal 





communities of foreigners,’ Billig adds (1995:78-79).4 
In line with his approach to nationalism, nations are reproduced daily as nations and 
their citizenry as nationals with the texts of media and politicians being among the key 
agents of this process of reproduction of nationhood day in day out. As he writes, ‘‘we’ 
are constantly reminded that ‘we’ live in nations: ‘our’ identity is continually being 
flagged’ (1995:93), and this is what makes ‘‘our’ national identity unforgettable’ (1995:93). 
This mundane, continual, omnipresent and so familiar and therefore unnoticed ‘flagging’, 
or reminding, of nationhood is the everyday nationalism of the established Western 
nations – what Billig terms as ‘banal nationalism’. 
For Billig, national identity is ‘more than an inner psychological state or an individual 
self-definition: it is a form of life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states’ 
(1995:69). As he explains, 
it is a form of reading and watching, of understanding and of taking for 
granted. It is a form of life in which ‘we’ are constantly invited to relax, at 
home, within the homeland’s borders. This form of life is the national 
identity, which is being renewed continually, with its dangerous potentials 
appearing so harmlessly homely (1995:127). 
Morley also reminds us about the interdependence of the binary oppositions of 
‘us’/‘them’ images saying that ‘the production and definition of a sense of home and 
Heimat [..] involves the designation of those – foreigners or “strangers” – against whom 
those within define themselves’ (2000:34). For Morley and Robins, the German concept 
of Heimat, the metaphor of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’, is an ominous utopia, mirage, 
dangerous delusion:  
Whether “home” is imagined as the community of Europe or of the 
national state or of the region, it is drenched in the longing for 
wholeness, unity, integrity. It is about community centred on shared 
traditions and memories [..] It is about conserving the “fundamentals” of 
culture and identity. And, as such, it is about sustaining cultural 
boundaries and boundedness. To belong in this way is to protect 
                         
4 For example, as Billig concludes in his analysis of the news items of the British daily newspapers, not only 
does the press construct the national ‘we’, but it also allows its readership to imagine ‘us’ vis-à-vis ‘them’, 
those being outside the national communion. ‘We not only see reminders of ‘ourselves’, we see reminders 





exclusive, and therefore, excluding, identities against those who are seen 
as aliens and “foreigners”. The “other” is always and continuously a 
threat to the security and integrity of those who share a common home 
(1996:459).  
Also for Schlesinger ‘to talk of national identity requires us to analyse processes of 
inclusion and exclusion’ (1991:173). It is the (official) national culture, national cultural 
space that constitutes ‘the boundaries for versions of national identity’ (1991:160, emphasis 
in original), Schlesinger argues, reminding of various collective identities which may be in 
opposition to the official version of national culture. As he points out, 
in principle, the national culture is bounded by the territorial confines of 
a given nation-state. However, the ‘national’ characteristics are not given. 
National cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which 
the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be 
approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions 
takes place (1991:173-174).  
For Schlesinger, it is the national culture, ‘a repository, inter alia, of classificatory systems’ 
(1991:174, original emphasis), that 
allows ‘us’ to define ourselves against ‘them’ understood as those beyond 
the boundaries of the nation. It may also reproduce distinctions between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ at the intra-national level, in line with the internal structure 
of social divisions and relations of power and domination (1991:173-174, 
emphasis in original).  
With Schlesinger’s proposed conceptualization of national identification in mind we can 
look also at the media, and public broadcasting institutions in particular, as one of the 
key producers of the (official) national culture with their power to set demarcation lines 
between ‘our’ culture and identity, and ‘theirs’ both beyond and, what is important in the 
case of my own study into responses of publics of the Latvian public television, also 
within national borders. As Schlesinger, commenting on Anderson’s idea of the 
communicative community, has rightly pointed out: ‘the boundedness of a given national 






In a similar vein, Billig reminds us that the idea of an imagined community of a nation 
does not necessarily imply the idea of an imagined unity and, instead of unity, the daily 
ritual of newspaper reading that Anderson sees as the producer of a feeling of the 
national ‘we’ can as well reproduce fissures in a reading collectivity (see Billig, 1992, 
1995). While in his study of discourses of ordinary Britons discussing royalty Billig agrees 
that through the newspaper reading ritual ‘a sense of a shared world is imagined’, he also 
adds that ‘it is not that simple, for the imagined community is not imagined as a 
harmonious unity’ (1992:171). 
What Schlesinger and Billig are suggesting is that there is no, and has never existed, such 
a thing as one unproblematic national ‘we’ and, instead, we should think of imagined 
national communion as a sum of different, and often contradictory, versions of the 
national ‘we’. This in turn implies that the process of forming a nation, with the help of 
broadcasting institutions or not, has never been a smooth one. No matter how nation-
builders would like to see their constructions of the national ‘we’ as part of a national 
consensus, in no society has there ever existed an agreement among all members of the 
national community on what the national ‘we’ actually means. In a similar vein, instead of 
thinking of national identity as a singular, uniform, fixed and unproblematic category we 
should think of different, and often conflicting, constructions of what it means to be a 
member of one or another national community shifting over time. Likewise, instead of 
aspiring to create a national unitary all-encompassing public sphere (with one national 
public) we should think of several public spaces interacting, and, at some points, also 
competing, with each other. I return to this discussion later in the chapter when 
examining Habermas’s theory of the public sphere and its relevance for the study of the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics.    
1.4 Broadcasting and National Imagination  
‘Being national is the condition of our times,’ Eley and Suny have once argued (1996:32). 
As they remind us,  
we are “national”, when we vote, watch the six o’clock news, follow the 
national sport, observe (while barely noticing) the repeated iconographies 
of landscape and history in TV commercials, imbibe the visual archive of 
reference and citation in the movies, and define the nation day by day in 





Schlesinger has noted that in Anderson’s approach ‘the newspaper is singled out for its 
insertion of the ‘imagined community’ into a simultaneous mode of address’ (1991:164). 
‘But that has long been the effect of radio, and latterly of television,’ Schlesinger reminds 
(1991:164). Indeed, as Morley and Robins argue, ‘on either side of the Atlantic, 
broadcasting has been one of the key institutions through which listeners and viewers 
have come to imagine themselves as members of the national community’ (1995:10-11). 
What is more, as in response to Anderson Hartley points out, ‘like newspapers, television 
may be more than merely a metaphor for imagined communities; it is one of the prime 
sites upon which a given nation is constructed for its members’ (1987:124).  Instead of 
‘merely ‘reflecting’ the complex make-up of a nation which pre-existed it’ television, as 
well as radio has served as ‘an instrument, an apparatus, a ‘machine’ through which the 
nation was constituted’, to quote Hall describing the nation-forming aspirations of the 
BBC (1993:32).  
As the history of Western European public broadcasting institutions shows it, in the eyes 
of its pioneers public broadcasting was an ambitious ‘bringing-the-nation-together’ 
project with the help of the ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983) – namely, 
through the exploitation of invented traditions that Hobsbawm has classified as 
‘communitarian’, ‘establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of 
groups, real or artificial communities’ (1983:9)5 – expected to provide its geographically 
dispersed national publics with universal access to the collective life of the nation and to 
promote a sense of national ‘we-ness’. European governments, as well as programme-
makers themselves, saw as the primary task of recently launched public broadcasting 
institutions the provision of their publics with symbolic resources that could allow 
viewers and listeners to imagine themselves as part of the national ‘we’. Public radio and 
television became instruments for the creation and maintenance of a single unitary 
national public sphere expected to hold the national public together, and though it has 
remained only a normative goal and has little to do with an empirical reality it is the view 
on public broadcasting that is much alive also today, as we shall see also in the Latvian 
                         
5 It is worth noting here that Hobsbawm sees nations themselves as products of the process of the 
‘invention of tradition’. For him, they are historically novel constructs made with a help of ‘social 
engineering’. ‘Whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of ‘France’ and 
‘the French’ – and which nobody would seek to deny – these very concepts themselves must include a 
constructed or ‘invented’ component. And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the 
modern ‘nation’ consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent 
symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as ‘national history’), the national phenomenon cannot be 
adequately investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’,’ Hobsbawm argues 






Reflecting on the introduction of public broadcasting in Europe, Ellis, who has famously 
described television as ‘the private life of a nation-state’ (1992:5), notes that European 
governments ‘realized the potential of broadcasting as a unifying force, pulling together 
individuals, families and groups into a national whole’ (2000:49). ‘Through the ideal of 
public service broadcasting, broadcasting became another tool in the construction of the 
nation state,’ Ellis concludes (2000:49). For him, early television, by bringing national 
populations together ‘had an important national role, unifying the nation around a 
common television culture’ (2000:46). 
Yet, we should not forget that national imagination projects of early Western European 
public radio and television sought to achieve ideals of national coherence through 
standardization (unification) of national cultures creating something like an official 
culture of the nation, and for that same reason we should keep in mind that national 
cultures were merely underpinned by an illusion of unity of the nation as their publics 
not always readily accepted that role of national subjects public broadcasters had 
reserved for them. Though that version of national culture as created and disseminated 
by early public broadcasting organizations might be common (available) to all members 
of the national community, it was not necessarily shared (accepted) by the whole 
population. In other words, the ‘national whole’ Ellis is referring to has never been a 
harmonious category – this is something I return to later in the chapter. 
Briggs notes that founders of British broadcasting believed that it ‘could enlarge 
horizons, both artistically and politically’ (1965:37). ‘Artistically [John] Reith [the BBC’s 
first director general] believed that it could do much to engender new cultural interests – 
in music and drama, in particular: politically it could serve as an instrument of integration 
in a divided community,’ writes Briggs (1965:37). Cardiff and Scannell in their analysis of 
the early years of public radio and television in Britain have demonstrated how 
enthusiastically the BBC utilized royal rituals and other state ceremonials, public events 
and national festivals to provide its publics with ‘symbolic images of national unity and 
identity’ (1987:169). Radio and, later, television, they argue, served as instruments for the 
creation of that special ‘we-feeling’ of a sense of belonging to the national community. 
Broadcasting ‘made the nation real and tangible through a whole range of images and 
symbols, events and ceremonies, relayed to audiences direct and live’ (Scannell, Cardiff, 





identity by creating an annual calendar of public events and occasions alongside the little 
ceremonies of everyday consumption’ (2000:55), and, just as the BBC, other early 
Western European radio broadcasters were also engaged in similar projects of national 
imagination in their own societies. As Löfgren in his study on the role of radio in 
everyday nation-building concludes, radio in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s ‘above 
all served the task of binding the nation together’ (2001:26). It ‘created new forms of 
imagining the nation, novel modes of sharing as well as new frames of reference’ 
(Löfgren, 2001:29). 
Through live broadcasting that opened access for all to an array of national events, which 
have previously been exclusively available only to the few privileged being present at the 
scene, and thus made national life public, the BBC ‘attempted to supply its isolated 
listeners with a sense of the community,’ Cardiff and Scannell point out (1987:162). It 
created ‘a sense of participation in a corporate national life,’ they write elsewhere 
(Scannell, Cardiff, 1991:277). ‘The nation as a knowable community became available to 
all members with access to broadcasting,’ Scannell and Cardiff claim seeing it in a rather 
idealistic manner as a democratization of the public sphere (1991:280). 
As many commentators have pointed it out, British public broadcasting sought to offer 
its publics an image of the national community as a family. The live broadcasted rituals 
of the monarchy – what Cannadine has described as the ‘celebrations of consensus, in 
which the royal family, individual families and the national family were all conflated’ 
(1983:140) – were of particular importance in the nation formation project as 
orchestrated by early BBC radio. In the early 1930s, BBC radio established a tradition of 
the monarch’s Christmas speech to the nation, an example of ‘invented, constructed and 
formally instituted’ type of traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983:1) where, again, an image of the 
nation as a family, the King as a head of the family and listening audiences at home as 
members of this national family, were evoked. ‘The King sent the best wishes of his 
family to the assembled listeners at home, symbolically binding together a united 
‘national family’,’ Moores writes (2000:56). As Scannell concludes, ‘it set a crowning seal 
on the role of broadcasting in binding the nation together, giving it a particular form and 
content: the family audience, the royal family, the nation as family” (1988:19). While the 
national family might come together around the monarch’s Christmas speech, it might 
not necessarily be a family free from internal divisions, with all its members happy with 





return to this point. 
These mediated royal ceremonies, seen by Cardiff and Scannell as moments of 
‘broadcasting as national integrator’ at its best, are what Dayan and Katz have labelled as 
the genre of ‘media events’ (see Dayan and Katz, 1992). Just as in Scannell and Cardiff’s 
analysis, for Dayan and Katz, the shared simultaneous viewing experience these 
broadcasts seem to offer to their mass audiences makes national integration with the help 
of broadcasting possible. As Dayan and Katz put it, media events ‘integrate societies in a 
collective heartbeat’ (1992:9, emphasis in original). ‘All eyes are fixed on the ceremonial 
center, through which each nuclear cell is connected to all the rest. Social integration of 
the highest order is thus achieved via mass communication,’ Dayan and Katz claim in 
their discussion of broadcasting as a national integrator (1992:15). 
However, as Dayan and Katz’s media events approach itself has been highly criticized, 
most notably in the writings of Couldry who rightly reminds that not necessarily all 
members of the national community enthusiastically accept that version of the national 
‘we’ as constructed through these mediated national events (Couldry, 2003, Hepp, 
Couldry, 2010)6, so has Scannell and Cardiff’s account on the power of broadcasting in 
binding the nation together. In a similar vein to Couldry’s critique of Dayan and Katz’s 
approach, Moores also warns that Cardiff and Scannell ‘are in danger of implicitly 
assuming audiences to have identified unproblematically with those forms of output’ as 
offered by the early British public broadcasting (2000:56). In his oral history research, 
Moores has observed that while all of his respondents had listened to most of the 
broadcasts that Cardiff and Scannell have called ‘the programmes of national identity’ 
(1987:158), ‘by no means all were willing to recognise themselves straightforwardly as 
patriotic national subjects’ (2000:56). Moores provides a telling illustration of his 
observations: ‘there are memories of some families poking fun at the king’s voice during 
his Christmas Day speech’ (2000:56). 
For Morley, Scannell and Cardiff’s approach is premised on an ‘over-simplistic model of 
the media, as producing some indivisible form of sociability, equally inviting and 
accessible to all’ (2000:118). To quote Morley,   
                         
6 Couldry insists that ‘media events’ do not necessarily perform an integrative function as responses of 
audiences to these events are far from being uniform and may produce a variety of readings, including 
oppositional ones. According to Couldry, as much as these events establish unity they confirm divisions in 
a particular society. Instead, Couldry proposes to conceptualize these events as ‘media rituals’ constructing 





sociability is simply not the indivisible Good which Scannell assumes it to 
be. By the very way (and to the very extent that) a programme signals to 
members of some groups that it is designed for them and functions as an 
effective invitation to their participation in social life, it will necessarily 
signal to members of other groups that it is not for them and, indeed, 
that they are not among the invitees to its particular forum (sic) of 
sociability. [..] Any one form of sociability must have its constitutive 
outside, some necessary field of exclusions by which the collective 
identity of those whom it interpellates successfully is defined (2000:111-
112).  
In his and Brunsdon’s 1978 study on the ways BBC current affairs Nationwide programme 
constructed a sense of national unity and provided its audiences with a particular 
representation of the national community, they identified ‘the construction of a particular 
type of white lower middle class national (ethnic?) identity as Englishness’ (Morley, 
Brunsdon, 1999:12). As Morley and Brunsdon conclude, television programmes such as 
Nationwide are one of the sites on which ‘national identity is constructed and 
reconstituted daily, along with its own patterns of inclusion and exclusion’ (1999:13). As 
Morley argues elsewhere,  
if the national media constitute the public sphere which is most central in 
the mediation of the nation-state to the general public, then whatever is 
excluded from those media is in effect excluded from the symbolic 
culture of the nation. When the culture of that public sphere (and thus of 
the nation) is in effect “racialised” by the naturalisation of one (largely 
unmarked and undeclared) form of ethnicity, then only some citizens of 
the nation find it a homely and welcoming place. The imagined 
community is, in fact, usually constructed in the language of some 
particular ethnos, membership of which then effectively becomes a 
prerequisite for the enjoyment of a political citizenship within the nation-
state (2000:118). 
To be true, in their discussion on the image of the nation as constructed by the early 
BBC radio Scannell and Cardiff themselves have admitted that it was often a myth of 
national unity, an imaginary unity of the nation, an idealized representation of the nation 





Though something like a common national culture and identity was given 
expression in moments of ritual celebration, it was often at the expense 
of different cultures and identities within the imposed unity of the United 
Kingdom and its national broadcasting service (1991:303). 
While Morley admits that ‘national broadcasting can [..] create a sense of unity – and of 
corresponding boundaries around the nation’, he also reminds us that this process has 
not always been ‘smooth and without tension or resistance’ (2000:107). Indeed, Raboy’s 
account of the tangled experience of Canadian public broadcasting fulfilling its raison 
d'être of ‘promoting and supporting Canadian national unity against pressures for regional 
autonomy and threats of fragmentation’ (1985:65) echoes the experience of various 
turbulent nation formation projects of public broadcasting institutions in Europe and 
other parts of the world marked by internal societal contradictions and divisions. In 
Canada, as elsewhere, normative national integration ideals of public broadcasting soon 
collapsed against the actual reality of having not one but several, and not necessarily in 
harmony with each other, publics which public radio and television were meant to serve. 
Different, and opposing, conceptions of the Canadian nation dividing the francophone 
minority and the dominant English-speaking community have made the relationship 
between the public broadcaster and its publics in Canada uneasy and challenged 
tremendously its nation-building mandate. As Raboy reflects on the introduction of 
public broadcasting in this bilingual country,   
having created a system on the basis of nationalist feeling, the architects 
of Canadian public broadcasting found themselves unable to reconcile 
competing and conflicting concepts of the Canadian nation. For 
Canadian broadcasting there would soon be two audiences, two markets, 
two publics... but one policy, one mandate, and one corporation 
(1985:68-69). 
1.5 The Shifting Relationship between Public Broadcasters and Their Publics  
It should be reminded here that public broadcasters, during their formative stage, have 
often been accused of being elitist, arrogant and complacent producing asymmetrical 
top-down power relations with their publics. As public broadcasting embraced the 
project of cultural homogenization attempts were made to create common national 





societies which recently launched public radio and television organizations were 
supposed to serve. Thus, reflecting on the history of Swedish broadcasting, Löfgren 
provides an illuminating example on how linguistic standardization was employed by the 
public radio in this Nordic country to create a homogenized national culture:  
In Sweden the first generations of radio announcers were primarily 
academics, and they created a cultured mode of speaking and tone of 
language that became known as “high Swedish,” which became the 
educated standard for the country as a whole. [..] The use of regional 
dialects by Swedish radio staff was discouraged until the 1960s (2001:27-
28). 
The introduction of public radio in the 1920s and the advent of public television a few 
decades later have often been described as paternalistic projects of cultural enlightenment 
and national cohesion. Not surprisingly then, the actual responses of their publics often 
did not match with identities premised on national loyalty and the cultural uplifting that 
in a patronizing manner were imposed upon them by broadcasters, as the example 
provided by Moores on reactions of British audiences to the King’s Christmas radio 
speech has already demonstrated. While ‘the audience-as-public was positioned as 
citizens who must be reformed,’ writes Ang (1991:119), actual audiences turned out to be 
‘too intransigent or recalcitrant to submit unproblematically to such reform attempts’ 
(1991:106). 
Initial resistance of the BBC, which during the Reithian years preferred to see itself as an 
institution of high culture having a mission of the edification of the masses, to address 
popular tastes of their publics, seen by definition as bad tastes contrary to the tastes of 
cultural elites the BBC was so eager to impose on the masses, is a good example of often 
uneasy relationship between public broadcasters and their publics during the early years 
of public broadcasting. Early definitions of public broadcasting implied a notion of 
‘public service as a cultural, moral and educative force for the improvement of 
knowledge, taste and manners’ (Scannell and Cardiff, 1991:7) – what Ang has described 
as an objectification of its publics ‘in the name of highminded, national cultural ideals’ 
(1991:101). The public service ethos of the BBC ‘particularly in the era of its monopoly, 
was suffused with an assumption of knowing better than its listeners what they wanted 
or needed,’ Scannell notes (1996:11). As Hendy succinctly puts it, ‘instead of satisfying 






The wave of liberalization and deregulation of media markets that commenced across 
Europe in the 1980s broke the longtime monopoly of public broadcasting institutions 
and paved the way for commercial players to enter the scene (with few exceptions such 
as the UK where commercial broadcasting first appeared as early as the mid 1950s). Over 
the same period, technological change allowed the proliferation of new types of 
broadcasting transcending national frontiers and creating new transnational audio-visual 
spaces. Inevitably, these changes forced European public broadcasters to revise their 
relationship with their publics that among other things also required greater 
responsiveness towards popular tastes in their programming. Something public 
broadcasters have obscured for many years in the name of their noble ‘making-society-
better’ ideals could not be ignored anymore. 
Though it may as well be seen as the cultural democratization of public broadcasting, 
critics noted the commercialization of public broadcasting, echoing the criticism on the 
part of Habermas of what he saw as the commercialization of the public sphere, and, 
ultimately, its decline, marked with the arrival of the mass circulation press in the mid 
nineteenth century and later the advent of radio and television which, as he has in a far 
too pessimistic tone argued, replaced the citizens of the reading publics with the masses 
of passive consumers (see Habermas, 1989). Similarly, for those accusing public 
broadcasters of succumbing to the logic of commercialization, the latter was a threat to 
the high-minded ideals of public radio and television of visualizing their viewers and 
listeners as a public (citizens), conceived as the antithesis of the logic of commercial 
broadcasting, and of addressing viewers and listeners first and foremost as a market 
(consumers). For critics, commercialization marked a shift from understanding the 
concept of ‘public service’ as ‘broadcasting in the service of the public sphere’ to  
‘broadcasting whose prime purpose is to satisfy the interests and preferences of 
individual consumers rather than the needs of the collective, the citizenry’, to use the 
conceptualization introduced by Syvertsen (1999:7; see also Syvertsen, 2004). 
The introduction of commercial broadcasting in a number of European countries during 
the 1980s and the early 1990s and the concomitant end of the monopoly of public 
                         
7 Such view on its publics has been reflected in resistance among the management of early BBC radio to 
launch regular large-scale studies into listening habits, tastes and preferences of its listeners. Programme-
makers feared that pleasing of interests of their publics could jeopardize that highbrow elitist perspective 





broadcasting and arrival of competition was a traumatic experience for public 
broadcasters. It is what in the literature has often been labelled as the ‘identity crisis’ of 
institutions of public broadcasting. A ‘captive audience deprived of any choice’ 
(Jakubowicz, 2007b:118), as it was in the era of public broadcasting monopoly, now 
could enjoy expanded viewing choices. Newcomers, commercial channels, aiming to 
please tastes of their viewership prioritized popular programming. This inevitably led to 
declining audience shares for established public broadcasters as audiences increasingly 
migrated to their new commercial competitors. In an attempt to win audiences back, 
public broadcasters became more compliant to the demands of their audiences than ever 
before – critics often saw this shift as contamination of the principles of public 
broadcasting. Their shrinking viewership figures in combination with a turn towards 
more entertainment-oriented programming has ultimately seriously challenged the 
legitimacy, as well as the viability of European public broadcasting institutions. 
Although critics saw in the popular demand for the newly established commercial 
channels and in the popularization tendencies of public broadcasters (increasing volumes 
of light programming in their output) a tendency towards  giving up their public 
broadcasting ethos by public broadcasters, as well as by their publics, it is important to 
note that this shift might just as well have exposed the fragility of the taken for granted 
nature of the loyalty of publics towards institutions of public broadcasting during the 
long years of their national monopoly. As Flew has pointed out, ‘greater competition for 
public service broadcasters from commercial services challenged many of the often 
implicit assumptions of loyalty that had existed between broadcasters and their publics 
and underpinned their status and implied contribution to national culture’ (2009:983). 
As d’Haenens et al. have recently concluded, ‘the demise of public service broadcasting is 
far from being as serious as forecast’ (2011:189). Nevertheless, the transition from the 
era of scarcity with ‘a few channels broadcasting for part of the day only’ to the era of 
availability with ‘several channels broadcasting continuously jostled for attention’, to 
borrow the words of Ellis (2000:39), has left behind the epoch of simultaneous mass 
viewing of the same, and of the single channel of public television, creating extra 
challenges for public broadcasters in fulfilling their ‘bringing-the-nation-together’ 
mandate. 
In the middle of the 1990s Morley and Robins forecasted that ‘the proliferation of 





more fragmented social world than that of traditional national broadcast television’ and 
‘may well disrupt our assumptions of any ‘necessary simultaneity’ of social experience’ 
(1995:68), and only a few years later Moores concluded that  
today’s audiences for multi-channel broadcasting are becoming 
increasingly diverse and fragmented, no longer restricted to a national 
audio-visual space. The electronic landscapes of television are 
transforming, with no prospect of a return to the kind of shared 
community-in-simultaneity which Scannell and Cardiff described 
(2000:141). 
If in the early 1990s, in the light of a rising era of multi-channel television, Dayan and 
Katz argued that television as ‘the medium of national integration’, ‘television-as-we-
know-it’ will disappear (1992:23) then, more recently, Katz has announced that ‘the 
television of “sharedness” – of nation-building and family togetherness – is no longer 
with us’ (2009:7). In the spirit of Scannell and Cardiff, Katz claims that, contrary to 
modern broadcasting, early radio and television were better at integrating the nation as, in 
his opinion, they served as national unifiers. Dayan also pessimistically notes that ‘as new 
media technology multiplies the number of channels, television has become a medium of 
segmentation, and television-as-we-knew-it continues to disappear’ (2010:25). 
The question, however, is whether television has ever been an effective national 
integrator and unifier as Dayan and Katz propose, or does their account rather constitute 
an idealization of an actual reality, in which only some members of the national 
communion felt addressed and embraced by a national unity project supported by public 
radio and television, the idealization of the same sort as a myth of public broadcasting as 
an institutional embodiment of a modern national public sphere of the Habermasian 
tradition – I discuss this question in more detail later in the chapter. 
For ethnic minority audiences the arrival of cable and satellite television often 
transcending national boundaries offered an escape from the confines of established 
public (national) broadcasting where they may have rarely found themselves part of that 
conception of the national family offered by mainstream public (national) channels. For 
instance, in Moores’ study on the introduction of satellite television in British households 
in the early 1990s the father of a middle-class Asian family compares the mode of 





Sky News channel: 
With the BBC, you always feel as though the structure of society is there 
– the authority. Their newsreaders speak just like schoolmasters. They’re 
telling you, like schoolmasters telling the kids. I think Sky News has more 
of a North American approach. It’s more relaxed. They treat you like 
equals and don’t take the audience for a bunch of small kids (1993a:635).  
For Moores, the negative response towards the public broadcaster of this respondent is 
‘the consequence of a broader hostility towards establishment values in white British 
society – and towards the BBC as an institution which, from his perspective, embodies 
them’ (1993a:635). As it has been demonstrated in a number of studies on diasporic 
media audiences, it is a protest against unequal power relations within public (national) 
broadcasting, and society more generally, ethnic minority audiences often express silently 
by their withdrawal from established public (national) channels what is often followed by 
their migration to transnational broadcasters (Cunningham and Sinclair, 2001, Robins 
and Aksoy, 2006, Tsagarousianou, 2007, just to name a few). 
1.6 Defining the Role of Publics in Public Broadcasting 
For defenders of public broadcasting as an institutional embodiment of a modern public 
sphere, public broadcasting makes a crucial contribution to a democratic process and, 
therefore, it deserves the status of a public good. In line with this paradigm, public 
broadcasting institutions have at least the potential to form a modern Habermasian-style 
public sphere providing a space for shared national public debate turning their publics 
into citizens, rather than serving individual needs and interests of consumers that, is, in 
turn, seen as something that should be left for commercial broadcasting, often accused 
by its critics of populism because ‘it gives audiences what they want’. 
In contrast, for those sceptical about the actual performance of public broadcasters in 
the realization of their public sphere function, the idea of a single unitary national public 
sphere and public broadcasting as its central element is an idealization, just as the 
Habermasian public sphere model itself, of what appears to be a more complex and 
problematic reality – indeed, this is a view I share. The key criticism in this respect is that 
parts of the citizenry have been excluded from the national public as constructed by 





Habermasian public sphere has included only some members of the national population. 
While some publics, dominant groups in the society, have been addressed by public 
broadcasters, others, minority publics, have been left outside that public sphere in its 
mediation through public broadcasting institutions, argue their critics. 
What is understood as the universality principle of public broadcasting serves as one of 
the key arguments in hands of the proponents of the idea of public broadcasters as 
institutions of a modern public sphere. The universality principle implies the idea of free 
access to public broadcasting services provided to all citizens and across the entire 
national territory, as well as needs and interests of all members of the national public are 
purportedly being addressed in its programming output. In the writings of defenders of 
the public broadcasting idea the universality ideals of public broadcasting are often 
equated to the core principles of the eighteenth century liberal public sphere that, in 
theory, was marked by equality, openness to all, freedom from market and state interests 
and where consensus was reached through ‘a public rational-critical debate of private 
people as a public’ (Habermas, 1989:192). 
Inspired by the ideals underpinning the Habermasian public sphere concept, supporters 
of the public broadcasting idea claim that public radio and television have at least a 
potential to serve as key institutions in creating, sustaining and developing a modern 
public sphere. They idealize a nationally bound public sphere shared by all members of 
the national community and mediated through established channels of public (national) 
broadcasting as a prerequisite for vigorous democracy and successful national 
integration. Even if an all-embracing national Habermasian-style public sphere mediated 
through conventional public (national) broadcasting institutions has never been an 
empirical reality, just as the normative Habermas’s public sphere model itself, in much of 
the literature it still features as some ideal-type model of the relationship between public 
broadcasters and their publics. 
For instance, Dahlgren in his writings on the role of television in democratic societies 
stresses that ‘values, norms, and common, shared knowledge and frames of reference’ are 
necessary for a robust democracy and therefore argues in favour of ‘some minimal, 
shared public culture to which all citizens, regardless of their background, ethnicity, 
lifestyle and identity, can relate’ (2000:32). Similarly, in the light of the highly 
individualized nature of modern societies and increasing social fragmentation, Ellis 





public broadcasting:  
No longer the agent of a standardizing notion of national unity, public 
service broadcasting can provide the forum within which the emerging 
culture of multiple identities can negotiate its antagonisms. This is in 
many ways the opposite of its former role: instead of providing displays 
of national unity, it deals in displays of national disunity, the better to 
bring about ways of resolving them [..] The new public service 
broadcasting is no longer concerned with imposing consensus, but with 
working through new possibilities of consensus (2000:87). 
For Garnham, one of the neo-Habermasian proponents of public service broadcasting, 
as described by Collins (2004), public broadcasting is ‘an embodiment of the principles 
of the Public Sphere’ (Garnham, 1986:45), though, as he admits, imperfect in practice. As 
Garnham believes, public broadcasting should play a crucial role in providing citizens 
with an arena for a public debate that is built upon the principle of equal access 
(universalism). ‘The existence of a national focus for political debate and information is 
important to the national political process,’ he argues (1986:52). The assumed potential 
of public broadcasting to foster the ideals underpinning the public sphere prompts  
Garnham to demonstrate the putative superiority of the system of public regulation of 
broadcasting over the market-driven model of broadcasting (see Garnham, 1983, 1986, 
2003). In order to defend the British public service broadcasting model, Garnham 
opposes it with the market-driven broadcasting system of the United States:  
it is empirically demonstrable that the model of public service 
broadcasting in the United Kingdom [..] has played a more positive role 
in its relationship to democracy than has the commercially driven system 
in the United States (2003:197). 
From this point of view, public broadcasting is seen as a remedy for what is believed to 
be a dysfunctional market-oriented commercial broadcasting system. Dahlgren’s 
argument is typical of the perspective adopted by proponents of the public broadcasting 
idea: ‘the needs of a democratic society cannot be fully served if its major medium is 
organized exclusively along the principles of market forces’ (2000:32). The juxtaposition 
of what is described as a socially valuable mission of public broadcasting to the business-





legitimacy of the former. As d’Haenens et al. have aptly summarized, ‘market failure has 
become the main rationale for public service media’ (2011:197). 
Habermas’s model of the public sphere, which defenders of the public broadcasting idea 
are operating with, has attracted considerable criticism. Therefore, it should not come as 
a surprise that criticism towards claims of public broadcasting as an institutional 
embodiment of a modern public sphere often echoes the same critical reviews that the 
Habermasian conception of the public sphere has received itself, mainly because of the 
exclusionary character of the bourgeois public sphere. The eighteenth century liberal 
public sphere was open only to a small fraction of the population, namely educated and 
propertied middle-class men. In the words of Calhoun, reflecting on the restrictive nature 
of democracy more generally, ‘“the people” have not all been citizens’ (1994:311).8 
Similarly, Collins questions the contribution of European public broadcasting 
organizations to a democratic process in their societies, accusing public broadcasters of 
being elitist in their approach to their publics in the era of their monopoly: 
broadcasters’ commitment to informing and educating their public too 
often led them to serve an audience of their imagination rather than the 
real audience. Rather than a democratic public sphere, in which the actual 
experience and interest of a real empirical public was represented, 
monopolistic European public service broadcasters too often addressed 
the public experience and interests, the public sphere, of elites. ‘Bottom 
up’ public services, which gave voice to a real public, (or, to use Reith’s 
term, publics), and represented a demotic and genuinely democratic 
public sphere were conspicuous by their absence until competition with 
commercial services compelled public broadcasters to address the real 
public rather than that of broadcasters’ imagination (2004:43). 
Critical responses towards the concept of the Habermasian public sphere have triggered 
new conceptualizations focusing on the interplay of the multiplicity and diversity of 
public spheres – what Melucci in his discussion of social movements has termed ‘public 
spaces’ (see Melucci, 1989) or Cunningham in his writings on transnational diasporic 
media audiences has called ‘public sphericules’ (see Cunningham, 2001, Cunningham, 
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version of historical reality and, though imperfect in practice, still valuable as a normative ideal, as 





Sinclair, 2001) – as an alternative to the utopian ideals of a single unitary all-
encompassing nationwide public sphere. Morley, also, suggests that, instead of the 
idealisation of a single Habermasian-style public sphere, ‘we need to pay attention to the 
role of a variety of alternative public spheres and counterpublics based on divisions of 
ethnicity, “race”, generation, region, religion or class’ (2000:114). 
1.7 The Citizen/Consumer Opposition Revised  
According to the normative public broadcasting model, public radio and television are 
expected to treat members of their publics as citizens, and not (only) as consumers 
which, on the contrary, is conceived as the domain of commercial broadcasting whose 
rationale, argue its critics, is constructed around the maximization of audiences and 
profit-making. The discourse of the defenders of the idea of public broadcasters as 
servants of a modern public sphere has always been rather hostile towards serving needs 
and interests of consumers – commonly in their writings termed as ‘audiences’ and, what 
is more, as a rule, portrayed as passive and uncritical – within public radio and television 
seeing it as a threat to the assumed democratic mission of public broadcasting. In 
contrast, such discourses have prioritised addressing viewers and listeners as citizens, 
usually labelled as ‘publics’. However, as I will argue later, this rather simplistic 
citizen/consumer distinction itself has always been divorced from empirical reality, and 
for this reason its value as an ideal-type model for the conceptualization of public and 
commercial systems of broadcasting is also questionable. 
Seeing ‘viewership as a potential moment of citizenship’ Dahlgren argues that the ‘public 
sphere requires ‘publics’, in the sense of interacting social agents’ (1995:120). For him, 
the role of a citizen implies production of political talk and action in stark opposition to 
the role of a recipient of messages that is associated with a passive consumption. As he 
claims, ‘under the commodity logic of the commercial system, the audience becomes the 
product, delivered to the advertisers’ (1995:29) and ‘any gains in the identity of 
citizenship will, to a large extent, have to be won at the expense of consumerist identities’ 
(1995:148). In his later works (2000, 2001), however, Dahlgren mitigates his critique 
towards commercial broadcasting admitting that this model of broadcasting also has 
some democratic potential, although, he hastens to point out, it cannot substitute for the 
public broadcasting model entirely. 





to the public sphere for the realization of their rights and liberties. To quote him, the 
ideal of public service media is ‘a “natural” setting for the realization of citizens’ right to 
communicate since it represents the most indigenous societal extension of the citizen’s right 
to public reasoning’ (2006:17-18, original emphasis). The same spirit of the Habermasian 
public sphere ideals can be found in the writings of Scannell, who, because of its 
egalitarian character (making national life accessible to all citizens), sees public 
broadcasting as a common good:  
In my view equal access for all to a wide and varied range of common 
informational, entertainment and cultural services, carried on channels 
that can be received throughout the country, should be thought of as an 
important citizenship right in mass democratic societies. It is a crucial 
means – perhaps the only means at present – whereby common 
knowledges and pleasures in a shared public life are maintained as a social 
good for the whole population. As such it should be defended against its 
enemies (1989:164; see also, for instance, Scannell, 1990, Scannell, 
Cardiff, 1991). 
Many of the arguments of the proponents of the public broadcasting principles are 
highly normative, conflicting with the empirical reality of actual audiences. It suggests 
that, instead of being clear-cut categories that are in a constant tension with one another, 
the citizen and consumer roles attributed to audiences are in fact overlapping and 
complementary. Audiences are not voiceless, passive and malleable masses, as defenders 
of the citizen/consumer dichotomy like to argue. Instead, as a number of audience 
reception studies have demonstrated, viewers and listeners through the act of 
consumption are involved in the process of active meaning production of media texts (I 
refer to relevant studies in some detail in Chapter 3). Media consumption does not 
abolish citizenship. In fact, to consume can be seen as a modality of participating. 
Instead of seeing the citizen and consumer identities of audiences as fixed binary 
opposites we should rather think of them as dynamic categories and media, public 
service as well as commercial, as providing a platform for the interplay between both. 
Even Dahlgren, a strong supporter of the public broadcasting ideals as we have seen, 
admits that ‘we are all to various degrees both consumers and citizens and the two roles 






1.8 Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
For the purposes of my own analysis of forms of action various publics of the Latvian 
public television LTV have developed as a response to the imagined national community 
as conjured up by this institution Hirschman’s influential theory of ‘exit, voice and 
loyalty’ (see Hirschman, 1970) is a useful starting point. My main interest in utilizing 
Hirschman’s approach is to understand actions taken by those who feel being left behind 
by the national ‘we’ created by public television as well as by those who feel at home with 
its project of national imagination. To use Morley’s words, ‘who feels included in or 
excluded from symbolic membership of the nation’ (2000:105) as made by the Latvian 
public television, ‘who feels at home in the public sphere of national broadcasting’ 
(2000:127) and who does not ‘find it a homely and welcoming place’ (2000:118). 
According to Hirschman’s theory, there are two options for how individuals and groups 
can respond to a decline in the performance of institutions, be they business firms, other 
organizations or states, or, in a broader sense, how they can respond to a failure of the 
system: exit (withdrawal from the failing system) and voice (various forms of protest in 
hope that the system is able to recover). As Hirschman explains, ‘loyalty is a key concept 
in the battle between exit and voice’ (1970:82). For Hirschman, ‘loyalty’ is an attitude 
defined as ‘a special attachment to an organization’ (1970:77) that determines behaviour: 
exit and/or voice option. The main point of Hirschman’s approach is that in the absence 
of loyalty, exit will be preferred and exit itself will be costless and silent. ‘As a rule,’ 
Hirschman argues, ‘loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice’ (1970:78). 
Yet, it should be stressed that exit and voice options are not mutually exclusive, and may 
as well substitute or complement each other. What is important in the context of my 
own investigation is that the exit option itself can be seen as a voice-type response. As 
we shall see it in the Latvian case, the exit mechanism, namely rejection of public 
television, can be applied by its publics as a form of protest. They reject public television, 
seen as having close ties with the power elite, to protest in this way against the country’s 
political establishment and, in the case of its Russian-speaking publics, also against the 
hegemonic conception of the national ‘we’. 
Hirschman’s theory is useful in exploring discourses of publics of public television 
discussing their relationship with this institution as a nation-forming project. Such a 





the use of the exit mechanism or the voice option, or both, as an act of agency, and from 
this perspective, to examine the attitudes its publics have developed and actions they 
have taken towards the public television as an exercise of agency. 
Hirschman’s approach also enables us to treat the consumer and citizen roles of 
audiences as interplaying instead of being in conflict with each other. Although at a 
normative level the consumer/citizen opposition may work, when it comes to the 
analysis of actual audiences such artificial dichotomies become problematic and pose 
considerable obstacles in our attempt to make sense of a complex and nuanced empirical 
reality. Hence, the usefulness of Hirschman’s theory lies in its capacity to bring together 
the disciplines of politics (citizenship/voice) and economics (market/exit), the former 
often seen as a natural habitat for the citizen while the latter for the consumer – it is 
worth noting analogies with distinctions made between public broadcasting and 
commercial broadcasting by advocates of the public broadcasting idea I have discussed 
earlier in the chapter (for further discussion on Hirschman’s theory as providing 
connections between realms of economics and politics see Flew, 2009, Adelman, 2013).  
For instance, consider viewing choices television audiences make day in day out. The 
decision to watch a particular channel, programme or genre may appear at first as merely 
an act of consumption, while actually may involve a wide spectrum of actions ranging 
from exit-type to voice-type responses through which audiences may act as both 
consumers and citizens. Watching television is, indeed, an act of consumption but at the 
same time it is also an exercise of citizenship. Through consumption audiences also 
participate. What may look at first as merely a rejection of one or another channel, 
programme or genre may actually involve an articulation of voice. To put it another way, 
viewing choices audiences make may give them voice. As cultural theorists have 
demonstrated, audiences are active in their uses and interpretations of media texts, and it 
is Hirschman’s approach that makes it possible to investigate audiences as agents who 
through their media activities make their voice being heard. 
Drawing on Hirschman’s theory, instead of treating the withdrawal of publics of public 
television from the offerings of this institution as merely an employment of the exit 
mechanism we can see it also at the same time as a realization of the voice option. What 
at first may look as a typical case of the consumer exit accompanied by the absence of 
loyalty towards the public broadcaster on the part of its publics, may actually signal an 





the fact of viewers deserting from the public television to its commercial competitors, as 
ratings data suggest it. 
Hirschman’s concepts of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ have previously been utilised to examine 
individual and collective reactions to system failures, including public services, for 
instance, unsatisfactory public school systems. Nevertheless, to date his concepts have 
not been used to examine actions taken by publics of public broadcasters, though it has 
been recently advocated for their usefulness in broader media/citizenship debates (Flew, 
2009). 
Hirschman’s theory has been extensively used in marketing research to study consumer 
behaviour. His approach has, therefore, often been misperceived as market-driven and 
consumer-oriented. However, his proposed conceptual framework for the analysis of the 
relationship between consumer/citizen and product/organisation has also been utilised 
in other fields outside business studies (e.g. psychology, political science, cultural studies, 
feminist studies), thus demonstrating the applicability of Hirschman’s concepts to the 
analysis of social and political phenomena, the exploration of a citizen realm and a public 
good. Being a development economist and bringing economic and political theory 
together, Hirschman himself has argued that his concepts of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ 
should be ‘applicable not only to economic operators such as business firms, but to a 
wide variety of noneconomic organizations and situations’ (1970:1).       
1.9 Conclusion  
The historical examination of inclusion and exclusion strategies applied by public 
broadcasters in the formation of the national ‘we’ in Western European societies 
demonstrates how definitions of the nation have been intertwined with definitions of 
public (national) broadcasting they and their publics have developed, and also how 
various definitions of loyalty, that ‘special attachment’ Hirschman (1970) is talking about, 
towards both, nation and public (national) broadcasting, do interact with each other. 
The production and reproduction of national identity is all about setting the lines of 
demarcation between those who are included and those who are left out from the 
national ‘we’, and, as we have seen, it is institutions of public broadcasting that have long 
provided, and continue doing so, particular image(s) of what it means to be a member of 





reveals, not all members of the national family have felt at home with versions of the 
national ‘we’ visualized and propagated by these organizations. 
Exploring the role of public radio and television in the construction of a national self 
requires a discussion on what has often been an uneasy relationship between public 
broadcasters and their publics. The study of public broadcasting as a nation-building 
project also involves the analysis of diverse and shifting conceptualizations of what 
public service broadcasting is, or should be, about and what role is, or should be, offered 
to its publics in these contexts. To understand public broadcasting as a nation-forming 
resource we should seek an answer to the question of how ‘the nation’ is defined within 
public (national) broadcasting and, likewise, we should explore definitions of ‘the public 
sphere’ and its ‘publics’ within public (national) broadcasting. In this way we will be able 
to identify the relationship between formulations of the nation and conceptions of public 
broadcasting, understood as both public radio and television institutions and values 
associated with the idea of public broadcasting more generally, broadcasters and, what is 
more important as regards my own study, their publics have. 
A juxtaposition of the rather idealistic view of public broadcasting as an institutional 
embodiment of a modern nationally bound Habermasian-style public sphere with the 
empirical reality of the relationship between public broadcasters and their publics 
suggests that instead of understanding the relationship between public broadcasters and 
their publics in terms of a single unitary national public sphere and one national ‘we’ (or 
one national public) we should think of several public spheres, various publics and 
different accounts of the national ‘we’ interacting, and also contending, with each other. 
Likewise, we should abandon normative dichotomous distinction between audiences as 
citizens and as consumers and, instead, think of them as intersecting categories. 
So far I have mostly referred to the experiences of Western European, and British in 
particular, public broadcasters in their nation-building aspirations as Western Europe is 
the historical home of public broadcasting traditions with other countries elsewhere in 
Europe, as well as beyond its borders, having made more or less successful attempts to 
transplant BBC-style public broadcasting institutions in their societies. It is thus fair to 
say that it is Western European public broadcasting systems that have been fundamental 
to what can be termed as normative ideal-type models of public broadcasting. 





publics in Western European countries is crucial for understanding public broadcasting 
systems in post-Communist societies across Central and Eastern Europe. Western 
European public broadcasters have served as role models for media policy makers, media 
managers and journalists of public radio and television institutions on the Eastern part of 
Europe in their attempts, even if only on paper, to transform Communist era state 
broadcasters into Western-style public service radio and television organizations. Also in 
the Latvian case a BBC-like public broadcasting model has been seen as a source of 
inspiration, an ideal model to be mimicked. I expand this discussion in the following 
chapter where I concentrate on the relationship between public broadcasters and their 


















Public Service Broadcasters and Their Publics in Post-
Communist Societies 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the end of the Communist regimes and break-up of the USSR in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, former republics of the Soviet Union as well as its satellite 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe underwent transformations in different spheres 
of life, even if often only formal and incomplete if judged against Western ideal-type 
models which post-Communist societies have aspired to emulate. These transformations 
were underpinned by a shift from communism to capitalism and a subsequent arrival of 
market economy and liberal democracy and included the reformation of their media 
systems that encompassed the turbulent remaking of former state radio and television 
organizations into public service broadcasting institutions. 
In Latvia, as in other newly formed post-Communist nation-states, the process of 
change, which, as already noted, included also a comprehensive reformation of the 
broadcasting system, coincided with the equally turbulent process of nation formation. In 
Latvia political discourse has prioritized an ethno-nationalistic view, defining the 
language and culture of the Latvian-speaking majority as a main raw material of the 
national imagination and national integration. Accordingly, public radio and television 
has been seen by nation-builders, the local political elite, as a project of national identity 
and national integrity as based on the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic 
majority. 
Although the thesis focuses on the study of audiences, it is important to provide a 
background context in order to situate my own empirical research within the broader 
political, economic and socio-cultural macro-level developments surrounding the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics in post-Communist societies. 
The aim of this chapter hence is to contextualize my own investigation into the 
responses publics of the Latvian public television have taken towards it. Some of the 
issues addressed in the chapter, namely those that are of particular importance for 





subsequent data chapters. 
2.2 Reforming Post-Communist Broadcasting Systems  
Public service broadcasters in post-Communist societies have fundamentally different 
origins compared to many of their Western European counterparts. The idea of public 
broadcasting in Central and Eastern European region has been institutionalized, or at 
least attempts towards this direction were made, through the reorganization of former 
Communist-controlled state broadcasters. As Jakubowicz argues, the motive behind the 
introduction of public broadcasting in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 (like in 
West Germany after the Second World War and in Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 
1970s) was ‘systemic’ – ‘when change of the broadcasting system was part and parcel of 
broader political change, typically transition to democracy after an authoritarian or 
totalitarian system’ (2007b:117).9 
Despite the fact that post-Communist media reforms, like overall post-Communist 
transformations, are very often described in terms of profound changes, this view only 
partially corresponds to what had happened in reality and, since some notable 
characteristics of former Communist media systems have managed to survive the 
collapse of the Communist regimes, not all scholars agree that the paradigm of radical 
and immediate transformation is strong enough to explain the process of media change. 
As Rantanen in her analysis of the post-Communist media landscape in Russia rightly 
points out, 
the collapse of Communism is sometimes perceived as a total breakdown 
of the old system. In reality, the transition has been an interplay of the 
old and the new, where new structures emerge but many of the old 
structures still remain (2002:16).  
Because of the limited nature of changes in Central and Eastern European societies after 
the fall of Communism, Sparks develops a perspective that focuses on the social 
continuity of the old Communist systems as an alternative to those approaches stressing 
the total and complete nature of the transformations (although he also admits some 
degree of renewal, as well) and argues that what these societies have experienced were 
political, and not social, revolutions. As he explains, political change in the region has not 
                         
9 Jakubowicz also identifies ‘paternalistic’ (in the UK) and ‘democratising’ (in France, Italy) motives of 





been matched by substantial change at the level of social structure with the old 
nomenklatura in many cases retaining its power positions (see Sparks with Reading, 1998, 
Sparks, 2008). As Sparks concludes,  
there is singularly little evidence that there was anywhere a complete and 
total transformation following upon the end of communism. The 
elements of continuity are too obvious, and too central, to be dismissed. 
In terms both of structures and personnel, the media show singularly 
little transformation, and what there has been is best understood as a 
mechanism for ensuring social continuity in the face of political change 
(Sparks with Reading, 1998:105-106).10 
Similarly, Balčytienė has recently argued that the changes that took place in Central and 
Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Communist regimes ‘very rapidly 
transformed the ways in which the countries were governed’, and yet ‘these were not 
whole and widespread social transformations, since they did not pose a fundamental 
challenge to the existing social and cultural orders’ (2013:32). For her, ‘these were partial 
transformations where social developments did not evolve to the same degree as the 
changes that took place in other fields of public life, such as politics or the economy’ 
(2013:36). Just as Sparks, Balčytienė points to the considerable degree of continuity 
between the old regime and the new one in internal structures of institutions (such as 
their personnel), including certain media organizations. 
Before moving on to a more detailed examination of the transformations of post-
Communist broadcasting systems, the usage of some basic terminology has to be 
explained.  In the study I will distinguish ‘transition’ (‘initial breakthrough involved in 
abolishing the old system’) from ‘transformation’ (‘very long process of continued 
change’) in line with Jakubowicz’s conceptualization (2007a:59). According to 
Jakubowicz, it is ‘systemic social transformation’ that came after the relatively brief 
period of ‘transition’. Accordingly, we can say that the transformation of former state 
broadcasters into public broadcasting institutions (that is, the implementation of 
normative public broadcasting ideals into practice) followed the initial formal transition 
from state to public broadcasting (de jure renaming former state radio and television 
                         
10 For Sparks, when it comes to the media reform, post-Communist television systems are best examples of 
continuity of old systems where ‘large, state-owned broadcasting institutions with essentially the same 





organizations as public broadcasters).   
As media scholars have argued, the remaking of the Communist media, previously 
functioning as an ideological state apparatus, into the Western-like media in Latvia and 
elsewhere in the region turned out to be not as easily achievable as was initially assumed 
since old practices appeared to be deep-rooted not only among the political leadership 
but also among media professionals, as well as ordinary citizens (see, inter alia, Aumente, 
et al., 1999, Brikše, et al., 1993, Brikše, et al., 2002, Gross, 2002, 2004, Sparks with 
Reading, 1998, Sparks, 2008). 
While the legal framework within which radio and television operated under the 
Communist rule was soon changed to a new one echoing Western broadcasting ideals, 
implementation of these principles in practice was, and continues to be, a turbulent and 
incomplete one suggesting that it is not possible to sweep the Communist broadcasting 
legacies away with immediate effect and through merely restructuring former state radio 
and television organizations – more comprehensive change will take longer time and will 
demand greater effort.  
To quote Gross and Jakubowicz, ‘media transformation is proving to be a long and 
complex process’ (2013:2) as, indeed, the overall process of post-Communist 
transformations. Reflecting on the frustration and disillusionment in Estonian society 
during the first decade after the break-up of the USSR, Lauristin and Heidmets have 
pointed out that ‘the return to Europe has not been as simple and obvious a journey as 
was expected in the early 1990s’ (2002:22-23), and the same well describes also Latvian 
experience. 
As part of the broader Westernization project of the post-Communist world (or ‘re-
Westernization’, as Lauristin (1997) argues) with former Communist bloc countries in the 
region aiming to import the Western way of life, whatever its definition, in a hope to 
overcome Communist legacies11 initial attempts were made to copy Western-style public 
                         
11 This is what Stukuls Eglitis in her study on social change in the early years of post-Communist period in 
Latvia has described as the restoration of ‘normal’ societal order where a widely shared aspirations for 
‘normality’ were seen as a move away from ‘abnormality’ of the Soviet order. It was particularly within a 
narrative of ‘spatial normality’ (focus on Latvia’s ‘place in space’), one of the two dominant narratives of 
that time Latvian politics as identified by Stukuls Eglitis, that the modern West represented the desired goal 
of the process of ‘normalization’, and from this perspective a return to a state of ‘normality’ was translated 
as a return to the West. In contrast, a narrative of ‘temporal normality’ (focus on Latvia’s ‘place in time’), 





service broadcasting systems, so to say, to create small BBCs across Central and Eastern 
Europe, including the borrowing of classical mission and value statements of Western 
European public broadcasters. Also their cultural mission to care for national identity 
and to promote and protect national culture was transplanted into mandates of new post-
Communist public broadcasting institutions; this is an issue I return to later in the 
chapter when discussing post-Communist nation-building experiences.  
As with the entire (re-)Westernization project, the remaking of post-Communist 
broadcasting systems in line with the Western public broadcasting ethos often remained 
only on paper. Due to the complexity of political, economic and socio-cultural reasons 
which I shall specify later in the chapter, borrowed Western European broadcasting 
ideals, and the importation of Western-type public broadcasting institutional models in 
particular, were hard to implement in practice. 
‘The first year of the existence of public service broadcasting in Poland was not very 
successful in terms of fully defining its underlying philosophy and obligations, 
implementing them in practice and winning general understanding and acceptance for 
them,’ Jakubowicz concludes assessing the early days of public broadcasting in Poland 
(1996:189). As elsewhere in the region, in Poland, as Jakubowicz notes, the concept of 
public service broadcasting ‘had been borrowed from Western European practice’ 
(1996:178) and the mission statement of the Polish public television was ‘a distillation of 
familiar Western literature on the subject’ (1996:188). 
Notwithstanding that media laws were rewritten in the spirit of the ideals of Western 
European public broadcasting models, the transformation of former state broadcasters 
into Western-style public broadcasting organizations in reality appeared to be not as 
quick and smooth as was initially anticipated. It was an ‘attempt to impose a value system 
upon reality,’ as Sparks with Reading (1998:180) have aptly described the intention to 
establish independent public broadcasters in Central and Eastern Europe. As they argue, 
‘this proved quite impossible in practice, since neither the political nor the economic 
conditions for such a system existed anywhere in the region’ (1998:180), and, what is 
important, as Sparks (2012) stresses in one of his recent publications, such conditions 
today, more than 20 years since the fall of the Communist regimes, still are not in place 
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or have a rudimentary character. To the absence of the requisite political and economic 
conditions one should also add the lack of a necessary socio-cultural milieu for post-
Communist public broadcasting institutions to flourish. 
For Jakubowicz, the transformation of former Communist state broadcasters into public 
broadcasting institutions is part of what he has described a ‘mimetic’ media policy-
making approach. ‘Copying or transplantation of legal, institutional and societal 
arrangements from other social contexts’ has so far dominated in the media reforms of 
Central and Eastern European countries, he argues (2008b:51). It was a mistake, 
Jakubowicz and Gross now point out, ‘assuming that it is enough to transplant a law or 
institution copied on Western patterns for it to operate properly’ (2013:11). To quote 
Jakubowicz, ‘the idea was to ‘test the best of the West’, but the enabling sociopolitical 
and cultural environment needed for these policies to succeed has largely been absent’ 
(2012:34). 
What has often been emphasized in the previous studies on post-Communist 
transformations is that political and economic change in the region was not, and could 
not be expected to be, accompanied with rapid cultural shift. As Balčytienė has described 
it, transformations on the political and economic scene ‘were not automatically 
supported with social and cultural reforms’ (2013:36). While adoption of Western 
European traditions in different spheres of life was a declared destination of the process 
of transformations, the inherited Communist world-view was still much alive, and 
implementation of the so-called Western values in everyday practices was not easily 
attainable. 
Besides, adoption of Western broadcasting standards was problematic not only because 
the post-Communist context was significantly different from the one within which 
Western broadcasting models have originated but also because of the fact that during the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s the same Western broadcasting models, which post-
Communist countries were hoping to adopt, were themselves under scrutiny and review 
in Western European societies. It was a time when their public broadcasters underwent 
what is often termed in the literature as ‘identity crisis’. 
What is more, the reform of ex-state broadcasters into institutions of public broadcasting 
overlapped with the introduction of dual broadcasting systems in the former Communist 





organizations lost their dominant position soon after the first commercial players 
appeared on the media landscape, an experience well-established Western European 
public broadcasters had gone through few years earlier. Having been granted the status 
of public broadcaster, these institutions were forced to compete for audiences with their 
newly established commercial counterparts having no experience of what it means, first, 
to work in a competitive environment and, second, to operate as public service 
organizations in the way it is understood in Western European societies. It was nearly a 
mission impossible to compete with the new commercial stations and, meanwhile, to 
start developing a tradition of public broadcasting in, literally, a void.  
In addition to the problem of insufficient funding and political interference, publics were 
turning away from the recently established public broadcasting institutions and were 
engaging enthusiastically with novelties such as imported Western fiction offered by new 
commercial broadcasters, as the experience of Czech public television in the advent of 
the establishment of the first nationwide private television channel in this country in 
1993 clearly demonstrates:  
The general public had almost no experience with either the output of 
private commercial broadcasting or the concept of public service media. 
Widely accepted commercial programming was seen as evidence of 
victory of democratic media, especially as people found it hard to see a 
clear difference between (old) state television and (new) public service 
television (Jirák, Köpplová, 2013:185). 
Therefore, the implementation of normative Western-style notions of public 
broadcasting into practice, including building a relationship with their publics in line with 
these principles, was a formidable task newly established post-Communist public 
broadcasters faced. Public radio and television organizations in post-Communist 
countries, in contrast to their Western European counterparts, having no glory days of 
public broadcasting behind them met the very same challenges in terms of the 
introduction of dual broadcasting systems as their Western role models. 
As many commentators have argued, what Central and Eastern European societies have 
today are rather quasi-public broadcasters, effectively a mixture of public, state and 
commercial broadcasting institutions, or, according to more critical accounts, 





summarized a decade back,  
public service broadcasting has not yet been implanted successfully in 
Central and Eastern Europe [..] PSB12 has not, it seems, been able to do 
much more than figure as an ideal to those working to (re)establish 
democratic and pluralistic societies east of the Elbe (2004:33).  
It is true that the transformation of former state broadcasters into public broadcasting 
institutions was, and continues to be, a complex experience in all post-Communist 
societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and more than two decades after the collapse of 
the Communist rule public broadcasters in this part of Europe in their development are 
still significantly lagging behind their Western European role models, and discrepancies 
between normative ideals as expressed in broadcasting laws and everyday realities are 
more than apparent. Nevertheless, it is right to describe post-Communist broadcasting 
reform as a failure only if judged against some highly idealized view of Western-type 
public broadcasting and over-optimistic anticipations that ex-Communist broadcasters 
could be turned into ‘true’ (i.e., as seen in the West) public service organizations 
overnight.  
Thus, while Jakubowicz concludes that even in the more advanced post-Communist 
democracies public broadcasting organizations are in reality ‘hybrid constructs, 
combining disparate (public service; political elite mouthpiece; political battlefield; 
commercial) elements within one organization’ (2008b:50), at the same time he rightly 
adds that ‘this is not a feature of post-communist countries alone: many PSB 
organizations in older democracies are also hybrid constructs, combining these and other 
elements in various degrees’ (2008b:50). 
What has happened to public broadcasting models, exported from the West to post-
Communist societies, is exactly what Hallin and Mancini seems to have in mind when 
reminding us that  
particular media institutions develop under specific historical conditions. 
Outside of these conditions, it is not clear that those institutions can be 
exported to other social and political contexts without substantially 
changing their meaning. That is something we should always keep in 
                         






mind whenever particular models are proposed as norms, professional 
practice, or media policy (2010:xii).  
Therefore, when judging the progress of the reform of the broadcasting systems of the 
former Communist bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe, we should take into 
account the peculiarities of the overall process of post-Communist transformations 
instead of setting the Western-style normative broadcasting ideals as some benchmark 
post-Communist public broadcasters are expected to live up to. As Jakubowicz rightly 
concludes, ‘it is doubtful whether, realistically, more could have been achieved since 
1989, given that the creation of PSB is one of the hardest tests of the success of the 
general process of change in such circumstances’ (2008b:51). 
Some scholars have argued, and more vividly at the end of the second decade of post-
Communist years, that instead of uncritically mimicking Western media and journalism 
models former Communist bloc countries should search for distinctive approaches 
suitable for their specific historical context (for instance, see Brikše, 2010, Voltmer, 
2008). Though scholars agree that Western public broadcasting models could not be 
easily applied to post-Communist societies and only partially such Western public 
broadcasting giants as the British BBC could serve as role models for their counterparts 
in Central and Eastern European countries, the existing literature does not provide any 
alternative public broadcasting models to be future-proof in post-Communist societies. 
Similarly, it has been recently argued that instead of attempting to fit post-Communist 
media systems into existing typologies of Western media systems, namely Hallin and 
Mancini’s influential theory of media systems (see Hallin and Mancini, 2004),13 we should 
                         
13 Some media scholars have classified media developments in the region as more typical of Hallin and 
Mancini’s Polarized Pluralist (the Mediterranean) model (among other characteristics it is also weak public 
broadcasting institutions that Central and Eastern European media systems have in common with those 
media landscapes situated in the Southern part of Europe) what Splichal already in the mid-1990s termed 
as ‘Italianization’ of Central and Eastern European media systems (see Splichal, 1994). Yet, more recent 
attempts to classify media systems across the former Communist territories in Central and Eastern Europe 
warn that this is a rather oversimplification of a far more complex and nuanced reality. Thus, Dobek-
Ostrowska and Głowacki argue that ‘the media in Central Europe have to maneuver between political 
pressure on the one side (politicization typical of the polarized pluralist model) and economic pressure on 
the other, which led to commercialization typical of the Liberal model’ (2008:16). In a similar vein, 
Balčytienė notes that ‘not all postcommunist countries can be artificially situated around the Mediterranean 
Sea’ (2012:69). Examining media landscapes of the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia she 
concludes that ‘they have many significant elements from each of Hallin and Mancini’s models’ (2012:69). 
While Hallin and Mancini argue that ‘there are many strong parallels between the media systems of Eastern 
and Southern Europe, and much of the pattern of what we called the Polarized Pluralist model can be 
found in the East’, they also suggest that the media systems of the former Communist countries can also 





be searching for alternative conceptualizations taking into account not only peculiarities 
post-Communist media systems have vis-à-vis Western media systems but also 
particularities post-Communist media systems have vis-à-vis each other. Media landscapes 
across Central and Eastern Europe are far from being homogeneous, and there is no 
such thing as a single post-Communist media system (in the same way as there had never 
been ‘single, uniform, and monolithic communist media system,’ to quote Sparks 
(2000:47)) but instead what is in place are numerous distinct national media systems 
varying from one country to another and having a certain degree of both commonalities 
and differences not only beyond but also within national borders. 
2.3 Publics of Post-Communist Public Broadcasters   
In the current body of literature, the troubled and, some would also say, abortive attempt 
to transform ex-Communist state broadcasters into Western-style public broadcasting 
institutions has been mainly explained by reference to the political and economic realm 
(see, inter alia, Gross, 2002, Jakubowicz, 1996, 2007a, Sparks with Reading, 1998). First, 
the post-Communist political leadership has been accused of pressuring public 
broadcasters in order to keep control over the former state radio and television 
organizations (most often through politicization of nomination and/or appointment of 
governing and/or regulatory bodies of public broadcasters) that, as we shall see later, has 
also left its footprint on the way their publics perceive these organizations.14 Second, 
politically-motivated allocation of state funding has been detected, with negotiations 
between public broadcasters and their governments over the amount of the annual state 
subsidy, the main source of funding for the bulk of the Central and Eastern European 
public broadcasters, jeopardizing not only their political independence but also their 
financial viability, and, what is of special importance in the context of my own study, also 
                                                                      
systems, Polarized Pluralist, Liberal and Democratic Corporatist (2013:29; see also Hallin and Mancini, 
2010). 
14 As an extensive body of literature demonstrates, post-Communist governments have been keen on 
securing control over the former state broadcasters now officially renamed as public broadcasters. ‘In 
Poland, the first Solidarity government was not interested in developing public service media, as that would 
mean loss of control over the state broadcaster,’ Jakubowicz writes (2007a:180) illuminating a similar 
pattern of the public broadcasters/political elite relationship in other post-Communist countries with the 
first democratic governments, and also their successors, refusing to give up control over the media, and 
public broadcasting in particular. As Johnson has described the Slovak case, ‘every Slovak government 
since 1993 has sought to use Slovak Television, STV, ostensibly a public broadcaster, as a state television 
network’ (2013:160). A number of recent reports on the media landscapes across Central and Eastern 
Europe indicate that more than two decades since the end of the Communist regimes political pressuring 
on public broadcasting organisations has continued, even if in a more subtle manner and not necessarily 
always successful if compared with the first decade of the post-Communist period (see Bajomi-Lázár, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, Bajomi-Lázár, et al., 2011, Krajewski, Diakite, 2012, Milosavljević, Kerševan 





shaping the way their publics look at them – as also my investigation into the responses 
of the publics of the Latvian public television shows, along side political pressuring it is 
also state funding that makes their publics think of these institutions as state 
broadcasters.15 As Sparks wrote in his account on post-Communist public broadcasting 
at the end of the 1990s, ‘apart from political instability, the other major problem 
concerning the possibility of public service broadcasting is the question of financial 
stability’ (Sparks with Reading, 1998:164), and his observations are as much topical today 
as they were more than 15 years ago, as also the experience of Latvian public radio and 
television suggests. 
Yet, the fiasco, according to critics, with the introduction of Western-type public 
broadcasting institutions in post-Communist societies cannot be explained purely 
through recourse to political or economic factors, and a variety of socio-cultural factors 
should be taken into account in the same way as broadcasting reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe cannot be seen as exclusively institutional transformations (from state to 
public broadcasters), and much more attention should be paid to the study of the current 
state of the idea (values) of public broadcasting in the post-Communist world, something 
this study aims to redress in the current research agenda into post-Communist public 
broadcasting. 
The weakness of institutions of public broadcasting in the region cannot be understood 
focusing exclusively on the study of political elites and broadcasters, and equal scrutiny 
should be given to the research of the relationship between public broadcasters and their 
publics. It is of high importance to introduce the study of audiences in the current debate 
over post-Communist public broadcasting given the fact that research papers on 
broadcasting systems on the east side of the Iron Curtain usually report low level of 
public support for public broadcasting institutions that most vividly manifests in their 
poor audience ratings and massive difficulties public broadcasters face to collect licence 
fee payments. 
Despite the fact that in some Central and Eastern European countries, notably in Poland, 
public service television channels fare well in the ratings battles with their commercial 
                         
15 In the literature it has also been argued that the insufficient and unstable financial resources post-
Communist public radio and television organizations have to operate with have made them uncompetitive 
in their battles with commercial market players and led to further marginalization of public broadcasters in 
their societies. Due to the lack of political will, licence fee funding of public broadcasters has been 
introduced only in a handful of Central and Eastern European countries and, in some countries, as we shall 





rivals, in the majority of countries of the region, public channels are not the most 
watched and commercial stations dominate in the market, as is indeed the case in Latvia. 
And, although in Poland public television has atypically high viewing figures and strong 
positions in the market for the region, nevertheless, its publics are reluctant to pay the 
licence fee (for more detailed account see, for instance, the report of Krajewski and 
Diakite, 2012). As Klimkiewicz concludes, loyalty of publics of Polish public 
broadcasters ‘did not stretch as far as the willingness to pay licence fees’ (2007:317) and 
‘the financing of PSB solely from license fees appeared unaffordable in Poland’ 
(2007:299). 
Due to the high level of the license fee evasion, in 2002 the Hungarian government 
decided to abolish licence fee payments and replace them with state subsidies (Tóth, 
2012). Similarly, faced with the Slovaks’ reluctance to finance their public service 
broadcasters through direct payments, local politicians made attempts to abolish licence 
fees, albeit not successfully (Kollar and Czwitkowics, 2013, Štětka, 2012a). In the Czech 
Republic the number of supporters of the licence fee system is also low, giving rise to a 
failed attempt by some local politicians to abolish licence fees (Rybková, Řiháčková, 
2013). Though reluctance to fund public broadcasters directly from their own pocket on 
the part of their publics may signal their rejection of public broadcasting institutions, it 
should not be necessarily seen as a sign of them rejecting also the idea of public 
broadcasting as such, as indeed responses of my informants suggest. 
What has often been reported in the previous accounts of Central and Eastern European 
public broadcasting systems is a lack of understanding of the public broadcasting idea in 
these societies, including local political circles and in some cases also public broadcasting 
professionals themselves. Yet, as evidence from my own study indicates, it is not so 
much lack of understanding of the idea of public broadcasting as classification problems 
people face struggling to find a right place on a map for public broadcasting institutions 
that the previous studies in fact seem to have pointed out. 
Given that the research on post-Communist media reform has identified politicization 
and commercialization as key characteristics of the media systems that have emerged in 
Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism (see, inter alia, Dobek-
Ostrowska and Głowacki, 2008, Gross, 2002, Hallin and Mancini, 2013, Jakubowicz, 
2007a, Mancini, Zielonka, 2012, Sparks with Reading, 1998, Sparks, 2000, 2008, 2012, 





that in such a politicized and commercialized media environment (and yet, to be true, it is 
something that is not peculiar to Central and Eastern Europe alone and to various 
degrees can be found in countries in other parts of Europe as well) in the eyes of their 
publics, as well as politicians and sometimes also journalists themselves, public 
broadcasters are still often perceived as state radio and television organizations or as not 
that distinguishable from their commercial competitors (see, for instance, reports of 
Antonova, Georgiev, 2013, Lengyel, 2010, Milosavljević, Kerševan Smokvina, 2012, 
Stępka, 2010), as it is also in the case with Latvian publics, which I shall come back to in 
the subsequent data chapters. As we shall also see, such a view of public broadcasting 
institutions on the part of their publics tells us as much about the relationship between 
public broadcasters and their publics as about the relationship between political elite and 
society. 
Public television channels across Central and Eastern Europe have often been criticised 
for being too populist in their programming offerings where, as critics say, priority is 
given to entertainment in order to boost ratings and to compete with their commercial 
rivals at the expense of the public broadcasting ideals. What is often characterized as the 
highly commercialized output of post-Communist public broadcasters in the eyes of their 
critics is seen as a breach of some idealized Western-style public broadcasting ethos, 
something, in fact, Western European public broadcasters themselves struggle to live up 
to. 
Here, again, the Polish experience is a case in point. As already noted, contrary to other 
post-Communist societies Polish public television is the most popular channel in the 
country. However, its critics point out that its success in achieving high ratings should be 
mainly attributed to the high proportion of entertainment output in its programming 
(Bajomi-Lázár, et al., 2011). ‘Alongside political dependence, programming 
commercialization seems to be an equally important factor which undermines the idea of 
PSB in Polish society,’ Stępka (2010:242) argues. In a similar vein, Krajewski and Diakite 
claim that the public television in Poland ‘is truly public only in at most one-eighth of its 
programming. Usually it means the small hours of the overnight schedule’ (2012:39). 
Yet, commercialization is not an exclusive pattern of Central and Eastern European 
public broadcasters as also their Western European role models have been much 
criticized for giving up the public broadcasting ideals by prioritizing popular 





seems to fail to represent the whole picture of post-Communist public broadcasting with 
public broadcasters in the region varying in their focus on popular versus ‘serious’ 
programming, though such distinction itself is rather artificial. While replicating some of 
the strategies more often associated with commercial broadcasting, the output of the 
Latvian public television LTV hardly can be described as over-popularized. What is 
more, as we shall see it later, in the eyes of some of its publics popular programming is 
even insufficient in the offerings of LTV, something that also alienates these publics 
from public television. 
As already noted, the constant political pressure Central and Eastern European public 
broadcasters have been facing over the post-Communist period, combined with state 
funding making up the largest part of their budgets, has led to the widespread perception 
in these societies, including Latvia, of public broadcasters as state radio and television 
institutions. Besides, due to the Communist era experience with state owned, funded and 
controlled broadcasters for post-Communist audiences the concept of state broadcasting 
may be simply more familiar than that of public broadcasting. So, a mixture of historical 
legacies and the realities of today informs the attitudes of post-Communist publics 
towards their public broadcasters, a point I shall return to in the following data chapters 
when exploring the perceptions of the Latvian public television its publics have. 
For instance, as Antonova and Georgiev report in the case of Bulgarian public television 
and radio organizations BNT and BNR, ‘the overall perception (including that of some 
politicians and media) is that BNT and BNR are still state entities rather than 
independent broadcasters’ (2013:30). ‘The raison d'être of public broadcasting in Bulgaria 
is still to be defined, as the public at large remains far from recognizing the concept as 
distinct from state broadcasting,’ Antonova and Georgiev conclude (2013:31). Referring 
to the same Bulgarian example, Štětka describes the country’s public broadcasters as 
having a ‘divided institutional identity’ (2011:11) suggesting that it is perhaps the public 
broadcasters their publics in Bulgaria do not recognize as distinct from the ex-state radio 
and television and not so much the concept of public broadcasting they mix with the 
notion of state broadcasting, as Antonova and Georgiev (2013) have proposed it. As 
Štětka explains, 
although they are ‘public service’ media according to the Radio and 
Television Act, they are largely perceived as ‘state’ media, both by the 





system of their financing, as they are both mainly funded directly from 
the state budget (2011:11). 
Antonova and Georgiev add another important aspect, namely the lack of political 
independence, to explain such an image of the public radio and television organizations 
in Bulgarian society. No doubt the constant scandals of political interference, even if 
contested and unsuccessful, that post-Communist public broadcasters have been 
involved in over the years inevitably have left their imprint on the image of public radio 
and television institutions in their societies, something that as we shall see later the 
Latvian case confirms as well. To explain the fact that the news on one of the country’s 
commercial channels is seen by Slovenian audiences as more objective than the news 
offerings of the public television Milosavljević and Kerševan Smokvina refer to ‘a 
number of reported cases of political pressure on journalists and management 
interventions in the reporting’ (2012:40). 
As Jakubowicz reminds us in his account on the reform of post-Communist societies, 
‘organizational change must be accompanied, or followed, by cultural change’ (2007a:78) 
for the institutions, in our case public broadcasters, to function properly. To quote 
Jakubowicz, ‘the reorganization of post-Communist societies cannot be regarded as 
successfully completed until the new organizations have been institutionalized – that is, 
underpinned by the cultural foundations, the mental dispositions, and the spirit of shared 
public philosophies supporting them’ (2007a:78). In other words, what Jakubowicz says 
is that reform of the legal and institutional frameworks (through the importation of 
Western models) under which public broadcasters operate in post-Communist countries 
is not complete or sufficient and remains only on paper as it is not backed up by cultural 
change. 
Jakubowicz speaks about ‘lack of social embeddedness of the idea of public service 
broadcasting and lack of a social constituency willing and able to support public service 
broadcasters and buttress its autonomy and independence’ in the societies across Central 
and Eastern Europe (2008a:117). ‘Transplanted into post-communist countries in the 
process of “transformation by imitation”, they have not, generally speaking, been able to 
win support and a constituency in civil society,’ he explains (2008a:117). As Jakubowicz 
notes elsewhere, ‘civil society perceives PSB as a pawn of the politicians’ and ‘general 
awareness of political control over them prevents civil society from identifying with 





research into the discourses of Latvian publics discussing their relationship with the 
country’s public television, as we shall see it later in the data chapters. Yet, as I will also 
argue, his notion of lack of social embeddedness of the public broadcasting idea in post-
Communist societies tends to ignore the actual complexity of the relationship between 
public broadcasters and their publics in these societies. 
2.4 The Public Service Broadcasting System in Latvia 
Three stages of evolution can be distinguished in the relationship between the Latvian 
ex-state and now public television LTV and its audiences. First there was an era of 
‘ambivalence’ (suspicion and pleasure coexisting) during the Soviet rule followed by what 
could be labelled as a ‘romantic’ period (a period of unconditional trust and love) during 
the years of the Awakening, the time of the political breakthrough of the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s, and, finally, the stage of ‘betrayal’ (gradual alienation and migration from 
LTV to its commercial rivals) came during the 1990s onwards. 
The television era in Latvia started in early November of 1954, more than 10 years after 
the 1940 Soviet occupation, when LTV with its then name Riga Television Studio was 
launched. Under Soviet rule, state owned and funded LTV served as a mouthpiece of the 
Communist regime. While, on one hand, overall trust in the media was low, on the other 
hand, as under the totalitarian media system exit as an option for audiences was highly 
limited (access to alternative, oppositional Western media outlets was restricted), let alone 
the employment of the voice mechanism within official (institutional) contexts, people 
managed to select content as offered by the Soviet media. Though being suspicious 
towards the ideological messages sent to them by television as these were at odds with 
everyday social realities, television viewers enjoyed watching its culture and arts 
programmes, as well as popular content such as shows of popular music and other 
entertainment offerings. 
A new media/society relationship emerged in the middle of the 1980s along with the 
overall media liberalization in line with the glasnost (openness) policy that was part of the 
perestroika (restructuring) plans announced by the then leader of the Soviet Union Michael 
Gorbachev. Instead of reforming the Soviet system as Gorbachev hoped for, journalists 
in the Baltic countries gradually started to utilize Gorbachev’s ideas for different 
purposes aimed at destroying the system. During the Singing Revolution, the years of 





television in Latvia played a crucial role in mobilizing society in support of the struggle 
for freedom. Radio and television ‘were looked upon as a truly national media’ (Brikše, et 
al., 1993:240); it was a time later characterized as the glory days of LTV and Radio Latvia. 
As Brikše and others put it, media and journalists ‘enjoyed enormous trust and even love 
from the audience’ (2002:69). In January 1991 people even built barricades around the 
radio and television buildings to guard journalists round the clock against the possible 
invasion of the Soviet security forces. 
After the restoration of independent de facto statehood in August 1991, a few months 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, restructuring of different spheres of life in line 
with Western ideals, even if only on paper, became a declared political aim of the first 
governments of independent Latvia; this included also rewriting the broadcasting law to 
proclaim LTV and Radio Latvia as public broadcasters. Although the former Communist 
party-controlled Latvian state broadcasters acquired de jure the status of public service 
radio and television, the de facto reform of the ex-state broadcasters into public 
broadcasting institutions was, and continues to be, highly problematic. 
Whereas for post-Communist societies, including Latvian media policy makers and 
broadcasters themselves, the Western European public broadcasting normative ideals 
have served as a source of inspiration in their plans to transform former state 
broadcasters into public broadcasting institutions, neither media policy makers, nor 
broadcasters or even their publics have had knowledge of, and often also interest in, how 
to implement these ideals into everyday practice. Over more than 20 years, LTV, like 
other public broadcasters in the region, has experienced insufficient and unstable 
funding, political struggles over its control, commercial pressures, weak journalistic 
professionalization and audiences migrating to its commercial competitors.16 
The introduction of a free market system allowed new entrants, commercial television 
stations, to emerge on the media scene that with the offerings of imported Western-
origin fiction attracted large audiences challenging long taken for granted loyalty of LTV 
audiences. In 1996, the first nationwide private commercial television channel LNT was 
launched in Latvia, and, according to the audience measurements of that time, as soon as 
LNT appeared on the scene LTV, only recently being officially granted the status of 
                         
16 Reflections on the development of public radio and television institutions in other Baltic countries of 
Lithuania and Estonia bring out similarities with the experiences of Latvian public broadcasters (Lõhmus, 





public broadcaster, experienced a massive and rapid drop in its audience figures. It was 
American films and series, as well as Latin American telenovelas, offered by LNT that 
attracted the largest television audiences in the country at that time.  
To win audiences back, LTV adopted some of the strategies more often associated with 
commercial broadcasting, albeit with limited success in bringing audiences back. The 
trend, however, was not exclusive to the Latvian case as evidence from other former 
Communist bloc countries indicates the same pattern. As d’Haenens and Bardoel 
conclude, ‘in Eastern Europe state-controlled media complexes were dismantled and 
often a shift was made towards highly commercial media landscapes’ (2007:92). 
Ultimately, a non-substantial audience share of LTV, along with its other dysfunctions, 
has cleared a way for questioning the legitimacy, and viability, of the entire public 
broadcasting model in Latvia.  
Today Latvia’s public broadcasting system comprises two public service television 
channels and five public service radio stations. Alongside a recently launched joint 
internet news site LTV and Radio Latvia also have their own separate internet platforms. 
As part of the public broadcasting reform the Electronic Media Council, the national 
regulatory body of the radio and television industry and also the holder of the state 
capital shares in LTV and Radio Latvia, has proposed to merge the public television and 
radio into one multimedia institution, and during this process Latvian media policy 
makers have again looked at Western European public broadcasters as role models to be 
replicated. As part of the reform, the Council has also proposed to introduce a media tax 
on the public radio and television. So far all attempts to introduce license fee payments 
have failed, and today the main source of income of both public broadcasters is the 
annual state subsidy combined with some advertising revenue. 
Just as in the majority of Central and Eastern European countries so in Latvia public 
channels are not among the most watched ones in the country. The audience share of 
LTV has been dropping steadily over the last more than 20 years, and in 2013 LTV1, the 
main channel of LTV, commanded a meagre 9.4% share, while LTV7, its second 
channel, 3.2%. The commercial sector dominates the television landscape in Latvia, and 
the main rivals in the ratings battle for the status of the country’s most popular channel 
are the national, and until 2014 also free-to-air, commercial channels TV3 (13.4% of 





Scandinavian media company Modern Times Group.17  
Yet, the audience share of the commercial channels is not exceptionally high either. It is 
not only the public broadcaster LTV but also its commercial competitors that suffer 
from the ethno-linguistic split within television audiences in Latvia. While Latvian-
speaking viewers prefer national commercial broadcasting, the large Russian-speaking 
minority audiences primarily gather around transnational television from Russia, 
something I will discuss in more detail later in the chapter. Second, following the 2010 
digital switchover the commercial TV3 and LNT as well as both channels of the public 
television have experienced a drop in their audience figures as viewers more and more 
migrate to newly arrived digital niche channels. While the established national 
commercial channels are also losing their dominance in the market, viewing figures of 
both public channels are still lagging behind the commercial TV3 and LNT (see more in 
Juzefovics, 2011). 
It is not only the attractive entertainment offerings of these commercial channels that 
attract audiences away from public television. Along with popular, locally produced 
entertainment, mainly a variety of localized global reality and talent show formats, both 
TV3 and LNT have been successful in attracting large audiences also for their news and 
current affairs.  
The country’s most popular prime-time news are on TV3 and LNT with Panorāma 
(Panorama), long-running evening news programme on LTV1, gathering smaller 
audiences. While for many years Panorāma was the most watched news programme in the 
country, during recent years for a variety of reasons it has experienced a large-scale 
exodus of its audiences. Despite the fact that the journalistic output portfolio of the 
commercial broadcasters is limited, some of their journalistic products are highly 
popular. Thus, the weekly programme Nekā personīga (Nothing Personal) on TV3, offering 
cutting-edge journalistic analysis and investigations, is a regular ratings hit. 
As already noted, media audiences in Latvia with its two million population are not only 
among the smallest ones in Central and Eastern Europe but are also divided along ethno-
linguistic lines. Latvian-speakers and members of the large Russian-speaking minority – 
nearly 40% of the population, the bulk of them Soviet era immigrants who settled in 
                         
17 It also controls Russian-language channels 3+ and TV5, plus TV6 and Kanāls 2 (Channel 2), both aimed 





Latvia as a workforce from other Soviet republics and their descendants18 – each has 
their own favourite radio and television channels, print and online media outlets19, and, in 
this respect it is right to describe the Latvian media system as ‘segmented’, to borrow the 
typology introduced by Mihelj (2012), or divided into two, Latvian-language and Russian-
language, media sub-systems, as Šulmane (2010) proposes. 
The Latvian media landscape appears to be a classical example of Mihelj’s ‘segmented’ 
media system model (albeit some elements of Mihelj’s ‘integrated’ media system model 
are also present such as Russian-language news bulletins on the second channel of the 
public television LTV) with two ‘parallel, fully fledged media systems, complete with the 
periodic press, radio and television as well as internet websites, each catering for a 
particular ethno-cultural group’ (2012:67). As Mihelj concludes, in the case of segmented 
media system ‘the quantity and range of minority content tends to be relatively large’ 
(2012:67), and for this reason Šulmane is right saying that  
the Russian language press in Latvia is not a typical example of a minority 
press – one which speaks only to the needs of a specific culture and exists 
alongside the national press used by a majority of the population and 
addressed to the whole community of citizens (2010:225). 
Šulmane’s observations describe quite well the entire Russian-language media sub-system 
in Latvia, including the television sector what is the focus of this study. The vast majority 
of the audiences of the national channels broadcasting in Latvian are Latvian-speakers, 
while Russian-speakers make the bulk of the audiences of transnational Russian 
television distributed in Latvia via cable and satellite. Among Russian-speaking audiences 
the leader is Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (First Baltic Channel) who in 2013 with 9.8% of audience 
share, slightly higher than of LTV1, was the third most watched channel in Latvia. Pervyi 
                         
18 Latvia has the largest Russian-speaking community of the three Baltic states. According to the 2011 
population census, the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia constitutes 37.2% of the population (this 
means that they have indicated Russian as their main language at home) with the majority of Russian-
speakers living in either the eastern region of Latgale (60.3% of its entire population) or the capital city 
Riga (55.8% of its all inhabitants). In line with the census data, 62.1% of Latvian population are Latvian-
speakers. The overwhelming majority of Latvian-speakers (93.7%) have identified themselves as ethnic 
Latvians, while among Russian-speakers the majority (65.9%) think of themselves as ethnic Russians. 2.9% 
of the Latvian-speakers reported that they are ethnic Russians and 12.3% of Russian-speakers have 
indicated that they are ethnic Latvians. Among Russian-speakers there are also those who think of 
themselves as ethnic Belarusians (7.7%), ethnic Ukrainians (5.1%) and ethnic Poles (4.3%). Source: The 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.  
19 Alongside the national Russian-language media (full spectrum of print, online and broadcast media) it is 
also transnational broadcasting transmitting from neighbouring Russia that makes up the daily media 





Baltiiskii kanal is a Baltic version of a highly popular in Russia Pervyi kanal (First Channel), 
a Kremlin-controlled channel 51% owned by the state, also the successor of the Soviet 
Central TV. Along with popular Russian-origin entertainment, Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal offers 
news from Russia, as well as the national news on weekdays produced by journalists 
based in the Latvian capital Riga. Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal broadcasts also in Lithuania and 
Estonia, two other Baltic countries, providing the same programming with the exception 
of the locally produced national news bulletins. 
While Russian-speaking viewers have little interest in the offerings of both public 
channels, the commercial TV3 and LNT have been more successful in addressing the 
Russian-speaking minority, especially LNT which has good results in attracting the 
Russophone audiences. Nevertheless, still it is transnational Russian television, namely 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, that attracts the largest Russian-speaking audiences in the country. 
LTV1, the main public television channel, broadcasts solely in Latvian; but its second 
channel LTV7 offers a limited amount of Russian-language programming, primarily 
weekday news bulletins. While, following the 2012 language referendum when the 
proposal of radical Russian-speaking activists to make Russian the second official 
language in the country was rejected, some extra Russian-language current affairs content 
appeared on LTV7 as part of the government’s plans of national integration, still overall 
Russian-language output on the public television is scarce and Russian-speakers continue 
to make up only a tiny fraction of its programme-makers meaning that little has changed 
after the referendum in terms of ethno-linguistic diversity on or off screen. Contrary to 
LTV, the public Radio Latvia provides a popular among Russian-speaking audiences 24-
hour Russian-language service mixing music and talk that includes also a substantial 
volume of news and current affairs. 
The core audiences of LTV are members of the Latvian-speaking majority, and especially 
older generations. Young people along with Russian-speaking audiences are the main 
rejecters of public television, and its main channel LTV1 in particular. As far as regular 
audience measurements reveal, a typical loyalist of LTV1 is an ethnic Latvian female 
viewer in the 55 plus age group living outside the capital (except the eastern Latgale 






2.5 Public Broadcasting and Post-Communist Nation-Building  
Responses of the Latvian-speaking majority and the vast Russian-speaking minority to 
the public broadcaster LTV as a nation-building resource should be scrutinized in the 
light of the overall turbulent Latvian nation formation project, echoing similar 
experiences of other new post-Communist nation-states across Central and Eastern 
Europe, and most notably the Estonian case, another Baltic country with not only 
analogous ethno-linguistic composition to Latvian society but also with much the same 
chosen nation-building model that includes also similar citizenship, language and national 
integration (social cohesion) policies (for a comparative overview see, for instance, 
Muiznieks, et al., 2013). 
It is also in Estonia that a sizeable Russian-speaking minority20 has high interest in the 
Russian media, a pattern inherited from the Soviet era when Russian-speakers did not use 
the Estonian-language media (Vihalemm, 2006). As already pointed out the Estonian 
experience is much the same as that of Latvia, with Latvia’s Russian-speakers also having 
had little interest in the local Latvian-language media during the years of the Soviet rule. 
According to the regular audience statistics, only a small portion of Estonian Russian-
speakers today are among the audiences of the Estonian public television ETV, including 
its second channel ETV2 providing some Russian-language programming. Instead, 
Estonian Russian-speakers prefer watching the same transnational Russian channels that 
Russian-speaking audiences watch in Latvia with Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal being the most 
popular among the Russian-speaking community in Estonia (for a more detailed account 
see Jõesaar, Rannu, 2014, Loit, Siibak, 2013, Vihalemm, Hogan-Brun, 2013b).21   
The dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1991 put an end to the union of fifteen republics, 
and what was once one of the Soviet republics became independent Latvia with the 
physical state borders being re-drawn and with a need to re-imagine the national 
community, to quote Billig, through time (‘with its own past and own future destiny’) and 
across space (‘embracing the inhabitants of a particular territory’) (1995:70). The 
boundaries of the national collectivity had to be re-established setting the rules of the 
                         
20 According to the 2011 population census, 29.6% of its 1.3 million population have Russian language as 
their mother tongue. Source: Statistics Estonia.  
21 However, it should be stressed already at this point that despite the notable differences in the media 
preferences among Latvian-speakers/Estonian-speakers and Russian-speaking audiences neither in the 
Latvian, nor in the Estonian case ethno-linguistic majority or minority are homogeneous in their media 
consumption patterns as also T.Vihalemm (2002) in her study of the media repertories of ethnic Estonians 





game anew of who is to be included and who is ‘the other’ to be left out from the 
national ‘we’ and against which then the national identity could be formed defining what 
it means to be a Latvian. 
Among Latvian-speakers the popular leitmotif of the national re-imagination became the 
aspiration to re-establish the pre-war Latvian nation-state with the restoration of pre-war 
citizenship as a logical step towards this goal. It is a process that Vihalemm and Hogan-
Brun (2013a) have described as the restarting of the nation-building projects across the 
Baltics in the early 1990s that had been interrupted by the Second World War and nearly 
half a century of Soviet occupation. Accordingly, the post-1991 independent Latvia was 
seen by the official nation-builders, local political elite, as a continuation of pre-war 
Latvia, established in 1918 and ceasing to exist in 1940 when the Soviet troops occupied 
it. At the heart of this narrative was, and to a great extent continues to be, the idealization 
of the pre-war independence period accompanied with the lingering hope that problems 
could be resolved through the denial of the Soviet legacies and the restoration of the pre-
war social order and the country’s ethnic composition (see Rozenvalds, 2010). However, 
the realities of the post-1991 nationhood formation were far more complex than the 
paradigm of continuity seemed to promise. 
Furthermore, the nation formation plans in Latvia and Estonia, as in other new post-
Communist nation-states, coincided with the state-building projects in these societies 
with overall transformations following the collapse of the Communist regimes involving 
also the reformation of their media systems and attempts, even if only on paper, to turn 
former state broadcasters into public service organizations. As Mihelj in her account on 
the nationalism/media interplay in the Eastern European societies in the 1990s reminds 
us,  
the media environment of these recent nation-building efforts has been 
considerably different from the one accompanying similar historical 
efforts in Western Europe. Not only has the technological milieu been 
dramatically different; what is more interesting is that nation-building was 
happening precisely at a point when the media spaces in the region were 
subjected to a swift deregulation and reregulation, transnationalization, 
commercialization, tabloidization and audience segmentation (2011:176). 





envisioned as instruments in constructing and propagating an image of the national ‘we’ 
that is built on the basis of the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority. 
Already in the 1995 broadcasting law it was stipulated that Latvian public radio and 
television organizations should ‘ensure the development of the Latvian language and 
culture promoting the consolidation of a single community state’22 (Radio and Television 
Law, 1995). Yet, the view of the institutions of public broadcasting as agents of national 
integration expected to secure national unity has become central in the political agenda, 
though this was so more in declarative than practical terms, only starting from the 
second decade of the post-Communist years, perhaps reaching its peak after the 2012 
language referendum, though, again, more on paper than in practice. Untill then, during 
the 1990s, the new-born public broadcasters, themselves undergoing a stormy and 
contradictory reform experience, were expected to provide support for the equally 
troubled nation-forming aspirations – namely in terms of supporting the official version 
of the national identity that involved first and foremost the promotion and protection of 
the national language and culture (that is, the official version of the national culture). 
Further than that though, their role as contributing to the promotion of social cohesion 
did not occupy any significant place in the agenda of the local political elite, media policy 
makers and broadcasters themselves.23 This should not come as a surprise given that in 
the first years of the post-Communist period the ruling political elite, thinking that the 
hoped-for mass departure of the Soviet era immigrants to their places of origin – in the 
majority of cases Russia – would provide the solution to inter-ethnic relations, showed 
very little interest in the issues of national integration and for a long time there was no 
coherent policy of national integration present in Latvia with the first governmental 
programme addressing these issues being approved only in 2001 after pressure from the 
West (see Rozenvalds, 2010). 
In line with the ethno-nationalistic approach that has so far dominated in the country’s 
official national integration policy it is the language and culture of the Latvian-speaking 
                         
22 The notion of ‘a single community state’ is used to describe societies in juxtaposition to ones comprising 
two different, divided communities. 
23 For instance, as Šulmane (2010) notes, it was only during the second decade of the post-Communist 
period that the second channel of the public television providing also some Russian-language programming 
was positioned as a channel meant for the integration of minorities, though later that focus has been 
abandoned prioritizing orientation towards sports and entertainment programming and paying less 
attention to such content that is oriented towards the ethno-linguistic minority audiences. As noted earlier, 
the idea of the second channel of LTV as serving the purposes of national integration again entered the 
political agenda following the 2012 language referendum, though little has been done in practical terms as 
ruling politicians still continue to look at the Russian-language programming on the public television as an 





majority that are defined as the cement expected to hold the national community 
together and offering its members all-encompassing identity of the nation. To put it 
another way, common language and culture (of the ethno-linguistic majority) is seen as a 
prerequisite for building a cohesive society and making national integrity possible. For 
the Latvian nation-builders, ‘the Latvian language and cultural space create the 
foundation for national identity, strengthens feeling of belonging to the nation and the 
state of Latvia,’ to  quote the latest country’s integration policy document Guidelines on 
National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (2012–2018) (Latvian Ministry of Culture, 
2011:15). It defines ‘the Latvian language, culture and national identity, European 
democratic values and the unique cultural space [of Latvia]’ as ‘unifying foundation’ for 
the creation of a cohesive society (Latvian Ministry of Culture, 2011:9).24 As Kruk, one of 
the most outspoken critics of the official national integration policy, notes, ‘official 
language proficiency is treated as the foremost indicator of social cohesion’ (2011:447), 
and from such a linguistic determinism perspective, as Kruk argues, it is assumed that ‘by 
acquiring the Latvian language, the local Russophone population would inevitably 
interiorize the peculiar Latvian worldview and social cohesion (integration) would be 
achieved’ (2011:450). 
As public opinion surveys have demonstrated, the idea that ethno-cultural principles 
should be at the heart of the nation-building project is highly popular among ethnic 
Latvians – in line with the 2010 survey, 44% of ethnic Latvians even agreed with the 
statement ‘I would like it better if only [ethnic] Latvians lived in Latvia’ – contrary to 
Russians who are more open in their definitions of who constitutes the Latvian nation. 
In the same survey while 94.4% of Russians said that all Latvian citizens should be seen 
as belonging to the Latvian nation 81.1% of ethnic Latvians could agree. There were also 
significantly more Russians than ethnic Latvians who said that all Latvian residents with 
sense of belonging to the country, or simply all residents of Latvia, as well as all who 
were born in Latvia or have at least one parent who is ethnic Latvian should be seen as 
belonging to the Latvian nation (see Zepa, 2011).25 
                         
24 Acccording to the document, ‘the common basis for the [social] integration is the Latvian language, the 
feeling of belonging to the Latvian state and its democratic values, respect for Latvia’s unique cultural 
space and development of a shared social memory’ (Latvian Ministry of Culture, 2011:6).  
25 The majority of ethnic Latvians believed that along with ethnic Latvians (97.9%) it is also all Latvian 
citizens (81.1%) who constitute the national community. 75.6% said that all who speak Latvian and live in 
Latvia are also part of the national ‘we’, 72.9% – all Latvian residents with sense of belonging to country, 
67.7% – all who were born in Latvia, 65.1% – all who have at least one parent who is ethnic Latvian, and 





As the official national integration strategy has proved to be of limited success (for a 
detailed assessment see Muižnieks, 2010), sociologists in Latvia have recently called for 
the need to re-define the demarcation lines of the national ‘we’ where ethnic and civic 
elements of national membership could coexist. Instead of focusing primarily on ethnic 
criteria, the potential of the so-called citizenship model of nationhood should also be 
considered, sociologists say. As Zepa (2011) argues, while ethnic Latvians and ethnic 
minorities strongly disagree on the ethnically defined principles of national integration26, 
it is civic values that could unite the national community as such values are equally 
important to both the ethnic majority and minority. Zepa reminds that ‘there are many 
values related to civic nationalism which are very much supported by [ethnic] Latvians, 
Russians and members of other ethnic minorities – obeying the law, opposing injustice, 
fighting against corruption, etc.’ (2011:27). As she concludes, ‘presumably these issues, 
alongside the Latvian language and culture, could serve as equally important principles 
for the integration of the nation, thus establishing a set of ethnic and civic nationalism 
values’ (2011:27-28). 
Yet, the idea of the formation of the national ‘we’ not primarily in terms of ethno-
cultural principles but based on a combination of ethnic and civic values has so far failed 
to gain any substantial support in the circles of the ruling political elite. Even more than 
20 years after the restoration of the country’s independence ethno-linguistic markers are 
deep-rooted in the political rhetoric of national identity, and the language and culture of 
the ethno-linguistic majority remains to be conceived as the main raw material of the 
national imagination and also national integrity. 
However, this is by no means to argue that the so-called ‘civic’ nationalism is somehow 
better than the so-called ‘ethnic’ nationalism. As noted in the literature on nationalism 
such distinction between two types of nationalism is problematic as it creates 
stereotypical opposition between ‘good’ Western ‘civic’ nationalisms and ‘bad’ ‘ethnic’ 
nationalisms beyond the Western world. To quote McCrone, the ‘civic’/‘ethnic’ 
distinction ‘helps to justify the ‘superiority’ of Western – political – forms of nationalism 
over Eastern – ethnic – forms’ (1998:7). The ‘civic’/‘ethnic’ nationalism dichotomy also 
                                                                      
(94.4%) and ethnic Latvians (93.7%) it is also all Latvian residents with sense of belonging to country 
(90.6%) and all who were born in Latvia (89.6%) should be seen as belonging to the Latvian nation. 85.9% 
of Russians said that it is also all residents of Latvia part of the national ‘we’, 83.9% – all who have at least 
one parent who is ethnic Latvian, 79.9% – all who speak Latvian and live in Latvia (Zepa, 2011). 
26 In line with the 2010 survey, 89% of ethnic Latvians and only 46% of Russians supported one of the key 
postulates of the country’s official national integration policy that unity of the society should be based on 





misleadingly presents both categories as mutually exclusive, albeit, in fact, each form of 
nationalism comprises elements of both, though in different proportions. In the words 
of Özkırımlı, ‘what is common to all nationalisms’ is ‘that they are both cultural and 
political phenomena’ (2005:163). 
As already noted, in the Latvian project of national imagination so far ethno-cultural 
components of nationhood have dominated with political elements (citizenship 
principles) playing a minor role in the official national imaginary. Accordingly, 
broadcasting policy over the last more than two decades since the restoration of 
independent statehood has prioritized the promotion and protection of the language and 
culture of the ethno-linguistic majority, and it is the language and culture of the Latvian-
speaking majority that the local media policy makers have also defined as the common 
denominator expected to hold both ethno-linguistic communities together around the 
public radio and television. In line with the Latvian broadcasting law, the country’s public 
broadcasters are expected to ‘promote integration and social cohesion on the basis of the 
Latvian language’ (Electronic Mass Media Law, 2010). As stipulated in the law, LTV and 
Radio Latvia should also ensure the preservation and development of the Latvian 
language and culture, as well as the promotion of respect for the Latvian language, and 
popularisation of the history and cultural values of Latvia (see Electronic Mass Media 
Law, 2010). 
Media scholars in Latvia have long criticized LTV, as well as its regulatory body the 
National Electronic Media Council, for ignoring the needs and interests of the Russian-
speaking population and neglecting the idea that also Russian-language programming 
could serve as an instrument of social cohesion (Kruks, 2001, Kruks, Šulmane, 2005, 
Šulmane, 2006, Šulmane, 2010). As seen by such scholars, the output of original Russian-
language programming on the public television is insufficient given the ethno-linguistic 
make-up of Latvian society. As Kruks has argued,   
the large size of the Russian-speaking population and the domination of 
the Russian language under Soviet rule have created a situation in which 
the restriction of the Russian language in the public sphere has been 
perceived by the State authorities as a legitimate mechanism to protect 
the Latvian language. The priority of preserving the Latvian language has 
overshadowed any concern for promoting social cohesion, through 





As a rule, in the eyes of the ruling Latvian political elite media preferences of the 
Russian-speaking community, namely their high exposure to transnational Russian 
television, and overall high inflows of Russian-origin television production in the country 
have been seen as constituting a threat to national integrity. The accessibility and takeup 
of Russian television in the country and its high popularity among Russian-speaking 
audiences has been even discussed at governmental level as a matter of national security. 
Valdis Dombrovskis, then prime minister of Latvia, in his annual national security report 
of 2013 defined the creation of a single unitary national ‘information space’, though not 
providing any definition of what stands behind this rather ambiguous concept, as a way 
of fighting against ‘the pressure of foreign information spaces in the territory of our 
country’ (Valsts kanceleja, 2013). 
Despite its rather utopian nature the idea of a unitary ‘information space’, something that 
seems to be conceived by politicians as an overarching national public sphere whose 
language is Latvian and who encompasses members of both ethno-linguistic 
communities and provides them with shared knowledge and experiences or, to quote the 
then Latvian culture minister Žaneta Jaunzeme-Grende speaking with the journalists 
back in 2012, two months after the language referendum, where ‘unitary information’ is 
provided (LTV1, 2012), has won much popularity among the circles of the ruling 
political elite, especially after the referendum. Although the proposal of the Russian-
speakers’ movement to make Russian the country’s second official language has been 
rejected, the support it attracted in the Russian-speaking community forced the ruling 
politicians pay more attention to issues of national integration and the support the media 
can offer in this respect. 
The idea of the official nation-builders is to create a common public sphere of the nation 
not so much by bringing together Latvian-language and Russian-language media sub-
systems and their audiences but by integrating Russian-speaking audiences into a public 
sphere mediated through the Latvian-language media. It is first and foremost the 
Latvian-language media seen by ruling politicians as key institutions of the national public 
sphere they aspire to create. During the recent debates on the future of the country’s 
public radio and television organizations the government has announced that it is the 
task of public broadcasters to provide such a public sphere for the nation. 
In the discourse of the ruling political elite what may look as immersion of Russian-





evidence of alienation of the Russian-speaking community from their present home 
country Latvia and a display of a stronger identification with Russia that for many is their 
country of origin. At the heart of such argumentation lies an assumption that watching 
more transnational television from Russia than national channels signals a stronger sense 
of national belonging felt by Russian-speakers towards Russia than Latvia. From such a 
perspective ‘dangerous’, or at least ‘problematic’, media practices of Russian-speakers, 
namely their high attraction to Russian television, are seen as a manifestation of at least 
their unwillingness to integrate into Latvian society if not disloyalty of this community to 
Latvia, anxieties familiar also for other European societies with large immigrant 
communities, and not necessarily limited to the Eastern part of Europe (see for an 
overview of British, French and German responses to ‘peculiar’ viewing preferences of 
their immigrant communities Morley, 2000). 
The National Electronic Media Council in its recent strategy paper on the development 
of the radio and television industry argues that ‘Russia deliberately utilizes its electronic 
media to realize soft power by forming the public opinion in Latvia with an aim to 
promote its geopolitical interests’ (Nacionālā Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome, 
2012:5), the view shared by the ruling politicians. Both, media policy makers and 
politicians, would not mind if not to close Russian channels in Latvia then at least to 
limit their presence in the country, the sentiments entering the political agenda from time 
to time as it was also after the recent one-sided coverage of Ukraine crisis on Russian 
television. Nevertheless, the mood of antipathy and suspiciousness towards Russian 
television is not exclusive to the Latvian political elite, and it is also Estonian politicians, 
for instance, arguing that Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is doing anti-Estonian propaganda 
financed by the Russian government (Vihalemm, Hogan-Brun, 2013b). As Latviiskoe 
Vremya (Latvia’s Time), national evenings news on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, also its Estonian 
look-alike Novosti Estonii (News of Estonia) has often been blamed for being Moscow-
minded (Jõesaar, Rannu, 2014). 
In this discourse of what is seen as the dangerous intentions of Russian television, and 
often also of its audiences, threatening ideals of national integration, and even national 
security, Russian-speaking viewers are constructed as passive and uncritical audiences 
susceptible to what is commonly described as pro-Kremlin propaganda and brainwashing 
of a state controlled Russian television and deprived of any agency to make sense of 





chapters, these rather simplistic arguments conflict with what appears to be a far more 
complex and nuanced reality in which Russian-speaking audiences interpret, and as much 
as for one or another reason accept also reject, texts of Russian television. To quote 
Cheskin, they ‘may subscribe to Russian cable TV channels, but this does not mean that 
they also subscribe to Russian discourse in its entirety’ (2012a:336). 
The existence of two supposedly separate, Latvian-language and Russian-language, media 
sub-systems (or ‘information spaces’, to use this abstract and ill-defined but still highly 
popular in Latvia concept) with little interaction between each other, seen as an 
impediment to social cohesion has become a buzzword in local political, media policy 
and also academic discourses, though little conceptualized at a theoretical level and little 
supported by evidence of empirical audience research. This, along with the ethno-
linguistically segregated system of political parties and conflicting collective memories of 
both ethno-linguistic groups, has often been seen as another piece of evidence proving 
what is believed to be an overall ethno-linguistic split in Latvian society. 
In their report Kruks and Šulmane have identified the ‘opposition of two information 
spaces, lack of dialogue between them, which does not facilitate democratic discussion in 
the public sphere and the development of an integrated civic society’ as one of the most 
serious problems of Latvian media ecology (2005:147). In a similar vein, a few years later 
Šulmane concluded that ‘the parallel media spaces do not promote the integration of 
various audiences and social groups’ (2010:252). ‘In Soviet times, the media tended to 
propagandize the same ideas in two languages. Now there is different content in the 
media system – information in two languages which sometimes interacts, but usually 
stays apart,’ argued Šulmane (2010:225). 
Indeed, numerous comparative media content studies have demonstrated the 
construction of opposing versions of reality in the Latvian-language and Russian-
language media in Latvia (see Kruks, Šulmane, 2002, Muižnieks, Zelče, 2011, Šulmane, 
Kruks, 2001, Šulmane, Kruks, 2006, Tabuns, 2006, Zepa, 2006, Zepa, 2008, just to name 
few). Yet, apart from a number of issues – first and foremost the so-called ‘national 
questions’ as discussions over the citizenship law, language legislation, reformation of the 
education system (in terms of the language of instruction) and interpretations of the 
Latvia’s history of the 20th century – where attitudes of Latvian-speakers and Russian-
speakers are divided, everyday media discourses have similarities and differences equally 






In previous studies the media of both ethno-linguistic groups have been much criticized 
of reinforcing ethno-linguistic rifts in the society instead of searching for a dialogue 
between the Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities and blamed for 
hindering instead of facilitating the process of national integration. Indeed, contrary to 
the often heated and intolerant discourse of the media, as well as of the political elite, 
everyday realities of the inter-ethnic relationships in Latvia can be described as peaceful 
coexistence of both ethno-linguistic groups. It is worth reminding here of the relatively 
high rate of ethnically mixed marriages in Latvia both during the Soviet era and in the 
post-Soviet period (for a more detailed account on the inter-ethnic relations in Latvia see, 
for instance, Tabuns, 2010). 
2.6 Conclusion  
The transformation of the former state broadcasters into Western-style public 
broadcasting institutions in Latvia, as in several other new post-Communist nation-states 
across Central and Eastern Europe, occurred not only at the same time when overall 
system change was underway, it also coincided with the stormy nation-(re)building 
process. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in Latvia ethno-nationalistic 
sentiments have dominated in the government’s project of (re)building of the nation, and 
in line with this spirit not only new citizenship and language laws but also new 
broadcasting legislation has been written. 
It is the language and culture of the Latvian-speaking majority that is conceived by 
nation-builders, ruling politicians, as the cement of national imagination and national 
integration, and, accordingly, it is the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic 
majority public broadcasters are expected to ‘take care of’ as part of their contribution to 
the official project of national identity and also something that broadcasting policy 
makers have defined as a core element expected to bind Latvian-speaking viewers and 
listeners and the large Russian-speaking minority audiences together around the public 
radio and television. 
Although post-Communist public broadcasting institutions have been expected by their 
governments to provide sufficient investment in the project of (re)imagination of the 





commercial pressures that the new era of (distorted) liberal democracy and private capital 
has brought along. Politicization and commercialization are central features of the new 
post-Communist media systems in Central and Eastern Europe, and this is a context that 
has informed the process of reform of the former state broadcasters. 
Attempts to remake the ex-Soviet state owned, funded and controlled Latvian radio and 
television organizations in the image of Western European institutions of public 
broadcasting can be seen as an aspect of the overall process of the desired restoration of 
‘normal’ social order where ‘abnormality’ of Soviet regime was to be ‘rectified’ through a 
return to the Western world which was set as an overarching goal of the post-
Communist transformations (Stukuls Eglitis, 2002).  
However, in reality, the rejection of the Communist broadcasting principles, as part of 
the overall project of the ‘return to Europe’ and of breaking ties with the legacies of the 
previous regime, was not easily achievable mainly because the old ways of thinking, and 
also acting, were still much present in the mindset of the post-Communist power elite 
who continued to look at the newly established public broadcasters as part of the state 
apparatus and servants of the government of the day. Political meddling, or at least 
attempts to exert political pressure, accompanied with insufficient and unstable funding 
have been some of the key realities faced by Central and Eastern European public 
broadcasters over more than the past two decades since the collapse of the Communist 
regimes. These, along with a wide spectrum of other socio-cultural factors have hindered 
the tradition of public broadcasting, at least in terms of public broadcasting institutions, 
taking root in post-Communist societies. As Jakubowicz has rightly noted, ‘the successful 
introduction of PSB is so extraordinarily difficult to achieve [..] that it could be regarded 











Methodology   
Through qualitative audience research into responses of its various publics to the Latvian 
public television LTV in this ex-Soviet Baltic country the study seeks to make a 
contribution to our understanding of complex relationship between public broadcasters 
and their publics in post-Communist societies. My main interest is in exploration of 
discourses of the Latvian-speaking majority and the vast Russian-speaking minority 
publics of LTV talking about their relationship with public television as a project of 
nation-building. The focus of the research comprises the perceptions of public television 
its publics have or develop and their experiences with it. Focus group discussions and 
family observations form the methodological basis for this investigation addressing the 
following research questions:  
1. What attitudes have the Latvian-speaking majority and Russian-speaking minority 
publics developed and what actions members of both ethno-linguistic groups 
have taken as a response to Latvian public service television’s role as contributing 
to the nation-building project in the post-Communist era? 
2. What perceptions of the public broadcaster LTV publics of both ethno-linguistic 
communities have, and how these discourses inform and are informed by their 
experiences with public television with a special interest in their everyday 
television viewing practices within a domestic realm? 
3. What is the relationship between the way members of the ethno-linguistic 
majority and minority conceptualize the public broadcaster LTV, as well as 
understand the concept of public broadcasting more generally, and the way they 
define the national ‘we’? In other words, how do their definitions of the public 
broadcasting idea and its de jure institutional embodiment LTV interact with their 
definitions of the nation? 
With regard to the methodological framework of the study, focus group discussions with 
members of both ethno-linguistic groups, Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, are 
combined with participant observations within day to day family environments. To 





regular television audience measurements data27 and utilized findings of a number of 
quantitative surveys as secondary sources to my own research.28  
Ratings data and other statistics offer a large amount of representative and generalizable 
data on viewing behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of audiences and, therefore, may be 
useful for the purposes of methodological triangulation to contrast quantitative data with 
those acquired with the help of qualitative methodologies. Yet, such statistical 
information says little about the socio-cultural aspects shaping media experiences and 
perceptions of audiences this study primarily aims to investigate. To quote Ang, well-
known critic of ratings research, audience statistics ‘makes us know the audience in terms 
of patterns of a limited number of behavioural displays, but it remains silent about the 
ways in which television becomes meaningful and has an impact in people’s everyday 
lives and the larger culture’ (1991:151).  
Therefore, I have preferred to focus on qualitative methodologies, and it is the focus 
group discussions in conjunction with the participant observations in family settings that 
constitute the backbone of the methodological framework of the study. 
3.1 Focus Groups 
As the study seeks to grasp discourses of ordinary people talking about their relationship 
with the institution of public television in their country, Latvia, and discussing their 
understanding of the idea of public broadcasting as a set of values more generally, and it 
is meaning production practices involved in the formation of these discourses the study 
is primarily interested in, a qualitative data-gathering technique, focus group interviews, 
has been chosen as the most appropriate focal method of the enquiry.  
Qualitative interviewing, either in-depth one-to-one interviews or focus group 
discussions, has been a popular methodological choice in qualitative audience research. 
An examination of some of the classic works in the field of studies of reception and uses 
of the media by Gray (1992), Hobson (1982), Liebes and Katz (1993), Livingstone and 
                         
27 All provided by the ratings company TNS Latvia. 
28 Two large-scale national quantitative surveys addressing a wide range of questions relating to television 
viewing preferences, news media habits and use of different types of media more generally, as well as 
attitudes towards the main television channels in the country, including the public broadcaster LTV, were 
of special importance. Both surveys were carried out by the research company TNS Latvia in 2011 and 
2012 with a representative sample of 500 respondents aged 15 to 74. The results of both surveys have been 





Lunt (1994), Morley (1980, 1986), Radway (1984), Schlesinger et al. (1992) reveals a 
consensus stressing the active role of audiences in making sense of media texts. While 
the primary task of my study is not so much to investigate readings and uses audiences 
make of particular media texts as to explore the way their media experiences and 
interpretations inform and are informed by their discourses on the public television, what 
this enquiry has in common with the aforementioned classic texts is the centrality given 
to the examination of the way audiences exercise their agency, something that also 
explains the preference for qualitative audience research methodologies in my own study. 
The research methods literature provides a list of the pros and cons of group interviews 
versus individual interviews, and vice versa. Group interaction has been identified as the 
key advantage and at the same time also the main weakness of the focus group approach. 
While a group situation may stimulate the production of arguments and interpretations in 
the same way as it often happens in everyday conversations, group pressure may also 
silence some participants of the conversation, those holding atypical views, for instance, 
and their position may remain unvoiced, and though group interviews may be a 
convenient and cost-efficient method for obtaining information about meaning 
production processes from a large quantity and a wide range of respondents, these 
accounts, while diverse, may lack sufficient depth (for further discussion see, for 
instance, Barbour, 2007, Gunter, 2000, Hansen, et al., 1998, May, 2011, Ruddock, 2001, 
Schrøder, et al., 2003, Wilkinson, 2004). 
My decision to opt for focus groups rather than individual interviews was mainly driven 
by the key goal of the study to explore the reactions of Latvian-speaking and Russian-
speaking viewers as members of their ethno-linguistic group towards the public 
broadcaster LTV and the idea of public broadcasting more generally. I was particularly 
interested to examine to what extent it is their membership of the ethno-linguistic group 
that determines their experiences with and attitudes towards LTV, as well as their 
understanding of the public broadcasting idea, and therefore my preference for focus 
groups. Here I side with the advocates of the focus group method who, seeing the 
production of meaning as a collective activity, have insisted on the usefulness of this 
method for the study of the ways individuals as bearers of particular collective identities 





In support of his decision to use group discussions rather than individual interviews for 
the investigation of decodings audiences from different socio-economic backgrounds 
make of the BBC television current affairs Morley, in his The ‘Nationwide’ Audience study, 
argues that ‘much individually based interview research is flawed by a focus on 
individuals as social atoms divorced from their social context’ (1980:33). As Morley and 
other proponents of the focus group method rightly remind us, people form their 
attitudes and perceptions not in isolation from but, instead, in interaction with other 
individuals negotiating their opinions against those held by others, and through a group 
interaction the focus group method makes it possible to investigate meanings as 
‘collectively constructed through talk and the interchange between respondents in the 
group situation – rather than to treat individuals as the autonomous repositories of a 
fixed set of individual ‘opinions’ isolated from their social context’ (Morley, 1980:33; for 
further discussion see also Morley, 1992:17-18).  
In a similar vein, Liebes and Katz advocate the use of group interviews in their study of 
the responses of members of different ethnic and cultural groups in Israel (and also in 
the United States and Japan) towards the American Dallas series:  
We are aware that the method does not give equal weight to every 
individual’s reactions to the program. Nor do we wish to give equal weight 
to every individual. Group dynamics are such that opinion and 
participation are not equally weighted; some people have disproportionate 
influence. But real life is like that: opinions are not as much the property 
of individuals as public-opinion polling would have us think. Opinions 
arise out of interaction, and “opinion leaders” have disproportionate 
influence (1993:29, original emphasis). 
Yet, group settings are not somehow more ‘natural’ than it is in the case of the more 
atomized settings of interviewing people individually; both create artificial situations.  
Individual interviews too are not by definition incapable of grasping interpretations 
people make as a result of social interaction. Both approaches have their advantages and 
limitations, and often, as it was also in the case of my study, pragmatic considerations 
(financial and time restrictions) play an additional yet important role in making the choice 





interview to utilize one, as was, in fact, the experience of Morley with his Nationwide 
project (Morley, 1992:17). 
10 focus group discussions were carried out during October and November 2011, plus 
three pilot focus groups starting late August and finishing early October 2011, each 
group containing on average 6-7 participants. As the regular audience statistics suggested 
generational and ethno-linguistic divisions in the overall television viewing patterns in 
Latvian society, age and ethno-linguistic identity served as key variables when making 
decisions on the composition of the focus groups. It was gender, socio-economic status 
(educational background, occupational position, income level) and geography 
(urban/rural) though not the primary but also among the variables I considered when 
planning the focus groups. 
In the first pilot focus group discussion Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers were 
mixed together; however, such an approach did not work well and proved to be a rather 
unproductive strategy as the presence of members of both ethno-linguistic communities 
made some of the participants think that the focus of the discussion is on inter-ethnic 
relations in the country instead of their media related practices and perceptions. As a 
result, the overall atmosphere of the discussion was quite tense and, I felt, prevented 
respondents to be open in their responses. It perhaps revealed the existing rifts in the 
society, while, at the same time, it suppressed frank discussion. This was the key reason I 
decided not to proceed with mixed groups.  
Besides, some Russian-speakers found it hard to express themselves fully in Latvian and 
did not open up. While the majority of Russian-speakers in Latvia has satisfactory 
Latvian language knowledge and only older Russian-speaking generations have poor 
command of Latvian, it goes without saying that one feels more comfortable when 
communicating in his or her mother tongue (or the language he or she uses in the 
family). Though I am aware that the composition of the focus groups may affect the data 
generated and interviewing Latvian-speakers in the presence of Russian-speakers, and 
vice versa, may provide me with information only mixed group situations can offer, for 
the aforementioned reasons I decided to hold further discussions separately.  
Five discussion groups were conducted in Latvian and five were bilingual where Russian-
speakers could choose whether to speak in Latvian or Russian with me as the moderator 





communicate in Russian, some, instead, chose to speak in Latvian or used both 
languages switching from one to another throughout the discussion. In the capital Riga in 
total six discussion groups were organized: three in Latvian and three bilingual, and 
participants were split into three age groups (18-24, 25-54, 55 plus). In addition, four 
discussion groups were held outside the capital city – two in Latvian and two bilingual, 
and in this case all generations were mixed together. Two locations where Latvian-
speakers are in the majority were selected and two where the Russophones constitute a 
large part or the majority of the total population. Both urban and rural population was 
included in the sample of the focus groups conducted outside the capital. For details of 
the composition of the focus groups see Appendix 1. 
Quota sampling and snowball sampling methods were combined to recruit participants. 
In total (including three pilot discussions) 80 respondents aged 18-87 from both ethno-
linguistic groups and varied socio-economic backgrounds took part in the focus group 
discussions. According to the data of the questionnaire all respondents were asked to fill 
in at the beginning of the session, 22 of them were in the 18-24 age bracket, 33 aged 25-
54 and 25 aged over 55. In the sample 54 were female and 26 male informants. Female 
respondents are overrepresented in the sample for the simple reason that women were 
more responsive to the invitation to take part in the study. The skewed sex ratio in Latvia 
with, according to the 2011 population census data, 45.7% of its population being men 
against 54.3% women also partly explains the imbalance of male and female respondents 
in the sample. Regarding occupational positions of respondents, 11 had managerial 
positions, 5 ran their own business, 22 were doing varied specialist jobs, including such 
occupations as school teacher, civil servant, municipality officer, museum employee, 
archivist, human resources manager, agronomist, IT specialist, legal adviser, economist, 
project manager and others, and 7 were low-qualified workers. Around two thirds of 
economically active participants worked in the public sector. 20 were students, 12 retired 
persons and 3 unemployed. Leaving students aside, 35 had higher education, 19 had 
secondary or vocational education and one had basic education. There is no information 
on education for 5 participants. The sample includes people with different levels of 
household income.  
47 of respondents were Latvian-speakers and 33 Russian-speakers, the overwhelming 
majority of them citizens of Latvia with only few, mainly older Russian-speakers, either 





of Latvian-speakers (59%) and Russian-speakers (41%) in the overall focus group sample 
is very close to the ethno-linguistic make-up of Latvian society (see Chapter 2 for further 
statistics on the country’s ethno-linguistic composition). All informants who have 
indicated Russian as their main language in the family in the study are identified as 
Russian-speakers, and, correspondingly, as Latvian-speakers I have identified all those 
participants who have indicated that they mainly speak in Latvian at home. The majority 
of those in the study identified as Russian-speakers have reported that they think of 
themselves as ethnic Russians, and the majority of Latvian-speakers defined themselves 
as ethnic Latvians. Some participants preferred not to report their ethnic origin.  
Focus group discussions were semi-structured and a series of open-ended questions were 
applied to explore such issues as television viewing practices of the participants, their 
experiences with and attitudes towards the main television channels in the country with a 
special interest in their responses to the public broadcaster LTV and, last but not least, 
their understanding of the idea of public broadcasting. The discussions were structured 
so to start with broader questions on the overall viewing habits participants have and 
then gradually to move towards more specific questions regarding their experiences with 
and perceptions of LTV. For the full interview guide see Appendix 3.  
Several stimulus materials were used in breaking the ice and facilitating the discussion 
that were also important as tools of information gathering. To explore their overall 
television viewing habits participants were first asked to make a list of their five most 
favourite programmes on television, something they watch on a regular basis regardless 
of genre and format, language and country of origin be it on traditional linear television 
or on the internet, and then explain their choice. It provided me with a general picture of 
what kind of programming output participants are searching for on television – for 
instance, do they prefer watching news and current affairs, films and series, sports, music, 
etc. – and what motivates their programme choices but more importantly the list of their 
much-loved programmes on television revealed the position offerings of the public 
television LTV occupies in their viewing preferences. If LTV plays a rather marginal role 
in their daily viewing practices, most likely that its offerings will also be absent from the 
list of their favourite shows on television.  
Then participants were invited to comment on their associations with the main six 





writing down few keywords that first spring to their mind when thinking about the 
particular channel.29 The aim of this exercise was to situate their perceptions of LTV, be 
they based on their actual viewing experiences or not, in relation with other channels to 
see what in the eyes of its publics distinguishes LTV from other broadcasters. It also 
demonstrated the role LTV plays in their daily viewing practices. As a rule, with those 
channels watched rarely it was harder for participants to formulate their associations with 
them. 
Before starting a detailed discussion on their experiences with and attitudes towards the 
public broadcaster LTV participants were invited to write a small essay not exceeding a 
half of A4 sheet of paper offering their own definition of the concept of public television 
with the question of the essay being formulated as follows: ‘what do you think the idea of 
public service television is (or should be) about?’. Some referred to their viewing 
experiences, while others to some broader normative assumptions to provide their 
interpretation of the concept of public broadcasting that not only revealed their 
understanding of the idea of public service television but also showed whether they 
associate this concept with LTV, its current de jure institutional embodiment in their 
country, and what other classifications such as state, national and commercial 
broadcasting they employ to distinguish one channel from another. 
In addition, to facilitate discussion on the news offerings of LTV, a short clip (first 5-10 
minutes of the programme) from the latest Panorāma (Panorama) edition, main evening 
news bulletin on LTV1, was demonstrated, and in the same way as with the channels 
participants were asked to provide their associations with Panorāma. Their responses to 
Panorāma, including comments on its news selection priorities and sequence of news 
items, mode of address and other aspects of its presentation style, initiated a further 
discussion on the performance of LTV.30 See Appendix 4 for the scanned sample copies 
of all stimulus materials applied. 
                         
29 The list included both channels of the public broadcaster LTV, national Latvian-language commercial 
channels TV3 and LNT, both gathering the largest audiences in the country, plus Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, the 
most popular channel among the Russian-speaking audiences for the most of its airtime offering 
transmissions of the Russian Pervyi kanal. It was also the only Russian-language national commercial 
channel TV5 included in the list. 
30 Though it is fair to say that Panorāma is a typical product of LTV and its performance is not much 
different form the overall performance of public television (at least when it comes to its news and current 
affairs provision), and yet I am aware that showing a clip from some more popular programming of LTV 
may provoke more positive responses of my respondents towards LTV as, indeed, was the case with 





On average, each discussion lasted 2 hours and 30 minutes. All 13 focus groups have 
been audio recorded and transcribed in full, and later the interview data have been 
analysed in line with a thematic coding method involving close examination of the 
transcripts searching for recurring thematic patterns within and across group sessions 
and organizing these themes into larger categories, the procedure that was repeated again 
and again while at the same time supplementing and comparing this material with other 
data sets (family ethnography data, statistical information, findings of previous studies in 
the area). In the later stage of data interpretation with a help of a narrative analysis 
discourses and narratives coming out of the data were discussed in line with the 
theoretical and analytical framework of the study.  
3.2 Family Ethnography   
The second stage of the fieldwork involved participant observations with five families 
that were carried out in the period from November, 2011 to July, 2012. Keeping in mind 
that ‘the social world of actual audiences only takes shape through the thoroughly 
situated, context-bound ways in which people encounter, use, interpret, enjoy, think and 
talk about television’ (Ang, 1991:162), participant observation as a complementary 
method of investigation has been chosen to situate perceptions of and experiences with 
the public television members of both ethno-linguistic groups have in the context of 
their daily family life. The focus on the production of close analysis or, to use well-
known metaphor of Geertz which he borrowed from Gilbert Ryle, ‘thick description’ 
(2000:6) of use of the media as an integral element of the fabric of everyday life is what 
makes ethnography distinctive among other approaches to media audiences. It places 
lived media experiences audiences have at the heart of the investigation. 
As Bird argues, ‘only ethnography can begin to answer questions about what people really 
do with media’ (2003:191, emphasis in original). It also motivates my decision to 
introduce ethnography, ‘a method for investigating the social world of actual audiences’, 
to quote Moores (1993b:3) speaking in the words of Ang (1991), in the search for an in-
                                                                      
discussions by both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers. Nevertheless, I chose to demonstrate a clip 
from the news programme, and Panorāma in particular, instead of some other type of programming of LTV 
for two main reasons. First, I wanted to focus on the investigation of news consumption patterns as for 
many it is through news watching on television they most vividly exercise citizenship day in day out; it is 
the evening news gathering sizeable audiences on all channels. Second, I chose Panorāma, and not 
something else from LTV news and current affairs portfolio, as LTV itself has always positioned long-
running Panorāma as flagship of its news and current affairs, and, indeed, over those more than 50 years 






depth account on the connections between the everyday context of media activities, on 
the one hand, and attitudes and actions its different publics have developed in a response 
to the public broadcaster LTV and the overall idea of public broadcasting, on the other 
hand. Contrary to the usual focus of family ethnographies in the studies of media 
audiences, I was not so much interested in the role that television played within the daily 
domestic context itself as in the imprint these experiences of day to day viewing have left 
on the articulations family members make on the institution of public television, as well 
as on the concept of public broadcasting as such, and, equally, how these discourses 
shape their viewing practices. 
As family observations started shortly after the completion of the focus group 
discussions it allowed me to utilize family ethnography for the exploration of the key 
topics that have emerged during the focus groups in more detailed fashion. It was only 
when the focus group discussions were finalized that it became clear that due to the 
prominence in the responses of the focus group respondents of the issues of national 
imagination that the primary focus of the study should shift. Though not totally 
unanticipated, yet I did not expect that my focus group respondents were to frame so 
extensively their experiences with and perceptions of LTV within broader discourses on 
the nation, national identity and their inclusion in or exclusion from the national ‘we’ as 
much as within as beyond the public television. 
I started the research with a rather broad aim to investigate the relationship between 
public television and its publics in Latvia in order to understand the crisis in the 
relationship between the public broadcasters and their publics in post-Communist 
societies. Yet, the focus group findings made me rethink the focus of the study defining 
as its primary aim exploration of responses various publics of the Latvian public 
television have taken towards it as the project of nation formation. 
What was initially a general interest in the exploration of the relationship between public 
television and its publics turned into the examination of the relationship between 
definitions of the nation people have and their discourses on the public television, as well 
as their understanding of the concept of public broadcasting more generally. 
Accordingly, alterations in the initial agenda of the family observations had to be made. I 
paid more attention to the investigation of discourses of family members on the 





formation processes, than it was initially planned. In addition, I also introduced extra 
stimulus material, namely a questionnaire each family member was asked to complete, 
among other things addressing those issues of national identity that, according to the 
public opinion polls, divide Latvian society along ethno-linguistic lines. Inevitably, 
changes in the focus of the research also required readjustment of its theoretical 
foundations making the idea of public broadcasting as a nation-building resource central 
to the theoretical framework of the study. 
While the accounts of the participants of the focus group interviews provided me with 
information on the prevailing discourses of both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers 
discussing their relationship with the public television, close examination of viewing 
practices within quotidian domestic settings offered me a more nuanced picture of these 
discourses situating them within a broader context. It was the combination of focus 
groups and family observations that offered enough scope to investigate in depth, 
something that the utilisation of either focus groups or observations with families as the 
sole method of the research would fail to offer. 
Apart from gaining access to the day-to-day media practices of family members with 
special interest in their use of television, as well as to the rest of the episodes of daily 
routines of the family life, family ethnography provided me with rich and detailed data on 
the varied world-views and mental spaces family members have, different family 
histories, dynamics of home life such as interpersonal interaction and power relations in 
the family, even a layout of the living room that all to greater or lesser extent contributed 
to the further understanding of the responses members of both ethno-linguistic 
communities have taken towards the public broadcaster LTV as the project of nation-
building and the idea of public broadcasting more generally. As Morley has once put it to 
advocate the study of the domestic context of television viewing,  
the sitting room is exactly where we need to start from if we finally want 
to understand the constitutive dynamics of abstractions such as ‘the 
community’ or ‘the nation’. This is especially so if we are concerned with 
the role of communications in the continuous formation, sustenance, 
recreation and transformation of these entities. The central point 
precisely concerns television’s role in connecting, for example, the 





sustaining both the image and the reality of the ‘national family’, and of 
various trans-national ‘communities’ (1991:12). 
Initially it was planned to finalize the observations as early as in January, 2012, but the 
research took longer as, first, it was hard to gain access to families and for this reason 
some families joined the project slightly later than others and, second, it was not always 
easy to arrange a time for visits. During the period of observations, one of the 
informants gave birth and in the same family two other family members passed away, 
while in another family a close relative died, and this inevitably meant that alterations in 
the schedule of the visits had to be made, extending the overall time spent doing the 
fieldwork. The observations in the majority of the families were finalised in April, 2012, 
but in two families, because of the aforementioned reasons, the observations continued 
till July, 2012. 
In total, six visits were made with each family during which informal conversational 
interviews were mixed with observations and participation in watching television. 
Families usually were visited during the peak-time television slot (6pm-10pm) both in 
weekdays and weekends. Where possible, I arranged the visits in such a way so as to be 
present when their favourite shows on television were on air. On average, I spent two to 
three hours with a family per session – around 15 hours of total observational time per 
family. Usually the interval between the visits was three to four weeks.  
While for each visit I did some preparatory work jotting down some of the key topics I 
would like to discuss with the family members, I allowed considerable latitude for the 
participants and the situations they were involved in to set the agenda of my visits. Many 
of the topics of our conversations were initiated by the experience of watching television 
together with my informants. Their viewing decisions, channel and programme 
preferences, the chatting that accompanied watching their favourite shows, comments on 
what they had just seen on the screen, and other aspects of the act of viewing, all 
provided rich material and often raised unanticipated issues that were later discussed in 
our conversations. Written notes were made during and after the observations, and later 
all material was analysed using thematic and narrative analysis approaches in the same 
way as in the case of the focus group data.  
While in some families I was invited to enter also the kitchen and other rooms, the key 





all the families it was the place where their main television set in the home was situated 
and where a considerable part of their television viewing activities took place. The choice 
of the living room as the primary site for the fieldwork aided the making of my presence 
in the private space of my informants less intrusive, and, in some cases, the agreement to 
limit the field site to the living room also helped me to convince potential informants to 
take part in the study. As in Latvian society a living room has conventionally been that 
area of a home where guests are received, I did not face huge difficulties in entering it 
and also my informants seemed to be able to accept my presence in their domestic space 
as long as I did not break the rule of not moving beyond the living room. I thought of 
myself as an acquaintance who visited my informants regularly over a particular period of 
time to spend some few hours together while they watch television and to informally 
discuss that experience, and I think family members perceived me in the same way. To 
record information on the physical environment surrounding the field drawings of a 
layout of the living room, including the location of a television set and a computer, were 
made, as well as descriptions of the neighbourhood settings were documented.  
In addition, family members were asked to keep a television diary for the first week of 
the observations registering what programmes on which channels (or on the internet) 
they have watched each day starting from 6 pm till 1 am also noting a brief motivation of 
their viewing choices. When the end of the observational period approached they were 
also invited to complete an extended ad hoc questionnaire covering a variety of issues, 
including their media habits, popular culture consumption patterns, attitudes towards 
Latvian politics and history, questions relating their sense of belonging and their views on 
the national symbols of Latvia and days of national celebration and commemoration.31 
The responses family members gave to these questions were discussed during the final 
session of the observations. The scanned sample copies of a diary and a questionnaire 
can be accessed in Appendix 4. Some of the stimulus materials applied during the focus 
group discussions (the list of five the most favourite shows on television, associations 
with different television channels, small essay on their own definition of the concept of 
                         
31 Using open questions informants were asked, for instance, to rank their five most loved musicians, 
actors, sportsmen and television presenters, their most favourite films and series, radio and television 
channels, print media outlets and internet sites. They were also invited to name what for them are the five 
most important days of national celebration and remembrance and what they think are the five most 
important national symbols of Latvia. In addition they were asked to identify five places – for instance, 
their city, Latvia, Russia, Baltics or Europe – they feel they belong to. Family members were also asked to 
indicate what for them are the five greatest and the five worst events in Latvia’s 20th century history, as well 
as to name five politicians in or outside Latvia towards whom their attitude is positive and five who they 





public television) were also utilized during my informal discussions with the family 
members. 
Again I used quota sampling and snowball sampling methods to recruit participants for 
the family observations. Five families were selected from both ethno-linguistic 
communities in order to reflect the ethno-linguistic diversity in the country. Households 
from both rural and urban locations were included in the sample. Two ethnically mixed 
families, one with Latvian language dominating and one with Russian as their main 
language, came from the capital Riga. Two Latvian-speaking families were recruited 
outside Riga, one living in a provincial town of northern Latvia and one living in the 
countryside in the western part of Latvia. One Russian-speaking family living in a village 
in the eastern region of Latgale with the majority of its population being Russian-
speakers was also included in the sample. In total, 33 participants took part in the family 
observations with 22 Latvian-speakers and 11 Russian-speakers. The size of the families 
ranged from 4 to 10 people with the age of the adult family members spanning from 19 
to 81. For further information on the family profiles see Appendix 2.  
While a decision to include in the sample only the families of at least three generations 
living together made practicalities of planning and conducting the observations a highly 
demanding job, at the same time it allowed me to identify not only ethno-linguistic but 
also generational aspects of their daily media practices. Being at different life stages – 
some in their twenties others already in their sixties and seventies – and having different 
life stories – some have lived in Latvia for generations others have migrated to the 
country from other Soviet republics with their descendants born in Latvia – provided me 
with rich material and insights into the way it all informed my informants’ choices and 
attitudes. My informants also have different degrees of experience of the Soviet system 
and also different, and often conflicting, memories of living under Soviet rule. Some of 
the younger family members have been born in the late Soviet era or even after the 
breakup of the Soviet empire in 1991 having little or no direct experience of living the 
Soviet way of life. In contrast, the experience of having lived in the Soviet Union under 
the Soviet system constitutes a considerable part of the experience of older generations. 
This diversity of experience has turned out to be a significant source of information for 
understanding not only my informants’ overall sentiments, attitudes and beliefs but also 
their media habits and, more importantly, their perceptions of and experiences with the 





concept of public broadcasting. As we shall see in the following data chapters, not only 
deep-seated viewing habits going back to the Soviet epoch continue to shape the choices 
both Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking viewers make today but also, the long 
experience of the Soviet-style state owned, funded and controlled media system some of 
my informants have continues to inform their understanding of the way the media 
system in the country functions today and, what is also important, how it interacts with 
the political system. 
3.3 The Researcher’s Role in the Field  
At the time when the focus group discussions and the family observations were carried 
out, not only was Latvia going through a painful recovery from a deep economic 
recession that hit the country in late 2008 and was followed by severe austerity measures, 
but it also experienced months of political turmoil and ethno-linguistically motivated 
tensions entering the public domain, all inevitably leaving their mark on the sentiments 
of my informants and also affecting my role in the field.  
The focus group discussions took place shortly after the early 2011 parliamentary 
elections held in September 17 following the dissolution of the parliament after a 
referendum in the summer of the same year initiated by then country’s president Valdis 
Zatlers. The referendum itself was prompted by a political crisis after lawmakers 
prevented the country’s anti-corruption bureau from searching the home of MP Ainārs 
Šlesers, an influential local politician and businessmen named by Zatlers as one of the 
country’s oligarchs. The first focus group session was conducted on October 10, a time 
when political parties were in the middle of long and tense coalition talks on the 
formation of the next government. The parliament approved the new government on 
October 25 when the focus groups were still underway with the last sessions held shortly 
after, in early November.  
The Saskaņas centrs (Harmony Centre) alliance, a highly popular political force among 
the Russian-speaking electorate, won the elections, albeit failing to gain an absolute 
majority. Despite its return as the largest party, due to a deep mistrust in it, Saskaņas 
centrs was left outside the ruling coalition – its political opponents reminded of the ties 
Saskaņas centrs has with Moscow (it has an official agreement of cooperation with the 
ruling United Russia party) that, as they argued, cast doubt on the party’s loyalty to 





leading the coalition talks and formed by ex-president Zatlers after his failure to get re-
elected for the second term in office, insisted that Saskaņas centrs should be included in 
the government. Such a move would have made Saskaņas centrs the first ever political 
force supported by Latvia’s Russian-speakers to enter the government since the country 
regained its independence in 1991. Reformu partija later changed its mind and, instead of 
Saskaņas centrs, the right-wing nationalist bloc Nacionālā apvienība (National Alliance) 
joined the government as a third coalition partner, making in the process many Russian-
speakers angry and disappointed. ‘It is not fair that we are disregarded,’ said to journalists 
a young Russian-speaking man, one of the supporters of Saskaņas centrs, protesting with 
hundreds of others in front of the parliament building after the news that Saskaņas centrs 
are left outside the would-be government (Radio Latvia 1, 2011). ‘Only fighting for our 
rights together we will show that we are part of Latvia and that without us decisions 
should not be made,’ addressing protesters said Nil Ushakov, mayor of the capital Riga 
and leader of Saskaņas centrs (LNT, 2011).  
The family observations coincided with the language referendum held in February 18, 
2012 although it is important to note that  preparations for it had already commenced in 
2011 when a group of radical Russian-speaking activists, reacting to a failed attempt by 
Nacionālā apvienība earlier the same year to make Latvian the only language of 
instruction at all state-funded schools replacing the current system of bilingual education 
in minority schools, launched a petition calling for amendments in the country’s 
constitution giving Russian the status of the second official language alongside Latvian. 
The activists were successful in collecting the necessary number of signatures to force the 
national election commission to start a nationwide collection of signatures to initiate 
changes in the constitution in November, 2011 – this was when the family observations 
started. The number of citizens supporting the proposal was sufficient for it to be 
submitted to parliament where, as expected, later in the same year, it was rejected 
opening up the way for the language referendum which eventually took place in February 
2012.  
Although the referendum proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority of voters – 
74.8% – who effectively preferred that Latvian remained the sole state language, 
discussions surrounding the plebiscite made the ethno-linguistic climate in Latvia 
untypically strained. The referendum provoked societal self-reflection on the issues of 





divisions in Latvian society. The opponents of change in the status of the Russian 
language, mostly Latvian-speakers, saw proposed changes in the constitution as a threat 
to the foundations of independent statehood and national identity and a reminder of the 
Russification of Latvia during the Soviet era. They saw and called the referendum an  
anti-Latvian provocation, while supporters of changes in the constitution, many Russian-
speakers, though not all supporting the idea of two official languages, used the 
referendum to register their grievances against the power elite which they blamed for the 
unequal treatment of the Russian-speaking minority, with the recent exclusion of its 
favourite Saskaņas centrs alliance from the governing coalition still fresh in memory. 
What for Latvian-speakers was a referendum on the state language, for many Russian-
speakers was a protest vote against the political establishment and a call for them to be 
recognized as equal. ‘To show that we exist,’ to use the words of a young Russian-
speaking man quoted in the media (LTV1, 2011), was a popular argument among 
Russian-speakers. The intensity of the debate made many Latvian-speakers mobilize in 
response to the demands of the Russian-speaking minority leading to a record high 
turnout in the referendum – 71.13% of citizens took part in the plebiscite. Weeks before 
the referendum all media were full of the reports on the upcoming referendum with 
Latvian- and Russian-language media taking opposing sides that often turned into open 
agitation against or for the amendments in the constitution. The tense situation was also 
part of people’s everyday conversations, and, not surprisingly, it was impossible to avoid 
this topic also during my visits with the families observed. As a rule, my Russian-
speaking informants tended to support the amendments, while Latvian-speaking 
participants opposed them.    
Though the political conjuncture made the overall atmosphere tense, in contrast to the 
customary, peaceful everyday inter-ethnic relations, the political circumstances did 
nothing more than allow fissures already present in society to emerge in the public 
domain, turning otherwise rather private grievances of members of both ethno-linguistic 
communities into a matter of national debate. In other words, the language referendum, 
the earlier elections and the ensuing exclusion of the most popular among Russian-
speakers political force from the ruling coalition did not create new frictions in the 
society; it just illuminated already existing ones. The sentiments of both ethno-linguistic 
groups expressed during the debates surrounding the months of political turmoil were 
not something particularly new; they have always been present in society, yet they took 





tensions. Therefore, under other circumstances the issues of the nation and national 
identification in the responses of my respondents most likely would not have been as 
pronounced as they were under the current political situation. Though the study reveals 
patterns of the relationship between Latvian public television and its publics that are 
valid also outside the political context of the time of the research, still I prefer to see the 
outcome of the study as a snapshot of the particular moment acknowledging that the 
direction that the research took might have been different if the political context were 
different. 
The political developments made the pre-existing ethno-linguistic cleavages visible and 
this offered a valuable context for understanding the relationship between deep-seated 
rifts in the society and the polarized media preferences of both ethno-linguistic 
communities. At the same time, the politically charged atmosphere made my role as a 
researcher more complicated. Due to the heated debates on the political scene and in the 
media, some of the Russian-speaking participants reacted in a highly sensitive manner to 
my questions relating such topics as inter-ethnic relations in the country, their preference 
for Russian channels and their interest in national news versus interest they have in the 
news from Russia, interpreting it as questioning of their loyalty to Latvia, albeit my 
intentions were not such. My being a Latvian-speaking (and not Russian-speaking) 
researcher in the tense political climate at least at the early stages of my interaction with 
the Russian-speaking participants became an obstacle that I had to overcome. Some of 
my Russian-speaking informants approached me with suspicion (not as the ‘neutral’ 
academic I would like to be seen as, but as first and foremost a Latvian-speaker, the 
‘other’), and it took longer time than expected to establish a rapport with them and create 
an atmosphere of trust. 
Despite the fact that, in most of the cases I have managed to establish contact with my 
Russian-speaking respondents and to win their trust, still during my conversations with 
the Russian-speaking participants I have often been reminded, directly or implicitly, that 
I am not a member of their ethno-linguistic community. Thus, during one of the focus 
group discussions with the Russian-speaking viewers one of its participants, in order to 
argue that Russian-speakers do not have language problems and no difficulty in watching 
programmes in Latvian and that there is no need for Russian subtitles, speaking in jest 
addressed me saying ‘We now listen to you [speaking in Latvian] and do not need 





relations in Latvia as peaceful, referred to both of us as the representatives of our ethnic 
group. ‘Between me and you,’ he said in an effort to stress the good relations we have 
with each other and to speak of what he thinks are friendly relations between ethnic 
Russians and ethnic Latvians more generally. On another occasion, when we discussed 
political life in Latvia and the upcoming referendum he formulated our positions 
straightforwardly: ‘You [are ethnic] Latvian, I [am ethnic] Russian’. However, his 
intention was not to insist on some deep divisions and conflicts between us as the 
representatives of our respective ethnic communities, it just served as a reminder of 
different ethnic identities we inhabit as a context of our interaction. 
In one of the Russian-speaking families I have always been invited to share a meal 
together in an expression of their hospitality. During a visit in early January we marked 
the arrival of the New Year raising glasses in a toast and few weeks later ate pancakes 
with three sorts of filling, meat, curd and marmalade, to celebrate Shrovetide, while 
during Easter we knocked and ate eggs they had coloured. It was also the way the family 
members, Orthodox and Old-believers, could demonstrate that they celebrate religious 
festivals also together with Latvian-speakers, the majority of them being either Lutherans 
or Catholics. At the same time, whenever I initiated a discussion on the referendum and 
language policy in the country, or on inter-ethnic relations in Latvia, the atmosphere 
became somehow strained and all their answers were rather abrupt and elusive. It was 
clear that this was not the favourite topic of the family members and they would prefer 
to avoid discussing it. During one of our conversations I was questioned as to who was 
participating in the study, as to whether only Russian-speaking families are participating, 
as to what I was going to do with the notes I had jotted down during my visits and who 
would see the questionnaire they had completed, signalling the suspicions of the family 
regarding my intentions. Not to frighten them away I had to apply a more subtle 
approach to discuss these topics. On the one hand, I did not want to offend them and to 
make them feel guilty for taking part in the referendum and voting in favour of the 
proposal to make Russian the second official language in the country but at the same 
time I could not avoid discussing this issue.   
As I have a good command of Russian to break the ice and to get the conversation going 
in an unstrained manner I often switched to the Russian language when communicating 
with my Russian-speaking respondents. In addition, to make myself appear more as an 





communication with my Russian-speaking informants I have tried to avoid position-
taking when it comes to such ‘sensitive’ topics as the country’s citizenship and language 
policies or the interpretations of the 20th century history of Latvia, and usually have tried 
to leave my personal views and preconceptions at the door. Having said that, I am not 
arguing that I as a researcher while doing the fieldwork have achieved some state of 
complete objectivity and neutrality and, likewise, that my interpretations of the fieldwork 
results are completely judgment free.  
Although I have applied a number of strategies to minimise my impact on the field, it is 
impossible, as it has often been pointed out in the methodological literature, for me as an 
ethnographer to be free from the subjectivity and distance myself from my own 
biography that is made of my experiences and that, in its turn, forms perspectives I take. 
In my case, the aspect of my biography playing the most prominent role during the 
research was my ethno-linguistic background, with other facets of my identity such as 
gender, age or socio-economic status having relatively little impact on relations in the 
field, as well as during other stages of the research process.  
When studying the attitudes and experiences of my Latvian-speaking respondents I 
thought of myself as being more part of the culture I was studying than in the case of my 
Russian-speaking informants. At some point during the fieldwork I discovered that for 
me the perceptions and experiences of the Russian-speakers were somehow more 
unknown and unfamiliar, albeit not totally foreign and not at all something that fits into 
an ‘exotic’ category, to refer to the origins of ethnography, and therefore more interesting 
to be explored than those of the Latvian-speakers. To continue in this confessional tone, 
I have to say that all the time while being in the field I had to remind myself that my 
research objects are members of both ethno-linguistic groups and that I should not lose 
my interest in examining also the behaviour and attitudes of the Latvian-speakers. Not to 
take for granted and perceive as self-evident the phenomena that for me entering the 
field seemed known and familiar, albeit in reality little problematized and understood, I 
have applied, or at least have made such an attempt, a strategy of defamiliarizing myself 
(looking from a position of an outsider in relation to a culture researched) with the 
attitudes and experiences of my Latvian-speaking participants. 
While for some Russian-speakers I was a stranger because of my ethno-linguistic identity 





speakers, I did not experience the same difficulties when contacting the Latvian-speakers. 
Instead, on the part of my Latvian-speaking respondents I was treated as an insider in 
terms of ethno-linguistic belonging, and yet this is not to say that my experience of 
interacting with the Latvian-speakers was always smooth and free from tensions. 
For the majority of my informants, be they Latvian-speakers or Russian-speakers, their 
new, albeit temporary, status of being observed did not come easy. In most cases initially 
I was treated with curiosity and with some degree of suspicion and it usually took first 
visits to establish a rapport. My experience in one of the Latvian-speaking families 
illustrates this process of becoming accepted as an ethnographer by those being observed 
further. As they told me later, one member of the family following my first visit was 
questioning others whether they could trust me illustrating the anxieties that my intrusion 
in the family home had triggered; only after a couple of sessions one of the informants 
noted that their little daughter in my presence acted in a typical manner of romping 
around in their living room and from time to time joining conversations of the adults, 
something that usually does not happen when there is a stranger at home. It was a signal 
that initial anxieties caused by my arrival had, if not disappeared completely, then at least 
lessened and that I had been more or less accepted as a guest who was welcome in their 
home. 
However, it should not necessarily mean that what I had been observing accurately 
reflected the natural behaviour of my participants. Although I do not think that my 
presence in the field had significantly altered typical patterns of viewing behaviour of the 
family members, as well as their other domestic activities and interpersonal dynamics, it 
would be an idealization to insist that, while family ethnography takes place in the natural 
habitat of those under study, it happens with no obtrusiveness to the daily rhythms of 
the family life. While the environment (domestic space) is natural, the conditions under 
which the research happens are not such, for, as Moores in his study on the domestic 
consumption of satellite television rightly reminds us, ‘it is an unusual situation for an 
academic to be sitting in somebody else’s living room, talking to them about an aspect of 
their private lives’ (1996:32).  
While with some informants it took rather little effort to overcome initial barriers, with 
others it took much longer time to build a rapport, and in some extreme cases all 





providing little explanation for it and, instead, nominated his wife to speak on his behalf. 
In another family one of its members during the first sessions was very reticent and most 
of the time kept silent to announce in one of the next visits that he does not see any 
sense of the research and does not want to be a guinea pig signalling his uneasiness and 
discomfort about being subjected to monitoring and questioning what he compared with 
interrogation. ‘You have only 30 minutes’, he declared in an unfriendly tone at the 
beginning of one of the sessions to say that he did not wish to spend more time on this 
activity. Only after a long effort to persuade him and explain the purpose of the study 
and the importance of his cooperation, did I manage to convince him not to withdraw 
from the research. While our further meetings were less tense, this is not to say that his 
sceptical attitude towards the research had disappeared. On another occasion, due to the 
exacerbation of the illness one member of the family was unable to be interviewed, and 
later he, sadly, passed away.  
To conclude, I do not see my role in the field as the fly-on-the-wall type researcher who 
in some disengaged manner looks on the researched from the distance with ‘the 
disinterested eye and ear of the objective observer-reporter’, as Lull (1990:179) 
idealistically has put it in his study on the television viewing and family life. Instead, in 
the spirit of ‘postmodern reflexivity’ (Bird, 2003:16) I acknowledge that through my 
presence in the field I have participated in the construction of reality to the same extent 
as my informants, and our interactions should be read as jointly constructed meanings. 
As Clifford rightly points out, the ethnographer is not merely ‘scribe and archivist’, 
he/she is also ‘interpreting observer’ (1986:17). 
This project, just as other ethnographic narratives, is the result of a collaborative 
‘interpretive  activity’, as Geertz (2000:9) has described anthropological research, by the 
observer and the observed, and, albeit this is not to deny validity and reliability of the 
results of the study, this text remains merely an account of particular versions of reality. 
It is made, partial and incomplete account – ‘fiction’, to quote Geertz (2000), or ‘partial 
truth’, to use Clifford’s terminology (1986). To stress the interpretive nature of 
anthropological writings Geertz reminds us that ‘what we call our data are really our own 
constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up 
to’ (2000:9), and Ang puts his argument in the context of audience research. For her, 
representations of ‘audiences’ are inventions of audience researchers: ‘it is only in and 





certain profiles of certain audiences take shape – profiles that do not exist outside or 
beyond those descriptions but are created by them’ (1996:77). Yet, it is worth not to 
forget that ‘while we can only know audiences through discourses, audiences do in fact 
exist outside the terms of these discourses,’ as Morley has argued at the same time not 
denying constructed nature of audience research (1992:178). 
Instead of thinking of descriptions and their interpretations presented in the data 
chapters that follow in the coming pages as a claim for some ‘whole and objective truth’ 
mirroring some ‘normality of the real (natural) life’ I would rather prefer to think of them 
as a snapshot of constantly shifting meaning making processes surrounding the 

















Chapter 4  
Defining Public Service Broadcasting: Between State, Public, 
National and Commercial Television  
4.1 Introduction 
The publics of Latvian public television struggle to find a right place on the map for it 
and, as I demonstrate in this chapter, the diverse and competing definitions of LTV, the 
de jure public television broadcaster in Latvia, and the concept of public television more 
generally they have, not only reveal legacies of the Soviet past, namely the long 
experience with Soviet-style state broadcasting, but also illuminate today’s peculiarities of 
the country’s commercialized and politicized media landscape. 
For a variety of reasons many of my Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking informants 
disqualified LTV as a public broadcaster and, instead, discussed it more often in terms of 
a state and national broadcasting. There is a widespread belief among the audiences of 
both ethno-linguistic groups that LTV operates as a state channel serving as a one-way 
top-down communication channel in hands of the government of the day, and through 
their exit from LTV they register a protest against the distrusted local political elite.  
Because of its concern for the official version of a national culture in the eyes of both 
ethno-linguistic communities, LTV is often conceived as a national television, albeit 
Russian-speakers, contrary to Latvian-speakers, rarely feel at home with that version of 
the national ‘we’ as conjured up by the public television and employ their exit from LTV 
as a voice mechanism to challenge this hegemonic national imaginary.  
Despite the fact that, over the past 20 years, audiences have massively withdrawn from 
LTV and migrated to its commercial rivals, this migration does not constitute evidence 
of the rejection of the normative public broadcasting values in Latvian society. While 
often detached from the public broadcasting institution LTV, nevertheless, at least at a 
declarative level the Western-style public broadcasting ideals are valued in the society. 
Instead of the de jure public broadcaster LTV, for many it is the national commercial 
broadcasters that are better at implementing some of the public broadcasting ideals into 





more democratic approach – this, of course does not mean that these broadcasters are 
seen as being able to fully serve the role of public broadcasting. In short, poor audience 
figures of LTV are not so much a manifestation of a denial of the public broadcasting 
values as a rejection of the public broadcasting institution LTV.  
4.2 Searching for a Definition of Public Television  
When asked to provide their own definition of what the concept of public service 
television stands for, my respondents often referred to the same values that are 
associated with the normative models of Western European public broadcasting. While 
audiences value these ideals with the regular audience measurements suggesting that 
these may not be only declarative judgements and that at least partly they follow these 
ideals also in their everyday television viewing practices (consider, for instance, the high 
popularity of daily news programmes and weekly analytical and investigative shows, 
commonly considered as typical genres of the public broadcasting tradition, on all the 
national channels), they not necessarily associate these values with LTV, the official 
public service broadcaster. To put it another way, audiences detach the normative public 
broadcasting ideals from its current de jure institutional embodiment in their country, 
Latvia.  
Information, education and entertainment, the well-known trinity of so-called Reithian 
principles of public broadcasting, were those key words my informants often referred to 
in order to describe what they thought should be the main rationale of public television. 
Also for 20-year-old Latvian-speaking student Madara32 (FG1)33, public television should 
be television that ‘shows educational, as well as informative and entertaining materials’. 
My informants’ definitions of the concept of public television illuminate their 
perceptions of what they think an ideal, perfect television should be about, something 
that perhaps has never existed in reality and could be found only in the most optimistic 
normative writings of defenders of the public broadcasting idea. What their definitions of 
public broadcasting tell us about are their perceptions of television as a public good. As a 
good for society ideal television is expected to be free-of-charge, available to all, diverse 
in its programming output, politically and economically independent, the one you can 
                         
32 The names of all participants are fictional. 
33 ‘FG’ stands for ‘Focus group’, ‘PFG’ for ‘Pilot focus group’ and ‘F’ for ‘Family’ followed by the number 
of the particular (pilot) focus group or family. For the full information on the composition of the focus 





trust, impartial providing wide spectrum of opinions, it should also be non-commercial 
having no advertising, and so forth. These are all normative ideals of Western-type public 
broadcasting my respondents were referring to, even if not being aware of this fact. Here 
are some common definitions of the concept of public television as formulated by my 
informants:  
Public television should be available to the society free of charge. The 
second thing is that it should be an independent television not lobbying 
interests of one or another group of people (Anastasia, 29-year-old 
Russian-speaking manager working at the bank, FG4), 
No advertising. Independence from state officials and advertisers 
(Tatyana, 61-year-old Russian-speaking woman working with children at 
the school amateur theatre, FG6), 
Public television should be free and democratic, [a place] where 
censorship is not present (Ināra, 55-year-old Latvian-speaking 
agronomist, FG9), 
[Public service television should be] a television that is available free of 
charge. It should include programmes that are interesting for all groups 
of the society (Ilona, 35-year-old Russian-speaking head of the registry 
office, FG8), 
Public television, I think, should be such a television that is available to 
absolutely all. Television that reflects the opinion of the entire society. It 
should be free of charge, its programmes should be truthful, without lies, 
and programmes that everyone finds interesting, exciting (Līga, 27-year-
old Latvian-speaking secretary working at the local municipality, FG10). 
4.2.1 Public Television as a Public Good  
It is the principle of universality that underpins definitions of public broadcasting as 
offered by my informants. In line with these definitions, the universality principle is 
understood as technical, geographical and financial availability to watch public television 





the idea of diversity in programming so that public television meets different needs and 
interests of its various publics. In other words, it is the entire national population that, 
according to definitions of public broadcasting as provided by my respondents, should 
benefit from public broadcasting as a common good, irrespective of one’s socio-
economic background or ethno-linguistic identity. In the words of Jānis, 27-year-old 
Latvian-speaking worker at the supermarket (FG3), public television should ‘embrace all 
the society’. 
For Ingūna, a 59-year-old Latvian-speaking manager at a transport company (FG5), 
public broadcasting should function in the same way as public transport system does. 
First, like public transport, public television should be state subsidised. Second, in the 
same way as public transport, public television should be available to all. As she 
explained, while many prefer going by car (=watching commercial channels), public 
transport (=public television) should be a service that the state provides for all people. 
To quote her, 
I do not remember when I went by trolleybus last time. Those who go by 
car as me… I do not need [public transport], and then what? You cannot 
close trams, trolleybuses, buses. Our company operates bus line to Olaine 
[town close to the Latvian capital Riga], the majority who go [there] go by 
car while, once, it was the bus that was more popular but nevertheless the 
state should still provide it.  
In line with this analogy, it is public television that the state is expected to fund to 
provide a service for those who for some reason prefer watching public television instead 
of the commercial channels. Interestingly having your own car and abandoning public 
transport services here is equated with preference for commercial broadcasting and 
exiting from the public television signalling the poor image of the public broadcaster 
LTV in her eyes. For many in Latvia having your own car is a more desirable scenario 
than using public transport seen as providing service of low quality. 
So, at least at a normative level there seems to be an agreement between Latvian-speakers 
and Russian-speakers that public broadcasting should provide a public good that should 
include offering a service for all members of the society. However, there is no consensus 
on whether LTV, the country’s de jure institutional embodiment of public broadcasting, 





of public broadcasting, differences in their discourses on public broadcasting as a 
common good appears when it comes to realization of these principles in practice. Many 
Russian-speakers dismiss LTV as offering such universal service that is aimed at all 
members of the society, irrespective of their ethno-linguistic identity. As we shall see, 
various and competing conceptions of the nation LTV is expected to serve members of 
both ethno-linguistic communities have are central for understanding responses of my 
Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking informants towards the public broadcaster LTV 
as a good for the society.  
4.2.2 Popular Broadcasting  
Many see the country’s commercial channels, contrary to LTV, as more successful in 
providing diverse programming appealing to audiences of all generations and viewers of 
both ethno-linguistic groups. Here the idea of public broadcasting as serving the public is 
translated as ‘popular broadcasting’ with popularity (appeal to large audiences) seen as 
evidence of a television channel being successful in providing service for the public. No 
wonder that many of my respondents qualified the commercial broadcasters gathering 
larger audiences than the public broadcaster LTV as actual public channels. From this 
perspective they are seen as true public broadcasters as they do provide such a service for 
which there is public demand. In short, they are seen as better at serving the public.  
Because of their more popular and hence, in the eyes of audiences, also more democratic 
approach, both in terms of programming priorities and mode of address, my informants 
often identified the commercial channels as better at meeting the universality ideals of 
public broadcasting than the country’s public broadcaster by law LTV. Like LTV, also 
the national commercial channels are available to all (they cover the entire territory of the 
country and till 2014, when for economic reasons they left free-to-air terrestrial 
broadcasting network, the commercial broadcasters LNT and TV3 were also free of 
charge) but, contrary to LTV, their programming is seen by audiences as more in line 
with the diversity ideals of public broadcasting offering something for everyone. 
Thus, for instance, 39-year-old Latvian-speaking teaching assistant Gunta (PFG3) 
defined public television as a service that all members of the family can find as being in 
line with their needs and interests. Drawing on her family’s experience, it was the 
national commercial channels LNT and TV3 she identified as public broadcasters. Both 





news, there are also concerts. All age groups can watch it,’ she said describing both 
channels. For her, LTV1, the main channel of LTV, is serious and old-fashioned 
devoting too much of its airtime to politics and offering little entertainment. It is 
something that conflicts with her perceptions of public television as an institution 
providing diversity in its programming, a view shared by many of my respondents of 
both ethno-linguistic communities. It is also the mode of address of LTV that she finds 
rather elitist, contrary to the tone of LNT and TV3 which she characterized as ‘closer to 
the ordinary man’. It is ‘the ordinary man’ she identifies herself with, who is not properly 
served by LTV and who finds offerings of its rival commercial channels more relevant.  
4.2.3 Old-fashioned and Outdated Project  
For many of my respondents the performance of LTV conflicts with their views on how 
modern television should look like. ‘If one looked at archives… let’s say from the 1985, 
it will be the same, the same presenters and the same graphics,’ Sergei, a 30-year-old 
Russian-speaking worker at the railway company (FG8), described LTV1. ‘They are today 
as they used to be in the Soviet times. It has all been the same all the time, no changes,’ 
also complained 32-year-old Latvian-speaking construction worker Intars (F3) to 
describe LTV as a stagnating institution. They both exaggerate, and yet their arguments 
reveal the way they think about public television.34 Though the public broadcaster LTV, 
and particularly its main channel LTV1, is often perceived as an old-fashioned and 
outdated project, it is not to say that its publics also see the idea of public broadcasting as 
such. As already noted, people tend to detach the institution of public broadcasting LTV 
from the normative values they associate with the notion of public broadcasting. 
It is the plethora of alternative choices, the national commercial broadcasters, plus the 
full spectrum of transnational channels both from West and East, that informs 
perceptions of viewers on how modern television should look like, and LTV in the eyes 
of many fails to live up to these requirements. In this respect, we can consider the 
dismissal of LTV (the public broadcasting institution and not the idea of public 
broadcasting itself) as a rejection of stagnation (‘old-school’ public broadcaster) and 
preference for progress (‘modern’ commercial channels). If so, to express a preference 
                         
34 Mungiu-Pippidi, reflecting on the Romanian case, also reports on the poor image of the public television. 
As in Latvia, also in this former Communist country it is seen by its publics as outdated and non-
prestigious project. During the focus groups in Bucharest in the fall of 1999, ‘when using car metaphors, 
public service television was compared to a Renault 4 car series from the 1960s, while its main private 





for commercial channels may mean for audiences to be on the side of progress, while to 
express a preference for the public broadcaster may imply a less attractive scenario, i.e., 
to be backward and resistant to progress. In the eyes of audiences it seems to be a choice 
between being friends with the ‘losers’ (the public broadcaster) or the ‘winners’ (the 
commercial channels). As far as we can judge from the perceptions of my respondents, 
preference for the commercial channels seems to be valued much higher than that 
preference for the public television LTV. To put it another way, allegiance to the 
commercial broadcasters seems to offer more benefits (apart from practical benefits of 
attractive programming it is also symbolic value of being on the side of progress) than 
loyalty to the public television can promise. 
4.2.4 Bilingual Broadcasting  
The presence of both Latvian and Russian language on the national commercial channels 
made many of my Russian-speaking informants think that they – contrary to LTV1, 
broadcasting exclusively in Latvian with Russian language in the most cases being voiced 
over or, less often, subtitled in Latvian, and its sister channel LTV7 providing scarce 
offerings of Russian-language output – are aimed at all members of the national 
communion regardless of their ethno-linguistic background and, in this respect, are 
fitting the role of public broadcasting better than the almost entirely monolingual de jure 
public broadcaster LTV.  
For my Russian-speaking respondents, bilingual programming, the coexistence of 
Latvian-language and Russian-language content, serves as evidence of a channel 
addressing viewers of both ethno-linguistic groups. Here the diversity ideals of public 
broadcasting are first and foremost interpreted as catering to audiences of both the 
ethno-linguistic majority and minority. Accordingly, those participants who provided 
such definition of public broadcasting disqualified monolingual channels, including only 
Latvian-language LTV1, as public broadcasters. 
It is the national commercial channel LNT which, alongside its Latvian-language 
programming, also offers some entertainment imports from Russia subtitled in Latvian 
that for 48-year-old Russian-speaking school deputy director Boris (FG4) best qualifies 
as an ideal public broadcaster since, as he noted, being bilingual channel LNT addresses 





They have programmes that both audiences can watch. Of course, 
programmes for Russian-speakers [on LNT] are few but nevertheless 
they exist. But, to speak about TV1 [LTV1], there is nothing at all. Like 
LNT they [LTV] should also be oriented not only to the [ethnic] Latvian 
audience but should also think about others. If they [both channels of 
LTV] consider themselves as the main public channels, well, then they 
should do something so that the Russian-speaking audience also watch 
them. 
It is market logic that makes the national Latvian-language commercial channels to 
include in their output also Russian-origin popular content (for instance, sitcoms and 
comedy shows imported from Russia) since, as we shall see later in Chapter 6, it is also 
Latvian-speaking audiences who enjoy watching these offerings. As audience 
maximization lies at the heart of their commercial success, commercial broadcasters have 
been more responsive towards viewer demands, and this market-driven approach has 
appeared to be more successful in bringing both ethno-linguistic groups together around 
television and, hence, better in terms of the realization of the public broadcasting ideals 
of national integration in practice than ethno-nationalistic approach of the public 
broadcaster LTV with its focus on the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic 
majority as the cement of social cohesion.    
4.2.5 Commercial Channels Copying the Public Broadcaster  
Not only the public broadcaster LTV has taken over some of the tactics of commercial 
broadcasting but also its commercial rivals have mimicked some of the strategies typical 
to public broadcasting, and these tendencies have further blurred the demarcation line 
between public and commercial broadcasting creating additional confusion for audiences 
who cannot readily distinguish the public broadcaster LTV from its commercial 
competitors. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that in the eyes of audiences the 
commercial channels are often seen as substitutes of LTV. Many of the participants 
admitted that if LTV ceased to exist it would be easy to substitute its offerings with the 
ones provided by the commercial channels with few exceptions such as live sports 
broadcasting on the second channel of LTV; this I discuss in detail in Chapter 7. 
Although many see commercial broadcasters as able to replace the public broadcaster 





normative public broadcasting values. As we have seen earlier, for many the concept of 
public broadcasting involves the idea of some ideal-type television, something neither 
LTV, nor the commercial broadcasters in the eyes of audiences do fully qualify for. 
Although commercial broadcasters are often seen as more in line with public 
broadcasting ideals, just as in the case of LTV, they too are not seen as meeting all the 
normative principles of public broadcasting as defined by audiences themselves. 
Despite aspects of the provision and style of LTV having been replicated by the 
commercial channels, only a handful of those tactics of LTV have proved to be able to 
pull in sizeable audiences and hence bring commercial success that the commercial 
channels have been eager to take over and make part of their schedules. One of those 
‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm, Ranger, 1983) of LTV, later taken over by its 
commercial competitors is special programming during moments of national 
celebrations, something I discuss further in Chapter 6. What is more, following the 
example of LTV, national commercial channels, apart from daily news offer some weekly 
current affairs and journalistic investigations, pre-election debates, as well as provide 
extra news bulletins during moments of national crisis. Like LTV they also organize 
charity marathons and similar events. In addition to programme emulation, it should also 
be noted that, during the recent years some popular shows, as well as faces of LTV, its 
star journalists, have moved to its commercial rivals.35 
In addition, in contrast to some licence fee funded European public broadcasters, the 
presence of advertising on LTV, albeit, as many viewers have noted it, to a lesser extent 
if compared to the commercial channels, creates further confusion for audiences when 
                         
35 In 2007 following the conflict with then management of LTV, journalists of its popular weekly analytical 
and investigative programme De facto left the public television and moved to TV3 to start a programme of 
similar format Nekā personīga (Nothing Personal). Few years later, in 2009 due to the budget cuts, brought on 
by the financial downturn, LTV axed its popular national soap opera Neprāta cena (Price of Folly) that was 
later taken over by TV3 with the new title UgunsGrēks (FireSin) but with the same storyline and main 
characters. The cast and much of its production team moved from LTV to TV3. Today UgunsGrēks is a 
regular ratings leader gathering one of the largest television audiences in the country. As UgunsGrēks is on 
air during the same time slot when LTV1 broadcasts its main prime-time news programme Panorāma 
(Panorama), the soap opera brings audiences away from Panorāma. Many of my informants, once loyal 
audiences of Panorāma, said that they now prefer watching UgunsGrēks instead of Panorāma. For many years 
Panorāma was the most watched prime-time news programme in the country but today it is the evening 
news on the commercial channels that are the most popular. During recent years, popular news presenters 
of LTV have also migrated to TV3. Thus, at the end of 2012 Arnis Krauze, long-serving presenter of 
Panorāma, left public television to appear few weeks later on TV3 hosting its evening news. Before Krauze, 
a few years earlier another former star journalist of LTV Edijs Bošs also joined TV3 news presenters’ team. 
Finally, in early 2014 LNT, another national commercial channel, announced the launch of a new weekly 
current affairs show hosted by a household name, journalist Jānis Domburs who after the conflict with the 
management of the public broadcaster left LTV in 2011 having presented its popular weekly political 





they are called to draw a clear borderline between the public broadcaster LTV and its 
commercial competitors. For instance, consider a discussion (FG5) between two retired 
Latvian-speaking women, 66-year-old Ausma and 83-year-old Gerda, with the first 
speaker distinguishing both channels of LTV from its commercial rivals that in turn 
creates a confusion for the second speaker: 
Ausma: Well, there are channels that are funded by the state and the ones 
who earn money themselves through advertising.  
Gerda: Well, those adverts are on all [channels] that I watch. I see adverts 
everywhere, I see them all over. There are no channels that I watch where 
there would be no advertising at all.  
4.2.6 (Not) Paying the Licence Fee  
The deficit of a strong public broadcasting tradition (at least in terms of weak public 
broadcasting institutions) in combination with considerable alternative viewing choices 
(the national commercial broadcasters, plus a plethora of cable and satellite channels, 
including a wide choice of Russian television) makes exit from LTV easy and attractive, 
to refer to Hirschman’s (1970) theory.  
Older generations remember Soviet times when then state television LTV and the Soviet 
Central TV transmitting from Moscow were the only choices on offer and, for many 
years, audiences had no other alternative than to watch one of these two broadcasters. 
Then employment of the exit option was highly limited and loyalty towards LTV among 
its Latvian-speaking publics was little challenged by the exit alternative, if not to say that 
such an option, apart from moving to the Soviet Central TV or not watching television at 
all, was non-existent and loyalty towards LTV was rather imposed. 
In contrast, today when the exit option is all too present, also feelings of loyalty towards 
LTV look not as strong as they appeared to be during the era of its monopoly. For many 
LTV today is just another channel on offer and can be easily substituted with other ones 
that audiences find more successful in addressing their needs and interests and more in 
line with their perceptions of what modern and interesting television should look like. ‘I 
switch on a TV set, I have 40 channels... watch what you like the most,’ says 46-year-old 
Latvian-speaking blue-collar worker Pēteris (FG10) describing the plenitude of viewing 





today and that gives them voice with great enthusiasm. 
Given that for many in their everyday media routines LTV plays a minor role, if not to 
say no role at all, it is no wonder then that there are very few who would be willing to 
pay a license fee for LTV. In the 2012 TNS Latvia survey only 29.4% said that they 
would be ready to pay a licence fee or media tax for the public radio and television 
institutions, if such were to be introduced. Many of my informants pointed out that 
although LTV may provide a public good for others, loyal publics of LTV, and therefore 
it should not be closed and the government should continue funding it, they do not see 
LTV as the fulfilment of the public broadcasting ideals as far as it concerns them, and 
therefore would not be ready to pay for the public television directly from their own 
pocket. It may be a public good for others but not for me – was their line of argument. 
For many the licence fee would be an imposed payment, an unjustified expense. Many of 
my respondents pointed out that they do not see a need to pay for the products and 
services they use rarely or do not use at all. As some noted, they do not watch LTV to 
such an extent to get value back from it. Ieva, a 27-year-old Latvian-speaking legal 
adviser working in the public sector (FG3), for instance, argued: ‘It is most likely that I 
would not pay only for those two channels [of LTV]. Because I do not watch them 
anyway’. ‘It’s simply wrong. For instance, if I do not read some newspaper, I do not pay 
for it,’ similarly pointed out 22-year-old Russian-speaking student Arina (FG2). Some 
also claimed that, in the case of the introduction of the licence fee, they could do without 
LTV. It is such very pragmatic motivations standing behind the reluctance of its publics 
to fund the public broadcaster LTV directly through licence fee or tax payment. 
While in the 2012 TNS Latvia survey 36.6% of ethnic Latvians said they would be ready 
to pay for the public broadcasters, only 19.2% of members of the ethnic minority groups 
could say the same. This is hardly surprising if one remembers that there is only a small 
fraction of ethnic minorities who can be found among the regular viewers of LTV, let 
alone its main channel LTV1. Besides, in line with the same survey, there are many 
ethnic minority viewers who say that they would not miss LTV, if it ceased to exist.36 20-
year-old Russian-speaking student Nikita (FG2) put it straightforwardly: ‘You can close 
[LTV]... I do not watch it’. If LTV1 ceased to exist, we would not notice it in our family, 
                         
36 Only 31.1% of ethnic minority respondents said that they would miss LTV1, if it disappeared, compared 
to 56.9% of ethnic Latvians who could say the same. 44% of ethnic minority respondents and 55.8% of 





also said 48-year-old Russian-speaking municipality IT officer Viktor (FG8). While in his 
family they from time to time watch LTV7, second channel of LTV, they have no regular 
experience with LTV1. 
However, unwillingness to pay the licence fee for LTV should not be automatically 
interpreted as evidence of its publics not supporting the public broadcasting ideals. 
Instead, this should be rather seen as a manifestation of strong discontent with the 
current performance of LTV, the country’s de jure institutional embodiment of public 
broadcasting. While they exit from LTV as do not see it as providing a public good at 
least as far as it concerns them, it does not mean that they reject the overall idea of public 
broadcasting as a common good.  
Though reluctant to pay for LTV, audiences are ready to pay for the products and 
services they use and value. The overwhelming majority already pay on a monthly basis 
for their cable or satellite subscription, but the current offerings of the public broadcaster 
LTV, as many think, are not worth money they would have to pay as the licence fee. One 
of the rare exceptions, as we shall see in Chapter 7, is sports provision on the second 
channel of LTV that attracts large audiences and for which viewers would be ready to 
pay. Though not finding offerings of LTV in line with their needs and interests many in 
protest have exited from LTV, they still come back to the public television during those 
moments when there is something on offer they find relevant for them and, equally 
important, something for what there is no ready substitute on the rival channels of LTV, 
and one such moment is sports broadcasts.    
4.3 Defining the National ‘We’ 
It was common for many of my informants of both ethno-linguistic communities to call 
LTV ‘national television’, as well as to talk about it as a symbol of ‘Latvianness’, and yet 
Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers attached to this notion completely reversed 
connotations. For Latvian-speakers, LTV is ‘national television’ as it represents the 
official version of the national culture and cares for the national language, as well as 
supports the official conception of the country’s past. In the eyes of Latvian-speakers 
LTV reflects and sustains ‘Latvianness’ as many of my Latvian-speaking informants 
preferred to term cultural identity shared by the Latvian-speaking majority. Also for 
Russian-speakers LTV is ‘national television’ as it is oriented towards the ethno-linguistic 





culture, what Latvian-speakers like to describe as care for ‘Latvianness’, is treated as an 
exclusionary and therefore nationalistic approach ignoring the ethno-linguistic minority, 
and hence LTV seen as ‘national (=nationalistic) television’. 
While Latvian-speakers tend to accept that representation of the national self as 
constructed by LTV, many Russian-speakers feel excluded from this model of the 
national communion. Contrary to Russian-speakers, its Latvian-speaking publics do not 
see LTV’s ethno-nationalistic definition of national membership as problematic. It is also 
the concept of ‘Latvianness’ as constructed and reproduced by LTV that does not 
conflict with the vision many Latvian-speakers have of it, contrary to Russian-speakers 
who do not share this version of ‘Latvianness’. To put it differently, the way LTV defines 
who constitutes the national ‘we’ (and, accordingly, who ‘they’ to be left out are) 
corresponds with the dominant nation-building discourse principles many Latvian-
speakers share. There is a kind of common-sense among Latvian-speakers that it is the 
primary task of LTV as ‘national television’ to prioritize (national) culture and language 
of Latvian-speakers, dominating ethno-linguistic group in the country, something that is 
taken for granted and rarely questioned by Latvian-speaking viewers. 
Sergei, a 30-year-old Russian-speaking worker at the railway company (FG8), pointed 
out: ‘[When you watch LTV1], there is a feeling that there is no Russian-speaking 
population in Latvia, all is in the state language, well, the state language [in Latvia] is one’. 
Consider now how 27-year-old Latvian-speaking music teacher Ansis (FG9) described 
his association with LTV1: ‘On the first channel [LTV1] the Russian language will never 
be spoken, we still have Latvian as the state language’. For him, LTV is ‘the basis of 
nationality’; it is ‘Latvia and patriotism’ that informs his association with LTV1. 
Here we can see two opposing views on the absence of Russian language on LTV1, the 
main channel of LTV. While for 30-year-old Russian-speaker Sergei it is evidence of 
exclusion of Russian-speakers from the national ‘we’ as formulated by the public 
television, for 27-year-old Latvian-speaker Ansis it is evidence of LTV fulfilling its 
mission of catering for Latvian language. While for Sergei the absence of Russian 
language disqualifies LTV as a public good, for Ansis it is what makes LTV a public 
good. Interestingly, both see the nation defined in exclusion of the Russian-speaking 
minority. For Sergei the exclusion of Russian language from LTV1 is unfair but also an 
undisputed fact, while for Ansis it is unproblematic that the main channel of LTV should 





4.3.1 ‘We are Latvians’ 
In the eyes of Latvian-speakers it is a mission of LTV to project and preserve the cultural 
identity of the ethno-linguistic majority with the Latvian language seen as one of its 
central, if not the most important, elements. Because LTV broadcasts mainly in Latvian it 
supports the Latvian language, and, if LTV ceased to exist, ‘we would face either 
Russification or Anglicising,’ argued Līga, a 27-year-old Latvian-speaking secretary 
working at the local municipality (FG10), even though it is the commercial channels that 
constitute the bulk of her own daily viewing experiences. It is important for Latvian-
speakers that LTV being ‘national television’ broadcasts only (or mainly) in Latvian and 
(more) Russian language on LTV is not welcome and, instead, perceived as constituting a 
threat to the imagined ideals of ‘Latvianness’.   
This is how Antonija, a 87-year-old retired Latvian-speaking woman (PFG1), reacted to 
the idea of introducing Russian-language programming on LTV1 currently broadcasting 
solely in Latvian:  
I’m against it to start speaking in Russian on the first channel [LTV1]. 
There are already more channels in Russian language than in Latvian, if 
one looks at all channels we have. I’m against switching to Russian 
language also on the first channel [LTV1].  
Against a backdrop of high presence of transnational Russian television in Latvia, LTV1 
for Antonija seems to be the last bastion of television broadcasting in the Latvian 
language and, if one remembers the central role played by Latvian language in the 
formula of ‘Latvianness’, also one of the last bastions of ‘Latvianness’. It is a kind of 
sacred space where it is even unthinkable to imagine introduction of the Russian 
language.  
Anxiety and often even hostility towards the presence of the Russian language on LTV 
and in the public domain more generally should be seen as a response of Latvian-
speakers to the privileged status of Russian language and suppression of Latvian language 
under Latvia’s compulsory Russification during the Soviet era. Even today in 
independent Latvia with Latvian-speakers having the status of the ethno-linguistic 
majority it is these historical legacies continuing to shape attitudes of Latvian-speakers 





still often seen as an endangerment to Latvian language, and, indeed, also to the entire 
project of ‘Latvianness’. 
In the following extract Latvian-speaking students discuss a role of LTV in providing a 
sense of being (ethnic) Latvian (PFG2). Even if they are not among regular viewers of 
LTV, and its main channel LTV1 in particular, they still have a strong conviction that 
LTV should play a crucial role in reflecting and preserving ‘Latvianness’, conceived as a 
sum of cultural traditions defining what it means to be (ethnic) Latvian. For them, LTV 
should serve as a repository for cultural heritage of (ethnic) Latvians reminding them 
about their roots and allowing them to feel unique among other nations, something that 
should be handed on from one generation to another. It is a metaphor of an 
ethnographic museum that best characterizes perceptions of these students of a role 
LTV should play in the project of national imagination:  
21-year-old Krista: LTV1 and LTV7 are those channels where we can 
watch Latvian [Soviet era] films. Albeit they are old ones, but nevertheless 
we can watch them. Now also the latest animation films by our film 
makers are on LTV1 and LTV7. Or, as I said it earlier, it is Christmas 
time and Easter that makes my associations with LTV. Easter, I think, is 
quite Latvian celebrations. With all the programmes, live broadcasts they 
have they [LTV] usually create such a festive mood [during the national 
celebrations]. Or the [Latvian] Song Festival, is usually broadcast on 
LTV1. The Song Festival is, indeed, Latvian tradition.  
19-year-old Rūta: LTV showcases our identity. It is the same as, let’s say, 
folk songs or something like that. It is something that shows that we are 
[ethnic] Latvians. [Commercial channels] LNT and TV3, they are more 
focused on those things that have more to do with foreign countries 
[more foreign production in their programming output, for instance]. It is 
LTV1 and LTV7 that shows that we are [ethnic] Latvians.  
20-year-old Emīls: I agree. These are those channels [LTV1, LTV7] that 
show those fundamental values of [ethnic] Latvians. For instance, the 
Song Festival.  





our Latvian identity. We have our legend stories, our own folk songs, it is 
our Latvian heritage that we have. It is through broadcasts of the Song 
and Dance Festival, choral concerts LTV sustains Latvian identity. 
20-year-old Matīss: If there would be no such broadcasts, then the 
youth... well, we, perhaps, will still know it, but our children, they will 
forget about it.  
It is the traditional Latvian Song and Dance Festival at the heart of their definitions of 
‘Latvianness’ that, in turn, LTV is expected to reflect and preserve for next generations. 
It is through broadcasts of the Song and Dance Festival LTV is most vividly producing 
that special ‘we are [ethnic] Latvians’ feeling my young Latvian-speaking informants were 
referring to. Taking place once every five years the weeklong festival brings together in 
the capital city of Riga amateur choirs and folk dance groups from all around Latvia and 
the Latvian diaspora abroad culminating with the Grand Finale concert at an open-
air stage of a choir of thousands dressed in national costumes celebrating not so much a 
tradition of a cappella choral singing but more importantly national togetherness watched 
by large nationwide television audiences at home. 
For Latvian-speakers, the Song and Dance Festival has always been one of the core 
elements of their sense of national belonging that, as they believe, is also an expression of 
a unique Latvian national character. Throughout its long history37 the Song Festival has 
functioned as a unifying force making Latvian-speakers feel united and proud of 
themselves (even if it is only an idealized image of unity and pride about what is at stake 
and not much more), and this height of the spirit of national consciousness is all present 
during the live televised festival broadcasts on LTV making it in the eyes of its Latvian-
speaking publics during these moments project of national imagination at its best, 
something its Russian-speaking publics have little interest in.38 
                         
37 The tradition of the Song and Dance Festival goes back to 1873 when Latvia was under the rule of 
Tsarist Russia, almost half a century before Latvia established independent statehood in 1918, and it has 
been preserved also during the long years of the Soviet occupation when despite the presence of Soviet 
ideology the Song festival turned into a manifestation of hidden national feelings and an act of symbolic 
resistance. As Lauristin and Vihalemm explain, the institution of national songfests in the Baltic countries 
‘was preserved by the Soviets as a demonstration of the multinational character of Soviet culture, but in 
reality served as a powerful expression of national identity and will for the cultural resistance’ (2002:19).  
38 The Song Festival, and its representations on LTV, reflects the official government’s conception of the 
nation defining the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority as its cementing materials, and 
while during the weeklong festival special concert with the participation of ethnic minority performers is 





Even if LTV is not among their favourite channels, many Latvian-speakers still call it 
‘our television’. For 56-year-old Latvian-speaking farmer Dzintra (FG10), LTV is ‘our 
television’ namely because of its care for ‘Latvianness’. One such moment when LTV 
provides her with a sense of ‘Latvianness’ is during the annual midsummer festival on 
June 23 and 24, commonly described as the most loved national celebrations of Latvian-
speakers, popular also among Russian-speakers. It is a time when LTV traditionally 
broadcasts special festive programming, including concerts of popular Latvian music, as 
well as home-grown film and theatre broadcasts. Because of its special programming it is 
a time when LTV1 is ‘people’s channel’ also for 46-year-old Latvian-speaking blue-collar 
worker Pēteris (FG10) who in his daily viewing practices has little interest in the offerings 
of LTV. As we shall see in Chapter 6, one of those rare moments when many otherwise 
non-loyal viewers of the public broadcaster LTV search for it is the time of the national 
celebrations. 
Ingūna, a 59-year-old Latvian-speaking manager at the transport company (FG5), 
described LTV in affectionate terms: ‘20 years ago the first television of Latvia [LTV1] 
was, it was in my childhood, and somehow, nevertheless, it is our [television]’. It is ‘our’ 
LTV that has accompanied not only ‘our’ lives but most importantly the life of ‘our’ 
nation, and thus for many Latvian-speakers the very existence of Latvia is intrinsically 
linked with the existence of LTV. My older Latvian-speaking informants remembered the 
1991 August coup when following the Soviet troops invasion of LTV it stopped its 
operations for two days. Attack on LTV was then seen as an attack on aspirations for 
independent statehood. Because it is ‘national (Latvian) television’, it is perceived to be 
‘our’ television, and without ‘our’ LTV it is believed that there would be no ‘us’ and ‘our’ 
Latvia, even if the declared loyalty to LTV by its Latvian-speaking publics does not 
necessarily stretch to their daily viewing preferences. 
4.3.2 Not at Home with the Public Television  
As LTV broadcasts predominantly in Latvian and the overall visibility of Russian-
speakers on the public television is low, Russian-speakers do not recognize themselves as 
being part of that image of the national community as conjured up by the public 
                                                                      
majority, and therefore it should not come as a surprise that many Russian-speakers do not recognize the 
festival as part of their cultural identity and have little interest in it. In the 2013 TNS Latvia survey 44% of 
economically active population said they have not been following that year’s Song and Dance Festival 
events. Among them featured prominently ethnic minorities and those who speak in the family mainly a 
language other than Latvian. Also audience measurements show that only a small fraction of ethnic 





broadcaster and feel excluded from this version of the national family. It is their 
(Russian) language and culture39, their favourite political figures40, their attitudes, be it 
view of the Latvia’s 20th century past divergent from the one Latvian-speakers share, for 
instance, and interests Russian-speakers do not find on LTV. In other words, they 
struggle to identify with that vision of the national communion as offered by the public 
television. 
It is common among Russian-speaking audiences to think that they are not invited to be 
part of the national ‘we’ as imagined by LTV or, to paraphrase Morley (2000:118), they 
do not find LTV a homely and welcoming place. Not surprisingly then that many of my 
Russian-speaking respondents labelled LTV as ‘Television of [ethnic] Latvians’ instead of 
its official name saying that LTV is ‘Television of Latvia’. It is a popular view among 
Russian-speakers to see LTV, and its main channel LTV1 particularly, as oriented 
towards only or mainly Latvian-speaking audiences. Also 37-year-old Latvian-speaking 
deputy school director Silvija (FG7) who comes from an ethnically mixed family using 
both the Latvian and Russian languages in her everyday communication thinks that it is 
only Latvian-speakers who can find offerings of LTV1 relevant. ‘Watching the first 
television of Latvia [LTV1], I understand that I have to be [ethnic] Latvian to watch this 
television,’ she said. It is a very clear signal of a feeling many Russian-speakers share of 
being denied membership in the national community as made by LTV, and especially 
LTV1. They feel not being invited to join the club, to speak metaphorically. 
Because of some Russian-language programming on LTV7, second channel of LTV, or, 
as Nikolai, a 62-year-old retired Russian-speaking man (FG6), put it, because ‘you can 
hear [on LTV7] more Russian language’, some Russian-speaking participants argued that 
it is more in line with the public broadcasting ideals of addressing all members of the 
national communion than LTV1. Also Sergei, a 30-year-old Russian-speaking worker at 
the railway company (FG8), identified LTV7, and not LTV1, as a public service channel. 
It is because, contrary to LTV1 which he described as a state broadcaster, LTV7 ‘is 
oriented to a large part of the society, including Russian-speakers, and that is not 
unimportant in our country’. He explained: ‘LTV1 is mainly in Latvian, there is no 
Russian [language] at all. There is Russian [language], but it is being translated. On LTV7 
                         
39 It should be reminded here that Russian-speakers do not see the culture of the Latvian-speaking majority 
as their culture (see, for instance, Cheskin, 2013). 
40 The Latvian political scene has often been described as ethno-linguistically divided where Latvian-
speakers vote for the so-called ‘Latvian’ political parties and the Russian-speaking electorate supports the 





there are programmes... even films and series are in Russian language’. It is also its more 
popular programming, less political information and more entertainment-oriented 
content, of LTV7 that makes him think that it, instead of LTV1, is a true public service 
channel in terms of providing diversity in its programming. ‘There are a lot of 
programmes where politics are not present,’ he described LTV7 to contrast it with 
LTV1. 
Although in order to resist its hegemonic definition of the national ‘we’ that makes him 
feel marginalized Sergei, as many other Russian-speakers, has exited from LTV1, 
mainstream channel of LTV, he has chosen to stay with its second channel LTV7 to 
signal that for him the concept of the national community as offered by this channel with 
its, albeit still scarce, Russian-language output offering more space for the otherness is 
more acceptable than the one as formulated by LTV1. It is also important for him that 
the second channel of LTV prioritizing more light programming is less packed with 
politics. It makes LTV7 in his eyes different from LTV1 that for him is a state channel he 
associates with the distrusted country’s political establishment. Here a distinction 
between ‘the state broadcaster’ LTV1 and ‘the public (=popular) broadcaster’ LTV7 
helps him to explain his ignorance of LTV1 and preference for LTV7, viewing choices 
he makes that allow him to articulate his voice. 
Many of my Russian-speaking informants argued that the national communion as 
constructed by LTV should be open to all members of the national population 
irrespective of their ethno-linguistic background41 reminding that ‘not only [ethnic] 
Latvians live in Latvia,’ to quote Anastasia, a 29-year-old Russian-speaking manager 
working at the bank (FG4), and that, as 25-year-old Russian-speaking municipality officer 
Elizaveta (FG7) put it, ‘our country is multilingual’. We can look at these statements as a 
rejection of the official ethno-nationalistic definition of the national ‘we’ and a call for 
more inclusive rules of national membership. It is also a demand for re-imagination of 
                         
41 It is what Russian-speakers call ‘latviitsy’ (латвийцы), translated in Latvian as ‘latvijieši’, the term 
proposed by well-known Latvian poet Rainis back in the late 1920s. Russian-speakers utilize ‘latviitsy’ term 
as a civic (political) category encompassing all people living in Latvia, and distinguish it from an ethnic 
(cultural) label ‘latishi’ (латиши), or ‘latvieši’ in Latvian, used to identify ethnic Latvians. This distinction, 
while more or less accepted by Russian-speakers, is not popular among Latvian-speakers. For Latvian-
speakers there is no one name to identify all Latvian nationals and, instead, different combinations of 
words such as ‘inhabitants of Latvia’ or ‘people of Latvia’, as the national ‘we’ is formulated in the Latvian 
Constitution, are utilized. In the everyday language, as well as in the official contexts, the term ‘Latvians’ is 
rarely used for the purposes to identify all people living in Latvia as for both Latvian-speakers and Russian-
speakers it is the label excluding all those who do not consider themselves as ethnic Latvians. As such, 
‘Latvians’ is first and foremost an ethnic, and only then, if at all, a national category. In sum, currently there 





the current boundaries of the national communion as set by the public broadcaster LTV 
not restricting its membership to the ethno-linguistic majority and its language and 
culture and, instead, respecting ethno-linguistic diversity in the country and recognizing 
the ethno-linguistic minority and its language and culture as integral part of the fabric of 
the nation.   
‘When you watch it, you have a feeling that there are no Russians in Latvia, no Russian-
speakers, they simply do not exist, you simply do not notice them,’ 36-year-old Russian-
speaking municipality officer Mikhail (FG7) pointed out to describe LTV1. The same 
sentiment was also expressed by Vyacheslav, a 32-year-old Russian-speaker working at 
his own construction company (FG4). For him, it is a presence of both the Latvian and 
the Russian language that could make him feel being at home within public broadcasting: 
It should be as when a man switches [LTV] on [he does not] feel that… 
it is not for him at all but that he is welcome there as a viewer. 
Programmes where people speak their own language, some in Russian, 
some in Latvian. It is enjoyable to watch that kind of programmes; you 
feel that it unites. That is, it is meant for all. But when it is only [ethnic] 
Latvians about [ethnic] Latvians… [When watching LTV] you have a 
feeling that in Latvia only [ethnic] Latvians live, 100 percent [are ethnic 
Latvians], although it is not so. At least in [the capital city] Riga it is not 
so for sure.   
As he does not feel invited to be part of the national family as imagined by the public 
television, he responds by not welcoming LTV into his family or we can also say that as 
he does not feel at home with LTV he responds by not letting LTV enter his home. It is 
this feeling he shares with many other of my Russian-speaking respondents of being an 
unwanted and not accepted ‘other’ left outside the national communion as defined by 
LTV that is at the heart of his rejection of the public television, which for him, as for 
many other Russian-speakers, is as a symbol of the hegemonic conception of the nation. 
It was also 20-year-old Russian-speaking student Dmitry (FG2) who spoke about 
bilingual programming as bringing the nation together around television. As he put it, 
‘common channel broadcasting in both Latvian and Russian could perhaps unite the 
society as people would see that actually problems for all are the same and there is no 





dominant ethno-nationalistic vision of the national community and a call for re-
formulation of its membership rules. As this student suggests, it is not one (Latvian) 
language that will make national integrity possible but, instead, it is common everyday 
socio-economic realities affecting both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers equally 
that will bring the nation together around television. In short, he calls for re-imagination 
of the nation as bilingual community whose members share common everyday concerns. 
For him a nation seems to be first and foremost a political (civic) and only then cultural 
category.  
‘It is important to provide subtitles [in Russian] so that members of all ethnic groups 
could take part [as audiences of LTV] because we all work, pay taxes for the [state] 
budget. The result is that we are excluded,’ argued Nikolai, a 62-year-old retired Russian-
speaking man, Soviet era immigrant (FG6). He disqualified LTV as a public broadcaster 
since LTV, as he thinks, is oriented only towards Latvian-speaking viewers. ‘We live here, 
work, pay taxes,’ also pointed out Alla, a 62-year-old retired Russian-speaking woman 
who moved to Latvia from Russia in the early 1980s to become a school teacher and 
settled in the country (FG6), to stress her civic belonging to Latvia. It is civic elements 
(such as obligation to pay taxes) that are at the heart of her definition of the national ‘we’. 
‘We are members of this society. We all live in this country,’ she said to argue that LTV 
should work in the interests of all members of the national communion, all who share a 
common home of Latvia, including those such as herself who prefer watching television 
in the Russian language. With a reference to pre-war Latvia she called for a more 
inclusive conception of the national community respecting the multiethnic and 
multilingual character of Latvian society: ‘We all live here. Half are Russians, half [ethnic] 
Latvians, and many other ethnic groups. In Latvia before the war there were three 
languages, German, Latvian and Russian, [people spoke in]’. 
4.3.3 ‘Good’ Latvians and ‘Bad’ Russians 
Igor, a 57-year-old unemployed Russian-speaking man (F1), thinks that LTV is oriented 
towards Latvian-speakers or, to quote him, ‘indigenous Latvians’ (коренные латыши), and 
for this reason, for him, LTV is not a public but a national broadcaster. He defines 
‘public television’ as the one oriented towards the entire national population, while 
according to his definition of ‘national television’ it is such television that is aimed 
towards only part of the national public, the ethno-linguistic majority. In line with his 





that constitutes ‘the public’, and for this reason he, as many other of my Russian-
speaking informants, does not qualify LTV, especially its main channel LTV1, as a public 
broadcaster. As Igor thinks, it is only part of the public, Latvian-speakers, that LTV is 
serving. It is the ethno-nationalistic formulation of ‘the public’ dominating in LTV’s 
approach that conflicts with more open definition of ‘the public’ Igor has where 
territorial allegiance (all people living in Latvia) is prioritized over the ethno-linguistic 
markers of difference.  
Igor, as well as other members of his family, watches very little LTV, mostly when live 
sports broadcasts are on offer on its second channel LTV7. Not surprisingly that both 
channels of LTV are adjusted as only ninth and tenth in a row on the remote control of 
their main television set situated in the living room of their flat in one of the standard 
block of flats in the capital city of Riga. The first channels in terms of Igor’s preference 
are the Baltic or international versions of all three federal Russian state-controlled 
channels. 
It is the absence of Russian language on LTV that makes Igor think that LTV, and LTV1 
in particular, ignores Russian-speakers. ‘40 percent are Russians living [in Latvia]. There 
[on LTV1] should be something in Russian language, as well. There is no Russian 
language at all,’ he argued to remind that the Russian-speaking minority is a large one and 
as such thinks about the rights it deserves – it was a recurrent line of argumentation in 
the responses of my Russian-speaking respondents. Because of dominance of the Latvian 
language on LTV1, its bias against Russians and because of ‘nationalism’ prevailing in its 
approach it is why main channel of LTV is ‘channel of [ethnic] Latvians’ also for his 
daughter, 27-year-old shop assistant Marina. As her father, she also thinks that LTV is 
‘national television’. Her formulation of ‘nationalism’ as something that implies a special 
care for the ethno-linguistic majority and bad treatment of the ethno-linguistic minority 
helps to explain the dominant interpretation of the notion of ‘national television’ among 
my Russian-speaking informants. Many of them identified LTV as ‘national television’ 
because of it serving, as they believe, only, or mainly, in the interests of Latvian-speakers 
ignoring the interests of Russian-speakers. In other words, because of perceived 
dominance of nationalistic sentiments (see definition of ‘nationalism’ as provided by 27-
year-old shop assistant Marina above) in its approach in defining the nation it is common 
for Russian-speaking viewers to label LTV as ‘national (=nationalistic) television’. 





channel offering ‘nationally oriented political programmes’ with ‘nationally oriented’ here 
understood as ‘pro-Latvian’. Again we can see the same reading of the ‘nationalism’ 
concept, popular among Russian-speakers, as discussed above. In the eyes of Anna LTV 
news and current affairs are biased against the Russian-speaking minority, as well as 
against Russia: ‘Different points of view are not offered, only that all Russians are bad 
and all [ethnic] Latvians are good. [Vladimir] Putin [then prime minister of Russia] is 
threatening [Latvia] and the hand of Moscow is all around’. 
Just as Anna, also many other of my Russian-speaking informants argued that LTV 
provides one-sided reporting of the national affairs promoting the position of what they 
see as the pro-Latvian power elite and neglecting alternative, oppositional voices. For 
instance, this is how LTV1 is described by 23-year-old Russian-speaking businessman 
Anton (FG7): ‘The first channel [LTV1], it is the first state channel. It is completely 
under [the control of] the government and do not say anything against it... There [on 
LTV1] is only one spectrum of opinion’. 
Olga, a 31-year old Russian-speaking worker at the children and youth centre (FG4), 
explained what she thinks is the difference in reporting national politics on Panorāma, 
prime-time news on LTV1, and Latviiskoe Vremya (Latvia’s Time), national evening news 
on the Russian-language Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, the Baltic version of Russian Pervyi kanal, 
the most popular channel among Russian-speaking audiences in Latvia: 
Latvian Television [LTV], still, when looking for comments on some 
particular news in the first place will ask [ethnic] Latvian politicians to 
comment and then, if it concerns some Russian question, ethnic question, 
then they will invite some politician from the so-called ‘Russian’ political 
parties. Contrary, on Russian news, on Latviiskoe Vremya, the people to 
whom they will go first will be representatives of the Russian party that 
will comment on all topics. And [ethnic] Latvian politicians will be invited 
when it comes to a particular ministry, for instance, or some topic... such 
highly important topic. 
As she has regular viewing experiences with both Latvian-language and Russian-language 
news media we can say that she is thinking across both linguistic news spaces, to borrow 
Robins and Aksoy’s formulation describing migrant experiences of thinking across 





is this experience of moving across both Latvian-language and Russian-language news 
spaces that makes her aware of what she thinks are different realities as constructed by 
Panorāma and Latviiskoe Vremya. Though at first it may seem that she is making a 
distinction between Panorāma and Latviiskoe Vremya, in fact she is pointing to their 
identical practices of selection of news sources, only vice versa. As she thinks, both 
Panorāma and Latviiskoe Vremya prioritize their news sources along ethno-linguistic lines, 
and in this respect Panorāma and Latviiskoe Vremya are seen as equal. 
4.3.4 ‘Our’ Historical Interpretations Ignored  
In one of my conversations with Anna, a 55-year old Russian-speaking hospital 
administrator (F1), she referred to the recent political debates on LTV1 where journalists 
and politicians discussed the controversial commemoration of the Latvian Legion on 
March 16 in the Latvian capital Riga. Each year supporters of the veterans and those 
condemning the Latvian Legion gather in the city centre in front of the Freedom 
Monument, a symbol of Latvian independence with the motto ‘For the Fatherland and 
Freedom’ inscribed in it, to defend each their own interpretations of the past. 
Along with the celebrations of the Victory Day on May 9 each year a march of the 
veterans of the Latvian Legion on March 16 triggers tensions in the political circles, as 
well as in the media. Both dates, May 9 and March 16, illustrate conflicting collective 
memories of Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers each group having its own historical 
‘truths’ (for further discussion on opposing social memories of both ethno-linguistic 
groups see Cheskin, 2012b, Golubeva, 2010, Kaprāns, Procevska, 2013, Kaprāns, Zelče, 
2011, Muižnieks, Zelče, 2011, just to name few).42 
Preses klubs (The Press Club), a weekly political show on LTV1, was on air on the evening 
of that year’s March 16, and Tatyana Zhdanok, a high-profile Russian-speaking politician 
in Latvia43, was also invited to participate in it. On the same day Zhdanok was among 
                         
42 While for many Russian-speakers the veterans are war criminals who fought on the side of Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War, for many Latvian-speakers they are defenders of Latvia against the 
Soviet invasion. Similarly, while for many Russian-speakers the end of the Second World War is a victory 
of the Soviet army in the Great Patriotic War and liberation of Latvia from the Nazi Germany invaders 
celebrated each year on May 9, for many Latvian-speakers it is a return of the Red Army and a beginning of 
the second Soviet occupation of Latvia. What for some are liberators, for others are occupiers. Soviet 
troops invaded Latvia for the first time in 1940 but a year later were driven out by Nazi Germany. The 
Soviets returned in 1944 to stay for almost half a century till 1991. 
43 She is a former leader of the late 1980s International Front of Working People, an antithesis of the pro-






those protesting against the march in front of the Freedom Monument. As expected, 
during the Preses klubs debate she questioned the popular narrative among Latvian-
speakers portraying men fighting in the ranks of the Latvian Legion as freedom fighters 
who joined the Germans in the hope of protecting Latvia against the Soviet re-
occupation. The annual march of the veterans is a glorification of Nazi atrocities, 
Zhdanok claimed and had been immediately interrupted by the host of the programme 
who argued that Zhdanok is not right in saying so and, instead, preferred to describe the 
march as a commemorative event. The overall tone of the Preses klubs debate was highly 
critical about the viewpoint expressed by Zhdanok and she, with her version of the past 
was left alone with her opponents, other politicians, as well as journalists, being in the 
majority. 
‘No one listens to this opinion and takes it into account,’ Anna complained. It is 
important to note that it is not only the particular opinion of Zhdanok that has been 
ignored during the particular debate on LTV Anna is referring to. It is the voice of the 
Russian-speaking population generally that, as she thinks, is not being properly heard and 
respected in the public domain, including LTV. Because of an ignorant attitude towards 
the position of Zhdanok that Anna also shares she switched to another channel. In this 
way Anna protested against what she thinks is LTV’s dominating one-sided discourse of 
‘we, good [ethnic] Latvians, they, bad Russians’. 
Her exiting from the political show of the public broadcaster LTV is not a signal of 
Anna’s denial of citizenship, or lack of interest in the national politics. In fact, it was a 
very straightforward case of an exercise of citizenship. What she rejected was 
participation within that form of citizenship that she feels to be imposed on her. With 
‘our’ interpretations of the national history, which conflicts with the official 
representations of the past, being dismissed on the Preses klubs debate Anna took a 
decision to walk away from LTV. It is a choice she made to voice her discontent with 
such form of citizenship as offered by the public broadcaster requiring her to accept the 
dominant conception of the national past. 
Her withdrawal from LTV should be seen as a call for a respect of the historical narrative 
as shared by the Russian-speaking minority on the public broadcaster and more generally 
a claim for re-drawing of the lines of demarcation of the national communion as set by 
LTV. As Anna put it, LTV ‘should accept that here [in Latvia] live not only [ethnic] 





like that Russians are unwanted [in Latvia]’. Her reference to the rootedness of Russians 
in Latvia is a very straightforward reminder of Russian-speakers belonging to the national 
‘we’ to the same extent as Latvian-speakers and a call for more inclusive conception of 
the national community within the public television. 
It is this perception, that the public broadcaster LTV reflects the official position of what 
is often seen among Russian-speakers as the pro-Latvian government and, more 
generally, that it gives priority to the world-view of the ethno-linguistic majority at the 
expense of alternative, oppositional views of the ethno-linguistic minority that alienates 
Russian-speakers from the public television. 
Estonian researchers have reached similar conclusions to explain the lack of interest that 
young Estonian Russian-speakers with good knowledge of Estonian language have in the 
Estonian-language media (Vihalemm, Hogan-Brun, 2013b) suggesting that it is not so 
much the absence of Russian language per se, albeit crucial part of their cultural identity, 
as lack of visibility of Russian-speakers in their everyday normality, here and now, and, 
equally important, ignorance of their world-view on LTV what brings Russian-speaking 
viewers away from the public broadcaster. Here Russian language serves less as a mean 
of communication (majority of Russian-speakers do not have problems to understand 
Latvian) but more as a symbolic resource of representation. In other words, it is not so 
much Russian language they wish to hear on LTV itself as their voice being represented 
and respected in the public sphere as made by LTV. 
4.4 The Channel of the Government  
Although Latvian broadcasting law stipulates that LTV is a public service broadcasting 
institution, in the eyes of the publics which LTV is expected to serve according to the 
same law, it is more often seen as a state broadcaster, a servant of those in power. For 
many of my respondents, both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, LTV is a one-way 
top-down channel of communication in hands of the government of the day for it to 
address the society, inform about its decisions and even make the society better as part of 
broadcasting as an enlightenment project. To quote 45-year-old Latvian-speaking farmer 
Edgars (FG9), LTV is ‘the official channel of information’ that serves as a platform for 
the government to ‘address the society’ and ‘express its official viewpoint’. Here LTV is 
perceived as the domain of the power elite where for its publics only the role of the 





signalling that more than two decades since the breakup of the Soviet empire footsteps 
of the Soviet era state broadcasting tradition are still much present in the way how its 
publics think about the ex-state broadcaster LTV. 
For Ilona, a 35-year-old Russian-speaking head of the registry office (FG8), LTV1 is the 
channel ‘through which the government speaks’ with its people and where ‘the president 
makes his Christmas message’. On LTV1 information comes from the government, she 
explained. Also for 68-year-old retired Latvian-speaking woman Ilga (FG9) LTV1 is the 
channel where ‘our president congratulates us with the arrival of New Year’. For both 
Latvian-speaker Ilga and Russian-speaker Ilona, as for many other of my respondents, 
LTV1 is the channel where the country’s political leadership most often appears to 
address its people, express its viewpoint and explain its decisions, and it is what makes 
their perceptions of LTV as a state television, a broadcaster through which the 
government communicates with the society, a platform for the political elite to 
disseminate its messages to people. 
4.4.1 The Property of the State 
The image of LTV as a state broadcaster is not only a legacy of the Soviet past when the 
state owned, funded and controlled LTV served as a mouthpiece of the Communist 
Party; such a view on LTV continues to be sustained by the realities of today’s public 
broadcasting system with the annual state subsidy serving as a main source of income of 
LTV allocated by the government in the same way as to other state-funded institutions 
instead of direct public funding in a form of the licence fee payments or a media tax. In 
addition, scandals of (in)direct political pressure on the management of LTV to influence 
its editorial decisions from time to time entering the public domain support such a view. 
It all inevitably has left its mark on the way LTV’s publics look at the institution. 
With reference to its funding model it was common for my informants, both Latvian-
speakers and Russian-speakers, to label LTV as ‘a state television’. Their line of argument 
was that as LTV is funded by the state it is a state broadcaster. In the words of 32-year-
old Latvian-speaking construction worker Intars (F3), LTV is ‘the state channel’ (or ‘the 
state institution’, as he also described LTV) as ‘the state gives money to television... the 
state subsidizes [LTV]’. As a result, people do not feel as being owners of LTV. Instead, 
LTV is seen as ‘the property of the state’, to quote Intars. It is the government of the day 





eyes of its publics, and its Russian-speaking publics particularly, also perceived as keeping 
control over it. Here the argument goes that as it is the government that gives money to 
LTV it also controls its output.  
To quote Tatyana, a 61-year-old Russian-speaking woman working with children at the 
school amateur theatre (FG6), ‘the boss [of LTV] is the one who pays for it’. ‘The first 
channel [LTV1] is a state channel, a political one. The political party that comes to power 
also financially supports this channel,’ she explained. For her, as it is those in power who 
provide LTV with money they also ‘command’ it, to speak in the words of Tatyana’s 
friend Valentina, a 76-year-old retired Russian-speaking woman (FG6). 
The funding model of LTV also helps its publics to distinguish LTV from its commercial 
rivals. So, for many there are two types of television. First there is LTV, ‘the state 
television’, and then all the rest of broadcasters commonly termed as ‘commercial 
channels’. Public service television is a less familiar concept. ‘I understand that there is a 
state television, a commercial [television], but what is public television, that is something 
I do not understand,’ said Heinrihs, a 59-year-old Russian-speaking engineer (F2). ‘Public 
toilet, that’s what I understand but what is public television, that’s what I do not 
understand,’ he added jokingly. Although meant as a joke, it illuminates his struggle to 
comprehend the notion of public broadcasting.   
Despite the fact that it is tax-payers money that is allocated to LTV through the annual 
state subsidy, in people’s minds it is still more often seen as a state-funded instead of tax-
payers-funded broadcaster. While some participants of the study argued that since LTV 
is funded by tax-payers money it ‘should belong to the people’, to quote Sergei, a 30-
year-old Russian-speaking worker at the railway company (FG8); however, as it is the 
government who decides how to spend tax-payers money and it is the government that 
gives money also to LTV, in their everyday life people do not feel as real owners of LTV. 
It is because of a deep-seated state/people dichotomy widespread in Latvian society. 
It is typical for people in Latvia to make a sharp ‘us’ versus ‘them’ distinction between 
‘the state’ and ‘the people’ where ‘the state’ represents the political elite, those in power 
but ‘the people’ stands for the public, the society. The definition of ‘the state’ as 
formulated by 23-year-old Russian-speaking businessman Anton (FG7) is a popular 
interpretation of this concept among my respondents, both Latvian-speakers and 





the notion of ‘the state’. In everyday discourse it is common for people to detach 
themselves from ‘the state’, exclude themselves from being involved in its governance 
and thus also responsible for its failures, as well as the future of ‘the state’. 
Similarly, people do not feel in control over expenditure of their tax payments. As 48-
year-old Russian-speaking municipality IT officer Viktor (FG8) concluded, ‘we don’t 
know where our taxes go’. It is not only the government deciding how tax-payers’ money 
will be spent it is also tax-payers’ money seen as something that in a way belongs to those 
in power, and this is the reason why in the eyes of its publics LTV, despite being a tax-
payers funded organization, is more often perceived as not owned by ‘the people’, 
taxpayers, but as the property of ‘the state’, those in power, those who decide on the 
allocation of tax-payers’ money.  
4.4.2 New Parliament, New Director of Television   
Over the last more than 20 years since the restoration of the country’s independence 
LTV has experienced seven director generals and a number of acting leaders while a new 
one has been searched for. The fact that only one of its director generals so far has 
served his term fully while all others have either resigned or been fired as a result of a 
scandal serves as a striking evidence of constant political struggles that have surrounded 
this post. Scandals over the political pressuring of the management of LTV and meddling 
in its editorial decisions entering the public domain from time to time over all these years 
have inevitably left its footprint on the image of LTV among its publics. Even if editors 
and journalists of LTV have most often been successful in securing their editorial 
autonomy, regular clashes between the television and the power elite have made its 
publics question the political independence of LTV. 
For instance, Daina, a 43-year-old Latvian-speaking director of the animal shelter (FG3), 
referred to the 2011 case of dismissal of Kārlis Streips, one of the star presenters of LTV, 
accused of using insulting language during his political debates show Skats no malas (View 
From the Distance) to describe one of the local political parties. The journalist himself and 
his supporters argued that this incident served just as a pretext and the decision of the 
then management of LTV to ﬁre him was politically motivated. ‘One says one word and 
immediately are sacked,’ Daina said to signal her suspicion that this was another case of 





In the same year Jānis Domburs, another big name journalist of LTV, presenter of its 
flagship weekly political discussion programme Kas notiek Latvijā? (What Is Happening In 
Latvia?), also left LTV when he and then LTV management failed to agree on the future 
conditions of their collaboration. As journalists disappeared, first Domburs and later 
Streips, so did their political shows.44 In the following excerpt Jānis, a 27-year-old 
Latvian-speaking worker at the supermarket (FG3), reflects on the recent withdrawal of 
popular and, as he thinks, independent journalists:  
In our country when new Saeima [the parliament of Latvia] comes then 
immediately after a new director of television [LTV] also comes or some 
other shifts [in posts] occur. Recently it has been very clear that those 
popular, influential journalists who have achieved something disappear 
from LTV.  
4.4.3 Sit and Read as They Did It in the Soviet Times  
It is also because of its perceived official tone LTV is often seen as a state television. 
Many of my respondents described the programming output and mode of address of 
LTV, especially its main channel LTV1, as serious, official and conservative contrasting it 
with what is seen as more relaxed, informal and more entertainment focused approach of 
its commercial rivals. They have noticed that, for instance, the news anchors on the 
commercial channels can afford to make jokes, they smile more often, something you 
will not see so often on Panorāma, the main newscast of LTV1. Here is what 39-year-old 
Latvian-speaking teaching assistant Gunta (PFG3) pointed out discussing the mode of 
address as employed by Panorāma news readers to suggest that being constrained in their 
on-screen behaviour may imply also limited editorial autonomy behind the screen:  
[On Panorāma] like during the Soviet times announcers sat at a table, so 
they still sit there today. It’s too dry. They somehow only read that 
information, those news, and they do not have any emotions, nothing. 
On other [commercial] channels they are allowed to express their 
emotions, they usually say something more from themselves. But there 
[on Panorāma] they only sit and read that information, and that’s all. They 
[LTV] perhaps as a state television... they cannot afford to add something 
                         
44 Following the change of LTV management and the appointment of a new director general in 2013 
Streips with his show returned to LTV. Domburs, as noted earlier, started a new project on LNT channel, 






So, the Soviet legacies (highly official, unemotional news reading of that time when radio 
and television announcers were not allowed to express their emotions and had to 
carefully follow the text earlier approved by the censors) and the mode of address of 
Panorāma today (more conservative news delivery style if compared with more relaxed 
approach of the commercial channels) have mixed together to make LTV in the eyes of 
some of its publics look as an official (state) channel. 
4.4.4 To Punish the ‘pro-Latvian’ Government   
More suspicious about LTV as a government funded, owned and also controlled 
broadcaster are its Russophone publics. While the belief that LTV as a state broadcaster 
offers the official world-view of the government is also common among Latvian-
speakers, for Russophones LTV is not merely a state television, it is a television seen as 
representing the interests of what Russian-speakers like to call the pro-Latvian 
government.45 For many of them LTV is part of the political establishment that in their 
eyes privilege the ethno-linguistic majority of Latvian-speakers, and for the same reason 
LTV is seen as an embodiment of what is perceived as unfair governmental policies 
towards the Russian-speaking community. No wonder then that their resentment against 
the government in the end turns into their abandonment of LTV. 
By ignoring LTV, many Russophones protest against the way the government treats the 
Russian-speaking community – it is a protest against its perceived marginalization, 
othering and exclusion over the last more than 20 years (consider, for instance, the 
citizenship policy what many Russian-speakers believe is discriminatory) what 23-year-
old Russian-speaking businessman Anton (FG7) described as ‘Latvia only for [ethnic] 
Latvians’ or, to quote 25-year-old Russian-speaking municipality officer Elizaveta (FG7), 
‘supporting only Latvian language and [ethnic] Latvians’.  
To put it another way, through the rejection of LTV, what they see as part of the centre 
of power, Russian-speakers punish the power elite for its attitudes towards the ethno-
                         
45 While the so-called ‘Russian’ political parties, popular among the Russian-speaking electorate, are in 
power in some municipalities – for instance, the mayor of the capital Riga is Russian-speaker Nil Ushakov, 
leader of the Saskaņas centrs (Harmony Centre) alliance, a highly popular political force among the 
Russian-speaking electorate; nevertheless, these so-called ‘Russian’ political parties are excluded from the 
power elite at the national level. Throughout over than two decades since the restoration of Latvia’s 
independence they have always been left outside the governing coalition and, as a rule, have been the main 





linguistic minority. It is dismissal of LTV that gives them voice. Choosing to watch other 
channels, namely their favourite transnational Russian television, instead of the public 
broadcaster LTV Russian-speaking audiences communicate their disagreement with the 
hegemonic concept of the national ‘we’. It is an act of resistance and at the same time a 
call for recognition. In other words, employment of the exit mechanism allows them to 
realize the voice option. It is a political statement Russian-speakers are making by exiting 
from LTV. 
These sentiments among the Russian-speaking publics of LTV may explain the results of 
the 2012 TNS Latvia survey, according to which members of ethnic minority groups 
compared to ethnic Latvians were more convinced that LTV is a state television instead 
of being a public broadcaster. While 15.1% of ethnic Latvians and 9% of ethnic 
minorities strongly agreed that LTV is a public service television and it operates in the 
interests of the entire society, 22.8% of ethnic Latvians and 33.2% of ethnic minorities 
strongly agreed that LTV is a state broadcaster and it operates in the interests of the 
ruling political forces. Overall, people in Latvia are more convinced that LTV is a state 
channel than a public broadcaster. 27.1% of all respondents in the same survey strongly 
agreed that LTV is a state broadcaster and only 12.6% were strongly convinced that it is 
a public television. Interestingly, some claimed that LTV is both a public channel and a 
state broadcaster at the same time signalling that in the eyes of some of its publics 
identity of LTV is blurred and can involve elements of serving both the public and the 
political leadership at the same time.  
4.4.5 The Government Makes PR 
For many Russian-speakers, and some Latvian-speakers, as well, it is also their daily 
experiences with state-controlled Russian television that shapes their perceptions of 
LTV. As some of them argued, while Pervyi kanal, and its Baltic version Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal, is the official channel of Russia reflecting the official world-view of Kremlin, 
LTV1 is the official channel of Latvia offering the official world-view of the Latvian 
government. Some have even noticed that logos of LTV1 and Pervyi kanal depicting 
number ‘1’ that symbolizes their status of being historically the country’s first channels 
are similar, and due to the same historical reasons – both LTV and Pervyi kanal are the 
former Soviet state broadcasters – in the eyes of audiences, and not only for Russian-
speaking viewers, the status of being the country’s first channel is intrinsically linked with 





It is both Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal and LTV 36-year-old Russian-speaking municipality officer 
Mikhail (FG7) described as ‘the official mouthpiece of the government’. While Pervyi 
Baltiiskii kanal is ‘the official channel of Russia’ representing ‘the point of view of 
[Dmitry] Medvedev [then president of Russia] and [Vladimir] Putin [then prime minister 
of Russia]’, LTV1 is ‘the official channel of the government [of Latvia]’. To quote 
Mikhail, ‘the government makes PR for itself. Here, on Pervyi Baltiiskii [channel], it is 
Medvedev and Putin, here [on LTV1], [it is] the government of Latvia’. As many other of 
my Russian-speaking informants, he also believes that LTV provides ‘the official position 
of the state’. As he explained,  
All the rest of the channels, they, as far as I know, are commercial and 
their editorial line is set by their owners. That’s normal when the owner 
sets editorial line of the channel. It is clear that the Latvian state is the 
owner of these channels [LTV1, LTV7] and therefore they focus on the 
viewpoint of the state. All the rest of the channels, they have their own 
position.  
Mikhail is not alone holding such a view on the way the media operates in the country. 
There is a shared sense among both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers that such 
thing as independent media in Latvia does not exist. Owners of the media, if not all than 
at least a large part of them, are believed to exercise control over their media outlets with 
the only difference between LTV and its commercial rivals that in the case of LTV it is 
the government seen as the owner. Disbelief in the existence of independent media 
should come as no surprise given the fact that limited editorial autonomy and missing 
transparency of media ownership, especially when it comes to the daily press, have 
become the idiosyncrasies of the Latvian media system (for an overview see Juzefovics, 
2011, Salovaara and Juzefovics, 2012). 
4.5 Protest Against Those in Power 
According to regular opinion polls, politicians and political institutions in Latvia are 
highly distrusted46 and people like to say that they have little interest in the country’s 
                         
46 According to regular Eurobarometer surveys, Latvia has one of the lowest levels of trust in the political 
elite in the European Union. In the 2013 survey only 21% said that they do trust the government, those 
who said they trust the parliament were 17% and 6% expressed trust in the political parties, and, what is 
more, opinion polls also show that members of the ethno-linguistic minority tend to trust the government 
and the parliament less than members of the Latvian-speaking majority (see, for instance, Rozenvalds, 





political life.47 It is common for people to speak about politics, understood here as 
formal politics exercised by the political elite, as a sphere out of their interest and impact 
– yet, it does not necessarily mean that they do not care about what is happening in the 
life of the nation. All these sentiments, nevertheless, are reflected in their responses 
towards LTV. By rejecting what many believe is the state broadcaster LTV, understood 
as a government funded and owned (and, as many of my respondents would also add, 
controlled) institution, its publics register their protest against the country’s political elite, 
usually being blamed for all the socio-economic hardships people experience in their 
everyday lives affecting both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers more or less equally 
(see, for instance, studies of Hazans, 2010, Rajevska, 2010). In short, publics of LTV 
protest against the distrusted power elite by exiting from LTV, what they see as part of 
the same elite or at least having close ties with it. 
It was typical for my respondents to claim that LTV’s programming, and that of its main 
channel LTV1 in particular, is overloaded with political information. There were two 
words – ‘politics’ and ‘politicized’ – that my informants repeatedly referred to when 
describing their associations with LTV1.48 Anda, a 47-year-old Latvian-speaking specialist 
working at the local culture house (FG10), is among those who watch LTV1 hardly ever. 
It is because, as she argues, ‘there [on LTV1] is only politics’. It is with the news from 
Saeima, the Latvian parliament, LTV1 associates also for 20-year-old Latvian-speaking 
student Lauma (PFG2): ‘All those news always are coming from there, it is full of 
politicians, all news are with them’. 
For many it is only the pre-election period when they have a high interest in the country’s 
political life, and for many of my informants, both Latvian-speakers and Russian-
speakers, pre-election political broadcasts are one of the rare experiences they have with 
the main channel of LTV. It is a time when audiences, even those who otherwise have 
little interest in politics, search for political information, and as in the eyes of many LTV1 
is first and foremost a source of the political news it is LTV1 they most often search for 
as elections are approaching. However, as soon as elections are over many straight after 
experience disenchantment with those they have just elected, and for this reason also lose 
their interest in politics on LTV1. As quickly as they have joined LTV audiences shortly 
                         
47 In the 2012 TNS Latvia survey only 18.1% said that they have high interest in national political affairs. 
48 It should be explained already at this point that ‘politicization’ here implies not only perceived high 
volumes of the political news on the public television but also what is believed to be one-sided perspective 
(from the positions of the government) on the country’s political life dominating on LTV, the view more 





before the elections, so quickly they exit from LTV when the elections are over. 
23-year-old Russian-speaking businessman Anton (FG7) was among those watching 
political debates on LTV1 prior to the 2011 early general elections, and it was also for 
him his latest experience of being among those watching LTV1. He wanted to see how 
the Saskaņas centrs alliance, the political force he supports, will perform on debates. 
Anton also remembered watching LTV1, and hence being part of the national 
community as made by LTV, on one of the Saturday nights of May earlier the same year 
when during a live televised address to the nation then president of Latvia Valdis Zatlers 
announced a referendum on dissolving the parliament that later became one of the most 
watched programmes on television that year gathering also sizeable Russian-speaking 
audiences: 
When I saw information on the internet, on rus.Delfi.lv [the Russian-
language version of Delfi, the most popular news site in Latvia] that 
Zatlers will make a speech on the Latvian channel [LTV1] and most likely 
will announce dissolving of the Saeima [the parliament of Latvia]... It was 
the first channel [LTV1] I watched. Because where else will I see it?  
Though in his daily viewing experiences he ignores LTV, and its main channel LTV1 in 
particular, during the crucial moments of the national life he comes back to the public 
broadcaster. This time it was not only the significance of the event itself but also the fact 
that only LTV1 broadcasted president’s announcement to the nation what made him, 
otherwise typical non-loyal viewer of LTV1, to re-enter this channel. It also suggests that 
while being only occasional viewer of the political news on the public television, he has 
not lost his interest in the national politics. It is Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal his daily source of 
national news. 
Although many of my respondents complained of LTV because of its, as they think, 
being overloaded with political information, it is not so much high volumes of the 
political news itself that make its publics reject LTV, and its main channel LTV1 in 
particular. Instead, it is the problematic relationship, full of suspicion between the 
country’s political elite and the society that alienates its publics from LTV. Many protest 
against the power elite by exiting from LTV. They ignore political information as offered 
by LTV, for they distrust the political leadership that, as they think, not only so often 





another way, abandonment of LTV should be seen as an expression of protest on the 
part of its publics against those in power. 
Many of my Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking respondents were highly critical 
about the country’s political elite and spoke about their deep distrust of the power elite 
and their disillusionment with the ruling politicians. ‘Sometimes you cannot stand it. You 
wish to switch to another channel to watch something positive,’ Valentina, a 76-year-old 
retired Russian-speaking woman (FG6), reflected on her experience of from time to time 
watching popular weekly political debates show Kas notiek Latvijā? (What Is Happening In 
Latvia?) on LTV1. Though many of my informants, including non-loyal publics of LTV, 
namely young people and Russian-speakers, said that they had watched Kas notiek Latvijā? 
now and then, they also admitted that later they had lost their interest in the show as it 
did not have any tangible impact on the real life politics. Kas notiek Latvijā? was on air on 
Wednesday nights from 2001 till 2011 with its viewing figures declining steadily over the 
last years. So, we can conclude that by exiting from Kas notiek Latvijā? many voiced their 
protest against the power elite, whose members over the years have been regular guests 
of Kas notiek Latvijā? debates. To quote Valentina explaining her dislike and distrust of 
the country’s political elite and therefore also the little interest she has in political 
information as offered by LTV, ‘you do not want to see and hear them [politicians]’. 
Though critical about the political elite, she, as others, is not indifferent to what is 
happening in Latvia, to borrow the title of the LTV’s political debates show. She is a 
regular viewer of national news on television, most often on her much-loved Pervyi 
Baltiiskii kanal. 
As many distrust those in power they also distrust LTV what is believed to be funded, 
owned and even controlled by the same political class they distrust so much and blame 
for all the hardships and wrongdoings. These sentiments are especially widespread 
among the Russophones, albeit not totally absent from the responses of my Latvian-
speaking respondents. As already noted before, its Russian-speaking publics are more 
convinced that LTV is a state broadcaster operating in the interests of the ruling political 
elite. In the eyes of many of my Russian-speaking informants LTV is not merely a 
governmental channel but is seen as part of the political establishment what many 
Russian-speakers like to describe as pro-Latvian. Therefore, it is no wonder then that 
their lack of confidence in the government reflects into their distrust of LTV and its 





(FG7) put it, ‘if I do not trust the owner of the shop, then I would not buy anything 
from him’. Like for many other Russian-speaking viewers, it is also for him the 
government who is the owner and boss of LTV. 
The fact that the daily prime-time news on the commercial channels, also devoting much 
of their airtime to the coverage of national politics, gather sizeable audiences with their 
viewing figures outnumbering ratings of LTV1’s Panorāma signals that audiences, by 
rejecting political information on the public broadcaster LTV, do not necessarily exit 
from politics completely. For the majority of my respondents the evening news on their 
favourite channel, be it one of the national commercial channels for Latvian-speakers or 
localized transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal for Russian-speakers, is enough daily dose of 
the political news, and only small minority is searching for more politics on television, 
mainly older generations.  
Popularity of the news on these commercial channels also suggests that an exercise of 
citizenship is not necessarily linked with public broadcasting institutions. As viewing 
practices of my informants indicate, rejection of the political news on the public 
television does not necessarily imply abandoning of the citizen role on the part of its 
non-loyal publics. There is not only less politics on the commercial channels (LTV 
provides more current affairs output offering political information than its commercial 
competitors), what is more, political information here is presented in less official tone 
and is squeezed in-between light programming. Besides, though not necessarily seen as 
politically independent as some owners of the commercial channels have been accused of 
having close ties with particular local political forces, contrary to LTV these channels are 
free from those suspicions what the image of a state broadcaster brings along. There is a 
difference to be seen as serving the interests of a particular political party or serving the 
interests of the entire power elite. Though they may not be seen as politically 
independent, nevertheless, these commercial channels contrary to LTV are still seen as 
independent from the state where ‘the state’ implies the entire political establishment or 
all those in power more generally. It all makes politics on the public broadcaster LTV in 
the eyes of its publics look different from politics on its commercial rivals. 
4.5.1 Psychic Challenge Wins 
If the family of 51-year-old Latvian-speaking dairy farmer Sarmīte (F3), living in the 





Sastrēgumstunda (Rush Hour), the successor of Kas notiek Latvijā? (What Is Happening In 
Latvia?), on the public broadcaster LTV1 or Russian reality show Bitva ekstrasensov (Psychic 
Challenge) on the commercial channel TV3 under the Latvian title Ekstrasensu cīņas, both 
part of the Wednesday night slot and on air almost at the same time, priority will be 
given to Ekstrasensu cīņas. It is the last minutes of Sastrēgumstunda they sometimes watch 
when Ekstrasensu cīņas is already over. In addition to TV3 it is also its Russian-language 
sister channel 3+, as well as Russian REN TV offering Bitva ekstrasensov, highly popular 
show in many families of both ethno-linguistic communities. 
Apart from the older generation, especially Sarmīte’s 80-year-old father Zigurds, called in 
the family as ‘our politician’, no one else has great interest in politics. The older 
generation is also the most devoted audiences of LTV in this family, and of its main 
channel LTV1 in particular. During my visits to the family in the main living room where 
Marta, Sarmīte’s 30-year-old daughter, manager of debtors, with her family lives, and 
often also Sarmīte comes along to watch television throughout an entire evening, they 
were mostly watching the commercial TV3, their most favourite channel. At the same 
time next door in the room of Sarmīte’s mother, 78-year-old Lidija, LTV1 was usually 
switched on. It is Lidija’s favourite channel or, as she put it, the ‘main channel’ for her. 
‘My first channel,’ she described LTV1 stressing the central role it plays in her everyday 
viewing practices and the strong emotional attachment she feels towards it. It is daily 
news, as well as several weekly political debates among her favourite shows on LTV1. 
As a rule, on weekday evenings it is national soap opera UgunsGrēks (FireSin) on their 
much-loved TV3 that the majority of the family members are watching in Marta’s living 
room while Lidija alone in her room at the same time is watching Panorāma on LTV1. 
Both programmes are on air during the same time slot. They all are passionate viewers of 
UgunsGrēks, including the family’s men. They follow its latest developments carefully and 
try not to miss any of its episodes. ‘Leons starts,’ during one of my visits announced 
Marta’s little daughter Elīza. Leons is a name of one of UgunsGrēks main characters, and 
it is Leons, instead of UgunsGrēks, she calls the soap opera. It was 8.20 pm and the latest 
UgunsGrēks episode was just started on TV3. Marta’s little daughter made herself 
comfortable in front of their TV set and watched UgunsGrēks attentively during the next 
half an hour. 
When her daughter Sarmīte each evening for a few minutes visits Lidija to take her blood 





rare regular experiences Sarmīte has with LTV1. It is a typical situation of Lidija sitting in 
her bed and Sarmīte next to her doing health checking procedures, and both chatting and 
watching Panorāma at the same time. ‘If there is something interesting [on Panorāma], I 
stay longer,’ explained Sarmīte. If not Lidija’s high interest in LTV1, Sarmīte would have 
even less experience with the main channel of the public television. Also in other 
Latvian-speaking families it is the older generation sustaining ties, albeit quite fragile and 
sporadic, between the public broadcaster LTV, and LTV1 particularly, and its non-loyal 
publics. 
Yet, despite the great appetite of the majority of the family members for entertainment 
on the commercial channels they have not exited from national politics completely. It is 
the evening news on their favourite TV3 channel they watch day in day out signalling 
that their dislike of the political elite and rejection of political information on the public 
broadcaster does not necessarily signal their total lack of interest in the national politics. 
On TV3 its daily prime-time newscast is squeezed in-between their favourite 
infotainment news show Bez tabu (No Taboo) on one side and their much-loved soap 
opera UgunsGrēks on the other making politics on the commercial TV3 look in a way 
more tolerable than the same political news on the public broadcaster LTV. Because on 
the commercial channels politics, presented in more relaxed manner than it is in the case 
of the public television and squeezed in-between entertainment offerings, are made to 
look more attractive and hence more accessible to audiences, it is primarily through 
commercial broadcasting members of this family exercise the role of a citizen. Though 
dismissing political information on the public broadcaster, they are no ‘less citizens’. It is 
escapism from the everyday socio-economic hardships commercial broadcasting is so 
successful in providing the family members with. Nevertheless, escapism has not killed 
their interest in national politics completely. Besides, apart from television they also have 
other sources of political information. For instance, Sarmīte has a morning ritual to go 
over the latest news on internet news sites. 
4.5.2 Bread and Circuses 
For many of my informants, both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, television is 
first and foremost a source of entertainment offering pleasure and relaxation and, what is 
also important, escape from the harsh day-to-day socio-economic realities. Yet, as already 
noted earlier, escapism from the daily miseries through entertainment on television does 





role of audiences does not necessarily oppress the role of a citizen, and popularity of 
daily news and weekly current affairs on all channels is a case in point. Even if it is the 
news outside the public television they like more, it does not make audiences ‘less 
citizens’.  
What in the eyes of many of my respondents are serious, official and conservative output 
and mode of address of the public broadcaster LTV conflict with their expectations to 
escape from the day-to-day realities with a help of television. Instead, it is the commercial 
channels prioritizing popular content and more relaxed approach that are deemed better 
at addressing these sentiments of audiences or, to quote Elena, a 45-year-old unemployed 
Russian-speaking woman (FG7), more successful in providing the ‘positive emotions’ 
they are searching for on television. The regular audience ratings show that apart from 
daily news and weekly current affairs it is all sorts of entertainment offerings attracting 
the largest television audiences in the country. Even if viewers themselves do not judge 
such content as something of high value and quality and are quite self-critical about their 
viewing choices; nevertheless, the fact remains that it is the content their viewing 
preferences often go for. 
Also 36-year-old Russian-speaking municipality officer Mikhail (FG7) thinks that 
television first of all should provide entertainment and relaxation. ‘When you come back 
from work, you wish to switch on [TV] and leave everything behind,’ he said. It is also 
31-year-old Latvian-speaking civil servant Agita (FG9) who is searching on television 
gratification of the same desires: ‘Sometimes you just wish to unbend your mind. You 
come back from work, you don’t want to... [watch political programmes], you prefer 
watching UgunsGrēks, something that kind of’.  
‘You do not wish to strain your brains,’ said 48-year-old Russian-speaking municipality 
IT officer Viktor (FG8) explaining his lack of interest in what he characterised as 
‘serious’ programming of LTV. ‘People are not interested in dull television. They are 
interested in bread and circuses,’ he pointed out. Although his description of television 
audiences is not flattering at all, to say the least, he stresses what seems to be a highly 
important role television is playing in the everyday lives of many of my informants, 
namely diverting their attention away from day-to-day hardships they face. Yet, as we 
have seen, the search for ‘bread and circuses’ on television, as municipality IT officer 
Viktor put it, has not made audiences apathetic about the life of the nation. They may 





affairs in the country.  
4.5.3 ‘They All Lie’ 
The public broadcaster LTV is not among the favourite channels also in the family of 54-
year-old Latvian-speaker Māra (F2) working as an accountant at the state archive and 
living in the capital city of Riga. While the main language in their family is Latvian, they 
also use Russian as her husband, 59-year-old engineer Heinrihs, is a Russian-speaking 
ethnic German – Heinrihs came to study in Riga in the early 1970s from Kazakhstan, 
then one of the Soviet republics, where he was born after his parents, German emigrants, 
were deported there from Ukraine by the Soviet regime in the early 1940s. 
As many other Latvian families, they also cope with everyday socio-economic hardships 
and blame local politicians, and these sentiments also help to understand the 
abandonment of LTV in their family. They think it is better to ignore political 
programmes on television as the negative flow of information makes you feel stressed 
and depressed. It is the reason why they prefer watching their favourite dining show 
Zvanyi uzhin (Come Dine With Me) on one of the Russian channels instead of watching the 
evening news broadcasted at the same time on the national channels. ‘Better not to 
worry,’ Māra said. 
‘Politics annoys me,’ Māra complained. As there are no positive changes on the political 
scene and to the way things are done in the country, Māra thinks that ‘it makes no sense 
having these [political] debates’ on television, and therefore, for Māra and other members 
of her family, political programmes on LTV are just tootling. ‘It’s babbling. Hate that 
kind of programmes,’ said their oldest daughter, 26-year-old civil servant Dace working 
at the ministry. It is their deep distrust of the country’s political elite that makes them 
also highly sceptical about political debates on television. As Heinrihs noted, politicians 
do not tell the truth on these programmes, so there is no need to watch them. ‘Anyway 
they will tell lies,’ he said.  
When popular weekly political debates Kas notiek Latvijā? (What Is Happening In Latvia?) 
first appeared on LTV in the early 2000s Māra was among its regular viewers but later 
lost her interest in it, for, as she believes, the programme did not have any influence on 
the ways things are done in the political circles. Māra thinks programmes such as Kas 





LTV more generally, Māra, as other members of her family, has employed an exit option 
as a voice mechanism to register their protest against the power elite.  
It is not only those in power it is also journalists of LTV they do not trust. For Heinrihs, 
LTV is a state broadcaster and its main news programme Panorāma ‘very official’. As he 
thinks, journalists of Panorāma, like politicians it shows, do not tell the truth. He believes 
that Panorāma continues to serve the interests of the government and that censorship still 
exists just as during the Soviet times. They show only what the government likes, 
Heinrihs argued. For him, there is no difference between how LTV and state-controlled 
Russian television he is watching regularly is operating. As for many other Russian-
speakers, keen viewers of Russian television, also for Heinrihs it is not only his some 
distant memories of the Soviet era state broadcasting but his actual experiences with 
Russian state-controlled channels what shapes his perceptions of LTV as a state 
broadcasting organization. 
Māra works at the state archive receiving a low salary and, as many employees of state-
funded institutions, experiences difficulties to make both ends meet and this has led to 
her overall resentment and anger towards those in power. Māra and other members of 
her family are highly critical about the government and power elite in general. During all 
my visits Māra, her mother, 81-year-old Broņislava, and Māra’s husband Heinrihs 
complained about the wrongdoings of the country’s political elite over the past 20 years 
of independent Latvia. There were no such conversations we had when they would not 
have criticized those in power. Yet, to be able to criticize the power elite they have to be 
in touch with the political news. Indeed, despite their dislike of politicians and rejection 
of political information on television, they still are well informed about national politics. 
Radio, the internet, colleagues at work constitute important sources of national news for 
them.   
As others, they too are disappointed with the country’s path of development since the 
restoration of independence in 1991 and have a long list of failures Latvia has 
experienced during these years they blame the political class for. It is politicians, the 
current political leadership, as well as former prime ministers and presidents of the 
country, they characterised as incompetent, dishonest, corrupted, liars, squanderers, and 
so forth. ‘While we have to save money, those in power squander it’, Māra complained 
during one of our conversations. ‘Our own Latvians have robbed us,’ she said. ‘Gang of 





To voice their protest against the ruling politicians they have opted to exit from the 
public broadcaster LTV what for them is a state channel representing interests of the 
power elite they blame for their daily miseries. At the same time, it is not a denial of 
citizenship. They have found different ways to participate in the life of the nation outside 
the public television. Their critical stance itself is a signal of their interest in the national 
affairs. Whilst being critical they are not indifferent.   
4.6 Conclusion 
The lack of a strong public broadcasting tradition in Latvia (at least in terms of weak 
public broadcasting institutions) accompanied with a wide choice of alternative offerings 
(national commercial channels broadcasting in both Latvian and Russian, plus high 
presence of transnational Western and Russian television) makes exit from the country’s 
public service television institution LTV easy. The massive exodus of audiences LTV has 
experienced over the last more than 20 years since the restoration of independent Latvia 
and arrival of first commercial broadcasters at first glance may look as a fiasco of plans 
to introduce Western-style public broadcasting in the post-Communist world and a 
denial of citizenship on the part of post-Communist audiences. However, to judge loyalty 
of post-Communist audiences towards public broadcasting the idea of public 
broadcasting (public broadcasting as a set of values) should be detached from the public 
broadcasting institutions (public broadcasting as an institutional embodiment).  
Though many have withdrawn from the public broadcaster LTV, it does not mean that 
they have also rejected public broadcasting as a common good as such. There is a 
consensus among various publics of the Latvian public television LTV that the idea of 
public broadcasting should be about delivering a public good. Yet, they do not 
necessarily associate these ideals with LTV, the current de jure institutional embodiment 
of public broadcasting in their country. In other words, rejection of the public 
broadcasting organization does not automatically imply exiting from the normative ideals 
its publics attach to the idea of public broadcasting. As responses of my respondents 
suggest it, at least at a normative level these ideals are recognized, accepted and valued. 
The crisis of Central and Eastern European public broadcasting institutions should not 
automatically be linked to the crisis of public broadcasting values in these post-
Communist countries. As we have seen in the Latvian case, migration from the public 





Russian television, does not equate to abandonment of the public broadcasting ideals and 
a rejection of the role of citizen. As the viewing practices of my informants suggest, 
citizenship is not necessarily linked with institutions of public broadcasting and can be 
realized as well within commercial broadcasting organizations.  
Given that the commercial broadcasters in Latvia have emulated some of the 
programming strategies more often associated with the public broadcasting tradition, it 
came as no surprise to find out that many of my informants mixed the public broadcaster 
LTV with its commercial competitors and even judged them as more successful in 
implementing some of the public broadcasting ideals into practice. Yet, this is not to say 
that they see commercial broadcasting as the fulfilment of the normative public 
broadcasting principles. It only implies that they see the country’s commercial 
broadcasters being able, to a greater or lesser extent, replace the public television by law 
LTV but not necessarily the entire idea of public broadcasting. 
Despite the fact that rejection of and withdrawal from the public broadcaster LTV at 
first may look as merely a typical case of an exercise of the consumer exit, in fact it 
signals an employment of the citizen voice. We can treat exiting from LTV as a voice-
type response of its publics with an exit strategy here serving as a voice mechanism for 
the expression of a protest. 
First, exodus from LTV can be seen as a protest against the country’s political 
establishment. In the eyes of its publics, LTV is often seen as a state broadcaster, which 
serves as a communication channel between the powerful and ordinary people and, what 
is more, operates in the interests of those in power, the view more popular among its 
Russian-speaking publics. My informants placed LTV in the domain of the state, 
understood first and foremost as the realm of the political elite, instead of identifying 
LTV as constituting the public sphere independent from the power elite. Through their 
exit from LTV its publics manifest their mistrust and suspicion towards the political 
establishment whose interests, as many think, LTV represents. In short, it is their dislike 
towards the ruling politicians what explains their alienation from the public television, 
and its main channel LTV1 in particular, seen as a symbol of the power elite discourse, 
and not their lack of interest in the national life and giving up of a citizen role. 
Second, for its Russian-speaking publics LTV is not merely a state broadcaster, it is a 





Latvian government, and the world-view of the ethno-linguistic majority more generally. 
Hence exit from LTV for its Russophone publics is also marking their protest against 
what they think is their exclusion from that version of the national ‘we’ as conjured up by 
LTV, an echo of the hegemonic national imaginary. It is low presence of Russian 
language and low visibility of Russian-speakers on LTV what makes its Russian-speaking 
publics to think that they are not invited to join the national communion as made by 
LTV, the reason why for its Russian-speaking publics LTV is ‘national(=nationalistic) 
television’, the concept applied also by its Latvian-speaking publics, though with different 
connotations attached to it. We can look at the abandonment of public television as a 
form of resistance employed by Russophones to the way LTV represents the national 
community contrary to Latvian-speakers who do not find such projection of the national 
‘we’ problematic. It is obvious for Latvian-speakers as members of the ethno-linguistic 
majority that LTV should prioritize their language and culture. In other words, through 
their ignorance of LTV its Russian-speaking publics articulate their disagreement with 
the dominant (=LTV’s=the government’s) ethno-nationalistic concept of the nation 
where the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority is conceived as the core 
elements of national imagination and national integration. It is also at the same time a call 
for a more inclusive conception of the nation where more prominent position would be 













Chapter 5  
Television News Preferences and a Sense of Belonging: the 
Case of Panorāma and Vremya49 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is the interplay between news media preferences and broader 
sentiments and identity formation processes among the Russian-speaking minority. 
Drawing on the case study of two long running prime-time news programmes – Latvian-
language Panorāma (Panorama) and Russian-language Vremya (Time) – this chapter 
demonstrates that more than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet empire the mark of 
the Soviet era divisions in television news consumption patterns among both ethno-
linguistic groups, Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, is still very much in place.  
The fact that Latvian-speakers, that is, the ethno-linguistic majority, and the Russian-
speaking minority differ in their media consumption habits has often been used as one of 
the core arguments in favour of the idea of the coexistence of two parallel ‘information 
spaces’, to use this rather vague but popular among local political circles concept, in 
Latvia that, in turn, has often been perceived as constituting a threat to national integrity 
and even national security. From this point of view, the preference of Russian-speaking 
audiences for news in the Russian language, including those offered by transnational 
Russian television, is seen as evidence of not only their withdrawal from the national 
news space but also of their alienation from and even disloyalty to Latvia and 
identification with, and allegiance to Russia. As I demonstrate later, this view is a 
simplification of a far more complex and nuanced reality. 
Neither the Russian-speaking community itself is homogeneous, nor are its viewing 
preferences uniform and, as we shall see, different sub-groups of the Russian-speaking 
audiences with notable variations in their news media practices can be identified. 
Likewise, Russian-speaking audiences are not passive and vulnerable media users 
uncritically accepting messages of Russian television as it has often been claimed by the 
Latvian political elite. Instead, diverse news consumption patterns, as well as diverse 
readings of news messages of Russian television can be found among different 
                         





generations of Russian-speaking audiences. Rejection of news offerings of the public 
broadcaster LTV and popularity of the news on transnational Russian television among 
these audiences automatically does lead neither to their lack of interest in the national 
news flow and alienation of the Russophones from Latvia nor to their uncritical 
acceptance of the news discourse as offered by Russian state-controlled channels. While 
older Russian-speakers, the majority of them first-generation Soviet era immigrants, 
combine their interest in both the national and Russian news agenda, their offspring, 
young Russian-speakers, have not only little interest in life in Russia but also are highly 
critical about it and its representations on Russian television.      
5.2 Empire Collapsed, Panorāma and Vremya Survived 
During the Soviet era two prime-time television news programmes were on offer in 
Latvia – Latvian-language Panorāma on LTV, which then was a typical state broadcaster 
of the kind every Soviet republic had, and Russian-language Vremya on the Soviet Central 
Television, available throughout the Soviet Union. Both Panorāma and Vremya first 
appeared on television screens during the 1960s. Usually, at 8 pm Panorāma was on air 
followed by all-Union Vremya at 9 pm which was broadcast simultaneously on all three 
available television channels in Latvia at the time, i.e. on both channels of the Soviet 
Central TV and till the late 1980s also on LTV.  
Over several decades the structure of Panorāma remained constant. It usually started with 
the all-Union news from Moscow followed by the national news stories on political and 
economic life of Latvia. Similar to its pan-Soviet ‘sister’ Vremya the tone of Panorāma was 
official and full of positivity and pathos. Panorāma regularly reported on the winners of 
socialistic competition, successful completion of the five-year plan and increase in labour 
productivity. 
At the end of the 1980s along with the disappearance of the colours of the Soviet Latvian 
flag in the ident of Panorāma also its announcers who used to greet their viewers with the 
address Good evening, comrades! were replaced with journalists. Till then only announcers 
were allowed to read the news. It was a time when Vremya continued to serve as a 
mouthpiece of the Soviet rule while journalists of Panorāma became passionate supporters 
of the Latvian independence struggle. In fact, both Vremya and Panorāma used the same 
propaganda tools of the Soviet-style journalism, albeit for diametrically opposed 





the political and economic changes of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Throughout the years of Awakening, the period of the political breakthrough at the end 
of the 1980s and the early 1990s, radio and television journalists in Latvia, including 
those working for Panorāma, enjoyed enormous trust, popularity and, as media scholars 
say, even love from their audiences (Brikše, et al., 2002). Journalists, along with the 
leaders of the liberation movement, the Latvian Popular Front, became the heroes of the 
Singing Revolution.  
For older Latvian-speaking generations watching Panorāma is not only a deep-seated habit 
going back to the Soviet times (like for Russian-speaking elderly people watching Vremya) 
it is also a significant part of their memories of a critical historical period in the life of the 
nation creating strong emotional ties between Panorāma and its devoted audiences today, 
elderly Latvian-speakers who are also the core audiences of LTV, and its main channel 
LTV1 in particular. In other words, this historical experience is one of the central 
elements that makes their ‘special attachment’ to Panorāma, to quote Hirschman (1970), 
so special. As during one of the focus group discussions 62-year-old retired Latvian-
speaking woman Brigita (FG5) put it, Panorāma ‘is connected with all our past when we 
sat in front of a television set each night 20 years ago’.  
This is not an experience that is shared by many Russian-speakers as then instead of 
Panorāma the majority of Russophones preferred watching Vremya. Albeit during this 
period LTV for many of its key political broadcasts introduced simultaneous interpreting 
in Russian hoping to provide Russian-speaking viewers with alternative information to 
that they received from the Soviet Central Television, interest of Russian-speaking 
audiences in LTV remained low, and the Moscow-based Soviet Central Television was 
their key news source (Brikše, et al., 1993). This should not come as a surprise given that 
Russian-speakers were never strongly accustomed to watch LTV, and during all the 
Soviet years it was the Soviet Central Television their viewing preferences were for 
instead of LTV, although LTV offered substantial volumes of Russian-language 
programming, mainly production of other Soviet republics such as their films and 
musical programmes but starting from the mid 1980s also the national news bulletins, 
and there was even a rule for the continuity announcers of LTV to greet and say goodbye 
to its viewers in both languages, Latvian and Russian. 





Vremya today has even preserved the melody of its Soviet era intro; it is their institutional 
framework that has changed. Today Panorāma continues its broadcasts on LTV that after 
the regaining of independence has been de jure renamed as the public broadcaster. More 
recently, Panorāma that for many years had been the country’s most popular (and for a 
long time also the only one) Latvian-language evening news programme on television 
experienced a significant drop in its audience figures, and today it is prime-time news on 
the national commercial channels TV3 and LNT that attracts the largest audiences. Both 
also are the most watched channels in the country.  
During the early 1990s the former Soviet Central Television was still available in Latvia 
as a terrestrial channel and only in 1996 the first nationwide commercial channel LNT 
replaced it. After disappearance of the ex-Soviet Central Television from the national 
terrestrial broadcasting network its viewers actively searched for their favourite channel 
on cable and satellite platforms with the number of cable and satellite subscribers to rise 
very rapidly (for more detailed account see Brikše, et al., 2002, Kruks, 2005). The 
successor of the Soviet Central Television has changed its names for several times and 
currently it is known as Pervyi kanal, a state controlled and also partly state-owned 
channel, whose Baltic version Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is also available in Latvia and, 
according to the regular audience statistics, attracts the largest Russian-speaking 
television audiences in the country.  
Today in addition to Moscow-based Vremya, the most popular television news in Russia, 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal also offers its national version Latviiskoe Vremya (Latvia’s Time) 
produced by the local news desk in the Latvian capital Riga and focusing on the national 
political, economic, social and cultural affairs. It first appeared on air in early 2004. In 
line with the regular audience measurements, Latviiskoe Vremya is the most popular news 
programme among Russian-speaking viewers bringing the Russophone community 
together around the evening news on television. The main rivals of Latviiskoe Vremya, 
news offerings either on the national Russian-language commercial channel TV5 or on 
the second channel of the public broadcaster LTV, do not enjoy such popularity. 
The wide choice of the Russian-language news offerings be they on the national channels 
or localized transnational Russian television creates a strong alternative to the Latvian-
language news flow on television, including the one provided by the public television 
LTV, and makes exiting from Panorāma, and the overall Latvian-language news stream on 





Russian-speaking student Dmitry (FG2) indicate that Russian-speakers easily substitute 
Panorāma with its Russian-language look-alike Latviiskoe Vremya: ‘Simply many people 
watch, for example, Pervyi Baltiiskii [channel] not thinking about why do I need to switch 
to the first channel [LTV1], to Panorāma, for instance, if the same, similar [news content] 
is on Pervyi Baltiiskii [channel]’. In a similar vein, 20-year-old Russian-speaking student 
Sofia (FG2) argued: ‘If there is a choice, why not to choose in your mother tongue’. As 
for Latvian-speakers it is the Latvian language, for Russian-speakers it is the Russian 
language that offers all those feelings of comfort, familiarity and proximity that only 
one’s first language (or the language used in the family) can provide.  
5.3 Russian-speakers Watching Panorāma 
In 2003 during the special programme devoted to the 45th anniversary of Panorāma 
Gundars Rēders, then head of LTV news, idealized Panorāma as the national integrator 
holding the nation together:  
That evening ritual, Panorāma, when we all come together is one of those 
moments of togetherness. You run all day, you are on your duties, but 
then you know that Latvia around half past eight comes together and 
starts to think the same thoughts on what is happening with us in this 
country (LTV1, 2003). 
As the regular audience statistics show, it is mainly Latvian-speakers, and older 
generations, the most loyal publics of LTV, in particular, who constitute the collective 
body of ‘Latvia’ and ‘we’/‘us’ in the national imagery in Rēders quote.  
The audience measurements dating back to as early as the mid-1990s reveal the ethno-
linguistic divisions in the television consumption patterns within Latvian society. In line 
with the 1994 Baltic Media Facts Latvia survey, the overwhelming majority of LTV1 
audiences – 88% – already then were ethnic Latvians with only 12% of ethnic minorities 
being among its viewers. For ethnic minority audiences, it was Ostankino TV, the former 
Soviet Central Television and current Russian Pervyi kanal, was their mainstream channel. 
According to the same survey, there were two times more ethnic Latvians watching 
Ostankino TV than ethnic minorities watching LTV1, and this pattern of Latvian-
speakers being more interested in Russian television than Russian-speakers in national 





that time, the vast majority of Panorāma audiences already then were ethnic Latvians with 
ethnic minorities making core audiences of Vremya, the ethnic composition of audiences 
of both news programmes remaining much the same today. 
While many Russophones not only have little interest in Panorāma but also distrust it, as 
well as the overall news flow on the public television, Latvian-speakers have little interest 
in and are suspicious of Vremya and Latviiskoe Vremya, as well as the overall Russian-
language news stream on television.50 In the 2011 TNS Latvia survey, only 37.7% 
members of the ethnic minority groups said that they trust the news on LTV1, the main 
channel of LTV and also the home of Panorāma, and an even smaller number – 33% – 
agreed that LTV1 offers objective and politically neutral news content. To compare, 
among ethnic Latvians 76.3% of respondents expressed trust in the LTV1 news and 68% 
judged it as objective and politically neutral news source. In the eyes of ethnic minorities 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is the most objective and politically neutral news source – 67.6% 
gave such an assessment. Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is also the news source trusted most by the 
ethnic minority respondents (70.8%). Contrary, only a minority of ethnic Latvians trusts 
the news on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (39.4%) and even smaller number of ethnic Latvians 
regards its news reporting as objective and politically neutral (27.5%).51  
As for many Russian-speakers, and, to be fair, also for many Latvian-speakers, the public 
broadcaster LTV plays marginal, if not to say no, role in their overall quotidian viewing 
practices, it should not come as a surprise that Russian-speaking audiences also do not 
search for its news offerings. While there is some interest among the Russophone 
audiences in the Russian-language news bulletins on the second channel of LTV, only 
                         
50 Yet, it does not necessarily conflict with their appetite for Russian-origin entertainment, seen as free 
from politics, be it part of the offerings of national or transnational Russian television, as we shall see it in 
Chapter 6. Contrary to news and politics on Russian television that may make some of its Latvian-speaking 
viewers feel uneasy about their choice because of thinking that ‘it’s not accepted in our society’ to watch 
such content, to speak in the words of 57-year-old Latvian-speaking chief specialist at the local museum 
Inta, keen viewer of news and current affairs on Russian channels, there is no social stigma attached to 
watching Russian-origin entertainment among Latvian-speakers, perceived as a rather innocent activity. 
51 Majority of ethnic Latvians trust the news on LNT (76.7%), LTV1 (76.3%), TV3 (75.1%) followed by 
lower level of trust expressed to the news on LTV7 (61.7%), Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (39.4%) and the national 
Russian-language commercial channel TV5 (35%). Accordingly, for ethnic Latvian audiences the news on 
LTV1 (68.6%), LNT (68.2%) and TV3 (68.1%) are also the most objective and politically neutral compared 
to the news on LTV7 (47.3%), Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (27.5%) and TV5 (27%). Interestingly that, though 
thinking of LTV as a state broadcaster, ethnic Latvians say that they still trust the news on its main channel 
LTV1 no less than the news on its commercial rivals LNT and TV3, contrary to ethnic minorities who 
trust the news on these commercial channels more than those on LTV1. As already noted in Chapter 4, it 
may signal that ethnic Latvian viewers look at LTV with less suspicion than ethnic minority audiences, 





tiny fraction of Russian-speaking viewers are among the regular audiences of Panorāma.52 
For those Russian-speakers who watch Panorāma on a regular basis being part of the 
national collectivity watching Panorāma offers symbolic resources for sustaining 
interpersonal contacts with their Latvian-speaking friends or colleagues at work. This  is 
a very utilitarian use of Panorāma as it provides common points of reference for everyday 
inter-ethnic communication. It seems that for these Russian-speaking viewers Panorāma 
symbolizes a kind of ‘official’ gateway to the world-view as shared by the Latvian-
speaking majority, imagined as different from the one Russian-speakers inhabit, signalling 
once more that in the eyes of Russian-speakers Panorāma, and the public television LTV 
in general, is one of the key, if not the most important, sites on the media scene for the 
representation of attitudes and experiences of the ethno-linguistic majority. These quotes 
from the focus group discussion with Russian-speaking viewers illustrate this further:     
I watch this channel [LTV1] only in order to know and understand how 
[ethnic] Latvians live, what is important for them. Because it is very 
important especially in our city as here are members of both ethnic 
groups, we are all mixed together. I have friends both [ethnic] Latvians 
and Russians, and it is important for me [to know] what [ethnic] Latvians 
watch [on TV], as well. As we have a common bunch [of friends] we 
need something to talk about. (Mikhail, a 36-year-old Russian-speaking 
municipality officer, FG7)  
Why exactly [Panorāma]… Well, because our [ethnic Latvian] colleagues 
also watch this first channel [LTV1] and, for this reason, I watch it too. 
To know what they are talking about and how all this is reported there. 
(Irina, 52-year-old Russian-speaking senior accountant working at the 
ministry, FG4) 
It is an image of LTV as a state broadcaster disseminating the official agenda of the 
government that makes 48-year-old Russian-speaking deputy school director Boris (FG4) 
to watch Panorāma. It is ‘the news from those in power’ he is expecting to find on 
Panorāma. He explained: 
                         
52 In the 2012 TNS Latvia survey 52.4% ethnic minority respondents reported that they do not watch 
Panorāma at all, while among ethnic Latvians such were only 19.3%. In the same survey, 52.9% ethnic 
Latvians, not an exceptionally high number, as well, said that they would miss Panorāma if it ceased to exist, 





Perhaps it has something to do with my job. Let’s say if something 
happens in Latvia... what is going to happen, what to expect from the 
powerful. The news from those in power... Let’s say, who will be the new 
minister [of education]. In 20 years, [he is going to be] the twenty fifth, I 
think. What he is going to do in the education sector, what more we are 
going to reform, in which direction we are going to go, how much money 
will be cut. It is important for us as well to know at least something.  
5.4 Neutral Zone  
While the majority of Russian-speakers, and Latvian-speakers, as well, prefer watching 
the news in their mother tongue (or the language they use at home), for a significant 
number of Russian-speakers, and also for many Latvian-speakers, their everyday 
television news consumption practices are bilingual. In the 2012 TNS Latvia survey 
41.6% of ethnic minority viewers said that they usually watch the news on television also 
in Latvian and, in its turn, 29.5% of ethnic Latvians claimed to do the same in Russian. It 
suggests that at some point both ethno-linguistic communities at their daily news media 
practices meet and hence it is rightly to say that the Latvian-language and Russian-
language media subsystems (at least when it comes to the news media consumption 
patterns) are not entirely isolated. 
Though the majority of Russian-speaking viewers choose to watch the news in Russian 
with the national news programme Latviiskoe Vremya on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal being the 
most popular, this is not evidence of Russian-speaking audiences withdrawing from the 
Latvian-language news stream on television completely. Despite the fact that Russian-
speakers have very little interest in the news output of the public broadcaster LTV, and 
of its main channel LTV1 in particular, they are more interested in the news on the 
national commercial channels broadcasting in Latvian – indeed it is the news offerings of 
these channels that are more successful in bringing Latvian-speaking and Russian-
speaking television news audiences together. 
As already noted in Chapter 4, providing more bilingual programming (mainly through 
entertainment imported from Russia offered in Russian with Latvian subtitles), the 
national Latvian-language commercial channels, in contrast to the public television, have 
been more successful in addressing Russian-speaking audiences. Accordingly, it is also 





While Panorāma and Vremya divide the nation, the evening news on the national Latvian-
language commercial channels serves as a kind of neutral zone. The 2011 TNS Latvia 
survey revealed that while ethnic Latvians distrust Vremya and ethnic minorities are 
highly suspicious of Panorāma, it is the news on the national commercial channels LNT 
and TV3 trusted by both ethnic Latvian and ethnic minority viewers. This 
notwithstanding, the news on these channels are more trusted by ethnic Latvians than 
ethnic minorities and the portion of ethnic minority audiences expressing trust in the 
news on LNT and TV3 is not high. Nevertheless, ethnic minority audiences trust the 
news on these channels more than the news on public television, including even the 
latter’s Russian-language news service on its second channel LTV753, and it is worth 
noting that the trust expressed reflects also into viewing preferences. While still the 
majority of the news audiences of TV3 and LNT are ethnic Latvians, ethnic minority 
viewers have higher interest in the news offerings of these channels, especially of LNT, 
in comparison with the public television, and its main channel LTV1 in particular.54  
5.5 National News, a Sense of Belonging and Old Russian-speakers 
While Russian-speakers prefer watching and also trust more the news on their favourite 
Russian-language channels, including those transmitting from Moscow and offering news 
flow from Russia, there is no evidence of the Russophones identifying more with, and 
having stronger feelings of belonging towards Russia instead of Latvia. Interest in life of 
Russia does not rule out their interest in the national news flow. According to the 2012 
TNS Latvia survey, ethnic minorities are interested in national news to the same degree as 
ethnic Latvians. However, in contrast to ethnic Latvians, ethnic minority responses 
indicate that they perceive themselves as less informed on national affairs.  
In many Russian-speaking families watching both Vremya and Latviiskoe Vremya are quite 
the same as they celebrate the arrival of New Year twice – first according to Moscow 
                         
53 In the 2011 TNS Latvia survey 50.4% ethnic minority respondents expressed trust in the news on LNT 
and 47.2% said they trust the news on TV3 compared to only 37.7% expressing trust in the news on LTV1 
and 43.7% who said they trust the news on LTV7. Among Russian-speaking audiences the most trusted 
news source is Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (70.8%) followed by the national Russian-language commercial channel 
TV5 (60.5%). In the eyes of Russian-speaking audiences the news on the commercial channels LNT 
(42.1%) and TV3 (41.2%) are also more objective and politically neutral than those of LTV1 (33%) and 
LTV7 (36.2%). Again it is the news on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal (67.6%) and TV5 (54.8%) seen by Russian-
speakers as the most objective and politically neutral.  
54 Though not high, still, according to the regular audience measurements, the number of ethnic minority 
viewers watching the evening news on LNT has always been about two times more than those watching 
Panorāma. Thus, in line with the TNS Latvia data, in 2012 among Panorāma audiences only 5% were ethnic 





time and then few hours later also in line with the local Latvian time. They open a bottle 
of champagne, make fireworks and listen to the president’s address to the nation twice – 
first it is televised New Year’s greetings of the Russian president followed by best wishes 
sent by the Latvian head of the nation few hours later. I return to these rituals of New 
Year’s Eve celebrations and the centrality of a role of television in them in Chapter 6.  
In the same manner as celebrating New Year’s Eve in line with both Moscow and 
Latvian time many Russian-speakers, mainly older generations, organize their quotidian 
television news consumption practices. The weekday evening news hour on Pervyi 
Baltiiskii kanal starting 8 pm first with the transmission of Vremya from Moscow (it is the 
same edition of Vremya Russians are watching in Russia) followed by its national version 
Latviiskoe Vremya constitutes an integral part of their daily news watching ritual. Panorāma 
on LTV1 is on air at 8.30 pm overlapping with Latviiskoe Vremya.  
Researchers studying the identities of Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia have 
pointed to the divided affiliations of the Russophone population suggesting that its 
cultural and political allegiances do not match – something that is at the heart of their 
specific identity of being a Latvian/Estonian Russian-speaker, an identity that allows 
them to identify with both ethnic Latvians/Estonians and Russians in Russia and at the 
same time to see themselves as different from both or, to quote Zepa discussing the case 
of Russians living in Latvia, ‘we are dealing with a group that might be called “Latvia’s 
Russians”, these are neither “Russians” nor “Latvians”’ (2005:76), and this is of 
importance in understanding their news preferences.  
Thus, Cheskin in his study of identity-formation processes of Latvian Russian-speakers 
concludes that ‘Russian speakers increasingly see themselves as members of the Russian 
cultural world (russkii mir) but not the Russian political world (rossiskii mir)’ (2013:309, 
emphasis in original), and, in a similar vein, Vihalemm and Masso in their research on 
identity development of the younger generation of Russian-speakers in Estonia come to 
the conclusion that ‘the civic-cultural divide is rather clear between the previous 
(historical) homeland and the present home society – the cultural and civic attachment of 
Estonian Russian-speakers seems to be oriented towards different poles: the civic 





also Vihalemm, Masso, 2002a, 2002b).55  
Therefore it came as no surprise in the 2012 TNS Latvia survey to find out that only 
36.9% of ethnic minority audiences said that they have high interest in Russian news. 
Audience statistics also show that the viewing figures of Latviiskoe Vremya offering 
national news are significantly higher than those of Vremya delivering news stories from 
Russia.56 According to the same 2012 TNS Latvia survey, those who have high interest in 
the news flow coming from Moscow are mostly older ethnic minority audiences. Among 
the older Russian-speaking generations there are also very few who regularly watch the 
news on the channels broadcasting in Latvian. Yet, as we shall see, they are not out of 
touch with the national life. Instead of watching the national news in Latvian, they 
choose to do it in Russian, namely watching Latviiskoe Vremya on their much-loved Pervyi 
Baltiiskii kanal.  
5.5.1 Being an Alien  
Among older Russian-speakers many are either citizens of Russia or the so-called non-
citizens of Latvia (they are neither citizens of Latvia nor any other country) who not 
having the right to vote are excluded from the political community and participation in 
the political life of the nation. ‘I’m nothing,’ said Igor, a 57-year-old unemployed man 
(F1) who is citizen of neither Latvia, nor of Russia, to stress his political status and a 
feeling of being disenfranchised that accompanies it. His official status is a non-citizen of 
Latvia, and he has Alien’s passport. There are nearly 300 000 people in Latvia from its 
two million population holding a non-citizen passport. According to the official statistics, 
                         
55 Interestingly, while thinking of themselves as culturally more belonging to Russia than Latvia/Estonia, 
Latvian/Estonian Russian-speakers, as the previous research shows it, also identify cultural differences 
what they think distinguish them from Russians who live in Russia and in some aspects also make them 
superior – for instance, in Cara’s (2010) study, Russian women in ethnically mixed marriages in Latvia talk 
about the way they speak in Russian as different from the way Russian is spoken in Russia (in terms of 
accent, rhythm, pace), they also point out differences in the way they and Russians in Russia dress (saying 
that they have learned elegance and fashion from ethnic Latvians) and see themselves as being more 
orderly and cleaner than Russians in Russia (one more thing they think they have taken over from ethnic 
Latvians). 
56 The regular audience measurements show that on average 2/3 of Latviiskoe Vremya audiences do also 
watch Vremya. Thus, according to the TNS Latvia ratings data, in 2012 average viewership of Vremya was 
73 800 while for Latviiskoe Vremya it amounted to 110 700. The same pattern has also been observed in 
Estonia with Novosti Estonii (News of Estonia), the national news programme of Estonian Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal, gathering larger audiences than Moscow-based Vremya (for more detailed account see Loit, Siibak, 
2013). As with Latviiskoe Vremya also the overwhelming majority of Novosti Estonii audiences are ethnic 
minorities with ethnic majority viewers having little interest in it, and the same applies to the ethnic 





majority of them are elderly Russians.57 
Igor ironically uses self-identification ‘negr’ (негр/negro) in Russian that is a short form of 
‘negrazhdanin’ (негражданин/non-citizen) and has very negative connotations in order to 
manifest his sense of being left on the margins of the national collectivity. Through such 
self-conception he communicates his feelings of being an outsider, a stranger, the other 
in Latvia. Yet, he has made a choice – he could have opted for Russian citizenship and 
continue living in Latvia but instead of being a citizen of Russia he preferred to be a non-
citizen of Latvia, something we can look at as a statement of him belonging to Latvia. 
Igor is the only one with a non-citizen status in his family; all others – his wife, 55-year-
old Anna doing administrative work at a hospital, both their daughters and son and their 
children, as well as his mother-in-law – are citizens of Latvia. He is also the only 
Orthodox believer in the family, all the rest are Catholics, and this is the reason why they 
celebrate Christmas twice, though Orthodox Christmas is not an official holiday in 
Latvia.58 
The questions relating to Latvian politics in Igor’s questionnaire that I have asked to fill 
all members of the family were left unanswered. Igor has only briefly noted that he has 
no political rights: ‘the right to vote and be elected has been deprived’. He pointed to his 
disenfranchised status also when I asked him about his stance on the failed 2012 
language referendum on the idea to give Russian the status of the second official 
language in the country. ‘I don’t care about it. I don’t have the right to vote,’ the 
unemployed man replied all the time when I attempted to start a discussion on this topic. 
                         
57 Shortly after the restoration of the country’s independence only those who were citizens of the interwar 
Latvia (before the 1940 Soviet occupation) and their descendants were granted citizenship automatically, all 
the rest were later required to naturalize and to take a test in Latvian language and history (for an overview 
of citizenship policy see Brande-Kehre, Pūce, 2005, Muižnieks, 2006, Muiznieks, et al., 2013, Rozenvalds, 
2010). For many Latvian Russian-speakers their new socio-political status, allocated to them following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, triggered what is often described as traumatic identity crisis, and it inevitably 
has left its imprint on the collective identity-formation processes of this community. The majority had 
switched places with the minority, and members of the large Russian-speaking community who enjoyed a 
status of being a dominant group in the Soviet Union suddenly found themselves in a position of being the 
ethno-linguistic minority. The account of Lauristin and Heidmets on the realities many Estonian Russian-
speakers faced shortly after the restoration of independent Estonia echoes identical processes that took 
place in Latvia: ‘Due to the legal reforms of the early 1990s, which restored pre-war Estonian citizenship to 
the historical inhabitants of the country, the majority of the non-Estonians found themselves in the 
position of being aliens who had to apply for permits for residence and start naturalisation procedures to 
legally remain in the country. This was not only a change in personal legal status but also a social and 
psychological drama for thousands of people’ (2002:21) As Vihalemm has concluded, the Russian-speaking 
minority ‘faced a double challenge of self-determination – in terms of both transition and the new 
Estonian nation-state’ (2007:479). (For further discussion on a new status of Estonian Russian-speakers 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union see also Vihalemm, Lauristin, 1997). 
58 The proposal of the political parties popular among the Russian-speaking electorate to set also Orthodox 





Yet, it seems to be less a statement of his indifference to the referendum, and the 
national politics more generally, as of his resentment of being deprived of political rights. 
As we shall see, while being a non-citizen and left outside the polity he has not lost his 
interest in the national politics.  
With the exception of Anna’s mother, a Polish origin Latvian-speaker, other family 
members voted in favour of the proposal in the referendum. They later argued that they 
do not support the idea of making Russian an official language but think that its usage 
should be expanded in encounters of Russian-speakers with the authorities. To make life 
easier for the father – that was their main argument as Igor has the poorest Latvian 
language skills in the family.  
Unlike other family members, Igor watches only Russian-language news on television 
and is the only one who carefully follows the news flow coming from Russia. As Igor is 
not currently working and has some serious health problems, he spends most of his time 
at home and has lots of spare time to watch television. It is common for him to watch, in 
addition to the evening news, also day-time newscasts. Igor follows the news on a 
number of Russian-language channels on a daily basis, most often on those channels 
transmitting from Moscow but also on the national commercial TV5 and from time to 
time also on the second channel of the public television LTV especially when its news 
bulletin is broadcast shortly before or after live ice hockey transmissions Igor likes to 
watch so much (see Chapter 7).  
During my visits with the family when we were watching Vremya together he used to 
comment on it. I got an impression that he has an expert knowledge on Russia’s political 
affairs. During one session, while I was chatting with others Igor was attentively 
watching the news on one of the Russian channels, and when Vladimir Putin, then prime 
minister of Russia, appeared on the screen with some statement Igor straight away turned 
the volume up. Some other time he even moved to the kitchen to watch the news alone 
as I was talking with others in the living room disturbing him watching the news.  
One of the reasons for his preference for the news on Russian-language channels is his 
poor command of Latvian. While other members of the family speak Latvian fluently, 
the main language in the family still is Russian. This is mainly because of the father. 
During my visits in the family I noticed that while because of my presence other 





someone always had to translate to him what we were talking about so that he could 
follow our conversation. Not to upset or exclude Igor, other family members usually 
choose to speak in Russian so that he could also join in. When I spoke with him one-to-
one I also turned to Russian. As he says, difficulties to pass the language exam are his 
main obstacle to gain Latvian citizenship; he finds the exam too complicated. Igor also 
thinks that anyone who has lived in Latvia prior to 1991 should be granted the status of a 
citizen automatically without any examination.  
With Russian language enjoying the status of being the dominant language in the whole 
Soviet empire and serving as lingua franca in both the public and private spheres also in 
Latvia during the Soviet period, immigrants from other Soviet republics could easily do 
without the knowledge of the local language and their proficiency in Latvian at that time 
in the vast majority of cases was low or even non-existent. Asymmetric bilingualism was 
a reality of that time when the majority of Latvian-speakers had good Russian language 
knowledge and only a small fraction of Russian-speakers had a good command of 
Latvian. And although Latvian language competence (and use) among Russian-speakers 
has improved significantly since the restoration of independent statehood, the lack of this 
fundamental resource (poor command of Latvian language especially among older 
Russian-speaking audiences) has been a significant impediment to access to Latvian-
language media for a significant part of the national communion.59          
5.5.2 (Former) Homeland 
The news flow coming from Russia helps Igor, as many other older Russian-speakers, to 
stay in touch with life in Russia and thus sustain emotional ties with his country of origin. 
While being geographically located in Latvia, it is through sounds and images that the 
Russian news space coming to his living room via transnational television from Russia 
provides that he, so to speak, makes daily journeys back to his original homeland. Yet, 
their identifications outside the national time/space, to use the words of Clifford (1997), 
do not make these viewers indifferent to the national life of Latvia as they are traveling 
back and forth between the Russian and national news spaces day in day out. It is a two-
way route, again to use Clifford’s vocabulary (1997). 
                         
59 In the 2009 survey among older Russian-speakers (over the age of 60) those who do not know Latvian 
were 22%, 30% had basic knowledge and only 26% – good. Contrary, 64% of Russian-speakers aged 17-25 
said that they know Latvian good and 30% reported moderate knowledge. According to the same survey, 
among all respondents whose mother tongue is Russian 48% assessed their command of Latvian language 
as good, 27% reported moderate knowledge of Latvian, 16% said they have basic knowledge and 8% that 





‘I am Russian,’ Igor referred to his Russian origins to explain his interest in the Russian 
news. He was born in Russia, and at the age of 17 in the early 1970s came to Latvia to 
study, got married and settled there. ‘I live here [in Latvia], but my former homeland is 
over there [in Russia],’ he explained. Similarly, Tatyana, a 61-year-old Russian-speaking 
woman working with children at the school amateur theatre (FG6), explained her interest 
in the news flow from Russia during one of the focus group discussions: ‘I do not lose 
the ties with my fatherland. I live here [in Latvia], here is my home, but there [in Russia] 
is my fatherland’. She is a citizen of Russia and referred to herself as ‘originally from 
Russia’. Her husband, also born in Russia, graduated from the maritime school in Latvia 
in the early 1970s, and they both settled in the country and stayed after the collapse of 
the USSR. ‘He brought me to Riga [the Latvian capital],’ she recalled.  
Their life stories are typical of those of many Soviet era immigrants in Latvia. During the 
years of the Soviet rule Latvia faced a large-scale influx of immigrants who moved to 
Latvia as a workforce from other republics of the Soviet Union and stayed here after the 
collapse of the empire. While for many of them Latvia has become their home, Russia 
remains their ethnic homeland, and it is their strong affiliation to both Latvia and Russia 
that is at the heart of their ‘multi-local identities’, to use the concept introduced by Rouse 
(1995a) in his study on the experiences of the Mexican (im)migrants in the United States 
(see also Rouse, 1995b). Their attachment to Russia, their country of origin, however, is 
not necessarily in conflict with their allegiance to Latvia, their host country, and their 
everyday news media consumption rituals are striking evidence of this process of 
negotiating or, we can also say, harmonizing, their transnational identities of thinking of 
themselves as belonging at the same time to two national communities, the Latvian and 
the Russian. Many of my older Russian-speaking informants watch both Vremya from 
Moscow and its national version Latviiskoe Vremya every weekday night.  
Through a combination of elements of both transnational and national broadcasting 
connecting its audiences to the life and rhythms of the real world of both Latvia and 
Russia, to paraphrase Robins and Aksoy (2006), Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal addresses its viewers 
as bearers of multiple national identities (in other words, it responds to the sense of 
being ‘in-between’ Latvia and Russia many of them feel), and because of helping Russian-
speakers to hold their multi-local affiliations together it is so popular among these 
audiences. For instance, this is how her strong attachment to Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal 





one’. Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is Russian television aimed for pan-Baltic audiences combining 
Russian entertainment production and some local content – it is local adverts during the 
commercial breaks they show, national news offerings on weekdays, and even the annual 
address to the nation by the Latvian president and prime minister on the evening of 31 
December.  
Apart from maintenance of their ‘home ties’ (Basch, et al., 1994), watching Vremya is also 
simply a deep-rooted habit for Igor and many other older Russian-speaking viewers – as 
in other Russian-speaking families their main news source on television during the Soviet 
period was Vremya, instead of Panorāma. As Anna, Igor’s wife, put it, ‘we have been 
watching Vremya for our entire life’. Igor remembered a time when he was doing his 
compulsory military service, and it was a ritual even in the army to watch Vremya every 
night. Similarly, other older Russian-speaking informants referred to a deep-seated habit 
going back to the Soviet era to explain their interest in Vremya. Here is an excerpt from 
one of the focus groups (FG4) with 48-year-old Russian-speaking school deputy director 
Boris and 52-year-old Russian-speaking senior accountant working at the ministry Irina, 
discussing the habit of watching Vremya:  
Boris: Probably it is also a force of habit that has formed [over the years].  
Irina: And time… In the past it was at eight [o’clock] [starting from the 
late 1980s when Latvia abandoned Moscow time zone as part of the 
overall independence aspirations; till then Vremya was on air one hour 
later, at 9 pm] when we watched only Vremya, it was on the same time 
slot [as it is today]. You switch on when it is on air and you also know 
what time is it.  
What for older Russian-speakers is a deep-seated habit – watching Vremya – has its 
equivalent long-standing ritual among older Latvian-speakers – watching Panorāma, both 
having roots in the Soviet times. Indeed, my older Latvian-speaking respondents 
explained their strong attachment to Panorāma in ways echoing the rationalizations 
provided by older Russophones when discussing the centrality of watching Vremya in 
their daily viewing habits. Here is a typical comment by a loyal Panorāma viewer 
explaining her devotion to it:  





watch UgunsGrēks (FireSin) [popular national soap opera on the 
commercial TV3 channel] and know those characters, I know the 
announcers [of the LTV news]. (Nellija, 58-year-old Latvian-speaking 
school teacher, FG9) 
Most often Igor is watching Vremya alone, and other members of the family join him 
only when Latviiskoe Vremya – the programme that the majority of the family members 
like to watch – is on air. ‘It’s all about Russia. It has nothing to do with me,’ Igor’s wife 
Anna replied when asked why she does not accompany her husband watching Vremya 
from Moscow. ‘These are their [Russian] internal problems,’ she added. Contrary to her 
husband, Anna was born in Latvia in an ethnically mixed family with her mother being of 
Polish origin and her father being an ethnic Latvian. 
Marina, their 27-year-old daughter, working as a shop assistant, spends time in front of 
TV only occasionally. As she has shift work, she now and then joins her father watching 
Vremya. Sometimes, instead, Marina watches the breakfast time news be it on the 
national LNT channel or the transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal. However, instead of the 
news, Marina’s viewing preferences include films and series, as well as sports and music. 
Most often she follows the news on the internet which constitutes her main news source. 
Although she also keeps in touch with national affairs, she still finds Russian news on 
television more interesting. ‘Large territory [of Russia], plenty of events,’ Marina 
explained. 
The argument of big Russia and its big news stories turned out to be very popular among 
my Russian-speaking informants whenever they tried to explain their interest in Russian 
television news suggesting that it is not only, or mainly, their wish to sustain ‘home ties’ 
with their country of origin Russia, if at all, that motivates their news media preferences. 
It is also a search for more attractive news content than the one offered by national 
channels, and perhaps also a sense of superiority such content can offer to its viewers, a 
point I discuss further in Chapter 6. ‘Bigger country, more events,’ said Andrei, a 37-
year-old Russian-speaking football coach (F5), and provided an example: ‘In Tyumen [a 
city in Western Siberia, Russia] a plane crashed. When has something like that happened 
in Latvia? Here, only [the telecommunications company] Tele2 can dig the meteorite’s 
hole’.60 In a similar vein, 68-year-old Nadezhda, Andrei’s mother-in-law, argued: ‘We 
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have such a small country that there is nothing to be reported in the news’. 
Although Igor who we encountered earlier, like many other older Russian-speakers, is 
keen on watching the news on Russian channels, this is not evidence of his lack of 
interest in the national affairs. Igor has great interest and is well informed about the 
Russian, as well as national news. ‘Our politician,’ said his daughter to describe her 
father’s keen interest in political news, be they Russian or national. It is both Vremya and 
its national version Latviiskoe Vremya he is watching regularly. Igor is also a regular viewer 
of the political debates show Bez tsenzury (Without Censorship) which, in a grilling manner, 
questions local politicians – the show was part of the offerings of the national Russian-
language commercial channel TV5 during the time of my fieldwork. He also likes to read 
Latvian Russian-language newspapers that he borrows from their neighbours at their 
five-storey standard Soviet era block of flats in the capital city Riga. Newspapers are an 
important source of the national news for him along with television. 
While daily use of Russian television news provides older Russian-speakers with 
proximity to and synchronization with the realities of everyday life and events in Russia, 
to use the vocabulary employed by Aksoy and Robins (2003, 2006), it does not constitute 
evidence of estrangement from Latvia. The great appetite many older Russophones have 
in the Russian news flow does not conflict with their interest in the national life of 
Latvia. Instead of ignoring the national news, they negotiate their interest in both the 
national and Russian news agenda in the same way as they negotiate their sense of 
belonging towards both Latvia and Russia. It is through their day-to-day news 
consumption they are involved in a complex process of positioning themselves in 
relation to Russia and Latvia. Although they think of Russia as their fatherland, it is 
Latvia that they call their home.  
To quote Alla, a 62-year-old retired Russian-speaking woman (FG6), who moved to 
Latvia from Russia in the early 1980s, ‘it is interesting [to know] what is happening both 
in Latvia and Russia, and especially in Latvia as we live here, we are given a retirement 
pension here, we have to live here every day’. ‘We live here,’ also said Valentina, a 76-
year-old retired Russian-speaking woman (FG6), who identified herself as ‘indigenous 
Rigan’ (коренная рижанка), to stress that Russian-speakers are not less interested in what is 
happening in Latvia than Latvian-speakers. Referring to her life story and stressing her 
rootedness in Latvia, she argued that Russians belong to Latvia and are loyal to it to the 





I am pure Russian (чисто русская). I have lived all my life in Riga [capital 
of Latvia], I have been born here. Among my relatives and friends are 
both Russians and [ethnic] Latvians, all. Latvia is my fatherland. I 
consider myself a patriot of my fatherland as I have lived here all my life. 
How can one say that I am an occupier only because I am Russian. I 
have a lot of [ethnic] Latvian friends with whom we have been together 
all our life, and when it comes to politics we avoid this topic not to 
damage our relations. We have the same rights. [Ethnic] Latvian people 
and we have the same rights.  
The high exposure to the news discourse of the state-controlled Russian channels that 
Igor and other Russian-speakers have does not make them automatically passive and 
uncritical viewers, susceptible to the allegedly harmful influence of Russian television, as 
it has often been argued by the Latvian political elite whose reasoning leaves no room for 
agency and does not recognize the capacity of Russian-speakers to create their own 
alternative meanings of the messages sent to them by Russian television. Igor, for 
example, is not taking the news messages of Russian television for granted. It is because 
television, and the media in general, is not his only source of the news from Russia and 
he can compare life in Russia as represented by the Kremlin-controlled Russian channels 
with the experiences of the actual reality of his friends living in Russia. Although his 
relatives in Russia have died and today he is not visiting Russia as often as previously, he 
still keeps in contact with his friends living in Russia and their daily experiences serve as a 
point of reference for verification of the representations of life in Russia as seen on 
television. His Moscow friends have told Igor not to believe all that has been said on 
Russian channels: ‘They say – television does not tell the truth, life is different, reality is 
different’. As 48-year-old Russian-speaking deputy school director Boris (FG4) put it, 
talking about the relatives his family has in Russia, when you call them, ‘you start already 
comparing what has been told [on the news on Russian television] and how it is there in 
reality’. 
5.6 Opting Out of National Television  
In her family Nadezhda, a Russian-speaking retired school teacher, aged 68 (F5), is the 
only devoted viewer of the news on Russian television, and equally interested also in the 
national news. Together with Nadezhda lives her 39-year-old daughter Diana and her 37-





attending the same local school where her parents work – Diana is a primary school 
teacher while Andrei is a football coach – and where for many years also Nadezhda 
worked as a teacher giving Russian language lessons for children studying in Latvian. 
They live in a village in the eastern region of Latgale around 30-40 kilometres from the 
Russian border. Alongside the capital city, this is the region where the bulk of Latvia’s 
Russian-speakers live.61 It is also the poorest region in Latvia. 
All members of the family are citizens of Latvia. Nadezhda’s family has been living in 
Latvia already for five generations, and this is the reason why Nadezhda and both her 
daughters received citizenship automatically in the early 1990s. Nadezhda’s grandfather 
was born in Latgale in the mid 19th century when it was part of the Vitebsk Province of 
the Russian Empire, she told me during one of our conversations to stress that she is not 
‘an occupier’. Andrei became a citizen through naturalization only in 2006. Although 
Andrei and both his parents had been born in Latvia, he did not receive citizenship 
automatically and had to undergo the naturalization process to get his Latvian 
citizenship, something he finds unfair. He thinks it was because one of his grandmothers 
was not a citizen of Latvia in 1940 when Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union – she 
came to Latvia from Russia shortly after the Second World War in 1945 at the age of 22. 
In the 2012 language referendum Latgale was the only region where the majority voted in 
favour of the proposal to make Russian language the second official language in the 
country.62 Among those who said ‘yes’ in the referendum was also Nadezhda’s family. 
Despite the fact that the majority of voters in their village were against the proposal, still 
a substantial part voted in favour of it. Nadezhda’s family has neighbours from both 
camps. A large portion of the population of their village are Russian-speakers. According 
to official statistics, one third of its population of around 1300 belong to ethnic 
minorities. In the school where Diana and Andrei work approximately 10 out of 30 are 
Russian-speaking teachers, and alongside groups with Latvian as the language of 
instruction they also have groups with bilingual teaching where some subjects are taught 
in Latvian and others in Russian. However, according to Nadezhda, both ethno-linguistic 
                         
61 According to the 2011 population census, in Latgale region 60.3% of the local inhabitants reported 
Russian language as their main language at home. Less than half – 39% – said that it is Latvian language 
they mostly use at home. Source: The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.  
62 According to the official results of the referendum, 55.57% of voters in Latgale said ‘yes’ to the proposal 
to make Russian language the second state language in Latvia with 44.02% voting against. In other regions 
where Russian-speakers are in the minority the idea of Russian as the second official language has been 
rejected with around 90% voters saying no to the proposed changes in the constitution. In the capital Riga 
63.56% voted against the proposal with 36.03% supporting it. Source: The Central Election Commission 





communities in the village are living in peace and friendship. ‘There are no tensions 
among people, only among politicians,’ she explained. ‘We [Latvian-speakers and 
Russian-speakers] drink vodka at the same table,’ Nadezhda said in a joking tone. 
‘Because of the referendum we are not going to stop talking with each other,’ added 
Diana, her daughter. 
Whereas Nadezhda, as other members of her family, understands Latvian, she, unlike 
others, over the course of my visits consistently spoke with me only in Russian. It is 
perhaps a matter of generations. Her little granddaughter who goes to the Latvian-
language group in the school speaks fluently both Latvian and Russian and, for her, there 
is no problem to switch from one language to another. Aleksandra once told me that her 
Latvian-speaking friends have taught her Latvian while she, in turn, has taught them 
Russian. Alongside Russian and Latvian Aleksandra knows also Latgalian, the regional 
dialect in Latgale, and uses it to communicate with some of her friends. However, in the 
family they all speak only in Russian.  
After the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting in the summer of 
2010 they do not have access to any of the national channels. Although the Latvian 
government intended the switchover to simply constitute a transition from (national) 
analogue to (national) digital broadcasting, for the family, as for many of their Russian-
speaking neighbours, the occasion turned out to be a switchover away from national to 
transnational broadcasting. As other neighbours, they also now have a satellite dish 
offering them access to a plenitude of channels distributed free-of-charge via satellite, 
and while among them there are none of the national channels, there is a number of 
Russian channels transmitting from Moscow they now have access to.63 
                         
63 This is not to say that there were some technical problems to receive terrestrial signal of the national 
channels; Nadezhda’s family simply decided to opt out of national television and not to purchase a digital 
set-top box. As they were not among the regular viewers of the national channels already prior to the 
digital switchover, it was rather easy for them to quit national broadcasting, contrary to their Latvian-
speaking neighbours who purchased a digital set-top box as they were used to watching the national 
channels and for them it would be a much more painful experience to abandon national broadcasting and 
live without the offerings of the national channels. As already in the analogue era Nadezhda’s family 
watched the national channels rarely, they decided not to spend extra money on the purchase of a digital 
set-top box. They had acquired a satellite dish already some time before analogue broadcasting was cut off. 
In the analogue era they used a standard aerial to receive the national terrestrial channels, both channels of 
the public broadcaster LTV, plus the commercial LNT and TV3. While the family liked watching LNT 
(Diana, for instance, remembered watching the evening news on this channel to find out the weather 
forecast), they already before the digital switchover had little interest in the public television, and in its 
main channel LTV1 in particular. Having gained access to plenty of satellite television offerings, they 
switched to their favourite Russian channels almost completely. When the digital switchover approached 





They are not the only ones in the village who now have their own satellite dish. The 
majority of their neighbours, mostly Russian-speakers, have switched from national 
terrestrial to transnational (Russian) satellite broadcasting. I have counted at least seven 
satellite dishes on the walls of their small Soviet era three-storey block of flats. When 
traveling to Latgale to visit Nadezhda’s family, I noticed houses, be they private houses 
or blocks-of-flats, covered by satellite receivers. It has become a typical landscape of 
Latgale today. The family of teachers is among those 1.4% of the national population 
that, according to the 2012 TNS Latvia survey, do not have access to any of the channels 
providing regular national news either in Latvian or Russian.64 
Their most favourite channel is Russian Pervyi kanal, and it is also the first one on their 
remote control. Instead of its Baltic version Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal they are watching one of 
its international versions that is targeted at Russians living in Germany. Aleksandra once 
demonstrated me how to find on the internet TV listings for the international versions of 
all main Russian channels. Contrary to its Baltic version that the majority of Russian-
speaking viewers in Latvia have access to, the international version of Pervyi kanal that 
Nadezhda’s family is watching does not offer Latviiskoe Vremya, the national news 
programme. Only Moscow-based Vremya is available. So, while they have access to plenty 
of news offerings on a wide variety of satellite stations, including Russian ones, they do 
not have access to any of the national news programmes, be they in Latvian or Russian. 
Neither both channels of the public television, nor any of the national commercial 
channels are available free-of-charge via satellite. Also Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is available 
only as a pay-TV channel. Otherwise, the international version of Pervyi kanal the family 
of Nadezhda is watching is not much different from Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal. 
Nevertheless, the family of Nadezhda has not lost interest in the national life of Latvia 
and they are not isolated from the national news flow. Even if having no access to any of 
                                                                      
without them. The family seems not to regret abandoning national broadcasting. The satellite dish, they 
think, provides value for money. First, it offers a wide range of viewing choices, including a number of 
Russian channels they enjoy watching so much. Second, they have to pay only once when purchasing a 
satellite receiver without any further monthly subscription payments as it is in the case with pay-TV 
services. 
64 In line with the same survey, the majority of them belong to ethnic minorities, are part of the rural 
population, those living in Latgale region, and people of lower socio-economic background. In Latgale 
almost 9% said that they do not have access to any of the channels offering regular national news either in 
Latvian or Russian, including the public broadcaster LTV. The majority of them most likely are those, like 
Nadezhda’s family, who instead of national terrestrial broadcasting have chosen transnational (Russian) 
satellite broadcasting. In the light of the 2010 digital switchover the media have also reported that in 
borderland areas many of those who have not obtained a digital set-top box continue watching analogue 





the national channels with exclusively transnational television from Russia dominating 
their daily viewing practices, they have managed to find ways of staying in touch with 
national affairs, through public radio, online news sites, the local newspaper or word-of-
mouth. As we shall see later in Chapter 7, they have also employed a number of creative 
strategies to re-enter national broadcasting to get access to the content of the national 
channels they miss the most, something that transnational Russian television fails to 
substitute. 
It is the news on Radio Latvia 4, a Russian-language service of the public broadcaster 
Radio Latvia, popular among Russian-speaking audiences, that constitutes the main 
source of the national news for Nadezhda. They have a radio placed in their tiny kitchen, 
and all the time when Nadezhda is doing something there Radio Latvia 4 is switched on. 
Nadezhda is also a vital source of the national news for other family members – a ‘news 
carrier’, to quote Andrei, Nadezhda’s son-in-law. She usually informs others about the 
most important news she has heard on the radio. ‘They will start fighting now,’ 
Nadezhda ran into the living room during one of my visits to let others know that the 
pre-referendum radio debates will soon reach a radical turning-point. It was Radio Latvia 
4 where she, early in the next morning, also heard the results of the language referendum. 
For the younger generation in the family an important source of national news is online 
news platforms – for instance, news site Delfi.lv having both Latvian and Russian 
language versions, plus e-mail service Inbox.lv and local social networking site Draugiem.lv 
both offering also some news headlines. They have even discovered how to find the 
weather forecast for their village on one of the internet sites offering such services. An 
important news source for them is also word-of-mouth or ‘ОБС,’ as they explained in 
Russian. It is an acronym of Russian saying ‘одна бабка сказала’ that can be translated 
literally as ‘one old lady said’ describing learning the news via word-of-mouth. Thus, 
when in November 2011 the news that one of the Latvian banks went bankrupt spread 
over the country, it was their neighbours who let them know about it.  
With the exception of Nadezhda, for other members of the family it is first and foremost 
Russian-origin entertainment such as various talk shows, talent shows, films and series 
that they are looking for on transnational television from Russia, and that so easily wins 
the competition with the low-budget home-grown production on the national channels, 
something I discuss in more detail in Chapter 6. Only Nadezhda has a strong interest in 





Rossiya (Russia), another state-controlled federal Russian channel, is a daily practice. 
Vremya on Pervyi kanal is on air after their favourite tabloid talk show Pust govoryat (Let 
Them Speak), something all women of three generations in the family like to watch. 
However, when Vremya starts, Nadezhda usually goes to her room and watches it alone. 
Nadezhda is following the political life of Russia with great enthusiasm. Likewise, she is 
well informed about the latest news on the Latvian political scene. ‘She lacks stress in her 
life,’ Diana said in jest to explain her mother’s keen interest in the political news. 
Contrary to Nadezhda, Diana and Andrei devote little time to the political news, be they 
national or Russian. 
Nadezhda has also been the only one in the family who has carefully followed debates on 
Russian television prior to the 2012 presidential elections in Russia. ‘What [Dmitry] 
Medvedev [then president of Russia] will do after [the elections]?’ Nadezhda initiated a 
conversation on the latest developments on the Russian political scene while we were all 
watching Vremya during one of my visits. ‘I don’t care,’ strictly replied Andrei. ‘It is clear 
that [Vladimir] Putin [then prime minister of Russia and the front-runner for the 
presidential post] will win,’ he said to explain his indifference to the Russian presidential 
elections criticizing Putin for speaking as if he had already won the elections. ‘The 
outcome [of the elections] is clear,’ in a similar vein added Diana complaining that the 
news on Russian television is overloaded with reports on the activities of Putin and 
Medvedev. For her, Russia is just another ‘foreign country’, and she thinks that there is 
no need for her to be in touch with the political life of Russia. 
If she would have the right to vote Nadezhda would support Putin; he was her favourite 
presidential candidate. ‘He uses his head,’ Nadezhda praised Putin and criticized his 
opponents, eccentric showman Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of 
the Communist Party. ‘The time of the Communists has passed,’ she added. ‘Putin is in 
the right place,’ Nadezhda said some other time when we all together were watching 
Vremya a few weeks before the Russian elections. The report on Putin’s proposal for 
changes in the migration policy was on air. For her, highly admired Putin serves as a kind 
of role model of the perfect leader of the country and a point of reference against which 
her much criticized government of Latvia can be judged.65 ‘Here in Latvia it has not 
                         
65 The family subscribes to the Russian-language edition of the local newspaper, and the favourite section 
of Nadezhda is its editorial because of its typically critical stance on the Latvian government. During my 
visits she usually quoted the best parts of the recent editorials. Nadezhda herself is highly critical of the 





happened,’ Nadezhda commented on another news report of Vremya, this time on 
Putin’s plans to cope with the unjustified increase in the tariffs of public utilities. 
This suggests that, for Nadezhda, the news from Russia serves more as a comparison 
with the state of affairs in Latvia and not so much as a self-identification with Russia and 
the Russian political scene. Besides, to be able to criticize the Latvian government she 
needs to be in touch with the country’s political life, and not to lose her interest in the 
national news. It is the national news as compared against the news from Russia that 
feeds her critical attitude towards the Latvian power elite. Yet, her critical stance towards 
those in power in Latvia signals her care for the national life rather than her indifference 
to it. Through consumption of the Russian news she, in fact, articulates her feelings of 
belonging to the national community of Latvia and not alienation from it as it may 
appear at the first moment. Having exited from national television and opted for 
transnational broadcasting from Russia, Nadezhda’s family has not relinquished 
participation in the national life of Latvia and an exercise of citizenship.    
5.7 The Territory of Criticism 
For some Russian-speakers, idealization of life in Russia helps to escape from the harsh 
day-to-day socio-economic realities in Latvia to what they see as a better life in Russia. It 
is a feeling of pride that identification with such an idealized image of life in Russia offers 
them, helping to sustain a positive self-image in the light of everyday struggles of making 
both ends meet many people in Latvia face, and, what is also important, against a 
backdrop of what many Russian-speakers perceive as marginalization by what they see as 
the pro-Latvian political establishment. Yet, as already noted, it does not necessarily 
signal their indifference to what is happening in Latvia. Through the idealization of life in 
Russia they actually express their concerns of the state of affairs in Latvia. For instance, 
48-year-old Russian-speaking municipality IT officer Viktor (FG8) during one of the 
focus group discussions explained his interest in the news on Russian television as 
follows:  
Perhaps, you don’t want to listen about our harsh reality. That what is 
happening in Russia… at times you even feel great envy. There [in 
Russia] something happens, something has been done, here [in Latvia] 
actually nothing has changed. Here what we only hear is that retirement 
                                                                      





pensions have been cut down, and so on. 
This is also true for Igor, the 57-year-old unemployed Russian-speaking man (F1) 
encountered earlier: the news flow from Russia provides a point of reference, a yardstick 
against which one can assess the state of affairs in Latvia. During one of our 
conversations Igor compared that year’s New Year’s greetings of then Russian president 
Dmitry Medvedev and the same year’s New Year’s best wishes of then prime minister of 
Latvia Valdis Dombrovskis. As he put it, while Medvedev ‘wished everyone a good 
health’, ‘our Dombrovskis’ spoke only about that ‘how hard we are coping with 
[economic] crisis’. Here, the optimistic and inspiring New Year’s message by the Russian 
leader is opposed to the rather bleak address to the nation of the Latvian prime minister 
who, for Igor, embodies all the hardships of everyday living in Latvia. Though criticized 
by Igor, Dombrovskis is still ‘our’ prime minister for him.66 
To quote Alina, a 29-year-old Russian-speaking organizer of children festivities (PFG1), 
speaking about her parents:  
They watch PBK [Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal] since… first of all, it is a language 
problem. And the second problem is that they are oriented towards 
Russia. Both parents and PBK that indoctrinates them that in Latvia 
everything is bad and that in Russia everything is good.  
Yet, she is in danger in denying agency of her parents. Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal may have 
indoctrination plans, and yet it does not necessarily mean that its audiences take its 
messages for granted. Likewise, as we have seen in the previous accounts, even if being 
critical about life in Latvia, and its power elite particularly, it does not make one losing 
interest in the national affairs and a sense of belonging to the national community. 
Instead of thinking what Alina wished to say about her parents we should think what she 
wished to say about herself. Through exaggerating her parents’ orientation towards 
                         
66 Besides, for the last years it is not only Russia against which he can judge his daily living in Latvia, now 
there is a new point of reference, the United Kingdom where Mariya, his oldest daughter, with her family 
has moved to. 32-year-old Mariya is among those estimated 200 000 Latvian labour migrants who have left 
the country searching for a better life in the United Kingdom, Ireland and elsewhere. When Mariya visits 
Latvia she usually shares her positive experiences of living in the United Kingdom that she and others in 
the family oppose to what they see as the uneasy mundane socio-economic realities in Latvia. They think 
that it is because of all the hardships in Latvia many are leaving the country and looking for a better life 
abroad. Along the established route linking Latvia and Russia now there is a new route connecting Latvia 
and the United Kingdom what constitutes ‘transnational social fields’ this family is involved in, to use the 
concept of Basch et al. (1994) describing the simultaneous involvements of immigrants in the social and 
political life of more than one nation-state. When the weather forecast is on air, they usually pay attention 





Russia and their susceptibility to the influence of Russian television, she rather stresses 
her own strong national allegiance to Latvia and her own suspicions about the motives of 
Russian television. 
Olga, a 31-year-old Russian-speaker working at the children and youth centre (FG4), 
comes from an ethnically mixed family with her mother being ethnic Latvian and father 
Russian. It was both her father and his favourite Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal she labeled as ‘pro-
Russian’. According to Olga, he is well informed and has high interest in Russian politics. 
In the following extract she discussed her father’s news media preferences and what 
footprint she thinks they leave on his national affiliations. Yet, we should be careful 
about her assessment. Even if ‘pro-Russian’, he is still interested in the national life of 
Latvia (note that he reads a national Russian-language newspaper, even if his paper takes a 
critical stance on the Latvian government) as to be able to criticize he needs to know 
what is happening in Latvia. Besides, a critical attitude towards the government is not 
something exclusive to the Russian-speaking community – it is a popular sentiment also 
among Latvian-speakers, as we have seen in Chapter 4, and not necessarily a sign of 
missing feelings of national allegiance. Again we should look at her comment rather as a 
statement of her own sense of belonging to Latvia. If so, we can interpret it as a message 
on her part to stress that she thinks of herself as different from her father. To quote 
Olga:    
My father watches news at 8 pm [Vremya on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal] 
deliberately, and my father deliberately reads [Latvian Russian-language 
tabloid-style] daily Vesti Segodnya (Вести Сегодня/Today’s News), and he 
deliberately lives in… that’s what I call the Great Russian chauvinism 
here in Latvia. And as far as his sense of belonging is concerned, he 
considers himself closer to Russia than he considers himself as belonging 
to Latvia. He is not interested in Latvia, and, for him, it is more a kind of 
the ‘territory of criticism’. Say, what idiots they all are. Besides, he does 
not entirely understand Latvian. 
5.8 National News, a Sense of Belonging and Young Russian-speakers 
In contrast to the older Russian-speaking generations, the young Russophones, many of 
them already the post-Soviet generation (born and grown up after 1991), have little 





parents or grandparents have originated. In the 2012 TNS Latvia survey 15-24 year old 
ethnic minority youngsters were least interested in the Russian affairs if compared to 
other ethnic minority generations. ‘My parents are oriented towards Russia completely, 
but I have a different view,’ generational changes in her family described Lana, a 24-year-
old Russian-speaking police officer (PFG1).  
It was common for my young Russian-speaking informants to position their little interest 
in the news on Russian television as opposed to their greater interest in the national life 
of Latvia as an expression of their strong allegiance to Latvia. ‘I’m not interested in 
Russia, Moscow at all, absolutely. I consider myself a citizen of Latvia, only Russian-
speaking. I am much more interested in what is happening in Latvia,’ said Ilya, a 20-year-
old Russian-speaking student (FG2). It is civic category of self-identification (together 
with linguistic one as a marker of difference from the entire body of citizens) he utilizes 
to explain his indifference to life in Russia. It is through thinking of himself as being a 
citizen of Latvia and therefore having no interest in the news coming from Russia he 
manifests his national loyalty to Latvia.  
The same sentiment was also expressed by Vyacheslav, 32-year-old Russian-speaker 
working at his own construction company (FG4):  
When it comes to me, I don’t care what is happening there [in Russia]. 
Nothing good has ever happened, and it’s unlikely that in the near future 
will happen. But as I know from the people around me… I have mixed 
family, that is, my mother is [ethnic] Latvian. Those who are completely 
pro-Russian they all say that they are interested in what is happening in 
Russia and that it is good there. But the bulk of them have never been 
there. All who have been there they think differently.  
Young Russian-speakers are not only highly critical about life in Russia but also about its 
representations on Russian television. Thus, 36-year-old municipality officer Mikhail 
(FG7) described Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal as the official channel of Russia: ‘To judge from the 
news it is a point of view of [Dmitry] Medvedev [then president of Russia] and [Vladimir] 
Putin [then Russian prime minister]’. Similarly, for 20-year-old student Dmitry (FG2) 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is the channel where ‘lies are being told in the news’ and where 





The following discussion between 19-20 year old Russian-speaking students (FG2) offers 
discourses of young Russian-speakers talking about their own news consumption 
patterns and those of older generations of their families:  
Sofia: When I am with my mum or granny, grandpa, then – yes, [I watch] 
Vremya. But if I’m on my own then I skip it. I like watching our [news] 
more. If one speaks about the older generation, let’s say, granddad… I 
come home, and when they speak, they speak only about Russia. They are 
much more interested in it; they simply know all on politics in Russia, 
thoroughly, in details. Surely, Latvia also interests them, but only about… 
for example, cutting down retirement pensions interests them. But today 
the young generation… I don’t know about all, but those who are around 
me, they [are] somehow more [interested]... not in Russia, rather more in 
Europe. 
Kiril: It goes without saying – I live here, in Latvia, so it’s obvious that 
what is happening in Latvia is more interesting to me. When it comes to 
my parents, they, of course, are interested in the news about Latvia, but 
probably by habit continue to be also interested in Russia. Most likely for 
them the Soviet Union has collapsed, but not in their heads. Probably it 
continues to exist, simply the name has changed from the USSR to 
Russia, and no matter that ‘the USSR’ has become significantly smaller 
and Latvia is not anymore part of the USSR. Perhaps out of inertia they 
feel being part of Russia. My granddads and grandmas will trust more 
what is on the Russian news. They trust more since they believe that 
there [in Russia] it is better.  
Dmitry: I often notice that many Russian-speakers, I should admit, are 
disdainful towards Latvia and consider themselves rather as patriots of 
Russia than Latvia. And for that reason they rather watch Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal and not [the public broadcaster] Latvian Television [LTV]... simply 
because of their disdainful attitude towards the state where they live. And 
in Pervyi Baltiiskii [channel] they show all the time how good it is in 
Russia. People watch it and start thinking that it is really cool there [in 





Ilya: I have been there [in Russia] and it is not cool there at all.   
Nikita: If I were to speak about my family, we are interested, of course, 
mainly in the news from Latvia as we live in Latvia. But as we have 
relatives in other countries... for instance, in Russia... and I have 
acquaintances also in America and in Japan... therefore their news is 
interesting for me, as well... to get to know what is happening there. 
These accounts perhaps tell us less about their parents and grandparents as more about 
young Russian-speakers themselves. Many of them stress their high interest in the 
national news in contrast with their little interest in life in Russia to articulate their strong 
national allegiance to Latvia. Reference to older Russian-speaking generations helps them 
to position themselves vis-à-vis Russia, as well as Latvia, as feeling different from their 
parents and grandparents. Yet, they exaggerate the interest older Russian-speaking 
generations have in the news from Russia contrasting it with what they think is their not 
as high interest in the national affairs of Latvia. Though young Russian-speakers may 
have been less interested in Russian news than older Russian-speakers, the interest of 
young Russian-speakers in the national news is not necessarily higher than that of older 
Russian-speaking generations. As it came out from my further discussion with the 
Russian-speaking students quoted above, it is sometimes their parents, keen consumers 
of the news, be they national or Russian, who let them know what is happening in Latvia.  
Young Russian-speakers also tend to deprive older Russian-speaking generations of 
agency to interpret the news messages of Russian television independently of the 
intentions of their producers. As we have seen earlier in the chapter, old Russian-
speakers are not at all passive and uncritical viewers. We have also seen that even those 
who seem to accept news messages of Russian television may actually use these messages 
not so much, if at all, to identify with life in Russia (they may perhaps wish to identify 
with its idealized representations on television but not necessarily with its actual reality) 
but, instead, to express their sense of national affiliation to Latvia. Besides, young 
Russian-speakers themselves are not a uniform group and their varied positionalities in 
relation to Russian news can be detected. While some claim absolute indifference to what 
is happening in Russia, others admit that they accompany older generations of the family 
watching the news from Russia or that as they have relatives in Russia actually it is 






While Russian-speakers ignore and distrust Panorāma and the overall news flow on the 
public broadcaster LTV and mainly rely on the Russian-language news offerings, 
including those on the Russian channels providing news from Russia, there is no 
evidence of the Russian-speaking community becoming alienated from Latvia and 
identifying more with Russia instead of Latvia, at least their relationship with the two 
countries cannot be seen in terms of a binary divide. The popularity of transnational 
Russian television among Russian-speaking audiences does not rule out their interest in 
the national life of Latvia. They have found ways to exercise citizenship outside the 
public television, be it within national commercial broadcasting or most notably within 
localized transnational broadcasting from Russia.  
Despite having exited from the public broadcaster LTV, and its main channel LTV1 in 
particular, my Russian-speaking informants have not exited from the life of the nation. 
Their rejection of public television on one hand and what may look as their immersion in 
transnational television from Russia on the other hand does not make them ‘less citizens’ 
than Latvian-speakers. Russian-speakers are interested in and follow the national news to 
the same extent as Latvian-speakers. They do care about the life of the nation no less 
than Latvian-speakers. Through consumption of national news, even if this is part of 
content localization strategies of transnational Russian television as in the case of 
Latviiskoe Vremya and even if its reality constructions on such ‘sensitive’ issues as the 
country’s citizenship and language policies or interpretations of Latvia’s 20th century past 
may differ from those offered by Panorāma, Russian-speakers participate in the life of the 
nation no less than Latvian-speakers. 
It is through localized transnational television broadcasting in their own language and 
respecting other particularities of their community that Russian-speakers learn about 
national life. Instead of public television, which they regard with great suspicion because 
of its perceived close ties with what Russian-speakers see as the pro-Latvian power elite, 
Russian-speakers have chosen to take part in the life of the nation through their much-
loved pan-Baltic Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal which mixing Russian entertainment imports with 
the news from both Russia and Latvia has turned out to be more successful in addressing 
the transnational identities of Russian-speaking audiences than the public broadcaster 





Though language divides Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking news audiences – while 
Latvian-speakers prefer watching the news on the Latvian-language channels with the 
news on the national commercial broadcasters gathering the largest Latvian-speaking 
audiences, Russian-speakers choose to watch the news on the Russian-language channels, 
and Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal in particular; what they have in common are everyday socio-
economic realities and the need to keep up to date with them. This is the reason why the 
public broadcaster LTV has made so little inroads insofar as its project of national 
imagination prioritizing a common (Latvian) language as a unifier of the nation is 
concerned at the expense of the idea of making the national ‘we’ possible based on civic 
values, although, as we have seen earlier in the chapter, there is a potential for such 
conception of the national collectivity. The interest in national news that Russian-
speakers have clearly signals their sense of civic belonging to the national communion of 
Latvia. 
It is wrong to see Russian-speakers as a homogeneous community having uniform 
attitudes and experiences. Russian-speaking audiences are diverse as are their news 
preferences and news readings, and the generational shift serves as evidence of it. Among 
older Russian-speakers, the majority of them Soviet era settlers calling Latvia their home 
but Russia their homeland, interest in life in Russia coexists with their interest in the 
national affairs of Latvia in the same way as their affiliation to Russia does not rule out 
their allegiance to Latvia. Even if thinking of life in Russia as better than in Latvia and 
watching the news from Russia to escape from hard everyday realities of life in Latvia, 
they do not become indifferent to the national life of Latvia.  
At the same time, young Russian-speakers, for the most part the offspring of the Soviet 
period immigrants born in Latvia, are not only less interested in the Russian news agenda 
but also are highly critical about life in Russia and its representations on Russian 
television. It is the way they can position themselves vis-à-vis Latvia, as well as Russia. 
Through distancing themselves from Russian news they articulate their strong national 
affiliation to Latvia. Yet, while not thinking of themselves as part of the Russian political 
world they do not deny their cultural attachment to Russia. Their civic belonging to 
Latvia does not exclude their interest in the Russian cultural space. Accordingly, young 
Russian-speakers do not reject transnational television from Russia completely. Instead 
of the news from Russia, they enjoy some of the popular culture offerings of Russian 





Russian-speakers Russian television is first and foremost a source of grand entertainment 






















Chapter 6   
Celebrating the Arrival of New Year Twice: Public TV and 
National Celebrations  
6.1 Introduction 
Investigation of television viewing rituals during the New Year’s Eve celebrations in both 
Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking families provides a context for understanding the 
role played by the public broadcaster LTV at times of the national celebrations that is the 
focus of this chapter. For many non-loyalist publics of public television who have left 
LTV in their daily viewing practices the moments of national celebrations is that time of 
the year when they come back to the public broadcaster, though the tradition recently 
challenged by its commercial rivals.    
Because of its grand entertainment offerings during the New Year’s Eve celebrations 
Russian television easily outrivals national broadcasters, including Latvia’s public 
television. It is also many Latvian-speaking viewers who otherwise have little interest in 
Russian television that search for Russian channels on the evening of 31 December. 
Nevertheless, a few minutes before 12 o’clock audiences return to the national 
broadcasters to listen the address to the nation by the country’s president and prime 
minister followed by the clock counting down the final seconds of the year and the 
national anthem at the stroke of midnight. From year to year televised New Year’s 
greetings of the country’s political leadership gather one of the largest television 
audiences in the country. It is one of those rare moments when the nation comes 
together around television, though, as we shall see, not necessarily any longer around 
public television.  
The tradition of the country’s political leader to address the nation via television in the 
last few minutes of the year LTV has been inherited from Soviet Central Television and 
following the break-up of the USSR transformed for the purposes of the new political 
situation. Invented by Soviet state television and later continued by Latvian public 
television, during recent years this tradition has been taken over by its national, and even 
transnational, commercial rivals, to use the vocabulary employed by Hobsbawm and 





public and commercial but also between national and transnational broadcasting. 
While their parents and grandparents gather around Russian(Soviet)-origin entertainment 
and find nostalgic (Soviet) pleasures there, it is Western popular culture that brings 
together young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers. The English language of 
Western-origin entertainment has become a kind of lingua franca for young people of both 
ethno-linguistic groups.   
6.2 Festive Television   
While it is not their ‘everyday television’, for many the public broadcaster LTV is their 
‘festive television’, to borrow the idea of the ‘festive viewing of television’ as opposed to 
the ‘ordinary viewing’ introduced by Dayan and Katz (1992) in their media events study. 
It is during those moments when LTV airs special broadcasts of the rituals and 
ceremonials of the national celebrations, what Cardiff and Scannell (1987) in their study 
on the early days of the British public broadcasting have termed as ‘the programmes of 
national identity’ that many of my informants, including its non-loyal publics, said they 
search for LTV.  
To quote 68-year-old retired Latvian-speaking woman Ilga (FG9), LTV1 ‘is the most 
important channel that we watch in all national holidays, we could not do without it’. For 
her and many others, live broadcasts of the official ceremonies of the national 
celebrations on the main channel of the public television LTV1 such as the televised 
New Year’s president’s address to the nation are central to the ritual of celebrating 
important events in the national life. It is a time when, as Ilga put it, ‘we always watch the 
first channel [LTV1]’. Also for 56-year-old Latvian-speaking farmer Dzintra (FG10), it is 
the ‘solemn’ programming of LTV during the national celebrations such as Līgo Day and 
Jāņi on June 23 and 24 when people in Latvia celebrate summer solstice and Christmas 
that provides a festive atmosphere. ‘It is LTV1 that shows that holidays are approaching,’ 
she pointed out. 
As others among his peers, also Jānis, 27-year-old Latvian-speaking worker at the 
supermarket (FG3), has little everyday experience with LTV. While he has some 
favourite programmes on it, he is not a keen viewer of public television. Nevertheless, it 
is the special offerings of LTV during the national celebrations that bring him to the 





occasion when he re-enters the public television is on Independence Day, November 18. 
As he pointed out, it is a time when the routine schedule of LTV is broken and special 
programming is introduced: ‘Then you go and switch it to see what’s on [LTV]’. 
It is precisely this interruption of the rhythms of daily life, as well as the festive and 
solemn atmosphere that special programming of LTV during the national celebrations 
provides that explains why LTV’s festive programming has been so successful for many 
years, and has made even its otherwise non-loyal publics to return to the public 
broadcaster during these moments in the life of the nation in contrast to their everyday 
viewing patterns where the commercial channels otherwise dominate. As we shall see, it 
is the success of LTV’s established formula of special programming during national 
celebrations that has made also its commercial rivals, national and even localized 
transnational, to take over the role of the public television during these moments.   
6.3 New Year’s Eve Television Rituals  
It has already become a long tradition for many Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers 
to spend New Year’s Eve at home together with friends and family preparing a special 
meal and drinks and watching television, and it is also one of those national celebrations 
that are equally important for members of both ethno-linguistic communities, and along 
with the celebrations of March 8, International Women’s Day, one of those popular 
Soviet era traditions Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers are happy to retain after the 
break-up of the Soviet empire.  
As during the years of Soviet rule all religious festivals were banned, including Christmas, 
it was the evening of 31 December when Father Frost, the Soviet version of Father 
Christmas, came and children received presents, and over the years it has also become 
the most important event of the year for those making entertainment programmes on 
Soviet television. New Year’s Eve celebrations on Soviet television had become one of 
the most important dates in the broadcast year, to paraphrase Scannell and Cardiff 
(1991), something that contemporary Russian television with its annual grand musical 
shows on the New Year’s Eve has preserved. This Soviet era tradition of providing 





much alive today also on LTV.67 Besides, also its commercial rivals have taken it over. 
It is common in many Russian-speaking families to celebrate the arrival of New Year 
twice – first according to Moscow time and then, a few hours later, once more in line 
with the local Latvian time. They toast with champagne, light fireworks and listen to the 
president’s address to the nation twice – the Russian president is the first in a row to 
address them for few minutes interrupting New Year’s Eve special musical shows on all 
main Russian channels, and two hours later it is a turn for the president of Latvia or, to 
quote some of my Russian-speaking informants, ‘our president’ to appear on their 
television screens (it is also the prime minister of Latvia who addresses the nation on 
New Year’s Eve). ‘The president of Latvia... that’s sacred duty’, that is how 55-year-old 
Russian-speaking school teacher Galina (FG7) expresses her strong commitment not to 
miss the traditional New Year’s best wishes of the head of the nation. Russian-speaking 
viewers listen twice to the national anthem, first the Russian and then the Latvian one, 
on the evening of 31 December, as well. 
For many years for both Russian-speakers and Latvian-speakers New Year’s Eve has 
been one of those rare occasions over the course of the year when they have searched 
for the public broadcaster LTV. It has been also one of those rare moments when all 
generations of the family have gathered around LTV1, the main channel of LTV. On 
December 31 the role of LTV has been vital. It is because for many years since the 
restoration of the country’s independence LTV has been the only broadcaster where in a 
pre-recorded message the country’s political leadership addressed the nation looking 
back at the outgoing year, outlining what to expect from the next one and sending their 
New Year’s best wishes and where the traditional New Year’s clock counting down the 
final seconds of the year appeared followed by the national anthem at midnight. 
It is a tradition LTV has inherited from the Soviet Central Television where starting from 
the early 1970s each year on the evening of December 31 10 minutes before midnight 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party, leader of the Soviet Union, sent televised 
Happy New Year wishes to the Soviet people, or when the health of the General 
Secretary was too poor to do it himself they were read by a television announcer, 
followed by twelve rings of the Kremlin Chimes counting down the last seconds of the 
                         
67 Like the Soviet Central TV also LTV during the Soviet period traditionally offered special programmes 
of popular music on the evening of 31 December such as the late 1970s and early 1980s Gadu mijas melodijas 





year and the anthem of the USSR at 12 o’clock. Alongside both channels of Soviet 
Central Television this was simultaneously broadcast also on LTV with its then name TV 
Riga – all three were the only available channels in Latvia at the time – as well as on both 
channels of the Latvian state radio. Then Latvia was at the same time zone as Moscow. 
In the late 1980s, shortly before the break-up of the Soviet empire Latvia not only started 
to celebrate the arrival of the New Year according to the local Latvian time – one hour 
later than in Moscow, it was also the country’s new political elite, then Latvian political 
leaders, who now sent their New Year’s best wishes to their people on radio and 
television. Though the empire collapsed, the tradition of the country’s political leadership 
to address the nation on the New Year’s Eve a few minutes before midnight has been 
preserved, and it is a tradition happily repeated from year to year not only by the 
country’s political elite and television programme-makers but also by audiences. As 
audience statistics dating back to as early as the mid-1990s show, New Year’s address to 
the nation from year to year has been among the country’s most watched programmes of 
the year securing sizeable audiences for the public television LTV on the New Year’s 
Eve.   
Over the years, it has become for many a deep-seated tradition to watch LTV1 shortly 
before midnight on the evening of December 31, and yet, as we shall see, during the 
recent years the national commercial channels, and even the transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal, have managed to break this tradition and take a large number of audiences away 
from the public broadcaster and its New Year’s Eve special programming. Nevertheless, 
still, many by force of habit during their New Year’s Eve celebrations continue searching 
for LTV1 few minutes before midnight. It is one of those moments when those who 
have exited from the main channel of the public broadcaster LTV1 in their everyday 
viewing practices re-enter it.  
‘The only time when all of our family watches LTV1 it is for a couple of seconds on the 
evening of 31 December when the president addresses the nation and all the bells ring,’ 
21-year-old Latvian-speaking student Krista (PFG2) said, speaking about her family’s 
rituals of New Year’s Eve celebrations. In their everyday lives LTV1 plays rather 
marginal role and it is mainly sports programming on LTV7, the second channel of LTV, 
that make their regular experience with the public television. It is the president’s New 
Year’s message on the evening of 31 December one of those very few occasions 





Elizaveta (FG7) joins the audiences of LTV1. ‘You need to listen what the president will 
say,’ she explained.  
6.3.1 Between Moscow and Latvian Time  
Among those Russian-speaking families celebrating the arrival of New Year twice is also 
the family of 55-year old Russian-speaking hospital administrator Anna, her husband 
Igor, a 57-year-old unemployed Russian-speaking non-citizen of Latvia, and their 
daughter, 27-year-old shop-assistant Marina and her 4-year-old daughter Yuliya (F1).  
As in previous years, it was also this year on December 31 at 10 pm according to Latvian 
time when it was midnight in Moscow they pop opened a bottle of champagne for the 
first time and repeated the same procedure once more two hours later at midnight in line 
with Latvian time, this time to celebrate the arrival of what Anna called ‘our New Year’. 
Although they did not light fireworks themselves, other people in the nearby 
neighbourhood in the same way as in all previous years had prepared a firework display 
at midnight in line with both Moscow and Latvian time. Still, the bulk of fireworks were 
lit at midnight according to Latvian time, and that was also the only time when Anna’s 
family went out to watch others lighting fireworks. 
This year, too, they received televised greetings from both heads of the respective 
nations, Russian and Latvian. First it was Dmitry Medvedev, then president of Russia, 
who sent them Happy New Year wishes from Moscow followed by greetings of the 
Latvian president Andris Bērziņš sent from his Riga Castle residence. While Anna 
complained of what she characterised as uniform New Year’s Eve musical shows across 
Russian channels, still it was Russian television they were watching most of the time 
during their New Year’s Eve celebrations switching from one Russian channel to another 
instead of, in Igor’s words, watching the ‘humble’ offerings of the national channels, 
including the public broadcaster LTV. Anna also agreed that on the local channels on 
December 31 ‘there is no such cheerfulness and festive mood’ as one can find on 
Russian television.  
Nevertheless, a few minutes before 12 o’clock they switched away from Russian 
television to see the national commercial channel LNT offering a live broadcast from the 
New Year’s celebrations at the Freedom Monument in the centre of the capital Riga 





display at midnight. It was also on LNT where Anna’s family saw the New Year’s 
greetings of the country’s president and prime minister. In his less than ten minutes long 
pre-recorded address to the nation then prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis standing in 
front of the image of the Freedom Monument among other things called all citizens to 
take part in the next year’s language referendum reminding that Latvian language is the 
basis of Latvia’s national identity. 
Given that from the national Latvian-language channels, alongside LTV7 (mainly because 
of its sports programming) it is mostly LNT they watch on a regular basis – it is only 
Anna in her family who has some, albeit sporadic, interest and experience with LTV1 
with Anna’s daughter Marina and husband Igor being among the LTV1 audiences hardly 
ever with the only exception of the annual Eurovision Song Contest when they search for 
the main channel of the public television, it is therefore not surprising that instead of 
LTV1 they have opted for LNT also in their non-quotidian viewing practices, on New 
Year’s Eve, especially as during the last years LNT has work hard to emulate LTV1 on 
the evening of 31 December reproducing the same rituals as LTV1, including the 
transmission of the New Year’s greetings of the country’s political leaders.68 To put it 
another way, the commercial LNT channel has made itself a ready substitute of the 
public broadcaster LTV on New Year’s Eve making exit from LTV easy. In the eyes of 
audiences there is no difference anymore as to whether one should spend the last few 
minutes of the year together with the public LTV1 or the commercial LNT as both 
channels look almost the same. 
According to that year’s audience statistics, it was LNT gathering the largest audiences 
shortly before midnight when the country’s president and prime minister addressed the 
nation, the same pattern observed over the past few years.69 The commercial channel has 
                         
68 Besides, contrary to the public television, the commercial LNT shortly before midnight provided also 
New Year’s best wishes of the country’s ex-presidents, as well as the greetings of Nil Ushakov, mayor of 
the capital Riga, a highly popular political figure among the Russian-speaking community, something that 
could also explain the interest of Anna’s family in the offerings of LNT.  
69 As TNS Latvia ratings data shows, 358 600 viewers were watching LNT at midnight. The second most 
popular was Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal who also offered New Year’s greetings of the Latvian president and prime 
minister. 232 100 viewers were watching Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal at midnight. At 10 pm Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal 
broadcasted greetings of the Russian president transmitted from Moscow and two hours later, at midnight 
in line with Latvian time, also address to the nation of the Latvian president, and, as the audience statistics 
show, it was 229 300 watching greetings of Andris Bērziņš, the president of Latvia, and slightly less – 
222 700 – watching greetings of then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. It is the pattern of the recent 
years with the message of the Latvian president attracting slightly higher number of viewers on Pervyi 
Baltiiskii kanal than the one of the Russian president. LNT and Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal were the most watched 
channels on December 31 evening, other channels, including LTV1, lagging behind. It was only 80 900 this 





proved to be more successful in bringing the nation together for the last few minutes of 
the year leaving the public broadcaster with its official mission of national integration 
behind. Although it is their much-loved Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal where the majority of 
Russian-speakers prefer to watch greetings of the country’s political leadership, LNT is 
their second choice and only then follow other national broadcasters, including the 
public television LTV. It all suggests that in the presence of availability of the exit 
mechanism (similar offerings of other channels) many have easily abandoned their long-
lasting tradition to spend the last minutes of the year in the company of the public 
television.70 
Copying the traditional New Year’s Eve celebrations formula of LTV during the recent 
years the commercial rivals of LTV have been successful in breaking what seemed to be 
an enduring tradition for the whole family to gather around the public channel LTV1 a 
few minutes before the arrival of New Year. For many years it has been only LTV1 
broadcasting the address to the nation by the country’s president and prime minister but 
today due to the high interest of their audiences it is also the national commercial 
channels, and even the transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal doing the same. Along the 
greetings of Nil Ushakov, mayor of Riga, Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal just like its national 
counterparts also airs the New Year’s message of the Latvian president and prime 
minister but subtitled in Russian and it also plays the national anthem of Latvia as the 
clock strikes midnight, the procedure pan-Baltic Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal performs also in 
other Baltic countries of Lithuania and Estonia also there alongside Russian ones 
broadcasting greetings of their own president and playing their own national anthem. In 
fact, it was Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal that first started to broadcast the Latvian president’s New 
Year’s greetings back in the early 2000s with the national commercial channels following 
suit a couple of years later. Nowadays, shortly before midnight, the president’s and prime 
minister’s New Year’s message, followed by the countdown clock and the national 
anthem at 12 o’clock is televised on all the most popular channels in the country.  
Similar programming strategies by LTV and its commercial rivals during the New Year’s 
Eve celebrations further blur demarcation lines between public and commercial, and also 
                         
70 Though in 2013 LTV1 managed to regain its status of being the most popular channel in the country a 
few minutes before midnight on the evening of 31 December, the New Year’s greetings by the country’s 
political leadership gathered sizeable audiences also on its national and transnational commercial rivals 
LNT and Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, both also still being much more popular choice among Russian-speaking 






national and transnational, broadcasting in the eyes of the publics of the public television 
making it harder for them to distinguish LTV from its commercial competitors, 
something I have already discussed in Chapter 4. Emulating some of the strategies of the 
public broadcaster is part of the audience maximization plans of the commercial 
broadcasters – over the years special festive programming on LTV during the national 
celebrations has proved to be a generator of sizeable audiences. It is also the way these 
channels can justify their status of being national broadcasters but for the transnational 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal it is the way to make itself look more national. Emulating the 
national broadcasters during the last few minutes of the year helps Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal to 
domesticate (localize) its Russian-origin offerings (in the same way as producing the 
national news Latviiskoe Vremya along its Russian Moscow-based sister Vremya) and to 
make transnational television from Russia look more familiar for its Latvian Russian-
speaking audiences and closer to their daily rhythms. 
6.3.2 From the Periphery to the Centre 
The family of 68-year-old Russian-speaking retired school teacher Nadezhda (F5) usually 
celebrates the New Year’s arrival twice, first in line with Moscow and then later also 
according to Latvian time. However, this year they missed Russian celebrations as instead 
of the usual one hour this year for the first time it was two hours difference between the 
Latvian and Moscow time zones. We mixed it up, they explained.  
Although they are Orthodox and Old-believers, as they celebrate the arrival of New Year 
twice they also celebrate Christmas and other religious festivals twice. First together with 
the Lutherans and Catholics who make the majority of the Latvian population and later 
also in line with the Orthodox calendar. ‘We are internationalists,’ explained Nadezhda 
during one of our conversations to stress that in her family different cultures coexist 
peacefully and Russian and Latvian cultural spaces are not in conflict with each other. 
‘The more holidays the better,’ she said referring to the tradition of her family to 
celebrate Christmas twice. It is this kind of mix-and-match approach they seem to apply 
to engage with both Russian and Latvian cultural worlds, albeit it is still their engagement 
with Russian cultural space that seems to dominate over their experience with Latvian 
cultural sphere (at least as far as their television viewing practices indicate it). 
As many others, it is also Nadezhda’s family, her 39-year-old daughter Diana and 37-





watching Russian television on the evening of December 31. While offerings of Russian 
television for Nadezhda are ‘colourful and joyful’, watching the national broadcasters 
during the New Year’s Eve is like eating a soup without a salt added. For her, LTV1, the 
main channel of the public television, is ‘greyish and sombre’ and not only during the 
New Year’s Eve celebrations but also throughout the rest of the year, a view that is, to be 
fair, widespread not only among its Russian-speaking but also Latvian-speaking publics.  
However, despite their critical views on the New Year’s Eve offerings of the national 
channels still, as Diana put it, ‘to know that the New Year has arrived’ few minutes 
before midnight they had used to switch to LTV1. Watching the greetings of the Latvian 
president and prime minister followed by the traditional New Year’s clock counting 
down the last seconds of the year and, finally, the national anthem at midnight it is an 
experience Russian television fails to replace, something for what there is no ready 
substitute available on Russian satellite channels.  
As described in Chapter 5, following the 2010 digital switchover Nadezhda’s family has 
not had access to any of the national channels. It is a satellite dish offering access to 
transnational television from Russia they have chosen instead of purchasing a set-top box 
to continue watching the national channels. Instead of Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal they watch 
one of the international versions of Pervyi kanal providing only the Russian president’s 
New Year’s address to the nation. 
The reason they decided to opt out of national television is the high-budget 
entertainment on Russian television that easily outrivals offerings of the national 
broadcasters, including the public television LTV, also in their day-to-day viewing 
practices. As Andrei suggests, the national broadcasters are like the periphery, contrary to 
the centre, Russian television. ‘Where is it more interesting – in Riga [capital city of 
Latvia] or in the province?’ he asked rhetorically and added: ‘Russia is fifteen times bigger 
than Latvia’. It is more generous in funding, Andrei thinks, and that allows Russian 
television to win in its competition with the national television industry. As he argued, 
‘Russian television is more spectacular than the Latvian channels,’ and, therefore, better 
qualifies as a great source of entertainment allowing to escape from drabness of daily 
realities. People are searching entertainment on television, as he put it, ‘to colour the life’. 
Also Sergei, a 30-year-old Russian-speaking worker at the railway company (FG8), during 
one of the focus group discussions described entertainment offerings of the national 





provided by the national broadcasters saying that ‘you have not entered an ordinary shop, 
you have visited a supermarket’, and, to be true, it was also many of my Latvian-speaking 
respondents who used the same line of argumentation to explain their interest in 
Russian-origin entertainment on television. 
To use Andrei’s terminology, preferring Russian television instead of the national 
broadcasters they opt for ‘the centre’ instead of ‘the periphery’ or, to use Sergei’s analogy, 
they choose to do shopping at ‘the supermarket’ instead of some ‘ordinary shop’, the 
choice that itself on a symbolic level seems to be more attractive, and in combination 
with a pragmatic logic (grand entertainment offerings in their own language) makes 
preference for transnational television from Russia and exit from national broadcasting 
for many Russian-speakers rather effortless and easy.  
We can also see it as a strategy employed by Russian-speakers for redressing the balance 
with Russian television seen as offering an escape from what they see as their 
subordinate status within national broadcasting. While many of Russian-speakers feel 
inferior within national broadcasting, and the public broadcaster LTV in particular, 
watching their much-loved Russian channels provides them with a sense of superiority. 
There is a difference being a minority with your voice being ignored or, so to speak, to 
be allocated a peripheral position within national broadcasting or to be part of ‘the 
centre’ within transnational television from Russia. To put it differently, we can look at 
Russian-speakers’s assertion of the superiority of Russian television as opposed to the 
inferiority of the national channels as an expression of resentment they feel over being 
disregarded within national broadcasting.  
6.3.3 Goluboi Ogonek, and Other Soviet Rituals        
As already noted, it is not only Russian-speakers who prefer watching Russian television 
during their New Year’s Eve celebrations, also many Latvian-speakers, even those who 
are not keen viewers of Russian television in their everyday media practices, from year to 
year migrate to Russian channels during the New Year’s holidays. On December 31 and 
January 1 Russian channels usually experience untypically high audience figures.71 Here is 
                         
71 According to the ratings data, it was Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal that attracted the largest audiences on the 2011 
New Year’s Eve, also including many ethnic Latvian viewers. Its Olive-shou (Olivier Show) mixing music and 
comedy outrivaled all New Year’s Eve offerings of the national channels. As TNS Latvia ratings data 
shows, on December 31, 2011 among audiences of Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal 20.7% were ethnic Latvians and 
next day on January 1, 2012 the number of ethnic Latvians watching Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal amounted to 





a group of older Latvian-speaking female viewers (FG9), 68-year-old retired Ilga, 55-year-
old agronomist Ināra and 57-year-old chief specialist at the local museum Inta, discussing 
offerings of LTV and those of the Russian channels on the evening of 31 December to 
unanimously agree that Russian television stands head and shoulders above LTV in this 
respect. Yet, although it is ‘banal’, ‘boring’ and ‘the worst one’, it is still ‘our television’ 
and it is somehow even hard to criticize ‘our’ LTV indicating that their critique of LTV 
does not signal their indifference to the public television:   
Ilga: New Year’s programmes [on LTV] are so poor.  
Ināra: The worst ones. 
Inta: You cannot watch it on our television, I’m sorry to say.  
Ilga: The worst, the most boring ones you can imagine.   
Ināra: It is, indeed…  [The president’s] solemn speech ends and that’s it.   
Ilga: And after [the speech] there is nothing interesting to watch.   
Ināra: It looks banal. 
As in past years, also that December 31 the family of 54-year-old Latvian-speaker Māra, 
an accountant at the state archive (F2), was watching a long-running New Year’s Eve 
variety show Goluboi ogonek (The Little Blue Light) on RTR Planeta (RTR Planet), the 
international version of the Russian state broadcaster Rossiya (Russia), with Russian pop 
stars, stand-up comedians and other celebrities taking part in it. The Goluboi ogonek show 
mixing musical performances with comedy sketches and interviews first appeared on 
Soviet Central Television in the early 1960s when alongside performers of popular music, 
other well-known artists, poets, television announcers and sportsmen also army officers, 
cosmonauts and those honoured as heroes of socialist labour were among the guests of 
Goluboi ogonek sending their New Year’s greetings to the millions of those watching the 
                                                                      
viewership. Along Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal it is also RTR Planeta (RTR Planet), the international version of the 
Russian state channel Rossiya (Russia), gathering large audiences on New Year’s Eve year in year out, and 
the year of 2011 was not an exception. Its traditional New Year’s Eve variety show Goluboi ogonek (The Little 
Blue Light) with a format similar to the one of Olive-shou was among the most watched programmes on the 
evening of December 31. The ethnic composition of RTR Planeta viewership is similar to Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal. While on average in 2011 ethnic Latvian audiences made 23.4% of its viewership, on that year’s New 
Year’s Eve the number of ethnic Latvians watching RTR Planeta had grown significantly. On December 31, 






show at home. For many years the three-hour-long Goluboi ogonek has served as the 
central element of the New Year’s celebrations ritual on the Soviet television – it was on 
air five minutes past midnight straight after the rings of the Kremlin Chimes and the 
anthem of the USSR, and has retained its central role and popularity also today on 
Russian television. According to ratings data, Goluboi ogonek has many devoted viewers 
also in Latvia. 
On New Year’s Eve we have never watched Latvian channels, told me 19-year-old 
student Liene, Māra’s youngest daughter. ‘They know how to mark holidays,’ Māra 
praised the offerings of Russian television on the evening of 31 December which she saw 
as better at providing a festive mood on the New Year’s Eve than the national channels. 
Nevertheless, shortly before 12 o’clock they usually switch from transnational 
broadcasting from Russia to national broadcasting, and for a few minutes instead of 
Goluboi ogonek watch one of the national channels. ‘To check the clock to know when to 
drink champagne,’ explained 26-year-old Dace, Māra’s oldest daughter, civil servant 
working at the ministry. It is also the greetings of the president and prime minister of 
Latvia they usually watch on one of the national channels.   
While it is musical shows on Russian television they enjoy watching on the New Year’s 
Eve, there is a moment during the celebrations when they return to national broadcasting 
as it is only it that provides that feeling of being part of the national communion, which 
transnational television from Russia cannot offer (with the exception of the localized 
transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal), and despite their intense dislike of the local political 
class, as described in Chapter 4, still on the New Year’s Eve they wish to hear its 
greetings. It is because all these elements (receiving televised greetings from those in 
power, counting on television minutes and seconds till midnight and toasting with 
champagne at 12 o’clock) are part of deep-seated traditions of the New Year’s Eve 
celebrations with national broadcasting playing the central role in this ritual of the nation 
coming together around television during the last minutes of the year, the ritual repeated 
enthusiastically by broadcasters and their audiences from year to year. 
From year to year, during the New Year’s holidays, alongside Goluboi ogonek, they also 
watch 1975 Russian romantic comedy Ironiya sudby, ili S legkim parom! (The Irony of Fate, or 
Enjoy Your Bath!). Ironiya sudby tells a story of a chain of misunderstandings Muscovite 
Zhenya is involved in on the New Year’s Eve mixing up his standard Moscow block of 





Petersburg, making the film a subtle satire of the bleak uniformity of the Soviet everyday 
reality. Indeed, it is not only Māra and her husband, 59-year-old engineer Heinrihs, who 
enjoy watching this Soviet era classic but also their daughters, Liene and Dace. ‘We watch 
Ironiya sudby every year. Without it, New Year cannot start in our family,’ said 26-year-old 
Dace. For all members of the family Ironiya sudby is among their most favourite films. 
Popular films of the Soviet epoch are that part of the Soviet legacy even Latvian-
speakers, otherwise highly critical about the Soviet rule and legacy it has left in Latvia, are 
happy to hand on to the next generations, as we can see also in the case of Māra’s family. 
It is also that part of Soviet heritage that unites Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, 
and older generations in particular, in their shared search for nostalgic (Soviet) 
pleasures.72 The Ironiya sudby film is so popular among both ethno-linguistic audiences 
that it is not only Russian channels but also the national commercial broadcasters that 
have made it a staple of their New Year’s holidays schedules year in year out. It is a time 
when, to quote Māra’s daughter Dace, ‘almost all channels show’ Ironiya sudby. While on 
one channel the film has just started, on other it draws to a close. When late December 
national and transnational Russian channels start to run a promo of Ironiya sudby it is a 
very clear signal that the New Year’s holidays are approaching. 
As we have seen, it is deep seated habits going back to the Soviet era that still continue to 
shape the way how people in Latvia celebrate the New Year’s Eve. Many of them are 
rituals once invented by Soviet television (such as the country’s leader addressing the 
nation in the last few minutes of the year and special musical shows the whole night 
through) that not only the ex-Soviet and now public broadcaster LTV but also its 
commercial rivals are happy to reproduce. While Soviet state television along with the 
Soviet empire has long been dead, traditions it had once invented, to use the idea of 
‘invented traditions’ as proposed by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), are still much alive 
and enjoy enduring popularity even among Latvian-speakers who so enthusiastically 
during the first years of independence in the early 1990s wished to become ‘normal’ and 
as quickly as possible to return to Europe forgetting about all that associates them with 
                         
72 Hollywood production that was highly popular shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union today has 
lost its novelty status, and instead of Western blockbusters large part of audiences, and especially older 
generations, are happy to go back to the Soviet classics. Hence, we can say that after the initial rapid and 
massive Westernization of the ex-Soviet television space during the 1990s it is now a time for re-
Easternization, and popularity of the Soviet era popular culture in a combination with high demand for the 
today’s Russian-origin television entertainment in Latvia (and, as argued, not limited to the Russian-
speaking audiences) as in other former Soviet republics is evidence of this process (for a more detailed 





the ‘abnormal’ Soviet past (Stukuls Eglitis, 2002). It suggests that today, more than two 
decades after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, people are not anymore ashamed to 
see normality in the Soviet past, at least in some aspects of the Soviet way of life.73  
6.4 No More Monopoly on the Production of Festivity  
As already noted, because of their potential to pull in big audiences and thus bring 
commercial success, the commercial rivals of LTV have decided to copy the strategies of 
public television during the national celebrations, and for many it is the commercial 
broadcasters that today have become also their ‘festive television’. It is not only on the 
New Year’s Eve but also during the rest of the calendar of the national celebrations 
when the national commercial broadcasters have recently started to offer special festive 
programming, something that for many years only the public broadcaster LTV did and 
something that not only guaranteed its otherwise non-loyal publics coming back to LTV 
during these moments but also something that allowed its publics to distinguish the 
public broadcaster from its national and transnational commercial rivals.  
Given the weak tradition of watching the public television as part of their every-day 
viewing rituals, many have easily given up their long-standing tradition to watch LTV 
during the moments of national celebrations and have migrated to the similar offerings 
of their favourite commercial broadcasters that during these moments in the eyes of 
audiences have become ‘close substitutes’ of LTV, to speak in the words of Hirschman 
(1970). For many of my respondents the commercial channels have long become a 
substitute of public television in their day-to-day viewing practices but now when they 
have taken over some of the traditions of the public television it is also during the non-
quotidian moments of the national life, to paraphrase Morley (2000), they have found the 
commercial broadcasters as providing ‘a ready alternative’, again to use terminology of 
Hirschman (1970), to the public television who for many years enjoyed a monopoly on 
the production of festivity at times of the national celebrations. 
No wonder that for many there is no difference anymore as to whether they should 
watch the commercial channels or the public broadcaster LTV during the national 
celebrations as the former, during these moments, have started to provide programming 
                         
73 Also a recent public opinion poll has showed that ethnic Latvians over the last few years have become 
less negative in their attitude towards the Soviet period, still far from being as positive as Russian-speakers 
are (Kaprāns, Procevska, 2013). Nevertheless, according to the same survey, neither among ethnic 





similar to that of LTV, including live broadcasts of some of the ritual official ceremonies, 
challenging what for many years seemed to be the impregnable ‘special attachment’ 
(Hirschman, 1970) of its publics to the public broadcaster LTV during the moments of 
national celebrations. In other words, in the eyes of its publics there is no difference 
anymore as to whether to participate in the crucial moments of the national life through 
the public television or its commercial competitors. The commercial channels have 
happily taken over the role of the public broadcaster during these moments of the 
national life as it allows combining their aspirations as national broadcasters with 
commercial success.  
6.5 The Week of Commemoration and National Pride  
As this year’s president’s New Year’s greetings also his National Day’s address to the 
nation the family of 55-year old Russian-speaking hospital administrator Anna (F1) was 
watching on the national commercial channel LNT. Like previous years also this year on 
November 18 when the proclamation of Latvia’s independence in 1918 is celebrated 
LNT offered live broadcasts of the festive events of Independence Day, including the 
traditional president’s address to the nation given from the square by the Freedom 
Monument in the capital Riga, in which the head of the nation sends his National Day’s 
greetings to those gathered in the city centre in front of the Freedom Monument and 
thousands of those watching his speech at home on television. 
Back in 1999 it was then recently elected Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga who 
introduced this new ritual in the list of the established National Day’s official ceremonials 
starting a tradition of the president sending Independence Day’s greetings to the nation. 
From the very beginning alongside public television LTV, it was also LNT who has 
broadcast the president’s message but, recently, also other national commercial channels 
have started to do the same, and nowadays, at 8 pm on November 18 almost all national 
channels air the president’s greetings live from Riga city centre.74 There is no difference 
whether one watches the president’s speech on LTV or on one of its commercial rivals. 
Switching from channel to channel during those few minutes when the president’s 
address is on air they all look the same. 
According to the audience statistics, the commercial LNT is more successful in 
                         
74 The transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, the most popular channel among Russian-speaking audiences, 





addressing audiences of the ethno-linguistic minority during the National Day’s 
celebrations than the public LTV. Just as in previous years, also this year there were more 
Russian-speakers watching the president’s Independence Day’s address to the nation on 
LNT than on the public broadcaster. Overall, the president’s November 18 broadcast 
this year turned out to be more popular on LTV1 than on LNT, while the year before it 
was vice versa. Nevertheless, each year either the president’s greetings or the 
Independence Day’s fireworks display over the River Daugava in Riga later the same 
evening, something LNT started to offer only recently, gather equally large audiences on 
both channels signalling that substantial part of audiences have abandoned what only few 
years back seemed to be a deep-rooted tradition to watch live broadcasts of the National 
Day’s official ceremonials on the public channel challenging some of previously taken for 
granted assumptions of loyalty towards the public television on the part of its publics 
during the moments of national celebrations. It all also shows not only how recent but 
also how fragile these broadcasting traditions, in fact, are. Instead of being fixed and 
stable, they are actually subject to change, re-invention. 
On the evening of November 18 LNT looks much the same as the main channel of the 
public television, LTV1. Both channels provide their audiences with access to the 
National Day’s official ceremonies taking place in the capital city. As LTV1, also LNT 
offers a live broadcast of the president’s address, as well as the festive fireworks display. 
Both along the Independence Day’s military parade, also taking place in the capital, 
gather the largest television audiences of all televised National Day’s ceremonials.75 The 
dramaturgy and scenography of these live broadcasts on both channels are all the same, 
and also presenters of LTV1 and LNT with their solemn appearance and patriotic texts 
on November 18 do not look much different from each other. Through their special 
National Day’s programming both the public channel LTV1 and its commercial rival 
LNT present their claims to the status of a true national broadcaster. Its live broadcasts 
on November 18 allow also the commercial channel LNT to be part of the annual 
Independence Day’s project of national imagination, something the public broadcaster 
LTV has previously monopolized. 
Its special programming in the week from November 11, Lāčplēsis Day, which honours 
                         
75 According to the regular audience figures, the traditional ecumenical worship service, as well as the 
ceremonial meeting of the parliament and the official National Day’s concert are less popular, all 
broadcasted only on LTV1. Though few years back LNT offered also live broadcast of the annual 





the 1919 Latvian freedom fighters, to November 18 LNT has named as The Week of 
Patriots. Though LNT has initiated a new tradition calling people to wear Latvian 
carmine-white-carmine flag ribbon during these days – it was first anchors of LNT who 
appeared on screen wearing a ribbon in 2009, and later presenters of other national 
channels, and also news readers of Latviiskoe Vremya (Latvia’s Time) on the transnational 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal – another way for it to make itself look more national, as well as 
official figures and more and more also ordinary folks followed suit, and yet the 
scheduling strategy of LNT during its Week of Patriots utilizes the same triad of LTV’s 
long-standing conception of special programming during the national celebrations. It is 
popular Latvian films, including Soviet classics – or, as my Latvian-speaking respondents 
would like to instead say, ‘Latvian classics’, to speak in the words of 46-year-old Latvian-
speaking blue-collar worker Pēteris (FG10), as well as concerts of popular music and live 
transmissions of official ceremonies that is at the heart of the offerings of both LTV and 
LNT in the week from Remembrance Day, November 11 to Independence Day, 
November 18. 
The week of commemoration and national pride in the national calendar is a time when 
television traditionally has been full of programming appealing to national sentiments of 
their audiences. Overall, it is a time of the year when the societal self-reflection on the 
national identity is at its peak. Besides, in contrast to March 16, which for many Latvian-
speakers is a day to pay tribute to the Latvian Legion, and May 9, when many Russian-
speakers celebrate the Victory Day, polarizing the nation and reminding of conflicting 
collective memories among both ethno-linguistic groups (see Chapter 4), November 18 
celebrations bring Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers together.76  
6.6 Searching for Comfort and Pleasure on Russian Television 
In the same manner as celebrating the arrival of New Year twice, first in line with 
Moscow time and then, few hours later, also according to Latvian time, many Russian-
speakers, mostly older generations, combine their interest in the news flow from Russia 
with the national news, first they watch Vremya from Moscow and then its national 
version Latviiskoe Vremya that, it is worth to remind it here, translates as Latvia’s Time (see 
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National Day celebrations are quite popular among both ethno-linguistic communities – in the 2012 survey 
52.5% Russian-speakers reported that they celebrate November 18 compared to 80.3% ethnic Latvians 
claiming doing the same (Kaprāns, Procevska, 2013). (For more detailed analysis of attitudes of members 






Chapter 5 for a detailed examination of the news preferences of Russian-speaking 
audiences). It is being in-between Russian and Latvian time, and space, that best 
characterizes viewing practices of these audiences. However, for the majority of Russian-
speakers Russian television is first and foremost a source of large-scale generously 
funded entertainment and only then, if at all, it is a source of the news from Russia.77 
Mainly out of comfort (their own language, cultural proximity) and pleasure (attractive, 
spectacular programming) Russian-speakers enjoy the entertainment offerings of Russian 
television, and it is also the reason for their dismissal of national broadcasters, including 
the public channel LTV. It is this comfort and pleasure the majority of Russophones are 
searching and finding on Russian television and only then, if at all, identification with 
Russia, and its political world particularly. Some of these motivations also make many 
Latvian-speaking viewers, and especially older Latvian-speaking audiences, keen 
consumers of Russian popular culture. It is those ordinary gratifications, namely 
watching entertainment for pleasure, cross-cutting ethno-linguistic boundaries that attract 
Latvian-speaking audiences to Russian television and also make Russian-speakers so 
enthusiastic viewers of Russian channels. 
The fact that there are some motivations Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers have in 
common when choosing to watch Russian television suggests that it is not only, or 
mainly, the ethno-linguistic identity of Russian-speakers that guides their viewing 
preferences in the same way as in the case of Latvian-speakers it is not only, or mainly, 
their ethno-linguistic background what explains their viewing decisions. Yet, it is not to 
deny that apart from some commonalities there also exist different motivations Latvian-
speaking and Russian-speaking viewers have in their decision to watch transnational 
television from Russia. In short, Russian-speakers may have additional reasons to watch 
Russian television as they have additional reasons to reject public (national) broadcasting. 
While motivations of viewers of both ethno-linguistic groups may meet at some point, at 
the same time the comfort and pleasure gained from watching Russian channels may not 
always mean the same thing for Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking audiences. 
Although Russian-speaking audiences are ‘normal’ audiences to the same extent as 
Latvian-speaking viewers are with all the same ordinary gratifications people seek to find 
                         
77 The regular audience measurements show that apart from the evening news (with higher ratings for the 
national news Latviiskoe Vremya instead of Vremya focusing on the Russian news) it is a wide range of 
entertainment offerings – different talk, game, talent, reality and comedy shows, many of them adaptations 





on television, we cannot ignore different sociabilities, mental landscapes, habituses, 
linguistic abilities, family histories and other facets of one’s identity what make 
Russophone audiences different from Latvian-speaking audiences, and even if some of 
these particularities are not so significant as members of both communities tend to think 
they still shape viewing decisions and experiences of audiences of both ethno-linguistic 
groups. 
After the 2010 digital switchover when all terrestrial channels in Latvia abandoned 
analogue broadcasting and the family of 68-year-old retired Russian-speaking school 
teacher Nadezhda (F5) decided not to purchase a digital set-top box to be able to 
continue watching national channels, all they have today is a satellite dish offering a wide 
range of transnational television from Russia, as well as other foreign channels, and no 
access to any of the national broadcasters, including both public service channels (for 
more details see Chapter 5). It is Russian state-controlled channels, Pervyi kanal and 
Rossiya (Russia), what Nadezhda calls ‘the second channel’ (it is the second one on their 
remote control after Pervyi kanal set up as the first one), that are their favourite ones. 
The tabloid talk show Pust govoryat (Let Them Speak) on Pervyi kanal has become central to 
their viewing ritual on weekday evenings with the exception of Andrei, Nadezhda’s 37-
year-old son-in-law, who says being less interested in it; however, still sometimes joins 
others just for the company. It is all three women of the family, Nadezhda, her daughter 
and granddaughter, that are the most loyal audiences of Pust govoryat; they watch the show 
every evening. They have interesting topics, said Nadezhda, explaining their engagement 
with Pust govoryat. Whenever, during my visits, we were watching the show together they 
passionately discussed that day’s topic, participants, as well as the host of the show. 
‘There is a rumpus going on,’ once commented Nadezhda’s 10-year-old granddaughter 
Aleksandra when a heated debate among the participants of the show begun. ‘Women’s 
rumpus,’ ironically added Andrei. That evening, at the heart of the show there was a 
story of a 12-year-old girl who had become a mother and her 43-year-old guardian who 
had been sentenced for seducing her. ‘The father of my child – my father,’ was the 
episode title.  
Apart from Pust govoryat, a number of other entertainment offerings, most of them 
adaptations of popular global formats, are among the programmes they like on Pervyi 
kanal. During those months I visited the family on Sunday evenings they were usually 





version of Britain’s Got Talent/America’s Got Talent, with ordinary people from all around 
the country coming to a TV studio to show their talents. No doubt, they enjoyed 
watching the show; they were laughing while watching it and actively commenting on the 
performance of the participants. ‘It’s a nightmare,’ Nadezhda commented on one of the 
numbers. It was a 22-year-old primary school teacher from Moscow participating in the 
Minuta slavy show dressed in a vampire costume and coming out from a coffin to 
demonstrate what she thinks is her talent for dancing. She was booed by the studio 
audience and the judges were also highly critical about her performance with all three 
voting her down. ‘Why did they allow her to take a part?’ Andrei was wondering. 
It is Russian celebrities, singers, actors and television presenters, usually participating in 
the Minuta slavy show either as guests, members of the jury or the studio audience, and 
from the comments of the family members it was clear that they are highly competent in 
the Russian show business, and are better informed about the Russian celebrities than 
Latvian ones. Nadezhda’s 39-year-old daughter, school teacher Diana, remembered 
young Latvian singer Nikolajs Puzikovs having a concert in their village and Diana’s 
Latvian-speaking colleagues at the school being surprised that she had never before 
heard of him. Puzikovs became popular after taking part in the local X Factor type talent 
show broadcast on the national commercial channel LNT. ‘They mentioned his songs 
but I didn’t know any of them,’ Diana remembered her conversation with colleagues at 
work. Because being out of national broadcasting and having no shared knowledge 
audiences of the national channels have she felt being excluded from the communication.   
In the list of the family members’ most favourite actors and musicians are only names of 
Russian celebrities with the exception of Latvian household name composer of popular 
music Raimonds Pauls and Latvian singer Laima Vaikule with all her Russian language hit 
songs written by Pauls – both during the 1980s became hugely popular throughout the 
Soviet Union and today are still well-known in Russia and other former Soviet 
republics.78 It all signals of their strong cultural affiliation to the Russian, or more 
generally Russian-language, cultural world, something that also helps to understand their 
keen interest in popular culture on Russian television. 
What is more, as Andrei argued, it is the grand scale that makes entertainment on 
                         
78 It was only little Aleksandra, Diana’s daughter, who among her favourite singers has included also 
Latvian pop star Lauris Reiniks, highly popular among teenagers, that appears to be an influence of 
Aleksandra’s Latvian-speaking friends. As noted earlier, she studies in Latvian at school together with 





Russian television – alongside cultural proximity – not only more relevant but also 
superior to the offerings of the national channels. Also for Andrei’s wife Diana, shows 
on the national channels are ‘humble’ compared to the Russian ones what she finds 
‘more impressive and more colourful’. ‘Russia is bigger, the choice greater, and only 
those who are really talented are accepted,’ Andrei compared Russian and local talent 
shows. The Minuta slavy show was on air at the same time slot on Sunday nights when the 
Latvian version of the same talent show format Latvijas zelta talanti (Latvia’s Golden Talents) 
was on air on the national commercial channel LNT. While the family of Nadezhda was 
watching the Minuta slavy show, their Latvian-speaking neighbours were watching Latvijas 
zelta talanti, and in line with the viewing figures of that time both Minuta slavy and Latvijas 
zelta talanti were highly popular signalling once more that, though members of both 
ethno-linguistic groups prefer watching television in their own language, the type of 
programming they like is much the same. 
As suggested earlier, it is this sense of superiority Russian-speakers get when opting for 
Russian television instead of a feeling of being marginalized within national broadcasting. 
It is not simply better entertainment providing access to the Russian cultural space they 
find attractive on Russian channels, it is the different position allocated to them as 
viewers they find attractive on Russian television. Choosing transnational television from 
Russia they choose to escape from the minority status allocated to them within national 
broadcasting, and particularly the public broadcaster LTV. When saying that they like 
Russian television so much, at the same time they are saying that they do not like national 
broadcasting. When saying that they find Russian television more in line with their needs 
and interests, at the same time they are saying that they do not find national broadcasting 
relevant. Their dismissal of national broadcasting – the decision of Nadezhda’s family 
not to purchase a digital set-top box – is a manifestation of their discontent. It is an 
exercise of voice that their choice to watch transnational television from Russia, instead 
of national broadcasting, and the public television LTV in particular, signifies. 
6.7 ‘Sorrowful’ Latvians and ‘Joyful’ Russians  
Both national and Russian channels offer their adaptations of international television 
entertainment formats, and one such example is a dining show Come Dine with Me with 
participants, be they ordinary people or celebrities, competing to be named the greatest 
dinner party host whose Latvian version called Gandrīz ideālas vakariņas is part of the 





by the Russian commercial REN TV whose Baltic version is available in Latvia via cable 
and satellite. Both, Gandrīz ideālas vakariņas and Zvanyi uzhin, are part of the weekday 
peak-time schedules with Gandrīz ideālas vakariņas starting at 6 pm on TV3 and Zvanyi 
uzhin few hours later on REN TV. 
The family of 54-year-old Latvian-speaker Māra working as an accountant at the state 
archive (F2) instead of the national version Gandrīz ideālas vakariņas prefers Russian Zvanyi 
uzhin. As Māra enjoys cooking and even bakes bread at their apartment in the fourth 
floor of the nine-storey standard Soviet era block of flats in the capital Riga, it is one of 
her most favourite shows on television. As other members of the family like to 
accompany Māra while she is watching Zvanyi uzhin, the programme has become a central 
part of their viewing experiences on the weekday evenings.   
Their oldest daughter, 26-year-old civil servant Dace working at the ministry, 
characterised Gandrīz ideālas vakariņas, the Latvian version of Come Dine With Me, as 
‘insipid’ compared to its Russian version. ‘The emotions and temper [of the participants 
of the show] are much more colourful,’ she pointed out. Interestingly, some other of my 
Latvian-speaking informants, for the same reason, instead of the Russian version prefer 
watching the Latvian adaptation of Come Dine With Me. While for the former, the 
emotionality of Russians makes the show more attractive, for the latter it is rather a 
deviation of a norm. As 67-year-old retired Latvian-speaking telephone operator Ligita 
(F4) argued, Russians express their emotions too much or, to quote her, they are ‘more 
impulsive’ than participants of the Latvian version, and that is something she does not 
like. 
At the heart of these responses to the Latvian and Russian adaptations of the Come Dine 
With Me show are the supposedly different temper and manners of Latvian-speakers and 
Russian-speakers, and in this way the Latvian and Russian versions of the same global 
dinning show format help their viewers to distinguish the supposedly different nature of 
Latvian-speakers from the one Russian-speakers are believed to have and thus to 
demarcate boundaries between both ethno-linguistic groups. What is more important, 
both Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking audiences set these demarcation lines 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to explain and justify their own viewing preferences. Through 
the construction of difference (vis-à-vis ‘their’ group) and commonality (within ‘our’ 
group) viewing choices of both ethno-linguistic communities are presented as normal 





To explain what may look as their immersion in Russian television my Russian-speaking 
respondents often referred to the perceived cultural differences between Latvian-
speakers and Russian-speakers arguing that the mentality of Russian-speakers differs 
from the one Latvian-speakers have. ‘Russians, nevertheless, are Russians,’ commented 
Svetlana, a 33-year-old Russian-speaking real estate specialist working at the local 
municipality (FG8), to explain the high interest Russian-speakers have in transnational 
television from Russia. It is also Latvian-speakers who believe that members of both 
ethno-linguistic communities have different mentalities and that it determines also their 
viewing habits. ‘Perhaps Russian mentality is different, they like something else than 
[ethnic] Latvians,’ said 24-year-old Latvian-speaking student Mārtiņš (FG1) commenting 
on his lack of interest in Russian television. According to this logic, supposedly different 
mentalities of both groups are seen as determining different taste cultures they inhabit 
that, in its turn, are believed to leave ultimately its mark on their decisions about which 
channels (national versus transnational Russian) and in which language (Latvian versus 
Russian) to watch, albeit, as we have seen, in reality Latvian-speakers and Russian-
speakers in their viewing choices are not as different as imagined by themselves (at least 
in terms of some of the gratifications they seek to satisfy through the act of viewing).  
Besides, the perceptions Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers have about the public 
broadcaster LTV and all the national channels more generally vis-à-vis Russian television 
reveal identification schemes members of both ethno-linguistic communities apply to 
construct self-identity and that of the other group. For many, Latvian-speakers and 
Russian-speakers alike, LTV represents some stereotypical image of Latvian-speakers as 
being sorrowful and sombre compared to Russian channels seen as being more colourful 
and expressing joy of life, and thus reflecting some imagined Russian mentality. These 
accounts also reveal a poor image of the public broadcaster LTV in the eyes of its publics 
of both ethno-linguistic groups, and also a rather poor (self-)image of Latvian-speakers, 
as well. 
26-year-old Latvian-speaking civil servant Dace (F2) is among those who believe that the 
public broadcaster LTV reflects the nature of Latvian-speakers. She characterised LTV, 
and Latvian-speakers, as ‘grey and boring’ and contrasted it with Russian television where 
‘you feel temperament, colours and spice’. 39-year-old Russian-speaking school teacher 
Diana (F5) referred to what she thinks are different mentalities of Latvian-speaking and 





channels and transnational television from Russia, and at the same time to justify her 
own great appetite for Russian television. According to her observations, Latvian-
speaking children are more placid while their Russian-speaking pears are more restless.  
Responses of my informants towards Panorāma (Panorama), the main prime-time news 
programme of LTV1, say a lot not only about their overall perceptions of the public 
broadcaster LTV but also about the way Latvian-speakers see themselves and about how 
Latvian-speakers are seen by Russian-speakers and, finally, how the identity of Russian-
speakers is formed against these judgements. ‘Panorāma usually starts in such a very 
pessimistic and very conservative tone,’ commented Dagmāra, a 51-year-old Latvian-
speaking project manager at a state institution (FG3). Similarly, for 39-year-old 
unemployed Latvian-speaking man Arnis Panorāma is ‘gloomy’ (FG10). Also Vyacheslav, 
32-year-old Russian-speaker working at his own construction company (FG4), described 
Panorāma as ‘extremely tedious’ and ‘mournful, boring’. 
Consider also the following discussion between Russian-speakers, 48-year-old school 
deputy director Boris, Anastasia, a 29-year-old manager working at the bank and 26-year-
old medical student Vladislav (FG4). Here again the self-perception of some abstract and 
universal ‘Russian man’, conceived as different from ‘(ethnic) Latvian man’, is employed 
to explain why ‘Russian man’ prefers Russian television instead of the national channels, 
loved more by ‘(ethnic) Latvian man’:  
Boris: Because Russian man…, he is more fidgety.  
Anastasia: Cheerful… 
Boris: And therefore also their [Russian] programmes are joyful and there 
is energy… But all those programmes on LTV1, they are such…  
Vladislav: Such calm. 
Boris: Restful. 
Anastasia: With tears. 
It is again not only the public television LTV, but through their perceptions of LTV also 
Latvian-speakers, who are represented as ‘calm’ and ‘with tears’ contrary to Russian 





process of construction of difference (vis-à-vis outsiders) and commonality (within 
insiders) not only images of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are made but also ‘our’ viewing choices 
justified. In other words, audiences work through these stereotypical representations of 
‘self’ versus ‘other’ in order to draw frontiers on the basis of supposed cultural 
differences that would explain and make sense of their own viewing habits. To put it in 
simple terms, with reference to their feeling of being different from Latvian-speakers 
Russian-speakers explain their different viewing habits. Russian channels are seen as 
more in line with the needs and interests of ‘Russian man’. Though not necessarily 
thinking of themselves therefore as somehow superior over Latvian-speakers, still 
Russian-speakers, and, as we have seen earlier, also Latvian-speakers themselves, speak 
about ‘mournful’ and ‘grey’ Latvian-speakers, and ‘mournful’ and ‘grey’ LTV, with a note 
of irony in their voice.   
6.8 Russian Television and Nostalgic (Soviet) Pleasures  
The high interest in some of the offerings of Russian television illuminates a degree of 
nostalgia towards the Soviet era popular culture among the older generations of both 
ethno-linguistic communities. Latvian-speakers have always been highly critical about the 
Soviet system which has been seen as ‘abnormal’ – in the eyes of Latvian-speakers the 
Soviet order was ‘illegitimate, illegal, artificially imposed, and contrary to the national 
“way of life”,’ to quote Stukuls Eglitis (2002:13). Yet, today, more than 20 years since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Latvian-speakers are not afraid to admit (at least 
through their television choices) nostalgic feelings towards the Soviet era popular culture, 
something that seems to be regarded as non-political and hence harmless side of the 
Soviet regime. As noted earlier, seeing normality in some aspects of the Soviet past is not 
anymore such a taboo among Latvian-speakers as it used to be some two decades ago. 
However, high interest in popular culture of the Soviet epoch among the older 
generations, both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, not necessarily implies their 
longing for the Soviet times; it may simply be their youth what they are missing. To put it 
another way, the Soviet era popular culture may offer a symbolic journey taking them 
back to the Soviet years to the same extent as taking them back to the time of their youth 
that happened to coincide with the Soviet era. For instance, this is how her interest to see 
the jubilee concert of the Soviet era pop star Ukrainian singer Sofia Rotaru performing 
all her hit songs on one of the Russian channels explained 54-year-old Latvian-speaking 





pleasures (yearning for their youth, Soviet times, or both) that older Latvian-speaking, as 
well as Russian-speaking, audiences often search on Russian television.79 
As Vihalemm and Masso (2007) have pointed out in their study on the structures of 
collective identities of the Estonian Russophones, Russian television is an important 
source of material that feeds Soviet nostalgia, and one of the most prominent projects of 
post-socialist nostalgia on Russian television is the annual weeklong television contest of 
young pop singers Novaya volna (New Wave) taking place at the end of July in the tourist 
hotspot seaside town of Jurmala about 20 km from the capital Riga and being 
transmitted live to Russia and a number of other former member countries of the Soviet 
Union, including the host country of the contest, Latvia.80 
The Novaya volna festival that first took place in 2002 is a revival of the popular late 1980s 
summertime television contest of young singers Jurmala. Even the venue of the festival, 
the open-air Dzintari concert hall in Jurmala, has remained the same. Back in the 1980s 
Raimonds Pauls, a well-known Latvian composer of popular music, was among those 
having the idea to organize in Jurmala the contest of aspiring singers from all around the 
Soviet Union to be broadcast simultaneously on TV Riga, then name of LTV, and the all-
Union Central Television. The presence of Pauls in the Novaya volna festival from the 
outset of the competition in 2002 has become one of the most visible symbols of the 
Novaya volna as the successor of the late Soviet Jurmala festival. Till 2012 when Pauls left 
the Novaya volna festival he served as a co-chair of the jury of the contest together with 
Russian composer Igor Krutoi, both also former members of the jury of Jurmala 
contest.81 
During the 1980s Pauls became highly popular all around the former Soviet Union, and 
                         
79 Apart from some niche Russian cable and satellite channels showing archives of the Soviet television 
24/7 and selling to their audiences feelings of nostalgia (one of them even has such a name, Nostalgiya 
(Nostalgia) channel), it is also mainstream Russian channels offering a number of shows inviting their 
audiences to return to ‘the good old days’ of the Soviet epoch. Besides, there are quite many products of 
the Soviet era television that today are reproduced by Russian television where they coexist with global 
Western television formats. 
80 During the Soviet years Jurmala was one of the most popular Soviet seaside resorts and has retained its 
popularity among Russian tourists also today. It has become a status symbol for wealthy Russians to have a 
posh villa in Jurmala, and many of them also gather in Jurmala for the Novaya volna festival turning it into 
the get-together of the Russian super-rich. 
81 The Novaya volna festival is not only the successor of the popular late Soviet era contest, the Soviet past is 
all too present in the festival today. Each year along young talents taking part in the competition, vast 
majority of them representatives of the ex-Soviet republics, also stars of popular music of the Soviet epoch 
perform as guests of the festival. As critics say, the focus on the Soviet era pop stars overshadows the 
competition of young singers itself. These pop stars are all the same Russian celebrities that make regular 





many of his greatest hits have been released in both Latvian and Russian versions. Pauls 
is one of those rare local artists that both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers like. 
Many of my Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking informants indeed agreed that Pauls 
is the artist Latvia can be proud of. The popularity of Pauls also explains the high interest 
in the Novaya volna festival among both ethno-linguistic communities. Live broadcasts of 
the Novaya volna contest from year to year pull in sizeable television audiences in Latvia, 
close to the number of viewers watching the annual Eurovision Song Contest, and, as the 
ratings data show, both Russian-speakers and Latvian-speakers have equal interest in the 
Novaya volna festival.82 During recent years viewing figures of the Novaya volna broadcasts 
have experienced some decline signalling that audiences in Latvia are losing their interest 
in the festival; nevertheless, still for a significant number of viewers, watching the Novaya 
volna contest is a compulsory part of their summer viewing experiences. ‘It is my hobby,’ 
Larisa, a 67-year-old retired Russian-speaking woman (FG6) said referring to her interest 
in the Novaya volna festival.  
While it is common for Latvian-speakers to take a rather ironic, if not to say sneering, 
stance on the Novaya volna festival describing it as a Soviet relic, decrying it for bad taste 
and low quality and calling it the anti-Latvian project of Russian cultural imperialism, the 
Novaya volna provides its viewers, both Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, and older 
generations of both groups in particular, with nostalgic (Soviet) pleasures, even if it is ‘an 
ironically inflected nostalgia project’ (Platt, 2013:449).83 
Contrary to the younger generation of this Latvian-speaking family (F4), the list of the 
favourite artists of 67-year-old retired telephone operator Ligita and her husband, 66-
year-old retired music teacher Bruno, also contains some names of popular Soviet era 
celebrities. It is Ligita who is the greatest fan of Soviet (Russian) popular music in the 
family. 
For her, as for many Latvian-speakers, the years of Awakening, the pro-independence 
struggle at the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the following collapse of the Soviet 
Union and restoration of Latvia’s independence are one of the most positive events 
Latvia has experienced in its 20th century history, while the Second World War, the Soviet 
                         
82 It is the national commercial channel LNT and its Russian-language sister channel TV5 offering 
transmissions of the festival, and with a one day delay it is also available for viewers in Latvia on the 
international version of the Russian state channel Rossiya (Russia).  
83 As Platt rightly points out, ‘a stance of ironic distance makes it possible to take pleasure in the 
entertainment traditions of “the good old days” without necessarily entertaining the idea that there was 





occupation and the Stalinist repressions the most negative ones, and yet this does not 
rule out her high appetite for the Soviet era popular culture. When popular music 
concerts are on offer on Russian television, a crucial part of its weekend schedules, they 
are something Ligita will definitely not miss on television, especially the jubilee concerts 
of the Soviet era icons of popular music. 
During one of our conversations her telephone rung and she suddenly ran away back to 
her room upstairs to watch talk show Pust govoryat (Let Them Speak) on Pervyi Baltiiskii 
kanal, one of her favourite shows on Russian television. As it came out later, it was her 
niece calling to let her know that there is a special edition of Pust govoryat on air right now 
devoted to the christening of a new-born baby girl of one of the most popular Russian 
pop stars Filipp Kirkorov, also known as ‘the king of Russian pop music’. Kirkorov is 
one of Ligita’s favourite Russian singers, and as all the rest of her much-loved Russian 
pop and rock stars, many of them also legends of the Soviet popular music, it is also 
Kirkorov who is among the regular guests of the Novaya volna festival, and for this reason 
almost week long broadcasts of the festival are an indispensable summertime viewing 
ritual for Ligita year in year out. 
As soon as Pust govoryat came to an end, I could resume my conversation with Ligita. She 
spoke about the show with great passion, and it was clear that she was really interested in 
the topic. A number of notables of Russian show business were present at the 
christening, including all those popular Russian artists whose concerts Ligita likes to 
watch on Russian television so much. She recapped the hour-long show: 
All [Russian] celebrities have gathered [at the christening of Kirkorov’s 
baby]... [singer] Lolita, fashion designer [Valentin] Yudashkin, figure 
skater [Evgenii] Plyushchenko, and [singer, legend of the Soviet popular 
music] [Alla] Pugacheva was with [her husband, comedian] [Maksim] 
Galkin... [TV journalist, presenter of Pust govoryat] [Andrei] Malahov is a 
godfather [of the baby]... The baby didn’t cry at all.        
6.9 Young People and Western Popular Culture  
While their parents and grandparents have equal interest in Russian(Soviet)-origin 
popular culture, what brings young people with different ethno-linguistic backgrounds 





releases of American films and series they most often find on the internet. Contrary to 
the shared interest their parents and grandparents have in Russian-language 
entertainment coming from East, the English language of entertainment coming from 
West has become a kind of lingua franca for young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers 
making a common space of Western popular culture possible – something that has 
contributed to ‘the homogenization of the mental structures of the ethnic majority and 
minority youth’ that includes, among other things, also their shared strong Western-
oriented supra-national identity, as Vihalemm and Kalmus argue in their study of self-
identification patterns and value orientations among different generations of the two 
main ethno-linguistic groups in Estonia and Latvia (2009:111; see also Kalmus, 
Vihalemm, 2008, Vihalemm, Kalmus, 2008). 
It is Western television and the internet Vihalemm in her study of media repertoires of 
ethnic Estonians and Estonian Russian-speakers have identified as examples of ‘the new 
‘cosmopolitan’ channels of communication’ offering ‘possibilities for the creation of new 
inter-ethnic contacts and solidarity between different groups’ (T.Vihalemm, 2002:294), 
and evidence of my investigation into the media consumption patterns of young Latvian-
speakers and Russian-speakers suggests that this process is underway also in Latvia, or at 
least that there is a fertile ground for the emergence of new inter-ethnic contacts and 
solidarity between young people of both ethno-linguistic groups with Western-origin 
internet-based entertainment here playing a central role. 
Young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers in their twenties and thirties all know very 
well where and how to download their favourite, mostly American, films and series using 
the internet torrent services or to stream them live. There is no place for ethno-linguistic 
divisions when it comes to the consumption patterns of Western popular culture among 
young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers. They like the same American films and 
series and, what is more, prefer watching them online. During the focus group 
discussions with Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking students some of them even 
declared that they do not watch conventional television at all.84  
‘I do not watch [conventional] television at all. Sometimes I can catch some moments 
while going through the living room when the family is watching. But I myself do not 
                         
84 Yet, we should treat these statements with some caution as young people tend to overestimate the role 
of the internet played in their daily lives. Though it is the internet that dominates daily lives of young 






watch [conventional television] already for a long time,’ claimed 20-year-old Russian-
speaking student Dmitry (FG2). He is convinced that in the foreseeable future the 
internet will replace television and traditional television will cease to exist. Instead of 
traditional TV box he prefers watching his favourite films and series on the internet. 
American series Californication and Boardwalk Empire are among the ones he selected as his 
favourite, the ones he downloads on the internet.  
Like their Russian-speaking peers, also young Latvian-speakers prefer watching their 
favourite American series online. For 24-year-old Latvian-speaking student Mārtiņš and 
his friend Toms, also 24-year-old Latvian-speaking student, (FG1) it is American series 
Breaking Bad, Modern Family, American and Canadian co-production Fringe, as well as 
American and British co-production Game of Thrones they download on the internet. ‘I 
don’t have a TV set at all. All I watch it is on the internet,’ Mārtiņš claimed. As Dmitry, 
he also believes that traditional television will die out during the next decades. 
My young Russian-speaking respondents were well informed about the Russian 
celebrities and less about the stars of Latvian show business. They enjoy watching 
Russian music channels such as Muz TV and Pervyi Baltiiskii Muzykalnyi (First Baltic Music 
Channel) offering contemporary Russian popular music, something young Latvian-
speakers are little interested in. Many of my young Latvian-speaking informants claimed 
that they do not watch Russian channels at all or do it rarely,85 and therefore it should 
come as no surprise that many of them do not know much about the Russian celebrities 
and instead are much better informed about the local stars than their Russian-speaking 
pears. Yet, what they have in common are their much-loved idols of Western popular 
culture. 
While among young Latvian-speakers Russian-origin entertainment is less popular and, 
similarly, young Russian-speakers are less interested in home-grown entertainment, it is 
Western popular culture that young people from both ethno-linguistic groups enjoy 
equally, and it was also the 2006 study of the cultural consumption patterns of ethnic 
Latvian and ethnic minority university students concluding that what unites young people 
of all ethnic groups is their common interest in Western popular culture (Tabuns, 2006). 
                         
85 For many young Latvian-speakers their knowledge of Russian language is not as good as it is among 
older Latvian-speaking generations. For instance, 20-year-old Latvian-speaking student Zane (FG1) 
explained her little interest in Russian-language channels saying that ‘Russian language doesn’t come easy to 
me’. Yet, it does not mean that they reject Russian-origin production on television completely. Russian 
entertainment imports with Latvian subtitles on the national commercial channels have also some young 






The celebration of the arrival of the New Year, first in line with Moscow time does not 
make Russian-speakers less interested in repeating the same procedure of pop opening a 
bottle of champagne and receiving televised New Year’s greetings from the country’s 
political leaders a few hours later according to the local Latvian time. Their attachment to 
Russia – more to the Russian cultural space and less to the Russian political world – does 
not rule out their allegiance to Latvia. 
For the majority of Russian-speakers Russian television is first and foremost a source of 
great Russian-origin entertainment and only then, if at all, it is a source of Russian news. 
It is spectacular entertainment on Russian television that makes Russian-speaking 
audiences passionate viewers of Russian channels also during the New Year’s Eve 
celebrations, and because of its festive atmosphere also those many Latvian-speakers 
who otherwise have little interest in Russian television search for it on the evening of 31 
December. It is not only, or mainly, some special ‘homecoming’ stimuli (desire to 
maintain linkages with or, metaphorically speaking, to return to the lost homeland 
Russia) but also these ordinary motivations (namely, search for entertainment) what 
make Russian-speakers avid viewers of Russian television also for the rest of the year, 
and it is the same ordinary motivations what bring also significant portion of Latvian-
speakers, and older generations in particular, to Russian television in their daily viewing 
practices. 
This is not to say that there are no ethno-cultural motivations present – indeed, for many 
Russian-speakers television from Russia provides access to the Russian cultural sphere 
they associate themselves with (not necessarily with the culture of Russia but rather with 
a wider Russian-language cultural space) and especially for older Russian-speaking 
generations their experience of watching Russian television helps to sustain emotional 
connections with their original homeland Russia. Yet, these ethno-cultural motivations 
are not necessarily the only, or the most important, rationale standing behind the viewing 
choices of the Russian-speaking minority. 
While both Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking older generations enjoy watching 
Russian(Soviet)-origin entertainment offering nostalgic (Soviet) pleasures, it is Western 
popular culture what brings together young people of both ethno-linguistic communities. 





young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers contrary to Russian, a lingua franca of their 
parents and grandparents.  
Albeit it is transnational Russian television with its grand entertainment that easily 
outrivals national broadcasters during the New Year’s Eve celebrations, still there is one 
moment during the celebrations when national channels play a crucial role. It is popular 
among audiences televised address to the nation by the Latvian president and prime 
minister in the last few minutes of the year followed by a countdown clock and the 
national anthem as the clock strikes midnight. It is a ritual once invented by the Soviet 
television and after the dissolution of the Soviet empire continued by the public 
broadcaster LTV and recently also taken over by the national commercial channels, and 
even the transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, breaking the long-lasting tradition for the 
(national) family to gather around the public television at midnight on the New Year’s 
Eve. 
Apart from commercial motivations taking over and carrying on this tradition allows 
national commercial channels to show that they are no less true national broadcasters as 
the public television. For the transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal mimicking of elements of 
national broadcasting as the clock approaches midnight on the evening of 31 December 
is a way how to domesticate (localize) its Russian-origin content aimed at pan-Baltic 
audiences in the same way as running its national news service along provision of the 
Russian news agenda. It is this mixture of national and transnational broadcasting what 
makes Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal so successful in addressing multi-local (transnational) 
identities of its Russian-speaking viewers, namely their simultaneous, and not necessarily 
conflicting, affiliations to Latvia and Russia. 
This amalgamation of public and commercial, and also national and transnational, 
broadcasting during the New Year’s Eve celebrations makes further confusion for 
publics of the public broadcaster LTV in distinguishing it from its national, and also 
transnational, commercial rivals, something I have already discussed in Chapter 4. What 
is more important in the context of the focus of this chapter is that the blending of 
public and commercial, and also national and transnational, broadcasting also 
demonstrates that part-taking in those moments of the national life celebrating national 
togetherness is not necessarily linked with the public broadcasting institutions and that 
the national, and even localized transnational, commercial broadcasters can also provide 




























Chapter 7  
Popular Culture Bringing the Nation Together: the Case of 
Live Sports Broadcasts and the Eurovision Song Contest  
7.1 Introduction 
What today brings the nation together around the public broadcaster LTV are products 
of popular culture such as regular live sports broadcasts and the annual Eurovision Song 
Contest. It is one of those rare moments when young and old audiences, as well as 
Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking viewers search for the offerings of the public 
television, and it is only during these moments when LTV truly succeeds in its official 
mission of national integration. Contrary to the news and politics on LTV dividing the 
nation along ethno-linguistic lines, it is what audiences seem to qualify as politically 
neutral popular culture on LTV that is more successful in addressing its publics of both 
ethno-linguistic communities. It is also a time for the expression of national sentiments 
and manifestation of one’s allegiance to the nation. 
Popular cultural forms on the public television not only facilitate the meeting of different 
audiences over a common space and thus make the national ‘we’ around the public 
broadcaster LTV possible, however momentary and precarious this might be, but for 
otherwise non-loyal publics of LTV, namely the ethno-linguistic minority viewers and 
young audiences, it is also the only regular experience they have with the public 
television. Especially sports programming on the second channel of LTV is something 
these publics find relevant and would miss if LTV ceased to exist, and because of its 
sports broadcasts also would be ready to pay the licence fee for this channel, if such 
introduced. This is also the reason why some of my respondents qualified LTV7, the 
second channel of LTV, as a public broadcaster contrary to LTV1, its main channel, 
making associations with the distrusted political elite.   
7.2 Mass Ceremony of Watching Ice Hockey  
Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, the young and the old, all enjoy watching live 
televised broadcasts of ice hockey games when the national team takes part. Through 
simultaneous consumption of the same ice hockey game by large national audiences 





ceremony of watching ice hockey is made, to use vocabulary of Anderson (2006). When 
hockey is on air, in many families it is a time when all members of the family come 
together, all generations enjoy watching it. It is also a time when the manifestation of 
national sentiments or ‘flag-waving’, to speak in the words of Billig (1995) describing that 
form of nationalism that is reproduced daily on newspapers sports pages, is at its peak. It 
is one of those rare moments when a feeling of national ‘we-ness’ or, as Scannell and 
Cardiff (1991) have put it, ‘we-feeling’ is produced around the public television. These 
hockey broadcasts appear to be a very democratic form of national imagination as they 
allow each member of the national community to be part of the national family and 
through their support for the national ice hockey team to express their feelings of 
national loyalty. 
As the regular audience statistics show, during the 2011/2012 season when the study 
took place live broadcasts on LTV7 of Russia’s Kontinental Hockey League tournaments 
where the Latvian team Dinamo Riga was participating were among the most watched 
programmes in the country, and though the majority of viewers of these broadcasts were 
ethnic Latvians, it had also attracted considerable ethnic minority audiences. Already 
after the completion of the fieldwork starting from the 2012/2013 season Kontinental 
Hockey League games have moved from LTV7 to a number of pay-TV channels owned 
by the Swedish media group MTG. The news that MTG company has won the 
broadcasting rights to show the Kontinental Hockey League matches till 2015 sparked a 
public row as many complained that their much-loved hockey broadcasts have moved 
from the free-to-air public broadcaster LTV to privately owned pay-TV channels. LTV7 
started broadcasting the Kontinental Hockey League games from 2008 when the league 
was set up. However, LTV7 still is home to the transmissions of other national and 
international big sporting events, including Olympic Games, that continue bringing large 
audiences to LTV7, including non-loyal publics of the public television. 
It is sports broadcasts on LTV7 that bring to the public broadcaster also young people 
who otherwise have little interest and sporadic experience with the public television, and 
its main channel LTV1 particularly. It is the way how these publics of LTV re-enter the 
public broadcaster. Besides, many of them say that sports offerings of LTV7 are the only 
reason why they would miss the public television, if it ceased to exist, and the only reason 
why they would be ready to pay the licence fee for it, if introduced. Apart from sports 





oriented to old people.86 
The last time 24-year-old Latvian-speaking student Toms (FG1) watched the public 
television was the recent transmission of the Kontinental Hockey League game with 
Dinamo Riga playing on LTV7, and it is live sports broadcasts on its second channel he 
would miss the most, if LTV stopped its operations. ‘There would be no hockey 
anymore,’ he said. It is sports programming on its second channel that constitutes also 
19-year-old Latvian-speaking student Rūta’s (PFG2) regular experience with the public 
broadcaster. Live hockey transmissions with the participation of Dinamo Riga on LTV7 
are among her favourite programmes on television, and it is something that she would 
miss, if LTV disappeared, and it is also something she would be ready to pay for: 
I would pay for LTV7 because I watch there hockey, basketball... But for 
LTV1 – no, I would not pay for it. I don’t watch it at all. Well, maybe 
once a year I watch the Eurovision [Song Contest] there. 
Also 31-year-old Latvian-speaking civil servant Agita (FG9) enjoys watching televised 
hockey matches, though only as long as the national team does well. If the national team 
fails, she loses her interest in hockey and, therefore, also in hockey broadcasts. So, her 
attachment to the national ice hockey team goes as long as it succeeds. If Dinamo Riga 
fails, her national sentiments are over and also loyalty to LTV7 lost. It is the success or 
the failure of hockey players of the national team that also determines whether she will 
stay with the second channel of the public television or exit it. ‘If it goes well, then we 
follow it. If it doesn’t go well, then we switch away [to another channel],’ she explained 
traditions of hockey watching on television in her family. 
While a large part of Latvian-speaking viewers, and older generations in particular, along 
with sports broadcasts on LTV7 also has some more or less regular experience with 
LTV1, for the majority of Russian-speaking viewers sports programming on LTV7 are 
the only regular experience they have with public television overall. Many of my Russian-
speaking respondents struggled to remember the last time when they were among the 
LTV1 audiences. It is most often only live sports broadcasts on LTV7 that makes them 
                         
86 Those young Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers born in the early 1990s have grown up in the era of 
booming commercial broadcasting and deteriorating public broadcasting with their families spending less 
and less time with the public television LTV (if at all they have ever had regular experience with it in the 
case of many Russian-speaking families) and embracing more and more its commercial competitors, be 
they national or transnational Russian, and therefore little interest in LTV among younger generations of 





part of the national ‘we’ as conjured up by the public broadcaster LTV.  
‘The first channel [LTV1] – I don’t watch at all, but the second one [LTV7], it is hockey, 
sports,’ said Vadim, a 37-year-old Russian-speaker working at the travel agency (FG4), 
and the experience he has with the public television is typical to many Russian-speaking 
viewers and, to be true, also for some Latvian-speakers. While 46-year-old Latvian-
speaking blue-collar worker Pēteris (FG10) is a rather occasional viewer of LTV1, he has 
more regular experience with sports broadcasts on the second channel of LTV. This is 
how he described both channels of LTV: ‘The first one [LTV1] – indifferent, the seventh 
[LTV7] – there I watch hockey’. 
For 23-year-old Russian-speaking businessman Anton (FG7) LTV qualifies as a public 
broadcaster only ‘two times a week’ when LTV7 provides transmissions of the 
Kontinental Hockey League games. Otherwise, he has little interest in public television, 
and especially in its main channel LTV1. It is only during those moments when televised 
hockey matches are on air that he finds offerings of the public broadcaster relevant. 
There are moments when he, an otherwise typical non-loyal viewer of LTV, re-connects 
with the public broadcaster. 
Although Anton ironically argued that the ice hockey transmissions on LTV7 are ‘part of 
the patriotic education’ led by the government, it is something he enjoys watching on the 
public television. It is this ambivalence that best describes his attitudes towards the 
hockey broadcasts on LTV. He likes watching hockey on television but does not like 
LTV much. On one hand, he is suspicious that it is the government that has invented 
this tradition through LTV, what in his eyes is a state broadcaster controlled by the 
government, to impose the society patriotic feelings. On the other hand, he is happy to 
take part in this project, even if he sees it as an imposed inculcation of patriotism. 
Anton’s experience with the consumption of popular culture on the public television is 
also a good case in point of not always straightforward character of public broadcasting 
as the ‘bringing-the-nation-together’ project. As Morley has pointed out, while public 
broadcasters can bring the nation together, this process is not necessarily ‘smooth and 
without tension or resistance’ (2000:107). Through the national mass ritual of watching 
live televised hockey matches ‘a sense of a shared world is imagined’, though it is not 
necessarily ‘a harmonious unity’, to quote Billig (1992:171), that is imagined. The 





members of the viewing public are ready to accept dominant readings of national 
integration of these hockey broadcasts. Instead, rather complex, and for some viewers 
also possibly quite painful, processes of negotiation of the meaning of these broadcasts 
are in place. This is not to say that what we have to deal with here is nothing more than 
just a pseudo unity of hockey audiences but just to remind that the experience of 
togetherness of mass audiences simultaneously watching the same live hockey broadcast 
does not automatically remove any possible diverse, and even oppositional, readings of 
the same event, to borrow terminology of Hall’s encoding-decoding model (Hall, 1980). 
7.2.1 Time to Show National Sentiments  
As in many other families also in the family of 39-year-old unemployed Latvian-speaking 
man Edmunds (F4), living in a provincial town in northern Latvia, ice hockey broadcasts 
are one of those rare moments when all members of the family come together to watch 
television. It is his wife, 39-year-old head of the non-governmental organization Laima, 
their three children, as well as the older generation of the family, parents of Edmunds – 
66-year-old retired music teacher Bruno and 67-year-old retired telephone operator 
Ligita, who are all interested in hockey transmissions on television. ‘All are shouting 
then,’ Ligita described an atmosphere at home during the hockey broadcasts when they 
all are actively supporting Latvian hockey players. 
It is regular transmissions of the Kontinental Hockey League games with Dinamo Riga 
playing on the public channel LTV7, as well as annual broadcasts of the Ice Hockey 
World Championships with the Latvian national team taking part on the commercial 
channel TV3 they all enjoy watching. So, it is not so much the public LTV7 or the 
commercial TV3 they are searching for, it is hockey broadcasts as such they enjoy 
watching regardless of the channel offering them. In other words, it is their support for 
the national hockey team and love of hockey standing above their allegiance to one or 
another broadcaster, be it a public service or commercial channel. 
Every spring during the world championships the family has a tradition to set up a tent 
in the garden of their private house and take a TV set out. Then they prepare snacks and 
drinks, as well as invite their friends, neighbours, classmates of their children and Laima’s 
colleagues at work to come and watch hockey all together making it a special event. It is 
also through their passion for hockey and enthusiastic support for the national hockey 





on air Edmunds’ family go to great lengths to look just like hockey fans on television – 
like those fans who are present at the arena they also have special shirts, trumpets, the 
flag of Latvia and the flag’s colours also painted on their faces. 
These hockey broadcasts not only bring Edmunds’ family together, they also bring 
together his family with others watching the same game turning them all into the national 
‘we’ of hockey audiences and making a feeling of national ‘we-ness’ around the television 
possible. Edmunds’ family knows that along them there are thousands of other hockey 
fans watching the same game and supporting the same national hockey team, be they 
part of the spectators at the arena or those many more following the game at home in 
front of their television screens. 
It is only Bruno and Ligita, the older generation of the family, who are among regular 
viewers of LTV1. While Laima has some, albeit little, interest in LTV1 and is among its 
audiences sporadically, her husband Edmunds and 20-year-old son Mārcis have almost 
no interest in the main channel of LTV (it is only special broadcasts during the national 
celebrations such as the annual live transmission of the army parade on November 18, 
Latvia’s Independence Day, when they search for LTV1) and it is only hockey and other 
sports transmissions on the second channel of LTV that provide them with their regular 
experience of public television. During one of our conversations 20-year-old Mārcis even 
claimed that he does not know what the offerings of LTV1 are. For the majority of the 
family members commercial broadcasting plays the central role in their everyday viewing 
practices. 
In contrast to the first channel of LTV, because of its sports broadcasts LTV7 is of great 
value in the eyes of all family members. They all would miss LTV7 more than LTV1, if 
LTV ceased to exist, and only because of sports offerings of LTV7 they would also be 
ready to pay the licence fee for the public television. As Ligita argued, it is possible to 
substitute LTV1 with one of the national commercial channels (Ligita provided an 
example saying that they could do without Panorāma (Panorama), the evening news on 
LTV1, as similar news programmes are also provided by the national commercial 
broadcasters), while LTV7 provides sports programmes that other channels do not offer 
(As Mārcis explained, even if broadcasts of some key international sporting events are 
also available on cable and satellite channels such as Eurosport, they still prefer watching 
them on LTV7 because of its commentary focusing on Latvian athletes), and, therefore, 





public broadcaster. ‘If LTV ceased to exist, it would not be a tragedy for me, the only 
thing is hockey,’ said Edmunds. It is the absence of ‘a ready alternative’ (Hirschman, 
1970) to LTV7’s sports broadcasts that makes the majority of the family members, non-
loyalists of LTV, to stay with the public television and not to leave it completely.        
7.2.2 The Hockey Channel   
In the large family of 51-year-old Latvian-speaking dairy farmer Sarmīte (F3) almost all of 
them, including both of her grown-up children and their families, as well as 80-year-old 
Zigurds, father of Sarmīte, are great fans of the Latvian ice hockey team and enjoy 
watching hockey broadcasts on television. The family of 10 people are all living together 
in the countryside in the western part of Latvia, and when hockey transmissions are on 
air it is not only one of those rare moments when almost all their numerous TV sets are 
switched on the same channel (their farmstead has two dwelling houses), but for many 
family members it is also one of the rare experiences they have with the public 
broadcaster LTV.  
Along the annual broadcasts of the Ice Hockey World Championships on the 
commercial TV3 it is regular transmissions of the Kontinental Hockey League games on 
the public LTV7 they like to watch, and even 4-year-old Elīza, granddaughter of Sarmīte, 
knows that ‘hockey’ is a keyword distinguishing a button on the remote control for 
LTV7 from other channels. It is the hockey channel how Elīza recognizes LTV7.  
As in their everyday viewing routines the majority of the family members are not keen 
viewers of LTV1 (having high interest in the main channel of the public broadcaster only 
in some special occasions such as when its festive programming is on air during the 
national celebrations, plus it is also the annual Eurovision Song Contest they usually watch 
on LTV1), it is regular hockey broadcasts on the second channel of LTV that sustain 
their contact with the public television in the periods between above mentioned special 
events. Because of its sports broadcasts they would miss LTV7 more than LTV1, if LTV 
ceased to exist, and for the same reason would be more ready to pay the licence fee for 
LTV7 and less for LTV1. The commercial TV3 is their favourite channel with the 
exception of the older generation, Sarmīte’s 78-year-old mother Lidija and 80-year-old 
father Zigurds, who are the only loyal publics of LTV1 in their large family. 





interested in fishing and hunting programmes on LTV7, Sarmīte is a passionate ice 
hockey fan and also a devoted viewer of hockey transmissions on television. When 
hockey broadcasts are on air, she drops all her everyday chores and becomes as stuck to a 
television set, and it is also a time when all the other offerings of their favourite 
commercial channels become insignificant. Then Tālis who usually is in charge of a 
remote control of their TV set steps aside to allow his wife to be in the power positions. 
It was early January, 2012. Thursday night. One of my visits in the family had just started. 
‘Why is the seventh [channel] [LTV7] not switched on,’ Sarmīte asked entering the room 
of her daughter Marta, a 30-year-old manager of debtors, and she straightaway switched 
channels to see LTV7. It was 7.25 pm, 5 minutes before a start of the game of Dinamo 
Riga playing at home with Moscow’s Spartak. The live broadcast from the Arena Riga on 
LTV7 has just begun, and the Russian national anthem was followed by the Latvian one 
at that moment with the flags of both countries appearing on the screen accordingly, the 
usual procedure of anthem singing and flag waving repeated before every game. Sarmīte 
spent all evening attentively watching the almost three hour long hockey transmission on 
the second channel of LTV; she even went closer to the television screen not to miss 
important moments of the game. That evening Dinamo Riga was defeated 2-1 by Spartak. 
Sarmīte is very well informed about the latest hockey news. ‘Soon qualification games 
will start,’ she said during one of our conversations few weeks before a start of the 
Ice Hockey World Championships that year taking place in Finland and Sweden. Sarmīte 
has even gone to the capital Riga to watch her favourite Dinamo Riga team playing at the 
arena and to get direct experience instead of the usual televised one. ‘It was worth going,’ 
Sarmīte said having recently attended the Kontinental Hockey League All-Star game at 
the Arena Riga. Tickets to the All-Star game were Christmas gift Sarmīte received that 
year. It is also other big sporting occasions such as the Olympics and the European 
Football Championships Sarmīte enjoys watching on LTV7.  
7.2.3 Latvia as First Priority  
In the same manner as celebrating the arrival of New Year twice, first in line with 
Moscow time and then few hours later according to the local Latvian time (see Chapter 
6), and following both the Russian and national news and watching both Vremya (Time) 
from Moscow and its national version Latviiskoe Vremya (Latvia’s Time) (see Chapter 5) 





compete against each other Russian-speakers may be engaged in the process of 
negotiating their transnational affiliations. 
Many of my Russian-speaking informants argued that they are patriots of Latvia and 
spoke about the national ice hockey team of Latvia as ‘our team’ in the same way as they 
talked about ‘our Latvia’ in contrast with ‘they’ and ‘there’ when discussing Russia. Yet, it 
does not necessarily rule out their interest in and support for Russian athletes.87 While 
otherwise their sense of belonging to Latvia can coexist comfortably with their, if not 
civic then cultural, attachment to Russia, during those sporting competitions such as 
hockey tournaments with Latvian and Russian sportsmen competing against each other 
their transnational identities may also force Russian-speakers to make decisions over 
their priorities of which sportsmen, Latvian or/and Russian, to support. In other words, 
it may force them to arrange their multiple national allegiances in some order of priority. 
For 37-year-old Russian-speaker Andrei, who is a football coach at the local school and a 
great football fan, it is Latvian sportsmen his first priority with Russians coming as the 
second one after Latvians he supports. If Latvian and Russian sportsmen compete, it will 
be Latvians whom he will support. ‘Of course, Latvia comes first,’ he claimed. After 
Latvians and Russians it is sportsmen from all the other former Soviet republics his 
support usually goes to. In the list of his favourite athletes and sports teams are well-
known both Latvian and Russian names. Along Russian football club Zenit from St 
Petersburg, Moscow based CSKA basketball team and Russian javelin thrower Mariya 
Abakumova it is also Latvians, skeleton slider Martins Dukurs and long-distance runner 
Elena Prokopchuk, included in the list. 
7.2.4 ‘Our’ Team 
In the family of Igor, a 57-year-old unemployed Russian-speaking non-citizen of Latvia 
(F1), he is the most devoted viewer of the ice hockey transmissions on LTV7. When 
hockey broadcasts are on air, he even skips his favourite news programme Vremya and its 
national version Latviiskoe Vremya on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal. Igor is a great fan of Dinamo 
Riga team, and hockey provides a way for him to explicitly display his national loyalty and 
patriotic feelings towards Latvia. It goes without saying that Dinamo Riga is my favourite 
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team from those playing in the Kontinental Hockey League, he stressed and added: ‘It is 
our team’. During one of my visits the day after the latest Dinamo Riga game when the 
Latvian team playing at home was beaten 4-1 by Russian Torpedo from Nizhnii 
Novgorod, Igor complained about the poor Dinamo Riga performance: ‘I was almost 
crying’.  
In the Kontinental Hockey League, teams mostly from Russia participate with a few 
more from other ex-Communist Central and Eastern European countries taking part, 
and Latvian Dinamo Riga club, as many others in the league, is named after the popular 
Soviet era Latvian national hockey team, and for this reason its critics say that the 
Kontinental Hockey League, like the Novaya volna (New Wave) festival I have discussed in 
Chapter 6, is just another Russia’s soft power project aimed at the reanimation of its 
former imperial power in the region. At the same time, Dinamo Riga has turned out to be 
one of the most successful national integration projects over the last more than 20 years 
since the restoration of independent Latvia uniting Latvian-speakers and Russian-
speakers in their shared support for the national hockey team with Russian-speaking 
hockey players playing in it along Latvian-speakers. As journalists once have put it, 
Dinamo Riga creates a common ground between both ethno-linguistic groups (TV3, 
2012). 
It was around 7 pm on Friday night of late January, 2012 when I was half way in my 
fieldwork visit with the family. The evening news bulletin in Russian had just finished on 
LTV7 and me and Igor were watching the Legends Game of the Kontinental Hockey 
League on the same channel broadcast live from the Arena Riga when the Latvian and 
Russian Soviet era hockey legends, captained by Helmuts Balderis and Vyacheslav 
Fetisov, met on the rink. ‘Our Helmuts Balderis against Vyacheslav Fetisov. Legendary 
team of Latvia against the most famous hockey players of Russia,’ was the promo of the 
game broadcasted on LTV7 earlier the same evening. ‘They both [Balderis and Fetisov] 
once played in the USSR team. Now it is the national team of Latvia and the national 
team of Russia,’ Igor explained to me. During the Soviet era, Balderis for many years 
played in the Dinamo Riga team while Fetisov in the CSKA Moscow, both teams with the 
same names also playing in today’s Kontinental Hockey League, and both, Balderis and 
Fetisov, were also part of the national team of the Soviet Union. When hockey players 
from both teams, Latvian and Russian, in a friendly manner shook hands, Igor asked 





sportsmen of both countries. 
That evening Russian hockey veterans beat Latvian hockey legends 11-7. It is televised 
hockey matches such as this that make Igor negotiate his feelings of belonging towards 
Latvia and Russia. It is the nature of the game itself that forces drawing of lines of 
demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and positioning of oneself on one or another side. 
Albeit Russia is his fatherland and Igor is a non-citizen of Latvia, for him it was ‘our’ 
Latvian team playing against ‘Russians’, and we can look at it as a claim of him being a 
part of the national ‘we’ of Latvia. It is watching live hockey broadcasts on public 
television that provides him with a voice to manifest his national loyalty to Latvia. It is a 
combination of nostalgic (Soviet) pleasures and national sentiments what makes watching 
hockey broadcasts with Dinamo Riga playing for Igor so enjoyable. 
It is primarily sports broadcasts on the second channel of LTV that provide an 
opportunity to have regular experience with the public broadcaster also for other 
members of Igor’s family. As many other Russian-speakers, they have little interest in its 
main channel LTV1. While Igor’s wife, 55-year old hospital administrator Anna, has at 
least some, albeit rather sporadic, experience with LTV1, Igor, as well as their daughter, 
27-year-old shop-assistant Marina, have almost completely exited from this channel, and 
the only experience they have with LTV1 throughout the year is just the live broadcast of 
the annual Eurovision Song Contest.  
As Igor enjoys fishing, it is also Latvian-language fishing programmes he likes watching 
on LTV7, and even his poor knowledge of Latvian is no an obstacle for him to watch 
them. It is easy to understand as the language of the fishing programmes, contrary to the 
news language, is not complex: ‘There is nothing to understand, all is clear. For all 
fishermen the language is the same’. Programmes for the fishermen on LTV7 are more 
democratic, and hence more accessible for the ethno-linguistic minority audiences, than 
those of the news and current affairs on LTV1 as not only their language is easier to 
understand but also because they deal with life outside the political realm. There is no 
place for ethno-linguistic divisions when it comes to fishing.  
7.3 Watching the Eurovision Song Contest 
The annual Eurovision Song Contest on LTV1, back in the mid 1950s created by Western 





example of generating mass audiences for the Latvian public television and bringing the 
nation together around it. Although over the past few years the Latvian entry has failed 
to qualify for the all-European grand final, the annual singing competition of European 
nations has preserved its status as one of the most watched programmes of the year in 
the country. Over the years since the late 1990s when LTV for the first time broadcast 
the contest and Latvia first entered it a few years later, in 2000, and won the competition 
already in its third year of participation, the Eurovision Song Contest has become an integral 
part of an image of the public television in the eyes of its publics. As hockey broadcasts 
on its second channel it is also the Eurovision Song Contest on LTV1 bringing families 
together around the public television. 
Along with her husband, 80-year-old retired Zigurds, 78-year-old retired Latvian-speaker 
Lidija (F3) is the only devoted viewer of LTV1 in her family. Others have little interest in 
LTV1, and, instead, prefer watching the commercial TV3. During my visits in the family 
it was a typical situation of Marta, 30-year-old granddaughter of Lidija with her family 
living next door to Lidija’s room, watching their much-loved TV3 while Lidija was next 
door alone watching her favourite LTV1. Marta’s 4-year-old daughter Elīza run back 
from Lidija’s room from time to time to inform us what her great-grandmother was at 
that same moment watching on LTV1. ‘Eņģeļu māja (House of Angels) starts,’ during one of 
my visits she notified us returning from Lidija’s room. It was 8 pm on a usual weekday 
evening when the latest episode of the national soap opera Eņģeļu māja started on LTV1 
while at the same time in Marta’s room others were watching the evening news on TV3. 
The Eurovision Song Contest is one of those few moments throughout the year when both 
30-year-old Marta and 78-year-old Lidija are watching LTV1. During the study it was that 
year’s national final of the Eurovision Song Contest when LTV1 was switched on in both 
rooms. It was the Eurovision Song Contest that brought all generations of the family 
together around the main channel of the public broadcaster. 
Live broadcasts of the Eurovision Song Contest, national final followed by all-European 
final, for many non-loyal publics of LTV1, namely Russian-speakers and young people, 
serves as a point of re-entry to the main channel of the public broadcaster, even if this 
coming back to LTV1 happens only once a year and lasts only for few hours. For them it 
is the Eurovision Song Contest on LTV1 and sports broadcasts on LTV7 or, in the words of 
22-year-old Russian-speaking student Arina (FG2), keen viewer of the Eurovision Song 





from time to time entering back the public television. It is something they find relevant 
from the offerings of LTV, and, as in the case of sports programming on LTV7, also to 
the Eurovision Song Contest on LTV1 in the eyes of its audiences there is no ‘ready 
alternative’ (Hirschman, 1970) on either the national or transnational rivals of LTV.  
It is only because of the annual Eurovision Song Contest transmissions on LTV1 and 
Olympic broadcasts once in two years on LTV7 25-year-old Russian-speaking 
municipality officer Elizaveta (FG7) knows which buttons on her remote control are for 
both channels of the public broadcaster. Many of my Russian-speaking respondents said 
that LTV1 and LTV7 are not the first ones on their remote control, some even did not 
know where to find both channels of LTV on their remote control, signaling of the 
minor role the public television plays in their daily lives. ‘TV1 [LTV1] and TV7 [LTV7] 
are those channels where I can watch Olympics and the Eurovision [Song Contest]’, 
something that ‘for instance, on Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal I will not see,’ Elizaveta explained.88 
It is also special programming during the national celebrations such as the annual live 
broadcast of the military parade on November 18, National Day of Latvia, and the 
televised New Year’s Eve address to the nation of the Latvian president and prime 
minister that brings Elizaveta, as well as other members of her family, to the public 
television. Otherwise, she has no regular everyday experience with both public channels. 
It is only big media events such as the Eurovision Song Contest and Olympics, as well as 
special festive programming during the moments of national celebrations that make her 
experience with the public broadcaster. ‘Three times or twice a year I watch the first 
channel [LTV1], it is the [military] parade, [president’s and prime minister’s] greetings… 
and the Eurovision [Song Contest],’ she described her experience with LTV1. 
As the audience ratings show it, the all-European final of the Eurovision Song Contest 
gathers significantly larger Russian-speaking audiences than the national final bringing to 
the main channel of the public television untypically to LTV1 high number of viewers of 
the ethno-liguistic minority. The popularity of the Eurovision Song Contest among Russian-
speaking audiences most vividly manifests in the high support televoters in Latvia, as in 
other ex-Soviet countries, from year to year show for the Russian entrant to the contest. 
                         
88 While Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is not covering the Eurovision Song Contest, it is available on another Russian 
state broadcaster Rossiya (Russia) but only for those viewers who have access to its national version via 
satellite television. The international version of the Rossiya channel what usually providers of cable and 
satellite television offer to its customers in Latvia does not cover the Eurovision Song Contest. So, for the 





As a rule, it is Russia along Latvia’s Baltic neighbours of Estonia and Lithuania receiving 
the most points from Latvia. It is most likely a signal of strong cultural attachment to 
Russia many Russian-speaking viewers feel, and yet this should not serve as evidence of 
their national disloyalty. As it is not allowed to vote for the song representing your own 
nation, it is Russia Russian-speakers, and no doubt a significant number of Latvian-
speakers as well, most likely choose to vote for, albeit this does not rule out their support 
for the national entry in the competition. For instance, 39-year-old Russian-speaking 
school teacher Diana (F5) along her favourite ones, the participants she likes that year 
the most, it is also Latvian performers she usually supports in the Eurovision Song Contest. 
You always hope that Latvia will have good results, she explained. 
7.4 Rejoining National Broadcasting 
As already prior to the 2010 digital switchover the family of 68-year-old retired Russian-
speaking school teacher Nadezhda (F5) had little regular experience with national 
broadcasting – it was primarily the commercial LNT and because of its sports broadcasts 
also the public LTV7 they watched from the national channels, albeit still not as often as 
their favourite Russian channels; now when they have a satellite dish with a long list of 
foreign channels available with plenty of Russian channels among them and no access to 
any of the national broadcasters (for detailed account on their decision to withdraw from 
national broadcasting see Chapter 5) there are only few moments throughout the year 
when they miss national broadcasters and wish to opt in national broadcasting again.  
While transnational satellite television offers a large number of foreign channels to 
choose from, including a plethora of Russian channels they like so much, it is national 
broadcasting better at allowing them to recognize themselves as members of the national 
community of Latvia, something that transnational television from Russia struggles to 
provide. As we shall see, in order to take a part in the life of the nation, Nadezhda’s 
family applies a number of creative strategies of rejoining national broadcasting.  
It was the Eurovision Song Contest and special programming during the moments of 
national celebrations that they had used to watch on LTV1 and otherwise had minimal 
experience with the main channel of the public broadcaster. Now having no access to the 
national channels they have to search for alternatives to replace the gap of national 
broadcasting. This year they skipped the national final of the Eurovision Song Contest but 





channel Rossiya (Russia), available in Latvia via satellite. When it comes to the special 
broadcasts during the national celebrations, instead of the usual New Year’s clock 
counting down the final seconds of the year on LTV1 this year on the evening of 31 
December not to miss the clock striking midnight in Latvia they checked time on their 
computer, while, for instance, the annual firework display on November 18 when the 
proclamation of Latvia’s independence in 1918 is celebrated this year they found on one 
of the internet sites. They also searched the internet for the president’s Independence 
Day’s message but for some reason were unable to find it. 
Prior to the digital switchover from both channels of the public television they watched 
more its second channel LTV7 mainly because of Nadezhda’s 37-year-old son-in-law 
Andrei who enjoyed watching its sports broadcasts. Today the great variety of satellite 
sports channels they have, as well as a numerous internet sites providing live streaming 
of big sporting events, have offered an alternative to Andrei’s favourite sports broadcasts 
that he had used to watch on LTV7. 
During one of my visits while I was chatting with other members of the family in the 
kitchen Andrei, a football coach at the local school and a great football fan, was sitting 
alone in the living room in darkness in front of the computer attentively following the 
Champions League match between CSKA Moscow and Real Madrid streamed live from the 
Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow on one of the internet sites. Later the same evening he 
watched live online broadcast of the Eurocup game between the Czech Nymburk and the 
Latvian VEF Riga transmitted from Nymburk city, the Czech Republic. While Andrei 
was watching this basketball match online on one of his favourite sports websites, it was 
also simultaneously broadcasted on LTV7, access to which they do not have anymore. 
You can find all on the internet, he argued and demonstrated to me some of the internet 
addresses he uses to watch live sports broadcasts online. Even having no access to any of 
the national broadcasters, Andrei has not lost his interest in the national sports. Through 
the internet and transnational satellite broadcasting, which now serve him as a substitute 
for the second channel of LTV, he has find ways how to participate in the sports life of 
the nation. Recently, for instance, on the Italian Rai Sport channel he followed skeleton 
tournament with Latvian brothers Martins Dukurs and Tomass Dukurs taking part. 
It was also the annual broadcasts of the Novaya volna (New Wave) festival they valued from 
the offerings of national broadcasting. Along the national commercial channel LNT and 





broadcaster Rossiya – providing transmissions of the Novaya volna contest, however, very 
late at night. The last time they watched the festival on the internet, but they are not sure 
whether it still will be available online also next year. Maybe we will need to go to our 
neighbours and join them watching the Novaya volna, they said. This appears to be 
another of their strategies of re-entering national broadcasting. 
It was already in the summer of 2010, shortly after the digital switchover, when they went 
to their Latvian-speaking neighbours having access to the national channels to watch 
LTV1 broadcasting live the 10th Latvian Youth Song and Dance Festival events from 
the capital city of Riga where Aleksandra, 10-year-old Nadezhda’s granddaughter, also 
participated as part of her school’s folk dance group. Their desire to see their child taking 
part in the nationally televised festival made the family again part of the LTV1 audiences, 
even if their return to the public television was short-lived. They remembered watching 
the dance gala concert on LTV1 eager to spot Aleksandra’s dance group among the 
thousands of other schoolchildren who from all corners of the country have gathered in 
the Daugava Stadium in Riga to engage in a mass dance performance. 
In the eyes of Latvian-speakers the Song and Dance Festival is one of the key elements 
in the construction of national consciousness and unity, something many Russian-
speakers do not see as part of their cultural space, as already discussed in Chapter 4, and 
it was because of little Aleksandra and her interest in traditional Latvian folk dancing her 
family got that experience of not only being part of the national ‘we’ as made by the 
public broadcaster LTV but also being part of the celebrations of traditional culture of 
the Latvian-speaking majority. 
7.5 Singing Families  
Because the Puncuļi family participating in the show was coming from a nearby city in 
the eastern region of Latgale, Nadezhda with her granddaughter Aleksandra went 
watching at their neighbours the final episode of the talent show Dziedošās ģimenes (Singing 
Families) in its third season on one of the Sunday nights of early December 2011 on the 
national commercial channel LNT. Out of 12 families taking part in the singing 
competition it was the Puncuļi family of three generations that was named that year’s 
winners. It was their city, as well as the Latgale region they represented in the contest, the 
region being well represented in all seasons of the show. In order to support their 





voted even for several times to help their favourite Puncuļi family win. It was one of 
those rare cases when they did so. The show was so popular that the victory of Puncuļi 
family next day after the final became a talking point at the local school where Diana and 
Andrei work and their daughter Aleksandra studies; all were happy of their victory. The 
Liepiņi family, mother and her three daughters, from the northern region of Vidzeme 
came second. 
Dziedošās ģimenes has been one of the most popular shows in the country over the last few 
years and has become compulsory Sunday-night viewing for many having among its 
devoted viewers also some Russian-speakers. To quote 61-year-old Latvian-speaking 
head of the local culture house Rasma (FG10), Dziedošās ģimenes ‘comes on Sundays as 
something special’. ‘I like the unity of the families, their musicality. It’s a nice 
atmosphere,’ her interest in the show explained 51-year-old Latvian-speaking dairy 
farmer Sarmīte (F3). 66-year-old retired Latvian-speaker Ausma (FG5) had even 
purchased tickets to become a member of the studio audience of the singing contest. 
‘Amateurs but they perform like professionals,’ she commented on the show. 
Although Puncuļi was a Latvian-speaking family, among their supporters were both 
Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, and especially those viewers as Nadezhda’s 
family themselves living in or coming from the Latgale region. It was their strong feelings 
of regional attachment that united members of both ethno-linguistic communities of 
Latgale in their support for Puncuļi family. Even Nadezhda’s family, keen viewers of 
talent shows on Russian television and great fans of Russian celebrities, became 
enthusiastic supporters of the Puncuļi family. It is because of regional closeness that the 
family of Nadezhda could easily identify with Puncuļi family. They come from a city only 
some 30 kilometres away from the village where Nadezhda’s family lives. The national 
talent show appealing to regional sentiments brought together the Puncuļi family with 
Nadezhda’s family and other families in Latgale region and elsewhere in the country 
symbolically turning them all into the national family of all those watching Dziedošās 
ģimenes, the contest of singing families. 
In the singing competition, talented families from all around Latvia took part, including 
some ethnic minority families (in the show Russian-speaking, as well as Roma families 
have participated singing in their own languages), and it was also other respondents, both 
Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers, who said they have supported contestants in the 





popular as the show reflected regional diversities in the country (for instance, families 
from the Latgale region singing folk songs in the Latgalian, regional dialect, dressed in 
traditional costumes) allowing its viewers easily to identify with the participants of the 
show and recognize themselves and their culture on national television. In this case 
subnational regional loyalties cross-cutting ethno-linguistic belongings have turned out to 
be playing a more prominent role than any over-arching national identifications. 
It was Latvian-speaking Uškāni family coming from the southeastern city Daugavpils, the 
second largest city in Latvia having vast majority of its population Russian-speakers89 and 
the city in the 2012 language referendum overwhelmingly supporting the proposal to 
make Russian the second official language in the country90, 25-year-old Russian-speaking 
municipality officer Elizaveta (FG7) supported in one of the previous seasons of 
Dziedošās ģimenes contest. Daugavpils is also her hometown. For the same reason she 
watched another local talent show Koru kari (Clash of the Choirs) on the national 
commercial channel TV3 where choirs, each representing its own city and led by a 
popular musician coming from the same city, competed. Among other contestants there 
was also a choir representing Daugavpils city. ‘You watch the shows if some of your own 
people take part. You support your own people and it is interesting for you to watch,’ 
she explained.  
While she otherwise has little interest in the national channels and her viewing 
preferences are more for Russian television, it is a prominent role of regional identity at 
work here explaining her interest in the local talent shows. It is because among those 
taking part in these singing contests were also people representing her city that made also 
her avid viewer of these shows and also passionate supporter of representatives of her 
city regardless of their ethno-linguistic identity. Some of my informants even argued that 
for them it is regional (or, as we shall see in the following extract, city-based) 
identification more important than any national one. Thus, 23-year-old Russian-speaking 
businessman Anton (FG7) preferred being identified with the city he is coming from 
instead of employing some all-embracing national identification: ‘I’m not a big patriot of 
Latvia… But I’m a patriot of my city, I love Daugavpils very much’. 
Among those watching Dziedošās ģimenes was also 27-year-old Latvian-speaking music 
                         
89 According to the data of 2011 population census, 88.9% of people living in Daugavpils reported Russian 
as their main language in the family. Source: The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia.  
90 85.18% voters in Daugavpils voted in favour of the proposal to make Russian the second state language 





teacher Ansis (FG9), and his motivation was the same as for 25-year-old Russian-speaker 
Elizaveta (FG7). ‘I personally know people who participated from our city’, he explained. 
While they come from the cities with highly different ethno-linguistic make-up, one 
where Latvian-speakers overwhelmingly dominate and another with Russian-speakers 
being in the vast majority, they both enjoyed watching Dziedošās ģimenes. It was their 
strong feelings of regional allegiance, support for ‘your own people’ from ‘our city’, 
standing above any national level ethno-linguistic divisions that made them both, 
Latvian-speaker Ansis and Russian-speaker Elizaveta, part of the national audiences of 
Dziedošās ģimenes contest. Celebrating regional particularities the popular talent show 
format on the national commercial channel has appeared to be successful in representing 
cultural diversity in the country and bringing audiences of the ethno-linguistic majority 
and minority together, though still the show, according to the audience statistics, was 
much more popular among Latvian-speakers than Russian-speakers. The public 
broadcaster LTV does not provide such talent show type programmes as Dziedošās 
ģimenes. 
7.6 Conclusion 
It is products of popular culture such as live televised ice hockey matches with the 
participation of much-loved national hockey team, or other big national and international 
sporting events, and the annual music competition Eurovision Song Contest, first national 
selection and later all-European final with the Latvian entrant competing with 
representatives of other nations, what bring its Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking 
publics together around the public broadcaster LTV.  
It is those moments when otherwise along ethno-linguistic and generational lines divided 
national audiences in Latvia come together. Young and old, Latvian-speakers and 
Russian-speakers all enjoy watching live broadcasts of big events of popular music and 
sports on LTV. It is these events of popular culture on the public television what most 
vividly provide its publics of both ethno-linguistic groups with that special ‘we-feeling’ 
(Scannell, Cardiff, 1991) of national togetherness. While the news and politics on LTV 
create cleavages in the national community, it is popular cultural forms perceived among 
audiences as politically neutral what make the national communion around the public 
broadcaster possible.   





generations of the family gather around the public television, and it is also both Latvian-
speakers and Russian-speakers united in their support for the national ice hockey team. 
The success of ‘our’ hockey players feeds their sense of national pride. Through this 
mass ceremonial of watching televised ice hockey matches national sentiments can be 
expressed. It is a time to make ones strong allegiance to Latvia explicit what seems to be 
of special importance for audiences of the ethno-linguistic minority often because of 
their supposedly peculiar viewing preferences, namely their attachment to transnational 
television from Russia, accused of disloyalty to the nation. 
For non-loyal publics of LTV, young people and Russian-speakers, regular sports 
broadcasts on the second channel of LTV, something for what there is no ‘ready 
alternative’ (Hirschman, 1970) on its national and transnational commercial competitors, 
are the only regular experience they have with the public broadcaster. Though having 
exited from LTV for much of their daily viewing experiences, they enter back the public 
television during those moments when they find its offerings relevant and, what is also 
important, not easily substitutable. It is sports broadcasts something they would miss 
from the offerings of LTV if it stopped its operations and it is also something they would 
be ready to pay the licence fee for, if such introduced. Besides, because of its sports 
programming they like so much some of my informants granted the status of a public 
broadcaster to the second channel of LTV disqualifying as such its main channel LTV1 













As in other new post-Communist nation-states also in Latvia the nation-building efforts 
following the fall of the Communist regime happened to coincide with the state-building 
project involving an array of reforms in different spheres of life, even if only on paper, 
including the broadcasting system change. It all has made setting up of public 
broadcasting in post-Communist societies no easy task. Apart from missing political and 
economic preconditions also socio-cultural context, equally essential prerequisite for 
strong public broadcasting systems to emerge, was absent in Central and Eastern 
European countries only just having said goodbye to long decades of Communist rule 
and tradition of state broadcasting. 
Modest audience figures of Central and Eastern European public broadcasters today in 
comparison with popular demand for their commercial rivals have made post-
Communist media scholars speak of deep crisis in the public broadcasters and their 
publics relationship in the former Communist block countries. Perhaps the most notable 
is the notion of Jakubowicz (2008a) proposing to think of public broadcasting in the 
societies across Central and Eastern Europe as lacking social embeddedness and public 
broadcasters in the region as not enjoying support from their publics. Though not using 
such terminology, what Jakubowicz seems to suggest is that there is that ‘special 
attachment’ what Hirschman (1970) calls ‘loyalty’ missing on the part of post-Communist 
publics towards both their public broadcasters and the public broadcasting idea more 
generally, something I have sought to explore further in this study with the help of 
Hirschman’s theory of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ (Hirschman, 1970). 
Through qualitative audience research the study has aimed to identify attitudes and 
actions Latvian-speaking majority and Russian-speaking minority publics have taken as a 
response to the Latvian public television LTV as a nation-building project. The primary 
interest of the research was to explore perceptions of the public broadcaster LTV, and 
understanding of the idea of public broadcasting more generally, members of both 
ethno-linguistic communities have, as well as to examine their experiences with the 
public television with a special interest in their quotidian domestic television viewing 
practices. The research has sought to identify the relationship between the way its publics 
conceptualize the public broadcaster LTV, and understand the concept of public 





8.1 Key Findings of the Study 
Building on the Hirschman’s theory the idea that television audiences make viewing 
choices that give them voice is the central premise of this study. It has been 
demonstrated throughout the research that audiences utilize the exit mechanism (leaving 
and ignoring the public broadcaster LTV) as a voice-type response (protesting). Despite 
the fact that their exit from LTV most often is private and silent – if there are any 
complaints and protests within official (institutional) contexts, they are negligible and it is 
mostly airing grievances in mundane what is at stake here, and yet it does not make the 
act of exiting less vocal. Through their exit from the public television its publics of both 
the ethno-linguistic majority and minority voice their protest, be it against the country’s 
political establishment or in the case of Russian-speaking viewers also against the 
hegemonic definition of the national ‘we’. In any case it is strong anti-establishment 
sentiments standing behind the dismissal of the public television. 
Both its Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking publics reject the public broadcaster to 
manifest their discontent with the country’s political elite. Though programme-makers of 
the public television would like to think of themselves as politically independent and 
taking a critical stance towards the government of the day, because of the complexity of 
reasons where the Soviet legacies are blended with the realities of today its publics still 
see the former Soviet era state broadcaster LTV as a governmental institution serving the 
interests of those in power, the view more widespread among the Russian-speaking 
minority. Seen as part of the political establishment, its publics abandon LTV to penalize 
the distrusted power elite. It is withdrawal from LTV that gives them voice to express 
their ire against the government. All their feelings of bitterness and resentment triggered 
by the failures that the building of the state and the nation has brought along over the 
last more than 20 years since the restoration of independent Latvia find their expression 
in the anger many feel against the power elite blamed for all the socio-economic miseries 
people have to face in their daily lives. Exit from what is perceived as a state television is 
a manifestation of these sentiments. 
Yet, their criticism of the country’s political leadership does not make them indifferent to 
the national politics. Though many, indeed, like to declare that they are not interested in 
the formal politics exercised by the political elite, it is rather an expression of their dislike 
towards the powerful than their apathy to the state of the national affairs. Their criticism 





country and not their indifference to it. Though many of my informants have exited 
from the national politics on the public television, they have found alternative ways to 
participate in the political life of the nation, namely through the consumption of daily 
news and weekly current affairs on the commercial channels which are if perhaps not 
absolutely free from then at least less contaminated with unpleasant associations with the 
distrusted power elite. 
Members of the ethno-linguistic minority ignore the public broadcaster LTV to articulate 
their disagreement with the definition of national membership as formulated by LTV and 
the image of the national family it has conjured up, an echo of the government’s ethno-
nationalistic discourse on the national imagination and national integration, something 
Latvian-speakers do not find problematic. In other words, for Russian-speakers LTV is 
not merely a part of the distrusted political establishment, it is also a symbol of the 
government’s hegemonic imaginary of the national ‘we’, and hence deep suspiciousness 
among its Russian-speaking publics towards LTV seen as a state channel expressing the 
official world-view of the Latvian-speaking majority. Many Russian-speakers feel 
marginalized within that version of the national collectivity as imagined by the 
government prioritizing the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority as a 
main raw material of the national identification defining what it means to be a Latvian 
and a loyal national. Therefore it should come as no surprise that Russian-speakers also 
do not feel at home with that form of sociability as offered by the public television, to 
speak in the words of Morley (2000), operating in line with the basic postulates of the 
government’s project of the national imagination and national integration. 
The exit from the public broadcaster LTV is a way its Russian-speaking publics can 
punish the government for what is seen by them as unfair treatment of the Russian-
speaking population over the last more than two decades since the regaining of 
independence. It is all their feelings of marginalization, subordination, othering and 
rejection accumulated over these years that have been fused into their dislike to the 
political establishment and to what is seen as its mouthpiece the public television LTV. It 
is the official government’s nation-building strategy imposing the language and culture of 
the ethno-linguistic majority as membership criteria in the national community and the 
cement of national integrity, as well as its citizenship policy having left around 1/7 of the 
population out from the citizenry granting them the official status of ‘non-citizens’ or 





the political parties winning the most votes of the Russophone electorate from the ruling 
coalition, and disqualification of their historical narrative of the country’s 20th century 
past that is at the heart of the deep resentment many Russian-speakers feel towards the 
power elite and also what is central to their rejection of the public television. 
Apart from being an act of resistance, ignoring the public broadcaster LTV is also a call 
of Russian-speakers for re-imagination of the national ‘we’ recognizing and respecting 
ethno-linguistic plurality in the country. To put it differently, viewing choices Russian-
speakers make, namely their preference for transnational Russian television, is a 
statement of their rights to be recognized and respected as equal members of the national 
community of Latvia and not a signal of their missing feelings of national affiliation to 
Latvia, as it has often been stressed in the discourse of the local political elite.  
What we can learn from the Latvian case is that disloyalty towards the institution of 
public broadcasting, its rejection, is not necessarily a manifestation of national disloyalty, 
as the Latvian nation-builders, political establishment, would like to interpret it. We have 
also seen that there is not one but several, and rival, definitions of what constitutes 
‘national loyalty’ at play. Though that conception of ‘national loyalty’ as formulated by 
the government which invites to measure ‘national loyalty’ in terms of ones attachment 
to public (national) broadcasting institutions and, accordingly, sees opting out of these 
institutions as opting out of the national community seems to be more or less shared by 
the Latvian-speaking majority, it is not accepted by the Russian-speaking minority, main 
rejecters of public (national) broadcasting organizations. They have their own definition 
of what it means to be a loyal national which allows exhibiting feelings of national 
allegiance also outside the institutions of public (national) broadcasting. To put it another 
way, Russian-speakers have chosen to be loyal nationals differently, namely within 
localized transnational Russian television. 
Though rejecting the public broadcasting institution LTV, its publics do not reject the 
idea of public service broadcasting and normative values they associate with this concept 
– it was typical for my informants to refer to such Western-style public broadcasting 
ideals as universality, diversity, pluralism, impartiality, political independence and non-
commercialism to define the notion of public broadcasting, and for many it is these 
ideals at the heart of their perceptions of what perfect television should be about. 
Likewise, while many of my informants, and Russian-speaking respondents in particular, 





others but not for them), they did not reject the idea of public broadcasting as a good for 
society as such. It is because they detach normative values of public broadcasting from 
the current country’s de jure institutional embodiment of public broadcasting. In other 
words, they do not see the public television LTV as the fulfilment of those ideals they 
attach to the notion of public broadcasting. As we have seen, many even do not employ 
the label ‘public television’ to talk about LTV. 
Many of my respondents see the commercial channels as being able to replace LTV – or, 
to use Hirschman’s conceptualization (1970), they see the commercial broadcasters and 
the public television as ‘close substitutes’, something that perhaps should not come as a 
surprise given that not only LTV copies its commercial rivals, but also the commercial 
channels mimic some of the strategies of the public broadcaster, namely those bringing 
commercial success, during both quotidian and sacred moments of the national 
communion, to speak in the words of Morley (2000). Consider, for instance, special 
programming during the days of national celebrations on the commercial channels, 
something for many years provided only the public television. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that audiences also consider commercial broadcasting 
as a substitute for the ideals of public broadcasting. In the eyes of audiences, neither the 
public television LTV, nor the commercial players in the market succeed in fully living up 
to the ideals they attach to the notion of public broadcasting, and this is also the reason 
why it is hard to judge to what extent their loyalty to the public broadcasting ideals my 
respondents referred to in their definitions of the public broadcasting concept is 
something more than just a declarative statement. Indeed, both the public television and 
its commercial rivals have limited success in meeting the normative ideals of public 
broadcasting in practice, and therefore also the analysis of viewing preferences audiences 
make, though may provide some clue, can offer only a partial answer to the question 
whether their loyalty to these ideals is not merely on paper. It all makes the task of 
measuring loyalty to the public broadcasting principles on the part of post-Communist 
audiences within a context of their day-to-day viewing practices especially complicated 
and difficult one with no promise for any straightforward answer. 
What we have to deal with in the Latvian case, and I would like to believe it is also the 
case with other post-Communist societies, is not so much the crisis of the public 
broadcasting idea as the crisis of public broadcasting institutions. As the Latvian case 





equated with rejection of the public broadcasting ideals. Though there may be ‘lack of a 
social constituency willing and able to support public service broadcasters and buttress its 
autonomy and independence’ in Central and Eastern European societies, as Jakubowicz 
has proposed (2008a:117), another of his conclusions of ‘lack of social embeddedness of 
the idea of public service broadcasting’ in these societies (2008a:117) in the light of 
evidence of my own empirical research should be treated with caution and needs some 
clarification. 
As this study suggests, missing a ‘special attachment’ to organizations of public 
broadcasting in post-Communist societies, as Hirschman (1970) defines the concept of 
‘loyalty’, should not be automatically equated with disloyalty to the public broadcasting 
ideals on the part of the publics of these organizations. To put it differently, absence of 
attachment to public broadcasting institutions should not necessarily mean that also 
loyalty towards the public broadcasting values is missing. These ideals may not yet be as 
deeply rooted in post-Communist societies as they are in ‘old’ Western European 
democracies, if that is what Jakubowicz had in mind when arguing of ‘lack of social 
embeddedness of the idea of public service broadcasting’ (2008a:117) in societies across 
Central and Eastern Europe, the argument he unfortunately does not elaborate any 
further in his numerous writings on post-Communist public broadcasting. Nevertheless, 
as we have seen from the responses of my informants, at least at a normative level the 
public broadcasting ideals are recognized, accepted and valued also by Central and 
Eastern Europeans. So, we can say that at least some degree of embeddedness of the 
public broadcasting idea is present in post-Communist societies, even if the process of it 
taking root in these societies is still only at embryonic stage. 
As we have seen in the Latvian case, it is not lack of loyalty towards the idea of public 
broadcasting (even if this loyalty is limited to merely normative statements) as rejection 
of its institutional form, the country’s public television seen as a symbol of the distrusted 
political establishment, what is at the heart of the crisis in the public television and its 
publics relationship. For this reason social embeddedness of the idea of public 
broadcasting in post-Communist societies could not be measured solely on the basis of a 
degree of support and demand for public broadcasting institutions on the part of their 
publics, the trap much of the previous research on post-Communist public broadcasting 
seems to have fallen into. Instead, we should search for different, more nuanced, ways 





beyond the usual institutional prism, the task this study I hope has made a contribution 
to. 
Likewise, widespread audience withdrawal from institutions of public television in 
societies across Central and Eastern Europe should not be automatically treated as an 
abandonment of the citizen role of post-Communist audiences. While exiting from the 
public television LTV and migrating to its commercial competitors, audiences in Latvia 
do not reject the role of a citizen, in much of the literature pronounced as the antithesis 
of the role of a consumer where public broadcasting is seen as a natural habitat for the 
former and commercial broadcasting for the latter. As the Latvian case confirms, the 
exercise of the citizen role is not necessarily linked with institutions of public 
broadcasting and as well can be realized outside these organizations, i.e., within 
commercial broadcasting. This is by no means to argue that commercial broadcasting 
can, or should, fully take over the role of public broadcasting but just to remind that the 
exercise of citizenship is not restricted to public broadcasting, reminder that seems to be 
of special importance in the case of post-Communist societies where weak public 
broadcasting institutions have become one of the idiosyncrasies of their media 
landscapes. 
Although in the post-Communist media literature it has become an axiom to speak of 
commercialized (along politicized) Central and Eastern European media systems in a 
combination of thriving spirit of consumer culture in these societies (as if in other parts 
of Europe all of these phenomena would have been less pronounced), findings of this 
research suggest that even against a backdrop of unpopular institutions of public 
broadcasting and much-loved commercial broadcasters post-Communist audiences have 
not sacrificed the citizen role for the consumer role, though, as argued throughout the 
study, the distinction between the citizen/consumer roles of audiences itself is highly 
problematic. I have argued that the citizen/consumer roles of audiences are interplaying 
instead of being clear-cut categories conflicting with each other.  
Great demand for programming pleasing popular tastes on commercial television has not 
automatically killed the exercise of citizenship of post-Communist audiences, and, as the 
Latvian case suggests it, commercial broadcasters seem to have well understood this 
mixture of the citizen/consumer identities their audiences bear in their daily viewing 
practices, and as a response commercial channels have taken over quite a bit of the 





obligations that do not conflict with their audience maximization logic. 
Many of my informants, non-loyalists of the public broadcaster LTV, exercise the role of 
citizen within their much-liked commercial channels, be it the quotidian news and weekly 
current affairs offerings of these channels or their special programming at the moments 
of national celebrations. Devotion of audiences to popular programming on these 
channels, a way to escape from the hard everyday living, does not rule out the exercise of 
citizenship (yet, this is by no means to say that only through ‘serious’ programming one 
can exercise citizenship as popular programming should not be necessarily in conflict 
with citizenship ideals). Though having exited from the public broadcaster, rejecters of 
LTV are no ‘less citizens’ as those who have remained loyal to the public television. It is 
through the national commercial channels, or, as is the case with many of my Russian-
speaking respondents, even through the localized transnational television from Russia, 
exiters from LTV take part in the life of the nation no less than loyalists of the public 
broadcaster. 
It is their more liberal understanding of citizenship mixing popular programming with 
more traditional public broadcasting services, as well as respecting ethno-linguistic 
particularities of their audiences what brings to commercial channels, both national and 
transnational competitors of LTV, those who have rejected that form of citizenship as 
offered by the public television. The market-driven approach to national imagination of 
commercial broadcasters have proved to be more successful in reflecting heterogeneity 
of their audiences and opening for them access to a space allowing the exercise of 
citizenship than the strategy of the public broadcaster imagining the national ‘we’ 
primarily in terms of the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority. It is first 
and foremost their audience maximization plans what have made commercial 
broadcasters more responsive to different taste cultures, as well as ethno-linguistic 
differences of their audiences and hence have made them more open in their definition 
of citizenship. 
The high popularity of the daily national news and weekly current affairs on the 
commercial channels signals that, while having dropped out of the national politics on 
the public broadcaster LTV, audiences have not exited from the national politics on 
television totally. Following the political news on the commercial broadcasters, even if 
their agenda is much the same as on the public television, appears to be something 





suspicion because of its perceived close ties with the powerful. 
Similarly, what may look as immersion of Russian-speaking audiences in transnational 
Russian television is not evidence of their denial of citizenship. Their, if not civic then 
cultural, attachment to Russia does not rule out their allegiance to Latvia, and in a similar 
vein their interest in the life in Russia does not make them indifferent to the national life 
of Latvia. It is through their much-loved Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, pan-Baltic version of 
Russian state channel Pervyi kanal along the news from Russia offering also national news 
squeezed in-between grand scale Russian-origin entertainment, they learn about the 
national politics. The choice of Russian-speaking audiences to watch national news in 
their own language does not make them ‘less citizens’ than Latvian-speakers. Watching 
national news on transnational Russian-language Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal they participate in 
the life of the nation no less than Latvian-speakers watching the news on their favourite 
national channels broadcasting in Latvian. For those who feel left out from the public 
sphere of public (national) broadcasting transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal offers 
alternative, and at some points also oppositional, public sphere to exercise the role of a 
citizen, to use terminology of Hall’s encoding-decoding model (Hall, 1980).   
Though Russian-speakers have rejected terms and conditions of the exercise of 
citizenship as set by the Latvian political elite requiring them to leave their differences 
behind, they have not abandoned part-taking in the life of the nation as such. Instead, 
they have chosen their own strategy on how to exercise citizenship. In other words, they 
have chosen to be citizens in their own way – namely, within Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal, a 
mixture of transnational and national broadcasting, seen as better at addressing 
particularities of the Russian-speaking minority, and its transnational affiliations in 
particular, than national channels, let alone the public television LTV – and not as 
prescribed to them by the ruling politicians.   
The preference of Russian-speaking viewers for Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal is another telling 
instance of viewing choices providing audiences with voice. Apart from watching 
transnational Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal to challenge the hegemonic vision of the national ‘we’ 
of public (national) broadcasting, it is through their high interest in national news on 
Pervyi Baltiiskii kanal Russophone audiences also articulate their civic belonging to the 
national community in the same way as Latvian-speakers do it watching the news on the 
national channels suggesting that there is a potential for a conception of the national ‘we’ 





neglected by the Latvian nation-builders, local politicians. 
However some scholars would like to idealize public broadcasting institutions as an 
embodiment of a modern national Habermasian-style public sphere, or at least having 
such potential (see writings of Dahlgren, Garnham, Splichal, Scannell), this study clearly 
demonstrates that, though the nation may momentarily gather around the public 
broadcaster, apart from those rare moments there is no such thing as one unitary 
national public sphere as there is no one unproblematic national ‘we’. The study invites 
us instead of thinking of imagined (and, as the history of Western European public 
broadcasting shows it, often also imposed) homogeneity of the single unitary public 
sphere of the nation to focus on heterogeneity of several diverse ‘public spaces’ (Melucci, 
1989) or ‘public sphericules’ (Cunningham, 2001, Cunningham, Sinclair, 2001) interacting 
with each other.  
It is some products of popular culture for what there is no ‘ready alternative’ 
(Hirschman, 1970) on the commercial channels what today bring the nation together 
around the Latvian public television and offer imaginary connections between 
geographically dispersed members of the national communion. Yet, as soon as either the 
live televised ice hockey match with the national team playing or the Eurovision Song 
Contest final with the Latvian entry competing with representatives of other nations – 
those moments when non-loyal publics of LTV, including Russian-speaking viewers who 
otherwise do not feel being invited to share common national home as constituted by 
LTV, re-enter the public television – are over, audiences split into a number of public 
spaces/sphericules. 
It is within these various, and at times also competing, public spaces/sphericules, and not 
necessarily within any all-encompassing public sphere of the nation as advocates of the 
public broadcasting idea would like to claim idealizing public broadcasting as a conveyor 
of a shared national culture, audiences participate in the life of the nation day in day out, 
and it is participation within these public spaces/sphericules what turns them into 
citizens of the national community. It is within this multiplicity of public 
spaces/sphericules – with the public sphere of public (national) broadcasting being just 
one among many others – quotidian citizenship is exercised, and it should not be 
necessarily conceived as a threat to national integrity. Different public spaces/sphericules 





As we have learned from the Latvian case, these different public spaces/sphericules are 
not completely isolated and do meet at some points. Though coexistence of the Latvian-
language and Russian-language media sub-systems have often been seen by local political 
elite, media policy makers and also academics as threatening national integration, and 
even national security, ideals, the findings of this study show that, while the language 
divides Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking audiences in their viewing choices, it is 
their interest in the national life they have in common. In fact, the agenda of the Latvian-
language and Russian-language news media is much the same and what may differ is their 
interpretation of a number of those issues that also divide both ethno-linguistic groups. 
Even during the aforementioned what may at first appear to be true moments of national 
unity of watching live ice hockey matches or the annual Eurovision Song Contest, we should 
be careful not to mix the fact of togetherness with the fact of unity. As we have seen 
from the accounts of my respondents, though the mass ceremony of television viewing, 
to paraphrase Anderson (2006), may offer its audiences an access to ‘a shared public life’ 
(Scannell, 1989:164), coming together of the nation’s members around television should 
not necessarily create unproblematic national ‘we’ acceptable to all members of the 
nation. As Billig rightly reminds us, an imagined community is not necessarily imagined 
as ‘a harmonious unity’ (1992:171). As evidence in this study suggests, public 
broadcasting may be as much uniting as divisive force in nation-building aspirations. 
8.2 Originality of the Study 
Instead of traditional institutional and political economy perspectives on the public 
service broadcasting systems in post-Communist societies across Central and Eastern 
Europe this study takes a novel approach focusing on the investigation of the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics. With a reference to the 
spheres of politics and economics hitherto transformations of broadcasting systems in 
the region following the fall of the Communist regimes have mainly been explained as 
institutional reformations – from state broadcasters to public broadcasters (see, inter alia, 
Gross, 2002, Jakubowicz, 1996, 2007a, Sparks with Reading, 1998), paying less attention 
to the examination of the socio-cultural factors accompanying this process.  
Through qualitative audience research everyday television viewing practices are placed at 
the heart of this study, yet not ignoring macro-level political and economic aspects 





different publics towards the Latvian public television as a nation-building resource the 
study is primarily interested in thus shifting the focus away from researching institutions 
of post-Communist public broadcasting to investigating their publics. In the current 
scholarship on public broadcasting in post-Communist countries so far much has been 
said about publics of public broadcasting organizations in these societies without actually 
speaking with them. This study has aimed to fill this gap by providing publics with voice.  
Although with a reference to poor audience figures of public broadcasters in the region a 
number of previous research papers on post-Communist public broadcasting have 
pointed to the low levels of public support and demand for these organizations, little has 
been done to understand reasons standing behind this pattern with a help of qualitative 
audience research tradition. To my best knowledge, this is the first study employing 
ethnographic perspective to investigate publics of post-Communist public broadcasting. 
Such approach has made it possible to examine broadcasting reformations, and overall 
post-Communist transformations, as perceived and experienced on the individual level, 
so far predominantly investigated as macro-level phenomena. 
Establishing a link between the troubled project of nation formation in Latvia and 
equally tangled reformation, even if only formal, of its ex-Soviet state television into a 
Western-style public broadcaster, the study has invited to see similar broadcasting 
restructuring experiences in other Central and Eastern European countries within a wider 
context of societal post-Communist transformations. Focusing on the exploration of 
intersections of the broadcasting reform and the nation-forming process, the study has 
thus demonstrated that the investigation of popular sentiments and values, everyday life 
experiences, collective and individual identity formation processes is as vital as the 
analysis of macro(system)-level political and economic factors for understanding post-
Communist (media) transformations. 
The study also makes a contribution to the field of qualitative audience research by 
applying for the first time Hirschman’s influential theory of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ 
(Hirschman, 1970) for the purposes of the examination of responses of publics of the 
public television. The utilization of Hirschman’s concepts has allowed seeing viewing 
choices audiences make in their day-to-day viewing practices as an act of agency. 
Choosing to watch commercial channels instead of public, transnational broadcasters 
instead of national is an exercise of agency. As noted earlier, it is viewing choices 





of the Latvian-speaking majority and the Russian-speaking minority publics towards the 
country’s public television, it is a political statement members of both ethno-linguistic 
groups make through their viewing choices, namely through their rejection of the public 
television.  
Providing links between the spheres of politics (citizenship/voice) and economics 
(market/exit) Hirschman’s approach has also made it possible to treat the 
citizen/consumer roles of audiences as interplaying instead of being in tension with each 
other. As it has been demonstrated throughout the study, audiences use voice 
(protesting) through consumption (making viewing choices). To separate both roles of 
audiences is to create artificial and simplistic distinctions that collapse as soon as 
confronted with empirical reality. As experiences of my respondents suggest, what may at 
first sight look as employment of the consumer exit (migration from the deteriorating 
institution of public television to its national and transnational commercial rivals in 
search for better products and services) is in fact an exercise of the citizen voice (uttering 
of protest). In other words, what we have learned from the Latvian case is that the act of 
exiting as exercised by television audiences of both the ethno-linguistic majority and 
minority should be seen at the same time as a voice-type reaction. When rejecters of the 
public television vote with their feet by leaving it, they speak out at the same time, even if 
their exodus in the vast majority of cases is silent and private. 
As we have learned from the Latvian experience, ‘desertion’ from public television is a 
signal of discontent its publics send. What is more, it is not merely a rejection of the 
public broadcasting organization as such that they register through their exit from it 
(although they are highly critical about its performance), but, what is more important, it 
is a rejection of public television as an institution, which for them is a symbol of the 
power elite discourse. In other words, their protest against public television is at the same 
time a denunciation of the political establishment they associate this organization with. In 
the case of the ethno-linguistic minority audiences it is also an objection to the 
government’s hegemonic conception of the national ‘we’ what they articulate through 
their rejection of the public television. 
The experiences of my informants have demonstrated that the employment of the exit 
mechanism does not rule out the realization of the voice option. Instead of being 
mutually exclusive the exit/voice reaction mechanisms of audiences, like their roles of 





8.3 Limitations of the Study and Its Possible Future Developments  
The study opens up new agendas for future research into post-Communist public 
broadcasting. One possible direction for further research is thorough elaboration of the 
concept of ‘loyalty’, ‘a key concept in the battle between exit and voice’, as Hirschman 
has argued (1970:82), within the context of the relationship between public broadcasters 
and their publics. Though this study has provided some revealing insights into the 
relationship between the way we define ‘loyalty’ towards public (national) broadcasting 
(proposing to distinguish loyalty towards institutions of public broadcasting from loyalty 
towards the public broadcasting values and suggesting that at least when it comes to 
post-Communist societies they do not necessarily overlap) and different, and also 
contending, definitions we have of that ‘special attachment’ (Hirschman, 1970) to the 
nation we call ‘national loyalty’, and yet it remains the task of future research to provide 
more nuanced conceptualization of the way how the notion of ‘loyalty’ operates in the 
relationship between public broadcasters and their publics within and beyond the post-
Communist world, though no easy task given the intrinsically vague nature of the 
concept of ‘loyalty’ itself. 
Nevertheless, what we have learned from the Latvian case is that meaning of the concept 
of ‘loyalty’ has to be conceived as the outcome of social, political and historical contexts, 
and if we wish to understand the role of public broadcasting as a resource of nation 
formation it is of utmost importance to address the questions on who and how defines 
loyalty towards public (national) broadcasting and, equally important, how and by whom 
loyalty towards the nation is defined. 
There is also a need for more extensive comparative work to be done in the future to 
establish to what extent broadcasting reformation/nation formation intersections as 
witnessed in the Latvian case parallel those of other new post-Communist nation-states 
in Central and Eastern Europe in their nation-building aspirations and attempts to turn 
former state radio and television organizations into Western-like public broadcasters. It is 
equally important to search for points of comparison not only within post-Communist 
countries but also vis-à-vis Western European societies. As we have seen, the Latvian 
experiences have commonalities and particularities with other cases as much as within as 
beyond the post-Communist world. This study provides a good point of departure for 





It is also crucial to expand the scope of the investigation in future studies on media and 
national imagination in post-Communist societies addressing in more detail experiences 
audiences have with other types of media apart from the exploration of their television 
viewing practices to what I have concentrated on here. Particular attention should be 
paid to the investigation of online media practices given the increasingly prominent role 
they play in the everyday lives of many. It is the centrality of television as a medium in 
Latvian society that has informed my decision to pay more attention to the examination 
of television audiences; it is television a key site for the media consumption in Latvian 
households. Yet, as ethnographic perspective allows for a broader approach to the 
analysis of media practices, the exploration of radio, print and online media consumption 
could not be ignored in the present study and where relevant was incorporated in the 
overall analysis. 
As it has become clear throughout the study, much of today’s relationship between the 
public broadcaster LTV and its publics continues to be shaped by the Soviet legacies. 
Even more than 20 years since the disintegration of the Soviet Union patterns of media 
production and consumption inherited from the Soviet past are still much alive. 
Therefore, through a combination of archival research and oral history approach, the 
relationship between broadcasters and their publics under the Communist rule in Latvia, 
as well as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, needs further investigation. Such 
historical research would also allow expanding the utilization of Hirschman’s theory 
situating the concepts of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ against a backdrop of totalitarian system 
of media and politics. 
These are some potential directions for future research into post-Communist public 
broadcasting. I hope that my own study has shed some light on the tangled relationship 
between public broadcasters and their publics in former Communist bloc countries 
across Central and Eastern Europe, something that have been overlooked by the 
previous research into public broadcasting in this part of Europe. I have argued that to 
understand post-Communist public broadcasting in its complexity the study of 









The Composition of the Focus Groups 
Pilot focus group 1 (PFG1) taking place in Riga on August 30, 2011:  
24-year-old police officer Lana, female, Russian-speaker, 
29-year-old organizer of children festivities Alina, female, Russian-speaker,  
87-year-old retired woman Antonija, Latvian-speaker,  
57-year-old radiologist assistant Veronika, female, Latvian-speaker,  
53-year-old human resources manager in the state institution Zita, female, Latvian-
speaker. 
Pilot focus group 2 (PFG2) taking place in Valmiera on September 19, 2011: 
20-year-old student Emīls, male, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Matīss, male, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Oskars, male, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Roberts, male, Latvian-speaker, 
21-year-old student Krista, female, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Lauma, female, Latvian-speaker, 
19-year-old student Rūta, female, Latvian-speaker.  
Pilot focus group 3 (PFG3) taking place in Valmiera on October 3, 2011:  
55-year-old unemployed woman Lilita, Latvian-speaker,  
49-year-old factory worker Sandra, female, Latvian-speaker, 





39-year-old teaching assistant Gunta, female, Latvian-speaker.  
Focus group 1 (FG1) taking place in Riga on October 10, 2011: 
24-year-old student Mārtiņš, male, Latvian-speaker,  
24-year-old student Toms, male, Latvian-speaker, 
23-year-old student Sanita, female, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Zane, female, Latvian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Madara, female, Latvian-speaker. 
Focus group 2 (FG2) taking place in Riga on October 13, 2011: 
20-year-old student Ilya, male, Russian-speaker,  
22-year-old student Arina, female, Russian-speaker, 
19-year-old student Kiril, male, Russian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Dmitry, male, Russian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Sofia, female, Russian-speaker, 
20-year-old student Nikita, male, Russian-speaker.  
Focus group 3 (FG3) taking place in Riga on October 17, 2011: 
32-year-old manager at the retail company Vita, female, Latvian-speaker,  
43-year-old director of the animal shelter Daina, female, Latvian-speaker, 
27-year-old worker at the supermarket Jānis, male, Latvian-speaker, 
27-year-old legal adviser working in the public sector Ieva, female, Latvian-speaker, 
37-year-old economist at the state institution Solveiga, female, Latvian-speaker, 
51-year-old project manager at a state institution Dagmāra, female, Latvian-speaker.  





32-year-old man working at his own construction company Vyacheslav, Russian-speaker,  
29-year-old manager working at the bank Anastasia, female, Russian-speaker, 
48-year-old deputy school director Boris, male, Russian-speaker, 
52-year-old senior accountant working at the ministry Irina, female, Russian-speaker,  
37-year-old man working at the travel agency Vadim, Russian-speaker,  
31-year-old woman working at the children and youth centre Olga, Russian-speaker,  
26-year-old medical student Vladislav, male, Russian-speaker.   
Focus group 5 (FG5) taking place in Riga on October 21, 2011: 
84-year-old retired woman Laimdota, Latvian-speaker,   
59-year-old manager at the transport company Ingūna, female, Latvian-speaker,  
62-year-old doctor Mirdza, female, Latvian-speaker, 
56-year-old archivist at the municipality institution Inese, female, Latvian-speaker,  
62-year-old retired woman Brigita, Latvian-speaker, 
83-year-old retired woman Gerda, Latvian-speaker, 
66-year-old retired woman Ausma, Latvian-speaker.  
Focus group 6 (FG6) taking place in Riga on October 22, 2011: 
62-year-old retired man Nikolai, Russian-speaker, 
67-year-old retired woman Larisa, Russian-speaker, 
76-year-old retired woman Valentina, Russian-speaker, 
61-year-old woman working with children at the school amateur theatre Tatyana, 
Russian-speaker, 





73-year-old retired man Vladimir, Russian-speaker.  
Focus group 7 (FG7) taking place in Daugavpils on October 28, 2011: 
36-year-old municipality officer Mikhail, male, Russian-speaker,  
37-year-old deputy school director Silvija, female, Latvian-speaker,  
23-year-old businessman Anton, male, Russian-speaker,  
25-year-old municipality officer Elizaveta, female, Russian-speaker,  
45-year-old unemployed woman Elena, Russian-speaker,  
55-year-old school teacher Galina, female, Russian-speaker.  
Focus group 8 (FG8) taking place in Vilani on October 29, 2011: 
18-year-old secondary school student Kristina, female, Russian-speaker,  
39-year-old school teacher Inna, female, Russian-speaker,  
57-year-old agronomist Ludmila, female, Russian-speaker,  
33-year-old real estate specialist working at the local municipality Svetlana, female, 
Russian-speaker,  
35-year-old head of the local registry office Ilona, female, Russian-speaker,  
48-year-old municipality IT officer Viktor, male, Russian-speaker,  
30-year-old worker at the railway company Sergei, male, Russian-speaker.   
Focus group 9 (FG9) taking place in Talsi on November 3, 2011: 
68-year-old retired woman Ilga, Latvian-speaker,  
45-year-old farmer Edgars, male, Latvian-speaker, 
55-year-old agronomist Ināra, female, Latvian-speaker, 





31-year-old civil servant Agita, female, Latvian-speaker, 
58-year-old school teacher Nellija, female, Latvian-speaker, 
57-year-old chief specialist at the local museum Inta, female, Latvian-speaker.   
Focus group 10 (FG10) taking place in Tirza on November 5, 2011: 
28-year-old autograder driver Māris, male, Latvian-speaker,    
27-year-old secretary working at the local municipality Līga, female, Latvian-speaker,  
47-year-old specialist working at the local culture house Anda, female, Latvian-speaker,  
39-year-old unemployed man Arnis, Latvian-speaker,  
61-year-old head of the local culture house Rasma, female, Latvian-speaker,  
56-year-old farmer Dzintra, female, Latvian-speaker,  















The Family Profiles  
Family 1 (F1) 
Russian-speakers, 55-year old hospital administrator Anna and her husband 57-year-old 
unemployed Igor, live in a five-storey 1985 standard Soviet era block of flats in the 
capital Riga. As the period of observations coincided with the time when their daughter, 
27-year-old shop assistant Marina, with her family was searching for a new apartment, 
she and her 4-year-old daughter Yuliya were living with Anna and Igor, while the mother 
of Anna, 81-year-old retired Jadviga, often came around to look after Yuliya. During 
some of the visits their oldest daughter, 32-year-old Mariya, with her daughter, 2-year-
old Evelina, was also present. Although Mariya, as many other economic migrants from 
Latvia, with her family today lives in the United Kingdom, she, from time to time, visits 
her relatives in Latvia. They also have a 35-year-old son, Stanislav who with his family 
lives in Riga separately from his parents. All members of the family are born in Latvia 
and all are also citizens of Latvia with the exception of Igor. He was born in Russia, and 
at the age of 17 early 1970s came to Latvia to study in Riga Industrial Polytechnical 
College, after that worked at the factory in Riga, got married here and stayed for living. 
The current status of Igor is a non-citizen of Latvia meaning that he is neither a citizen 
of Latvia nor any other country. Igor is also the only Orthodox believer in the family, all 
the rest are Catholics. Although they all, except Igor, have a good command of Latvian, 
it is predominantly Russian they use at home. Mainly Russian-speakers constitute their 
circle of friends; also their three children are all married to Russian-speakers. Anna with 
her mother, who is of Polish origin, apart from Latvian often speaks also in Polish. 
Though Anna comes from an ethnically mixed family with her mother being an ethnic 
Pole and father an ethnic Latvian, she thinks of herself as ethnic Latvian. ‘I have lived in 
Latvia all my life’, she explained. Despite not being Russian-speakers, Anna’s parents 
decided to send her to a school with Russian as the language of instruction hoping that 
the knowledge of Russian will help their daughter in her future studies and career; this is 
the reason why Anna, alongside Latvian, has also a perfect command of Russian. 
Family 2 (F2)  





archive along her husband, 59-year-old engineer Heinrihs, and their two daughters, 19-
year-old student Liene and 26-year-old civil servant working at the ministry Dace, lives 
also Māra’s mother, 81-year-old retired Broņislava. They live in the capital Riga and have 
an apartment in a nine-storey standard Soviet era block of flats. All around their late 
1980s block of flats stretches mass of identical grey and shabby massive blocks of flats, 
also built in the 1980s. While main language in the family is Latvian, they also use 
Russian as Heinrihs is a Russian-speaker of German origin. Heinrihs came to Latvia to 
study in Riga Polytechnical Institute early 1970s from Kazakhstan, then one of the 
republics of the Soviet Union, where he was born after his parents, German emigrants, 
were deported there from Ukraine in the early 1940s as part of Stalinist mass 
deportations. Having finished his studies Heinrihs got a job in Latvia, met Māra and 
settled there. Today they regularly visit relatives of Heinrihs in Germany with whom he 
speaks in German. Their oldest daughter Dace thinks of herself as ethnic German, while 
the youngest daughter Liene identified herself as ethnic Latvian. ‘The oldest one is her 
father’s daughter but the youngest – my daughter,’ Māra explained in jest. All members 
of the family are citizens of Latvia with Heinrihs obtaining citizenship by naturalization 
in the 1990s as soon as the naturalization process began. 
Family 3 (F3)  
The large Latvian-speaking family of 51-year-old dairy farmer Sarmīte lives in the 
countryside in western Latvia where they have a farmstead with two dwelling houses. 
Along dairy farming they also have a livestock farming business, both started early 1990s 
shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Together with Sarmīte and her husband, 
51-year-old farmer Tālis, live also Sarmīte’s parents, 78-year-old retired Lidija and 80-
year-old retired Zigurds, and both of Sarmīte’s grown-up children with their families. 
Sarmīte’s daughter Marta, 30-year-old manager of debtors, lives together with her 
partner, 32-year-old construction worker Intars, and their 4-year-old daughter Elīza. 
Sarmīte’s son Gatis, a 28-year-old farmer, is married to 27-year-old accountant Ilze, both 
have 3-year-old daughter Klaudija. They all think of themselves as ethnic Latvians, use 
Latvian at home and all are citizens of Latvia. During the fieldwork period Zigurds 
passed away and shortly after also Lidija died while Marta gave birth to a baby boy. 
Family 4 (F4) 





39-year-old head of a non-governmental organization, coming from a provincial town in 
northern Latvia comprises their three children, 20-year-old unemployed son Mārcis and 
15-year-old twins, daughter Sabīne and son Gusts, attending school, as well as Edmunds’ 
parents, 66-year-old retired music teacher Bruno and 67-year-old retired telephone 
operator Ligita. They have a two-storey private house that during the Soviet period was 
turned into an apartment house and that the family of Edmunds regained as their 
property through the process of denationalization early 1990s after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. They all have identified themselves as ethnic Latvians, they use Latvian at 
home and have Latvian citizenship. During the period of observations Laima’s father, 
not living together with them, passed away. 
Family 5 (F5) 
The Russian-speaking family of retired school teacher Nadezhda, aged 68, lives in a 
village in the eastern region of Latgale around 30-40 kilometres from the Russian border. 
The majority of the population of the Latgale region are Russian-speakers. In their Soviet 
era three-storey block of flats, built in the mid of 1970s, Nadezhda lives together with 
her daughter, 39-year-old school teacher Diana, and Diana’s husband, 37-year-old Andrei 
who works as a football coach at the same school, and their 10-year-old daughter 
Aleksandra. In the same local school where Diana and Andrei work and where also their 
daughter studies, Nadezhda taught Russian-language to children studying in Latvian for 
many years starting from the early 1960s. Nadezhda’s oldest daughter, 48-year-old 
Ekaterina, with her family lives in the United Kingdom where they moved a few years 
ago when because of the economic downturn Ekaterina lost her job in Latvia. 
Nadezhda’s husband died several years ago. At home they all, Nadezhda, Diana, Andrei 
and Aleksandra, speak only in Russian, albeit their proficiency in Latvian is good. It is 
little Aleksandra who is fluent in both Latvian and Russian as she studies in Latvian at 
school and has also Latvian-speaking friends. They think of themselves as ethnic 
Russians. All four are citizens of Latvia. As Nadezhda’s family has been living in Latvia 
for five generations – her grandfather was born in Latgale in 1866 when it was part of 
the Vitebsk Province of the Russian Empire, Nadezhda and both her daughters had no 
problems receiving citizenship automatically in the early 1990s. Andrei acquired 
citizenship by naturalization only in 2006. When asked why he did not obtain citizenship 
earlier, he said, ‘on principle’. He did not have problems passing the Latvian language 





parents, Andrei was also born in Latvia but, nevertheless, did not receive citizenship 
automatically. As he says, it was because one of his grandmothers was not a citizen of 
Latvia in 1940 when the Soviets occupied Latvia – she came to Latvia from Russia 






















The Focus Group Interview Guide 
Introduction 
Participants were first asked to sign an informed consent form and fill in a questionnaire 
indicating basic socio-demographic information about them: name, family name, age, 
place of living, the region in Latvia they come from, ethnic origin, citizenship, language 
used in the family, educational background, occupation and household income. To kick 
off, moderator outlined aims of the research, explained how the discussion will be 
organized encouraging all participants to actively participate in it and also provided 
information on how data will be later utilized in the final report of the study. Moderator 
then introduced himself and asked participants to do the same saying their name and 
occupation.    
Key topics 
1. Viewing habits  
Stimulus material: Participants were asked to make a list of their five most 
loved shows on television, including those they watch on the internet, 
and discuss their choice. 
What makes you interested in the programmes you have included in the list? 
 
2. TV channels  
Stimulus material: Respondents were asked to provide their associations 
with the main six television channels in Latvia writing down few 
keywords that first spring to their mind when thinking about the 
particular channel, and later they were invited to discuss it.  
Which two channels from the list you watch more often than others? 
Were there any channels you struggled with when thinking of associations you 
have with them?  
 
3. Definitions of public television  
Stimulus material: Participants were invited to write a small essay offering 





of the essay being formulated as follows: ‘what do you think the idea of 
public service television is (or should be) about?’, and later they were 
asked to discuss the answers they have provided. 
Are you familiar with the term ‘public service television’? Have you heard about 
it earlier and, if so, in what context? 
Is there public service television in Latvia? Are there any particular channel or 
channels of which you think as public service channels?  
 
4. Latvian Television   
Do you remember the last time you watched LTV1 or LTV7, the second channel 
of LTV? If so, what was the programme you watched?  
What makes you (not) interested in LTV? 
Is there anyone in your family who watches LTV regularly? 
What makes, if something at all, LTV different from other channels? 
Would you be ready to pay a licence fee for LTV, if introduced? 
Would you miss LTV, if it ceased to exist? 
Is it important to have such a television as LTV? 
Stimulus material: Participants were asked to provide their associations 
with Panorāma (Panorama), main prime-time news bulletin on LTV1, while 
watching a short clip from the latest edition of Panorāma, and after that 
they were invited to discuss their responses to Panorāma.  
What makes, if something at all, Panorāma different from other evening news 
programmes on television? 
On which channel(s) do you usually watch the evening news, if at all? 
What are your key sources of news, if to choose from the various offerings of 
radio and television, print and online media. Or maybe is your key news source 
word-of-mouth?   
What makes you (not) interested in Panorāma? 
Roundup   
The moderator made a summary of the key viewpoints expressed during the discussion 































Stimulus Material 1 








































Stimulus Material 2 


































Stimulus Material 3 

































Stimulus Material 4 


































Stimulus Material 5 
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